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PREFACE
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was the first avowedly anti-imperialist revolution. The
Communist International, subsequently launched by Lenin in Moscow in 1919, took as its
rationale his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916) - a work which made
the future of socialism dependent on the contradictions of the imperialist epoch.
Theoretically, the Communist movement placed anti-colonialism at the centre of working-
class politics in Europe and in doing so, assisted the process by which socialist culture
permeated all the major anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements.
Goran Therborn observes that: 'This holds for the Indian Congress Party - the pioneering
nationalist organisation of the whole colonial zone from Northwest Africa to the
archipelagoes of the South Sea - the ANC, the Indonesian nationalist movement, Pan-
Africanism and Pan-Arabism. Socialist anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were even
more central to the major Asian Communist movements - the ultimately defeated ones
such as the Filipino, Malayan, and the Indonesian, as well as the victorious ones: the
Chinese, the North Korean, the Indochinese. . . In addition a culture of socialist rhetoric
has been cultivated by a large number of post-colonial non-Communist regimes, from
Sukarno's Indonesia, the early days of independent Singapore, Burmese socialism, and that
of the Nehru dynasty in India, to the Islamic, Arab and African socialisrns further west. . .
In the colonising world only Communists and left-wing socialists stood for universalist,
non-racist conceptions of equality, and offered solidarity to the nationalist movements of
the colonial zone.1
Over the years Communist states offered material support to such movements and from
the very first years of the Bolshevik state a model of independent development existed to
1 G. Therborn, 'The Life and Times of Socialism, in New Left Review, 192, July-August 1992, pp.19-
20.
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attract the leaders of nationalist opinion in the colonies. The inspiration of the Soviet
Republic and the aid it dispensed to colonial nationalists and socialists cannot be denied.
But none of this detracts from the importance of the active ways in which the Communists
sought to inform, organise, and mobilise anti-imperialist forces in both the colonies and the
metropolitan centres. This was a task which the Communist International (Comintern)
particularly entrusted to those Communist Parties located at the heart of the great
European empires of the twentieth century. This thesis is an investigation into the anti-
colonial work of one of them - the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) - a relatively
small organisation operating within the biggest of all the imperialist systems.
Although relatively little has been written on this subject, it was clear from the beginning
of this enquiry that the breadth of the subject matter was beyond the scope of a doctoral
thesis unless it could be focused on a particular period and by reference to specific British
dependencies. I have chosen to focus on the CPGB's efforts in the period 1920-1951.
This period begins with the foundation of the CPGB and is bounded at the end by the
termination of the first majority Labour Government - an administration which presided
over decolonisation in India, Ceylon, and Burma, but also entertained (and to some extent
excused) grandiose plans for colonial development. The year 1951 was also something of
a turning-point in the history of the CPGB, in that the Party adopted a new parliamentarist
orientation in its programme The British Road to Socialism which it adopted that year. As
we shall see the British Road also marked a break with the CPGB's earlier views on the
future of the British Empire.
This thesis is restricted in scope, as well as time. The British Empire covered one-quarter
of the globe and embraced territories of many varied types. It was not possible to examine
what the CPGB had to say about all of them. Instead I have chosen to focus on the Indian
subcontinent and, to a lesser extent,sub-Saharan Africa. These parts of the British colonial
system mark extremes of development and underdevelopment in terms of the strength of
indigenous nationalist and left-wing forces in the period under review. How did the CPGB
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set about making political interventions within and behalf of, these distant, complex and
diverse British dependencies? To what extent were the Party's colonial priorities externally
or internally determined? Did it act as a cypher of the Comintern or develop a degree of
autonomy in the conduct of its colonial work? Did it have any practical impact in the
territories it sought to reach? Were the Communists able to find allies in Britain and find
ways of bringing colonial issues to public attention? Was the CPGB handicapped by
racism within its own ranks, as has recently been suggested? 2 These are some of the
questions guiding the present enquiry.
Two bodies of work which do address this particular historiography are Stephen Howe's
Anti-Colonialism in British Politics3 (1993) and A.J. McKenzie's British Marxists and the
Empire4 (1978). However, Howe's study sets the subject of the practical anti-colonial
activities of British Communists and their allies in a wider context and as a consequence
the discussion of these specific themes tends to lack depth, while McKenzie's thesis was
written prior to developments which have both expedited and expanded the scope of
research in this area.
The Museum of Labour History in Manchester (MLH) has recently obtained from the
Moscow archives minutes of the CPGB's Central and Political Committee meetings for the
1930s for example, which offer fresh insights into the nature of the Party's anti-colonial
responsibilities and the relationship between the Comintern and the colonies. Published
research on the British Communist Party has not yet made full use of this archive which
was wholly closed until 1989. In addition, the archives of the GPGB, previously held in
much disorder at Communist Party premises in London, have been transferred to the
MLH, where the material has been sorted and catalogued, thus making it far more
2 M. Sherwood. 'The Comintern, the CPGB. Colonies. and Black Britons'. in Science and Society. 60. 2.
Summer 1996, pp.137-163.
3 Stephen Howe. Anti-Colonialism in British Politics. Oxford. 1993.
4 A.J. McKenzie, British Marxists and the Empire. unpublished PhD. University- of London. 1978.
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accessible to researchers. Here, the papers of leading Party figures such as Ben Bradley
and Rajani Palme Dutt and the International Department files were of particular value.
Professor Eric Hobsbawm recently pointed out that there are aspects of the CPGB's anti-
colonial work on which primary research has not been conducted' and this study attempts
to make a contribution to this neglected area by accessing archive material which was
closed to earlier researchers and by bringing together both original and existing research
on the connections between Communists and the network of peripheral anti-colonial
groups and activists operating in Britain during the period under review. Information from
the Public Records Office offers some insight into the British Government's approach to
Arican nationalists and their communist allies in the conditions which prevailed after 1945
as well as the true extent of Communist advance in sub-Saharan Africa.




When the Third (Communist) International was founded in March 1919, its Bolshevik
architects were determined to ensure that it would not share the fate of the Second
International, which was allegedly destroyed by the separate nationalist priorities of its
members, but that it would endure to provide the potent guiding force behind the
international proletarian revolution. At this time, Soviet Russia was the sole existing
workers' state and as such was simultaneously prototype and example, claiming the
unqualified support and protection of the international workers' movement. Consequently,
as prospects of a wider revolution in Europe faded and the Soviet state struggled to
survive in a hostile environment, the contortions of its national policies were increasingly
reflected in the policies of the Comintern, giving rise to a history of inconsistency and
vacillation.
As the revolutionary focus shifted from Europe to the subject peoples of the European
colonies and their struggles for self-determination, both as a means of destroying existing
empires and overthrowing the leading capitalist states, Britain was identified as both the
principal foe of Soviet Russia' and the leading imperialist power. 2 As such, the country
I Following the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918 - an accomodation with Germany
which enabled Soviet Russia to withdraw from the war - Britain became the leading player in actions against
the Soviet state. The negotiation of a separate peace was portrayed as an act of betrayal by the Allies,
despite earlier warnings by Soviet officials that the fledgling state was in peril from the advancing German
army (John Callaghan, Socialism in Britain since 1884, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p.93) and Lenin's
stated willingness to 'Accept arms from the Imperialist bandits' for its defence. ( See Victor Serge,From
Lenin to Stalin, Anchor Foundation Inc., New York, 1987, p.31.) The new regime found itself literally
under siege - during the ensuing naval blockade, not only ships carrying war materials to the Bolshevik
troops were turned back, but also vessels containing food. (CAB 23/18, Cabinet 8 (19), Conclusions of a
Cabinet Meeting held on 20-11-1919, p.5'7, Cabinet Papers (in Volumes), Public Records Office, (P.R.0.)
Britain's core role in the anti-Soviet campaign was admitted during a Cabinet Conference in January 1920,
when it was minuted that 'we had certainly done our best to estrange the Bolsheviks who had greater reason
to hate us than any other power'. CAB 23/19, Conclusions of a Cabinet Conference, held on 5-1-20,
Cabinet Papers (in Volumes), p.19, (PRO)
2 There were real fears among British ministers that the Bolsheviks would find common cause with
nationalists in Egypt Turkey and, ultimately, India. In Turkey, where a nationalist movement led by
Mustapha Kemal was gaining support, 'Britain's commercial interests had been nearly twice those of any
other power', (CAB 23/19, Conclusions of a Cabinet Conference, op.cit., p.16.) whilst India was, of course,
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became a primary target for the Comintern's attentions and the British Communist Party -
despite its small membership and the fact that it was consistently overshadowed by the
eminently more powerful Labour Party - was called upon to play a leading role in the
encouragement and support of colonial liberation movements within the British Empire.
Radical Dissent From Imperialism
Before examining the impact which developments in Soviet Russia had upon the course
of anti-colonial politics in Britain, it is necessary to set the context by referring to existing
currents of anti-imperialist thought from which the British left's understanding of
imperialism first derived. A tradition of anti-imperialist sentiment stretches back as far as
the English Revolution, when the Levellers opposed Cromwell's brutal subjugation of
Ireland,3 and runs through the work of campaigners such as Tom Paine, 4 the slave trade
abolitionists and the Chartist leader, Ernest Jones, who expressed his support of the 1857
Indian Mutiny.5 It was a sentiment which also flourished within branches of British
Liberal thought, where its most notable exponents were the anti-Corn Law campaigners,
Richard Cobden and John Bright - but the evolution of opposition to empire was
fragmentary, springing from a range of diverse and often conflicting viewpoints.
The Cobdenite-Radical tradition itself covered various strands of argument. In line with
the laissez-faire economic theories of Adam Smith, 6 the colonial system was attacked for
the 'Jewel in the Crown'. A Cabinet Conference held in January 1920, concluded that, 'Every day they (the
Bolsheviks) were making great strides towards the East. . . They were carrying out a regular, scientific, and
comprehensive scheme of propaganda in Central As ia against the British'. (Ibid, p.11.)
3 Fenner Brockway, The Colonial Revolution, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, London, 1973, p.21. The
Levellers' opposition was encapsulated in the proposition; 'How can the conquered be accounted rebels, if at
any time they seek to free themselves and recover their own?' Quoted in Tony Gilbert,The Movement for
Colonial Freedom, draft document, 'Liberation,' London, n/d.
4 Paine campaigned in support of the American colonists' fight for freedom.
5 Jones wrote of the Mutiny that, 'It is one of the most just, noble, and necessary ever attempted in the
history of the world.' Quoted in John Saville, Ernest Jones, Chartist, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1952,
p.219.
6 Under the old Mercantile system, trade was seen as an essentially finite process - if more was exported
to a trading partner than was received in imports, a healthy economy resulted. Consequently, the colonies
could be justified economically as long as they were utilised in a manner consistent with the acquisition of
surpluses - ultimately of gold and silver. Smith and his disciples successfully challenged this assumption,
as8u:11 < that a general expansion of trade increased the benefits to all, (as A.P. Thornton writes; 'It was not 'Empire',
but the wide world itself that was the oyster, ready to be prised open by the force of British capitalist
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restricting trade and necessitating high defence expenditure and - through its
encouragment of imperialist rivalry - as a possible cause of wars. 7 Bright, in describing
the Empire as 'a gigantic system of outdoor relief 8 for the aristocracy, was articulating the
view that the system perpetuated the power of this small minority, whilst campaigners
such as Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill were concerned with more efficient government -
and in the case of the non-European territories, 'civilised' government.
Concern at the mileatment of subject peoples and the maladministration of empire
motivated the humanitarian wing of Radical thought, exemplified by the activities of E.D.
Morel. Between 1900 and 1913, Morel led a successful campaign against atrocities
committed in the Belgian Congo by King Leopold and a handful of concessionary
companies who held power in the territory. It was his belief that the only defence which
the African had against exploitation by European imperialists was the determination of an
ethical Europe to intervene on his behalf9 Yet Morel's position was tempered by the
view that the colonial peoples should cooperate with the capitalist system in order to
ensure that the resources of their territories would not be lost to the world, m and his
appeal to humanitarian principle was supplemented with the argument that British trade in
West Africa was being damaged by the spread of the concessionary system. Despite
attacks upon the concept and operation of Empire, these early critics did not encourage
withdrawa1, 11 but merely looked askance at its expansion, especially after the outbreak of
the Boer War in 1899.
enterprise.' A.P. Thornton, The Imperialist Idea and its Enemies, A Study in British Power, Macmillan and
Co. Ltd., London, 1959, p.6.) and Britain, as the foremost industrial and naval power with the largest
empire, was content to accept this analysis after 1815.
7 This was contrasted to the free trade system which, it was claimed, promoted harmony by creating inter-
national dependence.
8 Quoted in Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire, British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895- 
1914. Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1968, p.12.
9 Frederick Seymour Cocks, E.D. Morel: The Man and His Work, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London,
1920, p.106.
10 Morel favoured Frederick Lugard's system of Indirect Rule for the West African colonies.
11 The interpretation of mid-Victorian indifference or even hostility towards Empire, has been challenged
by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, who identifed an 'informal' Empire which existed during the
period and was retained and even expanded through the use of indirect methods of control. See J. Gallagher
and R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', in Economic History Review, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1953, p.15.
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The first Socialist groups based their opposition to Empire-building on this Liberal-
Radical pastiche; the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the Marxist Social Democratic
Federation (SDF), for example, and William Morris's Socialist League, which stressed the
economic imperative behind the invasion of Sudan. Their failure to produce a rigorous
analysis of imperialism meant that not all socialists were completely hostile to imperialist
ideas. For example, Henry Hyndman - the self-aggrandising leader of the SDF 12 - wrote
on Indian and African affairs 13 in the organisation's journal Justice, where he denounced
imperialist expansion - but Hyndman was essentially a patriot whose anti-imperialism lay
uneasily beside endorsements of national self-interest.14
A similar insularity existed within the trade union movement at this time - those unions
which did not express wholehearted support for the Empire tended to ignore the issue,
concentrating on their immediate domestic economic and social objectives. 15 The Fabian
Society likewise showed little interest in colonial affairs, but when pressured by events in
South Africa to join the debate on the colonial Empire, leading Fabians such as Beatrice
and Sidney Webb expressed the paternalistic, even racist views 16 which were common
12 Henry Mayers Hyndman launched the Democratic Federation in 1881, this became the Social
Democratic Federation in 1884.
13 B. Porter, op.cit., p.100.
14
It was differences between Hyndman and fellow members which caused the SDF to split in December
1884, when William Morris, Eleanor Marx, Edward Aveling, Belfort Box and Andreas Scheu left to form
the Socialist League. See John Callaghan, 1990, op.cit., Chapt. 1.
15 This remained the case throughout the inter-war years. For the most part, the TUC was as uninterested
as the Labour Party in Britain's colonies, but when it was stirred to think about them it did so in
conventional ways. See Philip Poirier, The Advent of the Labour Party George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
London, 1958, p.16.
16 The perception of Western Europeans occupying the apex of a racial pyramid was reinforced by flawed
anthropological and anatomical studies and by the unenlightened reaction of certain travellers to their
encounters with different civilisations. Such ideas, which were systematised in Social Darwinist doctrine,
were widely disseminated by a mass circulation press (Arthur Harmsworth'sDaily Mail and Arthur
Pearson's Daily Express for example, disseminated the imperialist ideas of John Seeley, Charles Dilke and
others in an unsophisticated manner) which was established from the 1890s. For information on the spread
of imperialist ideas see: H.J. Field, Towards a Programme of Imperial Life: the British Empire at the turn of
the century, Clio Press, Oxford, 1982; Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform. English Social-
Imperial Thought 1895-1914, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, pp.56-'7; J.M. Mackenzie (ed.),
Imperialism and Popular Culture. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986.
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currency in late Victorian society. I7 George Bernard Shaw, in a tract entitled Fabianism
and Empire, attempted to justify imperialist expansion in terms of progress, as a step
towards internationalism and a means of 'civilising backward peoples'. 18 But in
advocating such ideas, the Fabians were not so much addressing the politics of Empire as
confronting the perceived national mood in order to move on to their real passion -
domestic reforms.19
The latter years of the nineteenth century were marked by a sharp escalation of
international economic competition20 between the industrial powers - a development
which prompted demands for protectionist measures to shield domestic industry and led
to a rekindling of the imperialist idea. For example, Joseph Chamberlain, the radical ex-
mayor of Birmingham, spearheaded a tariff reform campaign from 1903, during which he
attempted to persuade British workers that they too would profit from Empire, 21 if only
17 J.M. Winter, 'The Webbs and the non-white World: a case of socialist racialism', in the Journal of
I ntemporary History, Vol. 9, No.1, January 1974.
i. Shaw claimed that imperialism was the 'new stage of international polity' and advocated rule of
'backward' peoples by the 'civilised' races. Quoted in Bernard Semmel, op.cit., pp.70-72.
19 The Webbs were influenced by Social Imperialist ideas, and joined the cry for 'national efficiency'. (See
G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency. a study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971, p.61.) In 1902 they formed The Coefficients - a steering committee of
Fabians, Liberals and Conservatives - with the aim of establishing a social imperialist party. See Ibid.;
Winfried Baumgart, Imperialism: the idea and reality of British and French Colonial Expansion 1880-1914,
Oxford University Press, London, 1982, pp.170-2.
20 During this period, America and Continental Europe experienced what was in effect a second Industrial
Revolution, based on a convergence of science and technology.
21 The rehabilitation of the imperialist idea also reflected a domestic agenda. The nation was experiencing
great social change during these years; a time when sections of the working-class were being enfranchised
by the 1867 and 1884 Reform Acts and the deplorable plight of the nation's poor was being revealed in
studies such as Charles Booth's London Life and Labour. Furthermore, to these revealing investigations was
added the 'social question' - the array of half-submerged issues and interests that began forcing their
attention on the political class and which heralded the political activism of unskilled workers and even a
breach between the Liberal Party and its trade union allies. The Labour Representation Committee,
predecessor of the Labour Party, was formed in February 1900 from an alliance of socialist groups and trade
unionists. For the first time, organised labour began to look beyond the economic struggle towards the
political arena, triggering fear of social unrest among the men of property. When Walter Bagehot warned in
his English Constitution that the political combination of the working-class represented 'an evil of the first
magnitude', which had to be countered by removing 'not only every actual grievance, but where it is
possible, every seeming grievance too', he was recognising that reforms were necessary to placate the lower
orders and safeguard the existing system. Quoted in J.M. Golby (ed.),Culture and Society in Britain 1850- 
1890, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p.274. There was a growing belief that Empire provided a
way of maintaining working-class living standards and increasing employment, as well as offering
opportunities for emigration to Britain's unemployed and destitute people - a useful means of defusing
potential domestic unrest.
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the nation tied its economic destiny more completely to it. As the belief grew among
modern industrial nations that their positions could only be maintained through territorial
expansion, there was an acute intensification of rivalries over the remaining undeveloped
areas of the globe, notably the African continent22 and a mood of national chauvinism
appeared to sweep through Britain.
It was primarily in an attempt to rationalise this national enthusiasm for colonial
expansion, that J.A. Hobson produced his seminal work, Imperialism, A Study, (first
published in 1902), in which he claimed that the impetus for imperialism lay with
underconsumption in the domestic economy. The analysis identified a shortage of
demand in the domestic economy due to the depressed purchasing power of the national
working-class - a situation which arose out of the maldistribution of wealth and income.
The mass of people, struggling to purchase the bare necessities, were unable to absorb
consumer goods produced from the capitalists' surplus wealth. As a result, the capitalist
class increasingly looked abroad for worthwhile investment opportunities, supported in
their ventures by the state.23
Hobson quoted figures to illustrate that only a small section of the population, the finance
capitalists, benefited from imperialism, 24 while arguing on the broader level that
imperialism was both irrational and needless. His analysis implied that a more judicious
solution existed within the capitalist system, for if social reforms could redistribute the
nation's resources they would stimulate the extra demand required to satisfy the
capitalists' desire for sales and investment opportunities, thereby removing the need for
22 The 'scramble for Africa', as it became known, is easily traceable to the Berlin Congress of 1884/5,
when representatives from fifteen nations met in an attempt to ease European tensions over the partition of
Central Africa, but had its beginnings in the African railway construction projects of the 1870s. See
Winfried Baumgart, op.cit., p.4.
23 H.N. Brailsford shared this view of capitalists as rational beings who would not wish to risk the
economic cost of war. He wrote in March 1914, just five months before the outbreak of the First World
War, 'My own belief is that there will be no more wars among the six Great Powers'. See HN. Brailsford,
War of Steel and Gold„ 1914, p.35.
24 According to these figures, while Britain's trade with the new colonies represented an 'utterly
insignificant part of our national income', expenditure on these territories amounted to 'an immeasurably
larger sum'. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism, a study, Unwin Hayman Ltd., London, 1988, p.39.
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imperialism. The popularity of disadvantageous imperialist policies among the general
public was explained in terms of a giant confidence trick, in which patriotism was used to
screen the true situation from the British people. The 'party, the press, the church, the
school'25 were responsible for the inculcation of imperialist ideas; the remedy was as
simple as apprising the people of the true situation, knowledge which they would use to
change the system.
It was on these various threads of anti-imperialist thought that the Labour Party drew
when formulating its approach to imperialism. Radical sentiments of free trade,
internationalism, anti-militarism and hostility to secret diplomacy permeated the
Independent Labour Party, for example, and were reflected in the works of Kier Hardie
and George Lansbury. The work of Hobson 26 provided Labour with a theoretical manual
for its opposition to Conservative colonial policy, but on a more general level, it was the
Radical-Humanitarian approaches which influenced the small group of intellectuals
concerned with colonial affairs, many of whom belonged to the Party's Advisory
Committee on Imperial Questions. 27 Thus the Labour Party in practice stood for good
administration, free trade, native paramountcy, ultimate self-government and opposition
to colonial expansion.
Overall, the British left tended to remain detached from the deliberations and discussions
of continental socialists and thus from their theories of imperialism28 throughout the early
years of the twentieth century - Lenin's hugely influential work, Imperialism, the Highest
stage of Capitalism, was not translated into English until 1926. In consequence, their
influences tended to be Hobsonian or even Gladstonian and many of the early leading
Socialists exhibited imperialist and sometimes racist attitudes. A striking example is
25 Ibid., p.233-4.
26 Hobson is generally regarded as the precursor to J.M. Keynes.
27 Labour's interest in colonial affairs was largely confined to this group which included Leonard Woolf,
who served as secretary of the ACIQ; Sir John Maynard, the Committee's chair; Charles Roden Buxton,
Major Graham Pole; Sydney Olivier and E.D. Morel.
28 Such as Rudolf Hilferding's seminal Das Finanzkapital of 1910.
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provided by the labour movement's promotion of a pamphlet entitled Black Horror on the
Rhine, in which E.D. More129 condemned the decision to station French colonial troops in
the Ruhr in blatantly racist language. 3° Others feared that attacks against the British
Empire would alienate the masses - Tom Quelch of the British Socialist Party argued the
point at the Comintern's Second International Congress. 3I This then, was the form of
anti-imperialism in Britain during the three decades prior to the formation of the CPGB; it
was an approach which the Communist Party, armed with Leninist theory, was soon to
challenge.
Theoretical Developments
Marx himself had not initially attributed great importance to the role of the less-developed
countries in the struggle to advance international socialism, believing as he did that the
industrial nations were the womb from which the world revolution would be delivered.
But Lenin, who consistently advocated the right of every nation to self-determination,32
was clear that the cause of national liberation provided a useful weapon with which to
assail the capitalist powers. Commensurate with this view, he steered the Bolshevik Party
to a distinctive and uncompromising stance on colonial independence which established
anti-imperialism at the heart of communist ideology and, in doing so, served to emphasise
the poor record of the Second International on this issue.
n
Many leading figures in the Second International did not share Lenin's interpretation of
the changing world situation. 33 Some argued that Marxist predictions of capitalism in
crisis, the pauperisation of the workers and the polarisation of labour and capital were
29 A founding member and first secretary of the Union of Democratic Control, formed in August 1914.
30 The article was published in the Daily Herald, Britain's leading left-wing newspaper, and subsequently
reproduced in New Leader, the ILP's journal. Resolutions condemning the use of African troops were
passed by the Labour party, the ILP, womens' groups and trade unions. See Robert C. Reinders, 'Racialism
on the Left, E.D. Morel and the "Black Horror on the Rhine", in International Review of Social History,
Vol.XIII, 1968, p.l.
31 Stuart MacIntyre, 'Imperialism and the British Labour Movement in the 1920s: an examination of
Marxist Theory', in Our History pamphlet, No. 64, Autumn 1975, Journeyman Press, London, p.12.
32 The Bolsheviks upheld the right of national minorities to secede from the Tsarist Empire, although this
was to a large extent adopted as a tactical measure.
33 Including some of those on the left - Jean Jaures and August Bebel, for example.
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inaccurate. 34 In Imperialism, Lenin attempted to rebut these claims whilst simultaneously
providing a theoretical framework of imperialism and guiding its practical application.
This was an eclectic work, inspired to some degree by the economic ideas of Hobson,
although it differed fundamentally from the analyses of Hobson and the other Radicals in
that it identified imperialism as a specific stage of capitalist development, rather than a
mere policy adopted by the capitalist class.
Bukharin had been the first Bolshevik to advance the theory of finance capital, arguing
that, as capitalism developed, a concentration of production occurred which inevitably
resulted in the formation of monopolies. He observed a parallel process in the financial
sector, where a merger of large-scale industry and commercial enterprises with the big
banks led to what he termed 'a coalescence of banks and industrial capital'. 35 Because
monopolies acted to stifle competition in the domestic sphere, there was a consequential
accumulation of surplus capital which, when exported overseas, yielded vast super-
profits. It was the search for these super-profits, together with a requirement for raw
materials and cheap labour, which was identified as providing the central motive for
colonial expansionism.36 But whereas Bukharin had concluded that the dawning of the
age of international finance capital would render nation states obselete, Lenin recognised
that uneven development meant that for some countries, nationalism remained very
relevant.
What was different in Lenin's theory was his identification of an imperialist epoch
characterised by wars, civil wars and revolutions - one which represented the expiration
of the capitalist system. Rivalries between the modern industrial nations over
undeveloped territories were accelerating, yet, as he pointed out, the world had already
34 Opposition to the Leninist position also came from the redoubtable Rosa Luxemburg who, influenced
by developments in her Polish homeland, tended to take a nihilist attitude towards nationalism, regarding it
as a reactionary force which posed a threat to international socialism. See A. Reznikov,The Comintern and
the East: Srategy and Tactics, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p.34.
Nikolai Bukharin, quoted in V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism,Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p.60.
36
V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XIX, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968, p.156.
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been divided among the large capitalist powers by 1900, 37 leaving re-division as the only
option. In widening the theory of class exploitation to cover the global division of labour
Lenin, as Neil IIarding acknowledges, 'introduced a wholly new geopolitical framework
to ideological discourse.' 38 He predicted that competitive expansionism would inevitably
lead to conflict and, following from this, he was able to cite the First World War as an
example of an imperialist war - it being the denouement of the established imperialist
powers' attempts to thwart German imperialist ambitions.39
When formulating his treatise, Lenin set out to affirm this connection between capitalism,
imperialism and war in an attempt to refute the views of some socialists - notably leading
members of the German and Austrian Social Democrats - who claimed that the
globalisation of capitalism was a process which could actually reduce the risk of war.
Karl Kautsky's concept of ultra-imperialism, 40 for example, and Otto Bauer's assertion
that capitalism could continue to expand indefinitely without the support of a colonial
empire, were bitterly denounced by Lenin as an encouragement of the workers to self-
delusion. The message he endeavoured to communicate was that the interests of the
working peoples of all nations lay in opposing imperialism and not in following the
example of the majority of Socialists in the Second International, who had abandoned
their previous commitment to internationalism in order to support the war efforts of their
respective governments.41
37 During the so-called 'scramble for Africa', nine-tenths of that continent had been seized, leaving re-
division as the only option. V.I. Lenin, 1970, op.cit., p.174.
38 Neil Harding, Leninism, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, p.138.
39 Although the First World War is generally understood in terms of the new Germany's challenge to the
'old order', as epitomised by Britain, the main protagonists were all existing or aspiring imperial powers
acting out their own thinly-veiled imperialist agendas. In the aftermath of the war, colonial possessions
were redistributed among the victors; Britain's Empire increased and the popularity of the colonial-empire
grew, but not without cost. The war had severe economic and moral implications for Britain, not least its
radicalising effect upon the colonial peoples who bore much of the suffering and whose expectations rose
accordingly.
40 See Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy. Merlin Press, London, 1972, p.142; Anthony
Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism. a critical survey,Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980,
u.122-6.
The failure of Socialism to prevent the imperialist war and the general absence of revolutionary fervour
among the European working-class was attributed by Lenin to the creation of a 'labour aristocracy'. Neville
Kirk confirms that certain cotton operatives saw themselves as 'lords of labour: the manual aristocrats', and
Elie Halevy claims that a number of the British proletariat were 'able to keep up a standard of living almost
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Leninist logic allowed for no compromise with capitalism, revolution was the only road
and those who were not prepared to wholeheartedly follow the revolutionary path were
dismissed as stooges of imperialism. The polemical essence of this reasoning was
encapsulated in his assertion that 'He who is not for us is against us t .42 The core of his
analysis was that mankind had reached a crossroads; 'Leninism categorically defined a
time for all humanity - now is the moment of choice between Socialism and barbarism1,43
and the relentless rise of fascism in Europe as the international capitalist system teetered
on the brink of destruction throughout the 1920s and 30s, seemed to bear witness to the
accuracy of his predictions."
Lenin's ideas offered fresh insight into both the historical process and the global politics
of the time. But as Neil Harding astutely observes, the theory of imperialism was also
'compass and chronometer of Leninism and contemporary communism', 45 in other words
it was the most important component of the ideological rationale for the Communist
movement, this most ideological of political parties - a fact that is not generally
recognised. Within this rationale, Lenin's great innovation was to place the colonial
liberation struggle in the vanguard of the battle against both imperialism and capitalism
with the intention of enlisting the subject peoples in the international proletarian struggle.
Imperialism offered an explanation for the inequalities which distorted economic
conditions in the colonies and semi-colonies and provided the oppressed peoples with a
as high as that of the middle-class. See N. Kirk, The Growth of Working-Class Reformism in mid-Victorian
England, Croom Helm Ltd., Kent, 1985, p.85; E. Halevy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour. 1895-1905: 
A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century,Vol.5, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 1961, p.212.
The analysis included a warning that such an unholy alliance, forged with a system doomed to collapse,
would merely facilitate the ruling classes' descent into authoritarianism and political reaction, as they
struggled to defend their position.
42 V.I. Lenin, 1968, op.cit., Vol. XXIX, p.294.
43 Neil Harding, op.cit., p.115.
44 For many, disillusioned by the gratuitous slaughter of the 1914-18 war, their faith in democracy badly
shaken, Lenin's theory of capitalist collapse and continuous conflict struck a chord. As Europe 'slumped
into monumental melancholy' (Modris Eksteins,The Rites of Spring, Black Swan, London, 1990, p.340) in
the post-war years, civil strife flared in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Ireland and Italy; Turkey and Greece
were at war; the Middle East simmering - all seeming to confirm the view of the birth of a turbulent new
age.
45 Neil Harding, op.cit., p.141.
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way out of their growing frustrations. For those communists operating within the
imperialist powers, Leninist principles ensured that support of colonial liberation became
a defining part of their Socialism.
Plotting The Course
Following the Bolshevik's victory in October 1917, steps were taken to convert theory
into a programme of practical action. Despite an official policy of parity between the
component national parties of the Communist International, Russian delegates enjoyed a
permanent majority on the organisation's Executive Committee, ensuring that the
influence of the Bolsheviks - later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (CPSU) -
was paramount. This was illustrated to some extent by the reaction of delegates to the
separate theses relating to the national and colonial question, proposed by Lenin and the
Indian delegate, Menenabandra Nath Roy,46 at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920.
Lenin's prioritising of the colonial question was based on his belief that colonial
exploitation was actually prolonging the life of the capitalist system and that a proportion
of the colonial superprofits was being offered as an incentive to leading sections of the
national working-class, creating a 'labour aristocracy' which consorted with the capitalist
system. But, although he acknowledged the vital importance of colonial liberation
on
movements to the revolutionary struggle, he continued to lay greatest stressAthe role of the
Western proletariat.
According to Lenin's analyses, imperialism functioned to stunt economic development in
the colonies, constricting the growth of the working-class and giving rise to mainly rural,
peasant populations. However, he believed that the predominance of pre-capitalist
46 M.N. Roy, who was involved with Bengali terrorists during his early years, travelled to the U.S. as a
member of the Berlin-based Indian Independence Committee in 1916. Whilst in America, he collaborated
with the Ghadr Party - a revolutionary Sikh organisation - and met his future wife and co-worker, Evelyn.
The two moved to Mexico the following year, where they encountered the prominent Russian Communist,
Michael Borodin, who had been charged with the task of forming a Communist Party of Mexico. Roy
subsequently converted to Communism, arriving in Moscow at the end of 1919. See David H. Druhe,
Soviet Russia and Indian Communism,Bookman Associates, New York, 1959, p.28.
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relations did not necessarily pose an impediment to progress. It was possible for these
countries to bypass the capitalist stage of development altogether with the aid of the
international revolutionary movement - and he instructed workers of the imperialist
powers to guide and support those liberation movements operating in their respective
nations' subject territories.
He concluded that, because the modern class structure was insufficiently developed in
these subject territories for Communist parties to flourish there, it was inevitable that the
bourgeoisie would take the lead in the nationalist struggle. Communists therefore,
should enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonies and the
undeveloped nations. 47 There was no question that this stttegy would lead to a
diminution of the Communist Party's organisational independence. Its main purpose was
to 'rally the constituent elements of the future proletarian parties', 48 support of national
self-determination could only ever be a step towards internationalism.
Roy carried Lenin's arguments further; if capitalism was being shored up by massive
profits from the colonial territories, he reasoned, it was axiomatic that 'the fate of the
revolutionary movement in Europe depends entirely on the course of the revolution in the
East1 .49 He identified two separate movements within the colonies and semi-colonies:
bourgeois-democratic nationalism, which aspired to independence within the capitalist
system, and the struggle of the poor peasants against exploitation by both the imperialist
power and their own native bourgeoisie. It would be wrong, he contended, to support the
former to the detriment of the latter - the anti-imperialist movement must develop as a
class revolution.
47 Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1941 Vol. 1, 1919-22, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.,
London, 1971, p.141.
48 Ibid, p.143.
49 Quoted in Stuart Maclntyre, Autumn 1975, p.11.
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To illustrate his position, Roy referred to India as an example of a subject territory which
was undergoing a process of 'rapid industrialisation' and, in the process, creating a
proletariat which would eventually unite and rise against capitalism in a situation akin to
that in the West. Already, he contended, the revolutionary movement was gathering
strength among the poor. Given these circumstances, it would be a mistake to trust the
national bourgeoisie; they would prosper as industrialisation advanced, eventually allying
with feudal elements and co-operating with the imperialist powers against the workers
and peasants.
Lenin further muddied the waters with his perception of a world political system shaped
by the struggle between the Soviet movement, headed by Soviet Russia, and the
imperialist powers. He argued at the second Comintern congress that it was only from
this premise that 'the political questions of the Communist Parties, not only in the
civilised but also in the backward countries can be posed and answered correctly'.5'3
Communist policy was thus directed towards creating 'a close alliance of all national and
colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia', the forms taken by this alliance to be
determined by 'the stage of development reached by the Communist movement of each
country or by the revolutionary liberation movement in the undeveloped countries and
among backward nationalities.'51
In the event, Roy's theses enjoyed 'at least as much sympathy of those of Lenin', 52 and
were adopted on a supplementary basis, ensuring that communists were pledged to
support as suitable allies only those bourgeois-democratic national liberation movements
judged to be 'really revolutionary', or willing to employ communist tactics. 53 But the
ambiguity inherent in an analysis which allowed Communists to make common cause
50 R. Archer, The Second Congress of the Communist International Vol. 1, New Park, 1977, p.110.
51 J. Degras, op.cit., p.141.
52 E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution. a History of Soviet Russia 1917-23, Vol. 3, Macmillan and Co.
Ltd., London, 1961, p.254.
53 In this manner it was accepted that - in certain circumstances - it was possible for the colonial
bourgeoisie to follow a revolutionary path.
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with the national bourgeoisie in the liberation struggle whilst simultaneously agitating for
the class struggle and aspiring to its leadership, gave rise to a number of mistakes and
uncertainties.
Problems Of Application
As it was openly admitted by Communists that these alliances were temporary expedients,
designed to achieve the ultimate overthrow of the bourgeois leadership, it is unsurprising
that the nationalist leaders tended to regard their new 'allies' with suspicion. This
mistrust, compounded by the problem of how to decide if a national liberation movement
was 'truly revolutionary' would, in the case of the Chinese Kuomintang in 1927, cause a
great reverse for the communist movement. Similarly, the issue of whether to co-operate
with the Indian National Congress, which was long-established by 1920 and enjoyed mass
support under Gandhi's leadership, continued to divide communists even after India's
independence was won.
Despite the atheist nature of Communist ideology, support for the forces of national
liberation extended in some cases to movements of a religious character. Following the
1917 Revolution, Soviet Russia received considerable support from Moslem populations
within its borders and the Communists attempted to build on this. At the first Congress of
the Peoples of the East, held in Baku in 1920, Gregory Zinoviev, chief of the Comintern,
roused delegates towards a 'holy war' against British imperialism while casting Soviet
Russia in the role of protector of the oppressed in an attempt to win over the Moslem
masses to the fight against Western imperialism. 54 But such alliances were littered with
pitfalls, as the ill-fated collaboration between Communists and Sarekat Islam - the
Indonesian Islamic nationalist movement - proved.55
54 This accomodation was evident at the Executive Committee of the Comintern's Third Plenum on
Religion in 1923, when Bukharin instructed Communists to 'emphasise that they are proposing a fraternal
alliance with all workers, whether believers or atheists'. See S. MacIntyre, op.cit., p.11.
55 Sarekat Islam initially won the support of Communists and was even commended to the second
Comintern congress by the Dutch representative, 1-lenric Sneevliet - alias Maring - who accorded it with
revolutionary credentials and even a 'class character'. (E.H. Carr, op.cit., p.256.) During the early 1920s, the
mass base of Sarekar Islam became increasingly radical - a development misinterpreted by Indonesian
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Most frustrating for those Communists charged with the task of fulfilling Lenin's design
was the millstone which equated the interests and preoccupations of Soviet Russia with
those of the international communist movement. By 1921, as the Bolshevik state
struggled to find a foothold in the international polity of nations, the Comintern had
initiated the united workers' front policy of selective co-operation with European Social
Democracy and the colonial national bourgeoisie. 56 This policy changed in 1928 as
Stalin, who replaced Lenin as Soviet leader after his death in 1924, introduced his own,
more simplistic interpretation of Leninist analysis.
For reasons expedient to Stalin's factional struggle inside the CPSU, the New Line
stressed that only the proletariat embodied the universal aspirations of mankind and
therefore, in the struggle for national independence, only the proletariat - through their
representatives, the Communists - could provide leadership. As Stalin tightened his grip
on power and moved to isolate his critics, the ultra-left strategy - which shunned co-
operation with non-Communist elements in Europe and the subject territories - was
employed. It was a course to which the anti-colonial politics of the European Communist
Parties were expected to conform and as such, had particular implications for the CPGB.
Conclusion
Prior to the second decade of the twentieth century, the main body of anti-imperialist
thought in Britain sprang from humanitarian beliefs and moral principles emanating from
Gladstonian liberalism, suported by a secondary current of Radical criticism derived from
Hobson's Imperialism. Opposition to colonial expansion was based on objections to the
oppression of the subject peoples, or on the financial burden which the colonies were said
Communists as a movement towards their own position. This error, together with Stalin's repression of non-
Russian minorities and the condemnation of Pan-Islamism in theses approved by the Comintern's second
congress, led to the crushing of the Communist Party of Indonesia in 1926. See F. Claudin,The Communist
Movement, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975, p.244; A. Reznikov, op.cit., p.110.
56 It was reasoned that, if successful, the policy would awaken the workers' interest in Marxist ideas and
move their leaders to the left; if the strategy failed, these same leaders could be blamed and ultimately
overthrown.
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to represent to the metropolitan power. Even early Marxists accepted aspects of the
Radical analysis of imperialism and many Socialists were susceptible to racial stereotypes
and delusions of racial superiority and inferiority, which the supporters of Empire
promoted. Although the ideas of J.A. Hobson offered an economic explanation for
imperialism, they did not represent a significant break with the prevailing view of
imperialism as the machinations of a small group of finance capitalists determined to
increase their profits.
Lenin, however, formulated a distinctive analysis which reassessed both the nature of
contemporary capitalism and its historical evolution. 57 He identified the beginning of a
new imperialist epoch for mankind, an epoch of wars, civil wars and revolutions
providing the objective conditions for revolutionary Socialist politics. Indeed, he talked
of the end of capitalism and beginning of Socialism and insisted that this must be an
immediate, revolutionary transition, not a gradual process of change as others argued. It
was a position which tolerated no dissent and those who questioned it were dismissed as
supporters of imperialism.
The analysis of a new historical age of imperialism which 'means the progressively
mounting oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers',58
explained the position of the colonial peoples. Its conception of imperialism as a global
phenomenon was supposed to unite the proletariat in the developed states with the
peoples of the exploited nations in a united front against imperialism. But in addition,
Lenin offered the subject peoples the vision of Socialism and increasingly the Soviet
Union was exalted as the inspiration of that Socialism, the image of what could be
achieved in economic development, political independence and racial equality.
Behind these apparant simplicities lay numerous traps. For Communists, support of the
national liberation struggle was only ever a means towards the international proletariat
58 Quoted in A. Reznikov, op.cit., p.6.
57 Neil Harding, op.cit. p.264.
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revolution and the establishment of Socialism, never an end in itself. This inevitably led
to problems with bourgeois nationalist leaderships and religious elements who might
regard the goal of independence as an end in itself, fearing the Communists as unreliable
allies in the struggle and certain enemies in the future. As the Bolshevik revolution
became ever more isolated and insular, so Socialism and the international proletarian
struggle became increasingly identified with the nature and interests of the Soviet Union.
Support of Soviet policies was used as a measure of political virtue and internationalist
credentials in particular, creating great problems for the membership charged with
implementing the Comintern's anti-colonial policies. Responsibility for the day-to-day
conduct of this work fell to the national CPs of the imperial powers. To what extent this
duty was fulfilled by British Communists is the subject of this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE: EARLY COLONIAL WORK AND POLICIES 1920-27
Colonial Campaigners on the Left
In spite of the wide-spread ignorance in Britain of the emerging Leninist theoretical
framework of anti-imperialism, some radical activists were ready to embrace Bolshevism,
at least in part because of their public opposition to imperialism. Most notable were
Rajani Palme Dutt, 1 who subsequently became the Communist Party of Great Britain's
chief theorist on India and editor of the Party's periodical, Labour Monthly, his brother
Clemens Dutt and Shapurji Saklatvala, Battersea North's Communist M.P. from 1924-
1929.2 Prior to the formation of the CPGB in 1920/1921, Palme Dutt served on the
Labour Party's Advisory Committee on International Questions, LPACIQ, a sub-
committee of its National Executive Committee (NEC) established in 1918, alongside
fellow communist sympathisers Robin Page Arnot and Emile Burns.3
While in this position they were perhaps able to influence the tone and content of policy
statements intended for the NEC on such issues as Indian Constitutional reform. In
December 1919 for example, the ACIQ passed a resolution recommending to the NEC
that, when the Government of India Bill went before Parliament, it should press for 'some
extension of the principle of responsible Government to the Central Government of India',
and for 'Adequate representation of the urban workers in the new provincial legislatures in
view of the extent of special representation being accorded to capitalist interests'.4
Certainly these views were unusually radical for the Labour Party of 1919.
3 The LPACIQ was formed in May 1918, and reorganised into sub-committees on economic, political
and imperial questions in February 1920.
4 Minutes of a Meeting of the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions, 12-12-19,
Labour Party Archive (henceforth LPA), Manchester Museum of Labour History.
Dutt was a prime mover in the unsuccessful campaign to persuade the ILP to affiliate with the
Comintern.
2 Saklatvala was previously a Labour M.P. from 1922-1924.
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Saklatvala, who spoke in support of colonial independence at ILP conferences, 5 was also
a member of the Imperial sub-committee of the joint TUC/LP International Committee
until 1924, during which time he participated in deputations to Edwin Montagu 6 in 1921
and1922 and to Sidney Olivier after his appointment to the India Office in 1924.7
Following the formation of a Labour Government in 1924, Saklatvala insisted that the
new administration could 'do a great deal in their Indian policy to abate this exploitation
without affecting their administrative responsibility under the existing order of things'.8
He called for actions which included raising the level of wages, abolishing the impressed
labour system, encouraging trade unions and labour representation, extending education
and reforming the judicial system.
This early accomodation of left activists within the advisory hierarchy of the Labour Party
and TUC was in no way a reflection of either their enthusiasm for anti-colonialism or the
emergence of the Bolshevik state in Russia. Prior to the October Revolution, Arthur
Henderson warned of a looming crisis between 'the existing and, in his eyes, admirable
'moderate Socialists' (the Kerensky Government) and the 'extremists' who would hang
them all from lamp-posts, Lenin's group representing the latter tendency: 9 The Labour
leadership subsequently supported the British Government's hostile policy towards Soviet
Russia in the wake of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, albeit primarily to avoid disunity while
the war remained in progress. But despite the position of their leadership, sections of the
British labour movement rejoiced at the birth of what they believed to be the first
workers' state, responding to its plight with the launch of a 'Hands off Russia' campaign in
the Spring of 1918.10
5 Mike Squires, Saklatvala. a political biography. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990, p.162.
6 Secretary of State for India, 1917-1922.
7 Marjorie Nicholson, op.cit., p.152.
8 S. Saklatvala, 'The British Labour Government and India', T.U.C. and Labour Party Joint International
Department memo, No. 9, July 1924, p.1, (LPA).
9 A.J. Williams, Labour and Russia: The attitude of the Labour Party to the USSR. 1924-34, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1989, p.7.
10 A national 'hands off Russia' Committee was subsequently established in January 1919 to co-ordinate
activities which culminated in the refusal by London dockers in May 1920 to load the 'Jolly George' with
munitions destined for the anti-Soviet forces of General Pilsudski.
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Preparing the Ground
When the CPGB was formed from the consolidation of a handful of Marxist groups on
the periphery of the labour movement in August 1920, it faced the prospect of repeated
attempts to affiliate to an essentially hostile Labour Party - a foretaste in British
conditions of the united front strategy adopted by the whole of the Comintern in 1921. It
also encountered problems in adjusting to the organisational dictates of the Comintern.
The new party's residual origins had bequeathed an undisciplined internal structure, while
isolation from theoretical developments in the rest of Europe left its members adhering to
a rigid Marxist model which pre-dated Lenin's directive towards a revolutionary
stratagem. Such a situation could not be tolerated in a highly centralised organisation
which demanded strict obedience to the official line.
Pressure was put on the CPGB to reorganise according to Bolshevik principles and in
March 1922, a Commission consisting of Harry Pollitt, Harry Inkpin and chaired by
Palme Duff, was appointed to implement the changes. H Of central importance was the
Party's acceptance of its responsibilities in the anti-imperialist campaign. These were
stressed as early as the second Comintern Congress in 1920, when British delegates were
informed that they 'would be judged, not by their articles in favour of liberation, but by
the numbers of them imprisoned for agitation in Ireland, Egypt or India'12
In June 1921, the Party was warned that 'The British Empire is the knot which Socialism
in this country will have to unravel if it is to succeed.' 13 The imperative to practical action
was reiterated in November 1922 when, at the fourth Comintern Congress, it was stated in
'The Colonial Tasks of the Metropolitan Parties', that 'The extreme importance of the
colonial revolutionary movements for the international proletarian revolution makes it
11 John Callaghan, op.cit., 1993, p.43.
13 John Langland, 'Our Imperial Responsibilities', in The Communist Review, No. 2, June 1921, p.4.
12 Jane Degras, op.cit., p.139.
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necessary to intensify work in the colonies; in the first place by the Communist parties of
the imperialist powers'.I4
Many in the CPGB were slow to grasp the significance of this directive, eliciting strong
criticism from the Comintern as late as 1924, when it complained of the Party's draft
programme that 'references to the colonies and protectorates are of the most obscure
nature. 115 Nevertheless, by the mid-1920s the CPGB had progressed to the point where,
outwardly at least, 'racialist sentiments disappeared and all Communists acknowledged
the importance of liberating the colonies', 16 allowing the Party to concentrate on strategy.
Most significant was the fact that the British Party included among its ranks the emerging
colonial experts mentioned earlier - and aspiring Indian experts in particular - which the
young Comintern did not possess.
It was during 1924 that the Comintern established a Colonial Bureau in Paris and, more
importantly, devolved responsibility for anti-imperialist work within the British Empire to
the CPGB. In response, the British CP formed its own Colonial Committee, which
claimed in September 1925 to have established 'working connections' with India, Egypt,
Palestine, Syria, South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland.17
This assertion was undoubtedly an exaggeration, though James Crossley did travel as the
Party's representative to Palestine and to Egypt, where he assisted in the establishment of
the Egyptian Communist Party. 18 It was during 1925 that Ralph Fox was sent to Moscow
to work in the Comintern's Colonial Department - concentrating mainly on India in
conjunction with Goldberg and M.N Roy 19 - and Clemens Dutt, who served as the British
14 Jane Degras, op.cit., p.392.
15 'The Draft Programme of the CPGB Criticised', in The Communist Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, August
17 HMSO, Communist Papers, (Documents seized by the British authorities in 1925), CMND, 2682, Vol.





16 Stuart MacIntyre, Autumn 1975, op.cit., p.12.
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CP's representative on the Comintern's Colonial Bureau, joined the Berlin-based 'Foreign
Bureau of the Communist Party of India', established in 1922 by Roy.20
On an agitation and propaganda level, the Workers' Weekly, launched in February 1923
with Rajani Palme Dutt as editor, devoted an increasing percentage of its space to
international and colonial affairs. For example, articles covered the persecution of
workers in Turkey, repression in Egypt, forced labour in Kenya, imperialism in Cyprus,
South Africa, Iraq and Ireland, as well as comprehensive coverage of events in India. The
paper adopted an uncompromising anti-imperialist tone; early issues proclaimed 'Mass
Murder in India', when discussing the actions of the British authorities at Amritsar, and
Ramsay MacDonald's Socialist administration fared no better. Palme Dutt attacked the
record of the Labour Government in India in 1924 under the headline 'Blood, Brutality,
Forced Labour, Do British Workers Stand For This? Down With The Imperialists!'21
Achieving a Wider Constituency
This activity contrasted sharply with developments in the Labour Party, some of whose
members, including leading left-wingers, had been captivated by the concept of Empire
Socialism by 1925. The argument that it was possible to develop the Empire along
Socialist lines, bringing benefits to both Britain and the colonies, was politically
expedient at a time of mass unemployment, when the British economy was under
increasing pressure from rivals in Europe and the United States - a fact emphasised by the
20 By 1915, Indian revolutionaries operating in exile had co-operated with the Germans to form the
Indian Independence Committee in Berlin. This Committee was dissolved in 1918 by Virendranath
Chattopadhyaya, sole leader of the Indian radicals at this time, who had become close to the Communists.
Chattopadhyaya formed the Indian News and Information Bureau in 1921, and that same year sent an
American journalist, Lockmann, to London to make contact with Indians resident there. Following
consultations between the organisation and members of the CPGB, the Foreign Bureau of the CPI was set
up - its mission being to contact Indian and European labour organisations. Chattopadhyaya subsequently
joined the Communists, but tensions developed as both he and Roy claimed to be the leader of Indian
Communism. See Sir Cecil Kaye, Communism in India, with unpublished documents from the National 
Archives of India 1919-1924, Editions India, Calcutta, 1971, pp.166-7, 233, 225 and 337; A.C. Bose,
Indian Revolutionaries Abroad. 1905-1922, Bharati Bhawan, Patna, 1971, p.194.
21 Workers Weekly, 7-3-24, p.1.
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CPGB.22 While the Labour Party's tendency towards a bi-partisan approach on foreign
and colonial issues undermined the confidence of many colonial activists in its will to
effect change, the Conununists were championing the colonial peoples' demands for
freedom in word and to some extent by deed, whilst attacking Labour's equivocal position
on these issues.23 One of the CP's singular claims, articulated by J.R. Campbell in
September 1924 for example, was that 'The Communist Party is the only anti-Imperialist
party in Britain today.'24
During the inter-war years, Marxist theories of imperialism were able to gain a credence
with the left in Britain to a degree which far outweighed the status of the CPGB. 25 For
example, many leading members of the 'Plebs League', a group founded by militant
students at Ruskin College, Oxford, in 1909, were CP members or sympathisers during
the 1920s. Morgan Philips Price and Arthur Cook; 26 Walton Newbold, the first
Communist M.P.; William Mellor; Ellen Wilkinson; Willie Paul; Maurice Dobb;
Raymond Postgate and T.A. Jackson were all active in the League. The organisation's
publication, Plebs, edited by Frank Horrabin, provided a platform for Marxist views up
until the late 1920s. 27 The India League28 also inclined towards a Leninist position on the
nature of imperialism by the late 1920s 29 and its secretary, Krishna Menon, was accepted
by Communists as a trusted comrade.3°
22 J.T. Murphy, 'The Empire Conference and the Workers', in The Communist Review, Vol. 4, No. 7,
November 1923.
23 Hugo Rathbone wrote 'Every pretence of 'Left Wing' leaders that sweating can be abolished without
the necessity of breaking up the capitalist Empire', condemned colonial workers to economic and political
oppression. 'By this means their mistrust and fear for all that is white even though it calls itself 'Labour' is
again a thousand times confirmed.' See H. Rathbone, 'Should the Empire be Broken Up?, in The
S
ommunist Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, August 1925, p.173.
J.R. Campbell, 'Must the Empire be Broken Up?', in The Communist Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, September
1924, p.224.
25 Membership had reached around 2000 in 1920. See J. Callaghan, 1990, op.cit., p.97.
26 Arthur Cook was a founder member of the CPGB, who resigned from the Party in 1921. Philips Price
was a CPGB member until 1923.
27 Stuart MacIntyre, A Proletarian Science. Marxism in Britain. 1917-1933, Lawrence and Wishart,
London, 1980, pp.73-86. See also S. MacIntyre, Little Moscows, Croom Helm, London, 1980.
28 The India League was a British-based pressure group, set up to further the cause of Indian
independence in this country.
29 F. Brockway, The Colonial Revolution, Hart -Davis, 1973, p.37.
30 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.201.
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In the years which immediately followed the end of the First World War, unemployment
rose relentlessly in Britain, triggering a period of trade union militancy which persisted
until the 1926 General Strike. During these years, left activists such as Harry Pollitt were
able to rally the movement in support of the struggling Bolshevik Government in Russia31
and to push forward the anti-imperialist campaign. The T.U.C.'s Parliamentary
Committee declared in 1921 that 'no measure will be satisfactory which does not give
Indian workpeople the same rights as those possessed by Trade Unionists in this
country 1 ,32 and in 1924, the General Council was instructed by Conference to take up the
issue of Irish political prisoners with the British Home Office.33
But the most radical resolution on imperialism was moved by A.A. Purcell of the
National Amalgamated Furnishing Trade Association, in 1925. It declared its complete
opposition to Imperialism and resolved 'to support the workers in all parts of the British
Empire to organise the Trade Unions and political parties in the British Empire to self-
determination, including the right to choose complete separation from the Empire.'34
Despite implaccable opposition by J.H. Thomas - the right-wing railway workers'
representative who served as Colonial Secretary in Labour's 1924 administration - the
resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority.35
The Labour Research Department, an initiative of various trades unions, co-operative
societies and Guild Socialists, was controlled by communists from 1921. Tom Bell, head
of the CPGB's Agit-Prop. section, confirmed in 1925 that the LRD was 'not a Party
31 A resolution authorising the General Council to set up a Russian Famine Relief Fund and to use the
power of organised British labour to induce the Government to recognise the Bolshevik regime was passed
at the 1921 Annual Conference. See Report of the 53rd. Annual T.U.C. Conference, Cardiff, 5-10th
September, 1921, pp.345-352, T.U.C. archives (TUCA), Congress House, London.
32 Report of the 53rd. Annual T.U.C. Conference, Cardiff, 5 - 10th September, 1921, p.84, (TUCA).
33 Report of the 56th Annual T.U.C. Conference. Hull, 1 -6th September, 1924, p.450, (TUCA).
34 Report of the 57th Annual T.U.C. Conference, Scarborough, 7-12th September, 1925, pp.553-4,
(TUCA).
35 The vote registered 3,082,000 in favour and 79,000 against.
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concern, but is under the control of the Party'. 36 Rajani Palme Dun served as its
International Secretary until 1922, when he was succeeded by his brother Clemens.37
During 1926 and 1927, Elinor and Emile Burns produced a number of pamphlets for the
Department, in which they argued from a Marxist perspective on imperialism and issues
relating to its operation within the British Empire. These included British Imperialism in
China, British Imperialism in Malaya, British Imperialism in East Africa and British
Imperialism in West Africa,
The publications on Africa, for example, addressed the question of capitalist profits, of
forced labour and land rights, the detrimental impact which the use of compulsion on a
huge pool of African labour would have on the conditions of the British worker and the
long-term implications for class struggle in the African colonies. British Imperialism in
East Africa claimed that 'There is perhaps no country in the world where the working of
the capitalist machine is more nakedly revealed than in East Africa'.38
It was an area where the imperial power had complete control of the means of production
and of labour supply, an area which was being 'developed' in the interests of European
capitalists by European financiers, supported by the imperialist governments. Here,
where the climate was more conducive to Europeans, the British Government
expropriated land and established legal rights of ownership for the benefit of European
settlers, forcing Africans into reserves which were also being steadily eroded. Having
been robbed of his land, the African was then taxed into wage labour. In the early stages
of capitalist development, Indian workers were imported to provide this labour at the cost
of much suffering - of 32,000 workers brought from India to work on the Uganda railway,
6,450 were invalided as unfit to work before the end of the operation and 2,490 died.39
36 Quoted in Neal Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959, p.79;
Inprecorr, Vol. 5, 6-5-1925, p.538.
37 J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., pp.20 and 43. Members included Robin Page Arnot, Hugo Rathbone,
Emile Burns and William Mellor.




At this juncture, the article concluded, the African workers as a class had no organisation,
not even the first stages of trade unionism, but antagonisms were growing - the 1922
rising in Nairobi 40 was quoted as an example - and the advent of a nationalist movement
was proclaimed inevitable. There was as yet no native capitalist class in East Africa; the
moment when it emerged 'must represent the organised resistance of workers and peasants
to their exploitation by British capitalists'.41
British Imperialism in West Africa pointed out that an alliance of British finance and
heavy industry required 'the constant flotation of loans and the placing of contracts for
railway material, bridges and harbour works on a steadily increasing scale.'42 Railways
and public works were being constructed by forced labour (although this was one of the
points on which British policy in the area was supposed to differ from policy in East
Africa) and the profits were going to British capitalists.
It was, Burns argued, the British Government's intention to create and train 'a labour
supply for capitalism'. 43 British Imperialism's increasing reliance on colonial investments
as a source of profits was affecting the economic development of the colonies - in order to
force Africans to become part of the capitalist process, their traditional link with the land
had to be broken and a new link with wage labour forged. This was done by lowering
prices paid to peasant producers for their products and increasing taxation. In East Africa
the hut or poll tax and the expropriation of land were the methods used - in West Africa
40 Resistance to higher taxes, land robbery and forced labour was led by Harry Thuku, who was
subsequently arrested and imprisoned. A spontaneous demonstration outside the prison was fired upon by
police, resulting in the deaths of some thirty men, women and children. Thuku, who was not brought to
trial, was deported to the coast, where he was kept in detention.
41 Ibid., p.64.
42 Elinor Burns, British Imperialism in West Africa, LRD, 1927, p.53. The pamphlet pointed out that
Lord Kylsant, chair of the Elder Dempster Shipping Company, which operated along the West African
coast, was also a director of the Bank of British West Africa and the Midland Bank, both of which operated
to finance the West African projects.
43 Ibid., p.61.
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peasant producers were more heavily taxed than waged workers to the extent of a quarter
of their yearly income.
But the transformation of the peasantry into a wage-earning class and the interference
with tribal land and the economic life of the villages was leading to direct conflict
between the state and the indigenous population, Burns predicted. The workers who were
forced to become wage labourers and the peasant producers whose markets were
disappearing would develop into a conscious opposition. The articles also linked the
exploitation of colonial workers in West and East Africa to domestic unemployment and
the lowering of standards for British workers; British imperialism was the 'common
enemy of both the organised workers at home and the new proletariat of the African
colonies'. 44
This informed analysis supplemented the colonial theses of the Comintern, which were
mostly formulated in general terms, and required - though did not always receive -
sensitive application to specific regions and territories. However, the lack of a proletarian
base in the African colonies ensured that Communist efforts in this direction were
principally propagandistic and educational; practical interventions necessarily focussed on
Asia for the most part during the inter-war years. 45 It was not until the Fourth Comintern
Congress in November 1922 that the 'Black Question' was first incorporated into the
44 Ibid., p.64.
45 From the early 1920s, a small number of Africans and black Americans attended the Communist
University of the Toilers of the East, or KUTV, which was founded in 1921 by Stalin's Commissariat for
Nationalities. Bankole Awooner-Renner, otherwise known as Kweku Bankole, and Isaac Wallace Johnson
were two West Africans who were educated there. (See Hakim Adi, 'West Africans and the Communist
Party in the 1950s', a paper presented to a Conference on the History of the British Communist Party,
Manchester, January 1994; Woodford McLennan, 'Blacks in the Comintern Schools, 1925-34, in
International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 26, Part 2, 1993, pp.371-390; Marika Sherwood,
The Comintern and Colonies until c1934, Paper presented to School of Oriental and African Studies
African History Seminar, December 1993). Afro-American students included Harry Heywood and Otto
Hall, later leaders of the negro liberation movement in the USA, and William Patterson, an Afro-American
lawyer who served as chair of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples. See
William L. Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide, International Publishers, New York, 1971, p.101;
also Claude McKay, A Long Way From Home, Arno Press, New York, 1969, p.165, 180.
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official agenda, 46 in line with Comintern observations of an awakening consciousness
among Africans and people of African descent, especially black Americans.47
Initiatives Within Britain
Much of the Communist movement's work with colonial activists was carried out under
the auspices of the Red International of Labour Unions, RILU, which was founded in July
1921.48 The organisation's British Bureau was formed during the early 1920s, with Tom
Mann - previously an organiser for the Seamen's Union - as its president, and Nat Watkins
as its secretary.49 Mann also served as chair of the The National Minority Movement,
NMM, established as an offshoot of the RILU in November 1923 , which held its first
national conference in August 1924. The organisation, whose officers included Harry
Pollitt, secretary; George Fletcher, treasurer and George Hardy, national organisational
secretary, shouldered some of the responsibility for colonial work in Britain.
The International Section of the NMM's programme pledged 'Full support for the trade
union movement in the colonies in their fight against imperialism,' 50 a task underlined in
1929 by an RILU directive. 'Your movement must now offer real support and help to the
labour movement in all the colonies of the British Empire. . . directly helping them to
establish revolutionary trade union organisations.' 51 This included responsibility for
46 During this Congress, plans for a Congress of Negro Peoples were drafted by a committee which
included the British Communists William Gallagher and Walter Hannington; Israel Amter of the CPUSA
and Sen Katayama, who served as secretary. See 'The Comintern and Africa', in African Communist, No.
43, 1970; T. Draper, The Roots of American Communism, Elephant Paperbacks, Chicago, 1989, p.387.
47 The Comintern decided to implement a policy of using American negroes to further the struggle for
liberation in Africa. See D. Ramsay, 'The Negro Arrives', in Communist Review, Vol. 6, April 1926,
pp.543-5; Harry Heywood, Black Bolshevik, Liberator Press, Chicago, 1978, p.225. It was a strategy
indicative of the distorted thinking of Comintern leaders; the contacts needed as a base from which to
operate simply did not exist outside South Africa and attempts to train Americans in Moscow for this work
generally failed as most chose to return to the USA rather than carry the message to the African continent.
E.T. Wilson, Communism and Black Africa before World War Two, Holmes and Meier Publications Inc.,
London, 1974, p.131.
48 A. Lozovsky was appointed General Secretary of the RILU.
49 Arthur Horner, Incorrigible Rebel, MaGibbon and Key, London, 1960, p.65.
50 NMM, Programme of Action, Draft Discussion Document, 20-3-29, Box 1, Jack Tanner Collection
(JTC), Nuffield College Library, Oxford.
51 Directive from the Executive Bureau of the RILU to the NMM Conference, 17-8-29; Letter, A.
Losovsky - general secretary of the RILU - to the E.C. of the NMM, 15-8-29, in Box 1, (JTC).
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establishing close contacts with colonial workers in Britain. The NMM's fifth annual
conference passed a resolution to 'actively support' such bodies as the League Against
Imperialism, the Pan-Pacific Secretariat and the Workers' Welfare League of India
(WWLI)52 and by September 1929, the Movement had formed a Colonial Committee.53
The bulk of the CPGB's work with Indians in Britain was initially directed by Shapurji
Saklatvala, who was active in the Indian Labour Bureau in London, established by the
Profintern in 1923, and the Oriental Seamen's Union. He played a leading role in the
British branch of the INC, of which Fenner Brockway was joint secretary prior to 1920,
and shouldered overall responsibility for Party work conducted among the increasing
number of Indian students studying at British universities during the inter-war years.
Saldatvala also served as a long-term official of the WWLI, which became the All-Indian
Trade Union Congress's British agent in 1921.54
Oriental Seamen's Union
On the 25th February, 1923, a meeting was held to discuss the establishment of an Indian
Seamen's Association (ISA), in Britain. Those present included Saklatvala - who
subsequently became the organisation's president - Ajoy Banerji, Pulin Dinda, and J.C.
Sen. Speakers were George Lansbury, Nat Watkins and Potter of the RILU, who drew up
a constitution for the Association. The Executive Committee included Banerji and two
lascar lodging-house keepers who performed the duties of assistant secretaries.55
At an ensuing meeting of the organisation, which was held on 8th. April and attended by
Mackenzie of the National Union of Seamen, it was agreed that the ISA should henceforth
be known as the International Oriental Seafarer's Union. 56 The international Communist
52 Report of the fifth NMM Conference, August 1928, pp.24-5; Report of the sixth NMM Conference,
August 1929, p.15, Box 1, (JTC).
53	 •Minutes of an NMM Executive Bureau Meeting, 6-9-29, citing correspondence from CPGB's Colonial
Committee, Box 1, (JTC).
54 Marjorie Nicholson, op.cit., p.152.
55 Sir Cecil Kaye, op.cit., pp.233-4; M. Squires, op.cit., p.148.
56 Sir Cecil Kaye, op.cit., p.233-4.
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hierarchy was well aware of the communications and propaganda value of such an
organisation - similar bodies operated in ports such as Hamburg and Marseilles. The
following month, Saklatvala was instructed by the RILU to 'make full use (of the ISA) as
a communist propaganda organisation.' 57 But, understanding the importance of not
confining the new initiative to a narrow political line, he insisted that the organisation
retain some independence. In response to his arguments, the RILU did not demand the
affiliation of the new organisation - accepting instead a declaration of shared principles.
The initiative however, was not a success, prompting Khan of the London-based Indian
Bureau to complain in July 1925 that a proposal to form a union among Indian seamen in
Britain - direct responsibility for which, he claimed, lay with N.J. Upadahyaya - had not
been carried out. 58 In response, Communist leaders sought to widen the work among
colonial seamen under the auspices of the NMM. In a directive to the British Party, dated
September 1925, the ECCI criticised the lack of progress in this area and ordered the
CPGB to extend its Minority Movement work to cover the textile and seamen's industries.
E.H. Brown, the CPGB's representative to the ECCI, attempted to soften the rebuke by
acknowledging the attention already given to this work by the British Party, and at the
same time stressing the importance of the CPGB's anti-colonial work to the Comintern.
The union was finally established with the assistance of the NMM at a meeting of Indian
seamen held on 20th September 1925, when the proceedings were chaired by George
Hardy and Upadahyaya was the main speaker.59
58 Report of Amsterdam Conference, in Communist Papers, op.cit., p.81. This claim contradicts a report
by the Young Communist League in July 1925, that the RILU had recently formed an Oriental Seamen's
Union with branches in London and Edinburgh. See Resolution on Colonial Work adopted by the YCL
Congress, in Ibid., p.89.
59 International Seafarer, Vol. 1, No. 10, August-September 1925, 'Indian Seamen's Union Formed', p.10.
57 Quoted in Ibid., p.85.
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The Worker's Welfare League of India
The Workers' Welfare League of India was created in 1917 by A.G. Field to campaign
for Indian workers' rights. Its first general secretary was J. Potter Wilson, an ILP
dissident who subsequently joined the CPGB; Saklatvala served as secretary of its India
Committee from 1917. 60 Potter Wilson was later replaced as general secretary by
Saklatvala as the League oriented towards the Communist Party, but it was not a
Communist-front organisation from its inception. In the early years, the emphasis of the
League was on reform, the right of Indian workers to trade unions and democracy, and it
ensured that these issues were discussed at Parliamentary level. 61 Potter Wilson also
made full use of the British press to spread the WWLI's message.62 The League later
developed links with African workers - a delegation representing Nigerian workers
attended the League's 1930 Conference, for example, 63 - and passed resolutions on the
troubled situation in China.
From the outset, the League was anxious to involve the British TUC in the struggles of
Indian labour, but growing tensions between British trade union leaders and Communists
soon affected the League's position in Britain. In 1920, the TUC's Parliamentary
Committee agreed to allow a fraternal delegate from the League to attend its Portsmouth
Congress, but when Saldatvala was nominated he was refused entry, ostensibly because
he did not also represent a trade union. Yet at this time he was not a CP member and he
continued to work on the Labour movement's Imperial sub-committee until 1924.
Furthermore, the TUC was prepared to waive the rules in the case of E.N. Nxumalo, who
was allowed to represent the Swazi nation and the ANC despite the fact that he had no
trade union status." In the face of this rebuff, the AITUC nominated Saldatvala and B.
62 CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Letter, J.E. Potter Wilson to City News Editor, Daily Mail, 29-2-32, also Minutes
of a WWLI Meeting, 10-3-32, Communist Party of Great Britain archive (CPGBA), Manchester Museum
of Labour History.
63 CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, WWLI Annual Report, 1930 -31, (CPGBA).
64 M. Nicholson, op.cit., pp.167-168.
60 M. Squires, op.cit., p.158
61 The Labour M.P. Mardy Jones was involved with the League.
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Horniman - the militant Irish editor of the Bombay Chronical - as delegates to the TUC's
Cardiff Congress. The TUC's Parliamentary Committee responded by ruling that all
fraternal delegates must be resident and members of trade unions in the country which
they represented - a decision which precluded both Saklatvala and Horniman from
attending.65
In the wake of communist expulsions from the Labour Party in 1924, the WWLI was
increasingly ostracised by the hierarchy of the labour movement, leaving it vulnerable to
absorption by the Communists who - just a year later - were claiming that; 'The (CPGB's
Colonial) Department directly influences the Welfare League.' 66 The League was
considered by the CPGB to be of great value to its anti-colonial work - as the recognised
representative organisation of the AITUC in Britain it was able to obtain space for its
views in a substantial number of Indian papers. Consequently, the decision was taken in
1925 to strengthen and develop its influence.
When, in May 1930, the Executive Bureau of the NMM decided that the link between the
AITUC and the NMM must be made 'a real live force', it was to the League that the NMM
wrote, asking them to cooperate in raising funds to send two delegates from India to the
Fifth World Congress of the RILU. 67 But by the late 1920s British trade union leaders,
alarmed at the Communists' progress in India, were attempting to establish their own links
with the Indian labour movement.
ml 927, a TUC delegation to the Eighth AITUC Session - which convened from 26th to
28th November in Cawnpore 68 - persuaded the EC of the AITUC to sever its links with
the League and appoint the British TUC as its agent in Britain. Saklatvala immediately
condemned N.M. Joshi - who was elected general secretary of the AITUC in 1925 - for
65 M. Nicholson, op.cit., p.152.
66 Report of CPGB's Colonial Committee, in Communist Papers, op.cit., p.100.
67 Minutes of an NMM Executive Bureau Meeting, 16-5-30, Box 1, File 2, (JTC).
68 This delegation attended the eighth session of the AITUC, held in Cawnpore on 26th-28th November,
1927. Mardy Jones also attended.
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collaboration with British imperialism and began campaigning for the League's
reinstatement. Following protests from Indian trade unions, the AITUC Congress held in
Jharia during December 1928 agreed a compromise and declared that it would no longer
have any affiliated agents in Britain.69
Seizing on this as a sign of indecision, the League passed a resolution the following June
urging the AITUC to reinstate the League, 7° and forwarded it to all trade union
organisations in India. This appeal was successful and the WWLI was reinstated as the
AITUC's representative in Britain at the Nagpur Session in November, 1929, 71 when the
Congress left were in the ascendant.
Despite the hostility of TUC leaders, the League managed to retain some influence
within that organisation prior to 1929 mainly through A.A. Purcell - secretary of the
Manchester and Salford Trades Council 72 - and through its links with Arthur Pugh. 73 But
following the imposition of the ultra-left phase in 1928, the organisation lost much of its
remaining support in the labour movement. 74 Walter Citrine, the general secretary of the
TUC, attacked Saklatvala and the WWLI in the Daily Herald in April 1929, maintaining
that although the League once did excellent work for Indian workers, it was now part of
the Minority Movement and thus operating under the dictates of the RILU. 75 In response
the League declared that it 'repudiates imputations that it is controlled by any other
organisation.'76
71 Saklatvala had been appointed WWLI delegate to the Nagpur Session, but the Labour government
refused to provide him with a passport. CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, WWLI Doc., n/d, c1929, (CPGBA).
72 CP/ORG/MISC/6110, WWLI Doc., n/d, c1929, (CPGBA).
74 Even as late as 1927, 78 trade union branches were affiliated to the WWLI. See M.Squires, op.cit.,
p.160.
75 CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, WWLI, The British TUC and the WWLI, 20-4-29, (CPGBA).
76 CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, Minutes of a WWLI Meeting, 18-6-28, (CPGBA).
69 CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, WWLI Annual Report, December 1928, (CPGBA).
70 CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, Appeal for the Meerut Prisoners, June 1929, (CPGBA).
73 M. Nicholson, op.cit., p.154.
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At this juncture the League was claiming the affiliation of 95 organisations - including
Shoreditch Trades Council, North Camberwell ILP and Battersea Shop Assistants Union -
26 individuals and four Indian trade unions.77 The organisation continued to provide
speakers for ILP meetings throughout the Communists' ultra-left period, Dr. Bhat for
example, addressed the youth section of Peckham ILP and East Dulwich ILP during
1932.78
During the early 1930s, the League was increasingly prone to financial problems and
internal wrangling as the Communists attempted to take total control. At a Central
Committee Meeting of the CPGB held in June 1930, George Allison complained that the
WWLI had issued only one bulletin on India that year and urged the Party to give more
attention to the composition of the League, whose EC then consisted of 25, ten of whom
were CPGB members. These ten included George Hardy, Saklatvala, Percy Glading,
Glyn Evans - who acted as assistant secretary - and Upadhayaya.79
In July 1930, the CPGB passed a resolution which stressed the importance of the League's
work. 'The Party must work actively among the Indian residents in Britain . . . and
establish the best possible connection with India through them'. But the effects of the
divisive 'third period' made progress extremely difficult. Treasurer and League founder,
Arthur Field, announced in March 1932 that the organisation was bankrupt, with debts
outstanding to the president, Dr. K.S. Bhat. 8° It was at this juncture that a split blame
apparent between the British and Indian sections, as Saklatvala stressed the need for more
Indian members. 81 Acrimony also surrounded a decision by Field to issue a circular
which called for a boycott of the LAI as a Communist organisation. The WWLI had
79 Reel 1, Minutes of a CPGB Central Committee Meeting, Discussion on Indian resolution;
CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Minutes of WWLI Meetings, 3-1-32, 29-1-32, (CPGBA).
80 CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Letter, A, Field to WWLI Committee, 10 -3 -32, (CPGBA).
77 CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, WWLI Doc., n/d, c1929; CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Minutes of a WWLI Meeting, 23-
4-32, (CPGBA).
78 CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Minutes of WWLI Meetings, 29-1-32 and 23-4-32, (CPGBA).






previously sent delegates to the LAI's 1928 and 1931 Conferences, 82 and Field was
accused by Saklatvala of trying to curry favour with the TUC by attacking the LAI.83
In defiance of this opposition the Indian section appointed Dr. Bhat, K. Sheldrake and
A.C. Banerji as delegates to the 1932 LAI Congress, at a meeting in May of that year.
This elicited a furious response from Field and his supporters, who protested at the Indian
section's actions during a full League meeting in June. Saklatvala countered by moving a
resolution endorsing the actions, which was passed, a move which prompted the
resignation of the chair, Dr. Bhat. A subsequent resolution, proposed by Saklatvala and
seconded by Sheldrake, stated that 'all reference to Mr. A. Field's statement and also to
the resolution passed by, or statements made by, the Indian Section be deleted from the
records of the League, and not be mentioned or referred to again.'84
Field resigned from the League on 10th September and subsequently wrote to Banerji -
then assistant secretary - of his disapproval of the 'illegal and irregular procedure
approved by a small majority in the monthly meetings' and the policy of 'undertaking
fresh expenditure without an attempt at paying the debts of the League.' He also took
issue with a WWLI bulletin, (the second of the series), for its imputation that communal
riots and violence in India were being engineered by the government, and requested that
his name be removed from all future WWLI materia1.85
Towards the end of the 1920s, fissures in the WWLI were mirrored in the British arm of
the INC, as Saklatvala launched an attack on non-Communist members of the branch.
Mohamed Uj Jafar, first president of the British INC had been succeeded by Beatle Bhia,
who adopted a more moderate political stance and attempted to steer the organisation
towards a softer line. This led to his censoring the views of one of the more radical
In 1931, K. Sheldrake, Day and A.C. Banerji had attended the LAI's Conference as WWLI delegates.
CP/ORG/MISC/6/10, Letter, Saklatvala to Indian Section members, 18-5-32, (CPGBA).
CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Minutes of a WWLI Meeting, 23-6-32, (CPGBA).
CP/ORG/MISC/6/9, Letter, Field to Banerji, 13-9-32, (CPGBA).
36
members - Sajjad Jahir - and precipitated strong protests from the Communist faction,
including an accusation by Saklatvala that Bhia was a supporter of British imperialism.86
In June 1931, the branch split and a large number of members left. Saklatvala took the
chair and the twenty-three remaining members decided to form an alternative anti-
imperialist organisation of Indians in Britain. But the NC, unable to sanction this new
sectarian group as its official representative, disaffiliated it in August 1931. The
communists subsequently formed the Independence of India League - an initiative which
soon floundered.87
We may pause here to note that this profile of the WWLI is suggestive of certain general
features of the Communist's anti-colonial work in the inter-war years. The Party was
fertile in devising forms of organised intervention and energetic in sustaining a variety of
related groups; but the organisations were hampered by their reliance on key activists,
their lack of deeper and broader support and by the episodes of Communist sectarianism
which drove scarce allies away. We shall see that this pattern is repeated, but also that it
does not tell the whole story.
Indian Students in Britain
The Young Communist League (YCL), also played an important role in recruiting
colonial students to the communist cause. The third Congress of the International YCL,
held in Moscow during November and December 1922, laid great stress upon the
obligations of the British League in this area and, in a resolution on colonial work
adopted by the organisation's 1925 Congress, it was stressed that 'Much work could be
done among the Indian students in London and at other university towns by agitating
against British Imperialism.' 88 In response to such urgings the British YCL appointed a
86	 -Nirmal Sen Gupta, The Influence of Communism amongst the Indian Students in London, Nishan
Publishers, Calcutta, 1989, Chpt. 3.
87 The Daily Worker, 29-6-1931 and 28-1-1932
88 Resolution on Colonial Work, in Communist Papers, op.cit., p.89.
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committee89 to contact Indian students in Britain with the aim of winning them to
Communist ideas9°
The overwhelming majority of these overseas students came from wealthy, middle-class
families to train for professional careers which they intended to pursue upon their return
to India, but many became involved with the British CP and extended their studies to
include the works of Marx and Lenin. A considerable number of these went on to occupy
positions of power in post-independence India - Mohan Kumaramangalam, later a
Minister in Indira Gandhi's government; Nikhil Chakravarty, editor of the Mainstream
journal and Indrajit Gupta, presently leader of the Communist group in the Indian
Parliament were some of those who developed connections with the CPGB whilst living
and studying in Britain. 91 Jyoti Basu, who later rose to become Chief Minister of Bengal
in the 1980s, was recruited by the CPGB in the mid-1930s, while he was at the Middle
Temple, qualifying for the Bar.92
There were a number of Indian student societies at British universities which had close
connections with the CPGB, notably the Majlis - which existed at Oxford, Cambridge
and London - and the Federation of Indian Students' Associations or Fedind, which had
branches in Britain, Northern Ireland and continental Europe. Rajani Palme Dutt was
closely involved with the activities of Fedind, earning from student members the title
'patron saint of the Fedind'. 93 In the late 1920s, Sajj ad Jahir - the Indian Communist
whose speeches triggered disruption in the INC meetings referred to above - took over
the editorship of the quarterly Bharat, produced by Oxford University's Indian students,
and transferred publication to London. Re-named New Bharat, the journal became totally
supportive of the Communist position. Nirmal Sen Gupta acted as sub-editor, T.A.
Jackson was among those contributing and Clemens Dutt vetted the articles before they
89 This committee was set up during 1924.
90 Sir Cecil Kaye, op.cit., p.87.
91 Author's conversation with Ralph Russell, 12-7-95.
92 Andrew Whitehead, 'Calcutta Compromise', in New Statesman and Society, 20-11-1992, pp.19-20.
93 A. Mitra, 'Marxism in India', in Seminar.  Vol. 178, New Delhi, June 1974, pp.43-46.
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were printed. The paper was sent to India for distribution and its subscribers included
Radha Krisnan - a future president of India.94
Following the success of the 1927 Brussels Congress against imperialism, Communists
were swift to appreciate the value of international conferences as a means of contacting
young colonial activists. A World Youth Peace Conference, held in August 1928,
provided an excellent opportunity for Communists to meet and influence students from
various colonial countries. Several Indians who were studying in Britain at this time
attended, including Rajinda Prasad, who became the first president of the Republic of
India.95
The manner in which the CPGB recruited colonial students is illustrated in Nirmal Sen
Gupta's account of his student days in this country during the late 1920s. While attending
a meeting of the Teachers' Labour League in Liverpool, Sen Gupta met the economist,
Maurice Dobb, who introduced him to one of his students at the London School of
Economics (LSE) identified only as 'Tony'. Tony was attempting to organise a
Communist group from amongst the colonial members of the London University Socialist
(1.U5S)
SocietyAand persuaded Sen Gupta to help. Sen Gupta subsequently rented a flat close to
the university and participated in meetings at which the main topics discussed were the
political nature of a future independent Indian state and the relevance of Marxist/Leninist
theories to the issue. Eventually, a Communist group was formed and considerations
turned to whether its members should join the CPGB; the majority view being that
Communists of whatever nationality should support the CP of the country in which they
were residing.96
This was a point under general discussion at that time - many in the CPGB felt that
secrecy was necessary with regard to the Communist affiliations of Indian students, a
94 N. Son Gupta, op.cit., Chpt. 3.
95 Ibid., Chpt. 1.
96 Ibid., Chpt. 2.
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view endorsed by Sneevliet, who cited the experience of the Dutch CP, which had been
unable to use valuable colonial members because they had become known to the
authorities. But M.N. and Evelyn Roy argued that these sympathisers should be urged to
join the Party openly and to continue the fight on their return to India, using the courts if
necessary for propaganda purposes.97
Involvement in Communist activities certainly caused problems for the students;
according to D.N. Druhe, such activities led to an investigation by the Chancellor and
Proctors of Oxford University in 1926, following which those implicated were threatened
with expulsion if they refused to sign a pledge ending their association with the CP. I can
find no record of this incident in either of the two references given by Druhe, however.98
Sen Gupta experienced similar pressure whilst at London University. He obtained copies
of a banned booklet written by Percy Glading, in which the author recorded discussions
held between Gandhi and British officials at the 1930 Round Table Conference,99 and
distributed them to LSE students. His actions came to the attention of the Principal, a
hard-line administrator from an Ulster background, who immediately informed Scotland
Yard and the India Office, whilst threatening the student with expulsion. It was only after
protests by lecturers and the LUSS that he was allowed to complete his course.100
It was the CPGB's intention to use the students as emissaries in their country of origin.
Leading Party members such as William Rust and Saklatvala met with Indian students as
they neared the end of their studies and urged them to return to India and practice
Communism there - in Saklatvala's case, duties included re-establishing contact after they
had returned home. In 1925, two non-Indian graduates compiled a memo. for the CPGB's
Colonial Department, listing the political composition of the student membership of the
97 Report of the Amsterdam Conference, in Communist Papers, op.cit , pp.87-88.
98 D.H. Druhe, op.cit., p.74.
99 These discussions concerned the maltreatment of anti-British demonstrators in India by British soldiers.
100 N. Sen Gupta, op.cit., Chpt. 4.
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Oxford Indian Majlis. Arthur MacManus, head of the CPGB's Colonial Department, sent
Saklatvala a copy of the memo. with a request that he interview sympathetic students
before they returned to India, adding that small, informal meetings would produce the
best results.
The students were divided into five catagories; moderates, Swarajists, Socialists,
goverment supporters and unclassified. The Socialists were naturally regarded as the
CP's best immediate candidates for membership, while the Swarajists were seen as
possible future recruits 1 °1 In some cases it was arranged that they should travel to Berlin
to continue their training and occasionally to Italy thereafter - Roy was particularly
anxious that they should establish contact with the European India Bureau. In Sen
Gupta's case, Raj ani Palme Dutt - who was ostensibly recovering from T.B. in Belgium -
arranged a meeting with the Indian students and instructed them to publish articles on
politics in the capitalist press in their home country. 102
There were constant problems with the security forces. British intelligence monitored the
political activities of colonial students - Sen Gupta's passport was impounded following a
visit to Berlin and restored only after intervention by a member of the Indian
Government's Law Commission - and forwarded the information to their respective
governments. In 1936, the fifth Indian Political Conference passed the following
resolution: 'This Conference strongly condemns the espionage and strict control over
Indian students in England by the British Government. It demands the abolition of the
Educational Department of the High Commissioner which. . . is a great hindrance in
securing educational facilities for Indians in Europe. It further demands the immediate
dismissal of advisers to Indian students at various British Universities, especially Oxford
and Cambridge, for their anti-Indian and imperialist outlook, for their interference with
101 Letter, Colonial Department to Saklatvala, 23-6-25, in Communist Papers, op.cit., pp.75-7.
102 N. Sen Gupta, op.cit., Chpt. 4.
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political education, activities and opinions of Indian students and for their utter
incompetency and uselessness in being of any help to Indian students'.1°3
Although the bulk of its work was with Indians, a general election to decide on the
separation of Burma from India in November 1932 was an opportunity for the CPGB to
develop links with Burmese students in Britain.'" Reginald Bridgeman and Saldatvala
established contacts with activists in Burma and Burmese students in Britain 105 through
the Burmese Students' Union in London. 1 °6 On 28th May, 1933, a meeting of Burmese
students and CP members, arranged jointly by the Burmese League and the Burmese
Students' Union, agreed to form a study circle of those students 'considered most reliable',
to discuss Marxist ideas. Those present at the meeting included Myat Tun, who worked
in the High Commissioner's Office and was considered 'a very handy comrade.' 1 °7 The
training of Burmese activists in Britain and the setting up of a Burmese Club in London
was discussed and the students were apprised of the importance of translating Marxist
books, pamphlets and other literature, and how to utilize non-Communist, anti-
imperialist elements and the national press.1°8
M.N. Roy
Parallel with the work being conducted among Indians in Britain, the Comintern was
concerned to actively promote revolution in India itself. M.N. Roy, who had been a
founder member of the Mexican CP and led that country's delegation to the second
Comintern Congress, was initially accepted by Lenin and the Comintern as the leading
spokesman of incipient Indian Communism. He was sent to Tashkent as one of three
104 In Burma, where there was a Western-educated sector of the population which harboured nationalist
aspirations, sporadic disorder broke out during the 1920s and 1930s. The Monagu-Chelmsford reforms,
which were introduced into India in 1919, were extended to Burma in 1923, following a period of unrest,
but disorder continued unabated. Burma was separated from India on April 1st., 1937, despite a popular
vote against the move.
105 CP/CENT/PC/17/5, Letters and Documents, n/d, n/t, (CPGBA).
106 CP/CENT/PC/17/5, Letter from the secretary of the Burmese Students' Union, 1 - 10- 1932, (CPGBA).
107 CP/CENT/PC/17/5, Report on a 'Burmese Meeting', 28 -5 -33, (CPGBA).
108 Ibid.
103 CP/IND/MISC/7/6, Resolutions of the fifth Indian Political Conference, July11/12th., 1936, (CPGBA).
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representatives of the Comintem's Central Asian Bureau in October,1920, 109 where he
attempted to form a revolutionary army of Indian emigres which would infiltrate India
through Afg hanistan and agitate for a popular uprising.
These efforts were unsuccessful however, differences surfaced between the militants, and
the initiative was abandoned. Unhappy with the Comintern's decision to end its support
of the revolutionary army and with the terms of the Anglo-Russian trade agreement of
1921 - which restricted anti-British propaganda - Roy went to Berlin, where he published
the Vanguard of Indian Independence, later renamed The Masses of India, and worked to
establish a CP in India. In addition to corresponding with Indian militants and furnishing
with
themAmonies, one of his first moves on arriving in Berlin was to assign Charles
Ashleigh"° to the task of establishing links with Indian Communists, a mission which
ended five days after Ashleigh's arrival in Bombay on 18th September,1923, when he was
deported!"
With the closure of the Tashkent military school, Communist attention switched to the
AITUC, created in the same year under the presidency of Lajpat Rai. Although the
development of the Indian labour movement since 1918 had been guided by a cautious
constitutionalist leadership, AITUC leaders displayed a sympathetic attitude to the Soviet
Union. When comparing the economic conditions of Indian workers with those of their
European counterparts, the organisation's chairman, Chaman Lal, declared that the
'continuence of such conditions meant the coming of Bolshevism in India'.112
Both La! and Rai were in close contact with British Communists through Saklatvala l 13 -
Lal, who was also a Member of the Legislative Assembly and secretary of the
1 °9 The Central Asian Bureau was established at the Comintern's second Congress.
110 Ashleigh, alias John Ashworth or Nandalal, was deported from the US in February 1922 for
involvement in strikes and riots there. He travelled to Britain and then on to Berlin, from where Roy
despatched him to India.
111 Sir Cecil Kaye, op.cit., p.207.
112 E. Roy, 'The Crisis of Indian Nationalism', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1922, p.15.
113 sir Cecil Kaye, op,cit., p.152.
43
Parliamentary Socialist Society, his colleagues T.C. Goswami and N.M. Joshi, held
several conferences with the CPGB's Colonial Department during a visit to London in
1925 and expressed their desire to visit the USSR. 114 But in the opinion of Roy, who
believed that the only way Communism could progress was by establishing a CP to lead
the workers' struggle, these nationalist and labour leaders were not 'real revolutionaries',
but stooges of capitalism. His American wife, Evelyn Trent, also expressed this view,
notably in a bitter attack on the role of the AITUC leadership during the Bombay textile
strike of 1924. The organisation, she claimed, 'has never so much as mentioned the
Bombay strike, nor sent one of its office-holders to the scene of the struggle to investigate
and guide it, nor issued a single appeal on behalf of the starving strikers'.115
Roy's distrust of nationalist leaders went back to his days as a Bengali terrorist and had
been fuelled by events which followed the first great mass civil disobedience campaign,
launched by Gandhi in August 1920. During the summer of 1921 India was in a state of
revolt with widespread strikes and boycotts, 116 but this popular upsurge - optimistically
hailed by Roy as the birth of a nationalist revolutionary movement 117 - was soon to be
curtailed. On February 4th, 1922, a violent confrontation between police and
demonstrators at Chauri Chaura village 118 prompted a shaken Gandhi to demand an
immediate end to the non-cooperation campaign. Congress concurred, adopting a
resolution for its temporary suspension at an extraordinary session held in Bardoli on the
11th and 12th of February. Roy, who perceived this to be a great betrayal of the militant
masses by Gandhi and the other Congress leaders, was scathing in his condemnation; he
believed that the Bardoli resolution was a class decision, based on the bourgeoisie's fear
of extensive expropriation of land if the masses won power.
114 Communist Papers, op.cit., p.85.
115 E. Roy, 'Some Facts About the Bombay Strike', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1924, pp.295-
6.
116 It was during the summer of 1921 that the Prince of Wales - heir to the British throne - chose to visit
India and the Indian people took the opportunity to express their anger to the King's envoy.
117 S. Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920-1947, Vol. 1, 1920-1934, Sage Publications Ltd., New
Delhi, 1992, p.50.
118 During the incident police fired on demonstrators who retaliated, killing twenty-two policemen.
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Rapid Industrialisation
Roy's opposition to collaboration with bourgeois democratic nationalist movements and
support of independent Communist action sprang from his conviction that a process of
rapid industrialisation was occurring in India. In his book, India in Transition, published
in 1922, Roy argued that British policy in India since 1916 had been one of encouraging
industrial development in order to expand the markets for British goods and 'Since, for
the interests of imperial capital, the colonial country has to be industrialised, the native
bourgeoisie cannot be any longer excluded altogether from this feast of exploitation'.119
As a result, bourgeois nationalism would compromise with imperialism and the liberation
struggle would be left to the political movement of the workers and peasants, led by the
Communists.120
There was a degree of congruity between this thesis and the views of some British
Communists. As early as 1921, Saklatvala was arguing that, faced with the growing
strength of British labour after the war, British capitalists had begun a process of limited
development of manufacturing output in India. This had encouraged the Indian
bourgeoisie to adopt modern industrialism and generated a competitive process which led
to a general speeding-up of industrialisation in the country. 121
Rajani Palme Dutt also wrote of the change in British Government policy on Indian
economic development which he traced back to the First World War - commencing with
the appointment of the Indian Industrial Commission in 1916, whose 1918 report
advocated a conscious policy of industrialisation. 122 Dutt, who claimed to have originated
119 M.N. Roy, 'The Empire and the Revolution', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 3, No. 4, October 1922, p.224.
120 M.N. Roy, India in Transition, Nachiketa Publishers, Bombay, 1971, p.240.
121 To illustrate his point, he quoted figures showing the number of new companies registered in India
between March 1919 and March 1920 as 965, compared to 356 in the twelve months prior to the outbreak
of the war in 1914. See Shapurji Saklatvala, 'India in the Labour World', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 1, No. 5,
November 1921, pp.440-441.
122	 •	 •Rajani Palme Dutt, Modern India, CPGB, 1927, pp.52-3.
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the rapid industrialisation argument,123 predicted in Modern India, that a deteriorating
world economic situation would accelerate capital export to India, triggering a rapid
industrialisation process. 124
In common with Roy, Dutt concluded that the industrialisation of India, together with the
moderate stance of Congress leaders, was leading to a partnership between British
capitalists and the Indian bourgeoisie. The interests of the Indian bourgeoisie, he wrote,
'are already heavily entangled with Imperialism, and this dependence is increasing.' 125 He
agreed that this process would in turn create a large, exploited Indian proletariat which
would undercut the living standards of British workers, thus facilitating - or so he asserted
- greater working-class solidarity. In this way, the industrial revolution in India would
ultimately 'create the means of India's emancipation'.126
Dutt's thesis differed from Roy's in that his estimation of the size of the industrial
working-class in India - in excess of two million127 - was much lower than Roy's. 128 putt
also argued, in contrast to Roy, that the industrialisation process was causing tensions
between British and Indian capitalists; 'The conception of current capitalist development
in India as a national development is a dangerous delusion. On the contrary . . .
(Imperialism) is drawing Indian Capitalism more and more into its train'. 129 By this
reasoning, sections of the Indian bourgeoisie did have a role to play in the anti-imperialist
struggle. Dull	 saw the Congress leadership as representatives of 'petty-bourgeois
intellectual elements', 139 rather than of the big bourgeoisie - another nuance of analysis
which distanced him from Roy's version of the argument. Whilst condemning nationalist
123 M. Ahmed, Myself and the Communist Party of India, National Book Agency, Calcutta, 1970, pp.479-
480.
124 He also saw the 1917 Montague-Chelmsford Report, which recommended a policy of limited self-
government or dyarchy, as the political counterpart of the rapid industrialisation process and the beginnings
of limited power-sharing between British and Indian capitalists.
125 Rajani Palme Dutt, 1927, op.cit., p.68.
126 Ibid, p.37.
127 R.P. Dutt, 1927, op.cit., p.19.
128 M.N. Roy, 1971, op.cit., p.54, pp.119-121.
129 R.P. Dutt, 1927, op.cit., p.63.
130 Ibid., p.81.
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leaders for encouraging religious and consequently communal differences, 131 he was
prepared to acknowledge Gandhi's achievements, noting that under the Mahatma's
leadership, the INC had become a mass movement.132
Thus the CPGB, consistent with Lenin's call for tactical alliances outside the workers'and
movements
peasante,Acontinued to pursue a policy of co-operation with colonial nationalists.133
Leading members of the party, moreover, seem to have independently grounded this
tactical orientation in a novel analysis of Indian development which owed nothing to the
Comintern and which, indeed, brought them into dispute with leading figures within the
organisation. These differences underlay the conflict between British Party members and
Roy at the Amsterdam Colonial Conference in July 1925 when divisions and uncertainties
within the Comintern were exposed ; 134 the rapid industrialization thesis was also a
position which they were forced to defend at the 1928 Comintern Congress and one which
they only very reluctantly abandoned thereafter.
With the advent of ultra-leftism, the CPGB's analysis came into direct conflict with
Comintern policy. The rationalisation of the Comintern's retreat from Lenin's united
front strategy fell to the Comintern economist, Eugene Varga, 135 who claimed that the
Indian bourgeoisie, antagonised by Britain's policy of retarding native industry, would
attempt to win concessions from the imperialist power by betraying the revolution.136
The colonial bourgeoisie were therefore judged to be incapable of leading the anti-
imperialist struggle; only the proletariat - in effect, the Communists - could do so.
131 Given the power of religious and communal traditions in Indian society, the task which Communists
faced in transmitting their message was a Herculean one.
132 R.P. Dutt, 1927, op.cit., p.72.
133 Roy, in one of a series of mistakes, endorsed the short-lived Swaraj Party, which was formed from the
'progress ive' wing of the INC by C.R. Das, believing it to be a potential 'embryonic revolutionary mass
party'. See E.H. Carr, op.cit., p.662.
134 Communist Papers, op.cit., pp.85-6.
135 E. Varga, 'Economic Policy in the Fourth Quarter'. Inprecorr, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1928, pp.285-310.
136 Evidence for this process was seen in the Swarajist's support of Dominion status for India and in
Ghandi's 'reactionary dreams', (See Jane Degras, Vol. 3, op.cit., p.389), of protecting native industry and
use of passive resistance. The Swaraj Party, led by C.R. Das, won substantial support at a special
Conference in Delhi in 1923, by opposing Gandhi's passivism. But by April 1927 the Party had returned to
the INC fold.
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Comintern leaders traduced the position of British Communists on this question in 1928.
It was directly equated to the views of Roy - now in disgrace - and both Roy and Dutt
were condemned as theorists of 'decolonisation' by Kuusinen at the sixth Congress.
Dutt's Modern India was specifically cited as a source of the fictional heresy. According
to this analysis, Comintern leaders argued, industrialisation would lead to an easing of
British rule in India and eventually to self-government - if decolonisation was a reality,
then Communists would have to admit that imperialism had played a progressive role in
the colonies and this just could not be so.
With the exception of J.T. Murphy, British delegates defended their position. They
exposed the weakness of the official line by questioning why the native bourgeoisie
would choose to collaborate in the deliberate retardation of their domestic economy and
how, in such conditions, it would be possible for the proletariat to develop to the level
where it would play a pivotal role in the national liberation struggle. When the vote on
Kuusinen's theses was taken, fourteen of the eighteen British delegates refused to support
the Comintern line.I37
The irony was that the anti-imperialist united front now being jettisoned by the Comintern
was beginning to show signs of success in India. Calls at the INC's 1927 Madras
Congress for full independence, the creation within Congress of the Independence for
India League 138 and Nehru's participation in the 1927 Brussels Congress, all signalled a
more radical mood within the Indian nationalist movement. This was consistent with the
views of British Communists, who argued that progressive nationalists such as Nehru
were moving to the left and these views were further vindicated when Gandhi, at the
beginning of 1930, launched the second great campaign of non-co-operation, in the name
of complete independence.
137 J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.123.
138 The Independence for India League was a pressure group led by Nehru and Subhas Bose.
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Conclusion
The newly-formed CPGB faced a number of problems. As a small Party formed from
groups outside the mainstream labour movement and affiliated to a body involved in
European-wide competition with the Labour and Socialist International and subversion in
the colonies, it was certain to arouse the suspicions of Labour leaders. But it also drew
criticism from the Communist International. Members were slow to conform to the
directives of Lenin, of which they had scant knowledge and understanding; many still
clung to the old Radical view of imperialism and failed to appreciate the central role of
imperialism in revolutionary strategy. Even so, the party benefitted from the presence in
its ranks of anti-colonial activists of the calibre of Rajani Palme Dutt, Shapurji Saklatvala
and Clemens Dutt who strove to interpret and explain communist theory and to develop
the CPGB's colonial work at home and abroad.
In Britain, the Party's propaganda machine was set in motion, primarily through the pages
of Dutt's Labour Monthly, but also in Workers' Weekly. Communists were able to attack
the Labour Government's record on foreign and colonial issues as a continuance of the
status quo and to capitalise on the resentment which many colonial activists felt towards
an administration in which they had invested their hopes only to be quickly disappointed.
In contrast, the CPGB's own uncompromising stance on imperialism was winning friends
and gaining influence. During the 1920s Communists came to dominate a number of
organisations on the left as they campaigned on issues such as forced labour, land robbery
and punitive taxation, which the Labour leadership was not addressing - even though its
own Imperial Advisory Committee complained of these practices. While the Comintern's
interest in black activists at this time was expressed mainly in broad outline, at least some
British Communists were putting forward more specific arguments in relation to Africa
and beginning to differentiate between African territories and their specific problems.
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On an agitational level, the Party worked to establish links with colonial workers and
students in Britain through organisations like the NMM, which was responsible for
initiatives like the Oriental Seamen's Union, the British arm of the INC and the WWLI.
As the British representative of the AITUC, the WWLI offered an important medium
through which to reach the British TUC and promote the campaign for Indian workers'
rights but in this, as in other initiatives, the fragile alliance between Communists and non-
Communists fractured in the polarised atmosphere after 1928. The CPGB was
particularly successful in cultivating links with Indian and Burmese students in Britain -
here Indian student organisations such as the Indian Majlis and Fedind were useful -
whom they hoped to use as emissaries and cadres for the Communist cause upon their
return home.
Divisions existed within the Comintern in relation to many aspects of colonial policy and
it must be recognised that the national and colonial theses adopted in the 1920s were, at
best, not much more than the first step towards a Marxist analysis of this very complex
question. Little wonder that those Communists engaged in this work could not even agree
over fundamental issues such as the character of bourgeois nationalist movements, for
instance, and the desirability of collaboratiing with them. Despite being censured for
pursuing arguments such as those formulated in Dutt's Modern India, the British Party
was able to develop its own distinctive line through its experts at a time when the
Comintern itself was divided and unsure on this and other issues.
From the mid-1920s, British Communists were able to unite around a resolute and
coherent anti-imperialist policy based on Leninist theories which included a practical
strategy for their implementation. This gave them a constituency on the British left and
also a credence with colonial activists which the Labour Party, burdened with rather
nebulous anti-colonialist credentials which were put to the test in office, could not
achieve.
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In addition, as one arm of a powerful international body headed by a model 'workers'
state, the Party was able to establish a network of contacts among colonial nationalists
and consequently, an organisational base in the colonies upon which to build. There is no
doubt that the work of the Communists prior to the late 1920s was facilitated by the more
co-operative atmosphere engendered by the united front strategy. It was from this
strategy that one of the most successful Communist anti-imperialist initiatives sprang -
the anti-imperialist Brussels Congress of 1927.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM
Background To The Brussels Congress
The Communist International was early alerted to the value of constructing a broad-based
international anti-imperialist movement as part of an overall united front strategy. In
September 1924, A. Rosenholz proposed to the Secretariat of the Executive Committee
of the Comintern, (ECCI), that they form 'an International Union to fight against
imperialism, bringing together not only Communist groups of oppressed nationalities but
a wider circle, within the auspices of the Comintern."
The reasoning behind this suggestion is clear; by the mid-1920s, unrest had broken out in
a number of colonial territories - Morocco, Indonesia, Syria and Nicaragua were all
affected - reinforcing the belief that the anti-colonial struggle was gathering momentum.
Furthermore, when the 1925 Shanghai strike and trade boycott was brutally suppressed by
the colonial authorities, many socialists in the West sympathised with the Chinese
workers' cause.
The willingness of British political figures such as the Labour M.P.s George Lansbury,
James Maxton, Ellen Wilkinson and A.J. Cook2 to identify with the China campaign3
encouraged the Communist movement towards the idea of establishing a united anti-
imperialist front, and ultimately gave rise to a major international initiative, the Brussels
Congress and its lasting organisational expression, the League Against Imperialism (LAI).
I Quoted in Dr. Mustafa Haikel, (University of Leipzig), 'Die Liga gegen Imperialismus und fur nationale
Unabhangigkeit', Research Paper prepared for a project organised by the IISH in 1992, references from the
Russian Centre for the Preservation of and Research into Modern History, Moscow. Dr. Haikel's work was
published as: 'The League Against Imperialism and for National Independence, 1927-37', in Jurgen Rojahn
(ed.), The Communist International and its National Sections. 1919-1943, Peter Lang AG, 1994. A
Commission under Bela Kun was subsequently set up to investigate the viability of Rosenholz's scheme but
Haikel could not find further information on this.
2 A.J. Cook, who resigned from the CPGB in 1921, served as General Secretary of the Miners' Federation
from 1924.
3 The highly successful China campaign, initiated by the Workers International Relief, (WIR) - a united
front organisation - at the beginning of June 1925, led to the WIR forming its own Colonial Section and
extending its work in Africa and Asia.
52
The idea of staging a Congress in Europe at which colonial nationalists could meet with
their Western sympathisers, was mooted by British Communists during a secret meeting
held in Amsterdam on the 11th and 12th July, 1925. Delegates, who included M.N. Roy,
Evelyn Roy, Henrik Sneevliet and Clemens Duff, discussed arrangements for an 'Oriental
Conference', to which colonial nationalists from India, Egypt, Syria, Palestine and
Morocco would be invited. Roy, consistent with his theses to the Second Comintern
Congress, argued against such a gathering, labelling it a 'futile' undertaking which would
involve 'unreliable elements 4 To Roy, these elements included those Indian nationalists
whom the CPGB were actively courting at that time. This conference never materialised,
but the idea was subsequently carried through by Willi Munzenberg, 5 General Secretary
of the Workers' International Relief, (WIR), reaching fruition in February 1927.
The first official steps towards organising an international anti-imperialist conference
were taken at a meeting convened on February 10th, 1926, in the Town Hall, Berlin.6
During these proceedings a League Against Colonial Oppression, LACO 3 7 was formed, its
stated purpose being to organise a conference to 'bring together all elements willing to
strike effectively against colonial atrocities and oppression: 8 It was originally intended to
4 Communist Papers, op.cit., p.86.
5 Munzenberg was fast emerging as one of the Comintern's chief propagandists. For details of his life and
works see: Babette Gross, Willi Munzenberg: a political biography,Michigan State University Press,
Michigan, 1974; R.N. Carew Hunt, 'Willi Munzenberg', in D. Footman (ed.),St. Anthony's Papers, No.IX,
International Communism, Chatto and Windus, London, 1960; H. Gruber, 'Willi Munzenberg: chief
propagandist for and against the Comintern', in International Revolutionary Socialist History, No. 10, Part 2,
1965; M. Haikel, op.cit., pp.12-13.
6 The meeting was convened on the joint initiative of the WIR and the Committee Against Atrocities in
Syria - a communist organisation engaged in agitation against the French authorities. Otto Lehmann-
Russbuldt of the German League for Civil Rights (GLCR) chaired the assembly; those present included
Gibarti, representing the WIR; Dr. Klauber of the Socialist Doctors; Mohammed Pour Reza, Socialist Party
of Persia; Marmulla, League of ex-combatants; Winter, GLCR; Munzenberg and a representative from
Camaroon.
7 Also referred to as the League Against Colonialism and the League Against Colonial Atrocities and
Oppression. Evidence of pre-planning was revealed in Munzenberg's announcement that the initiating
organisation of the LACO had already made the first moves towards convening the international conference.
8 The LACO's inauguration was announced ininprecorr, the Comintern's International Press
Correspondence, on 3rd August 1926, together with Munzenberg's proposal for an International Congress of
Oppressed Peoples. An LACO newsheet, The Struggle for Colonial Freedom - first published on 5th July
1926 - proceeded to offer 'honorary membership' cards. See International Information, Vol.IV, No.51, 7-
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stage the event in Berlin, where Munzenberg's headquarters were situated, but the German
Government refused permission following pressure from Britain. 9 Brussels was
eventually secured as the venue after the Hungarian communist Louis Gibarti travelled to
Belgium to negotiate terms.10
Soviet Russia's initial reaction to the plan was one of scepticism. Many leading members
of the CPSU, fearing ideological confusion, shared M.N. Roy's disapproval of
Munzenberg's methods of recruiting broad-based support for Communist causes. G.
Voitinski, deputy head of the Comintern's Eastern Secretariat, warned a meeting of the
Eastern Committee of the ECCI in March 1926, that such a conference could be used by
the Social Democrats against the Comintern and the Soviet Union." But these doubts
lost credence as leading political and intellectual figures responded to the Conference
invitations 12 and, in the event, the general response to the Congress went far beyond the
expectations of its organisers.
One of the most valued participants was Jawaharlal Nehru, then General Secretary of the
Indian National Congress (INC). Nehru, who in March 1926 accompanied his sick wife,
Kamala, on an extended trip to Europe for medical treatment, was informed of the
proposed Conference whilst in Berlin. He immediately realised its potential both as a
vehicle for INC propaganda and as a means of 'getting into touch with other countries and
peoples so that we may be able to understand their viewpoint and world politics
generally.' 13 His call for Congress to participate met with an enthusiastic response and he
10-27, p.416, published by the Secretariat of the Labour and Socialist International, Zurich, ID/CI136/7i,
(LPA).
9 George Padmore, op.cit., p.322. During the period of the Weimar Republic the city played host to a
large number of colonial activists, many of whom had established contact with the LACO.
10 Babette Gross, op.cit., p.185. Agreement was reached following Gibarti's assurance that the situation in
the Belgian Congo would not be discussed and that a list of delegates would be submitted to the Belgian
Surete for approval. It was significant that the recently appointed Belgian Foreign Minister, Emile
Vandervelde, was also secretary of the Second International - a decision to ban a congress against
imperialism would have undoubtedly reflected badly upon that organisation and its leaders.
11 M. Haikel, op.cit., p.19.
12 From early 1926, the WIR's Colonial Committee sent out hundreds of invitations throughout the world.
13 Dorothy Norman (ed.), Nehru: the First Sixty Years, The Bodley Head, London, 1965, p.128.
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was duly appointed as the official INC representative to the Brussels Congress - the first
occasion that Congress had sent a delegate to any international body.14
The Comintern was delighted with this development; an ECCI document entitled -
'Instructions for Delegates to the Brussels Congress', had stressed the need to establish
political relations between national revolutionary parties, especially 'the Indian, Egyptian
and other British colonial delegates'. 15 As a seal of approval on the Conference plan,
Moscow despatched Marcel Rosenberg, a Russian Foreign Office official, to Berlin with
orders to advise Conference organisers on the political character of the groups and
individuals involved.16
The Brussels Congress
British Communists - and Shapurji Saklatvala in particular - played an important role in
organising the Brussels Congress. 17 Invitations were issued from Berlin in December
1926 by a Provisional Congress Committee ls which included Saklatvala, who had been
prevented by the Egyptian Government from visiting that country in order to publicise the
event, a decision which led to protests in the Egyptian Parliament. 19 The appointment of
the British delegation - one of the largest with eighteen members - was organised by
Helen Crawfurd, a leading CPGB member and secretary of the British Bureau of the
WIR, and Reginald Bridgeman, a non-Communist, ex-professional diplomat of
aristocratic background."
14 In May 1927, the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution which recommended affiliation
with the LA!, the organisation which was officially formed at the Brussels Congress. SeeThe Anti-
Imperialist Review, Vol.!, No.1, July 1928, in the Reginald Bridgeman Papers (henceforth RBP), Brynmor
Jones Library, Hull University.
15 M. Haikel, op.cit., p.29.
16 Babette Gross, op.cit., p.185. A number of pre-Congress meetings were held with delegates from India,
South Africa and Indonesia, to ascertain and focus their views.
17 M. Haikel, op.cit., p.24, 11.5.
18 Opening of the Brussels Congress, 1927, LAI (1-50), International Institute for Social History
(henceforth IISH), Amsterdam. The Committee also included George Lansbury, Roger Baldwin, Mrs. Sun
Yat Sen, Nehru and Munzenberg, with Louis Gibarti as the contact name.
19 M. Haikel, op.cit., p.25.
20 Reginald Francis Orlando Bridgeman, a carreer diplomat, was acting Charge d'Affaires at the British
Embassy in Tehran during 1921, but was subsequently compulsorily retired from the service because of his
anti-imperialist views. See The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1924,
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The delegation was first discussed at a meeting held in the House of Commons on 2nd.
December, 1926, attended by the Labour M.P.s George Lansbury; R.C. Wallhead; J.
Compton; J.J. Tinker; Ernest Thurtle and Ellen Wilkinson. Also present were Colonel
L'Estrange Malone, a future Labour M.P. for Northampton; Ben Tillett of the Transport
and General Workers Union and member of the TUC General Council; W.N. Ewer, the
Daily Herald's foreign editor; Bridgeman; Saklatvala and Ralph Fox, a Communist writer
who later died fighting in the Spanish Civil War. A circular was subsequently issued by
Bridgeman on 4th. February 1927, announcing that the Belgian Government had given
authorisation for the Congress to be held in Brussels.21
A special Congress Secretariat was temporarily established at the Hotel du Globe, Place
Royale, Brussels, and Georges Gerard, secretary of the Belgian Section of the LACO,
was appointed acting secretary. The first full session opened at 4pm on Thursday,
February 10th 1927, and proceedings continued until the 15th, during which time
delegates discussed issues as listed on the Agenda. 22 Despite the difficulties involved in
assembling such a gathering - many delegates were forced to travel illegally to the
Congress - attendance was high, with an impressive number of eminent intellectuals and
literary figures offering their support both to the Congress and to the LAI. The official
list of officers elected and delegates in attendence is recorded in the 'Official Protocol of
the Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, the Signal Flame at the
Palais Egmont, Berlin, 1927', and is reproduced in Appendix Two of this thesis.
Full prominence was given to high-status participants - the opening address was delivered
by the distinguished French writer Henri Barbusse and honorary members of the
pp.153-4, ID/Cl/3611, (LPA).; J. Bellamy and J. Saville, National Dictionary of Labour Biography,Vol. 7,
Macmillan, 1984, p.41.
21 R. Bridgeman, Circular Letter, 4-2-27, (RBP).
22 These included Imperialism and its consequences in the colonies; Imperialism and the dangers of war;
co-operation between and co-ordination of national liberation movements and metropolitan labour; the
establishment of a permanent global anti-imperialist organisation.
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Presidium included his contemporary, Romain Rolland; American novelist Upton
Sinclair; Russian novelist Maxim Gorki and Albert Einstein. 23 Further messages of
support were received from Victor Margueritte, Mahatma Gandhi and Clara Zetkin,
president of International Red Aid, (MOPR).24
George Lansbury, the vice-president and respected 'elder statesman' of the British Labour
Party whose address urged those struggling for liberation in Africa and Asia to follow
Socialism before nationalism, was a particularly welcome ally. 25 Lansbury's support,
together with that of Edo Fimmen - Dutch founder of the International Federation of
Transport Workers and former Secretary of the moderate International Federation of
Trade Unions - helped to form the proceedings into a politically heterogeneous affair.
The most influential group at the Congress was provided by the Chinese. 26 The situation
in China was the focus of Soviet hopes 27 and a prominent issue in Comintern
deliberations at this time and this was reflected in Congress debates, with British
delegates speaking mainly on the progress of the1925-27 Nationalist Revolution. Given
the importance of both China and India to the anti-imperialist struggle, great significance
was given to the signing during the Congress of a Sino-Indian declaration of solidarity
drafted by
two nations.
23 Einstein did not attend the Congress, but sent a letter of encouragement.
24 Rolf Italiaander, Schwarze Haute im Roten Griff,Dusseldorf, 1962, p.32. MOPR was established by
the Comintern in 1922 to aid victims of the class struggle.
25 For details of Lansbury's address see Opening of the Brussels Congress, op.cit. He was unable to attend
the Brussels proceedings in person because of work commitments.
26 It was claimed in some quarters that the Kuomintang (KMT), was largely responsible for financing the
event, (See Letter, William Gillies to Walter Citrine, 28-8-29, (LPA), although support also came from
President Calles' National Peoples' Government of Mexico. The Mexican revolution, which began with
Alvaro Obregon's government in 1917, collided with vested interests when the government of Plutarco
Calles attempted to implement article 27 of the constitution and restore the land to the peasants. This was
opposed by landowners, the church and US oil magnates. SeeNew Leader, 14-2-27.
27 'The United Front in the Struggle for Emancipation of the Oppressed Nations', Resolution, Brussels
Congress, p.2, (IISH).
28 S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru - a biography Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p.54.
Nehru,28 which marked the beginning of a period of close relations between the
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Although African affairs did not feature prominently during the Congress, this was a time
when the Comintern, aware of the decline of early Pan-Africanism29 and the black
nationalist ideas of Marcus Garvey, was attempting to recruit negro groups30 and several
of the delegates were either African or of African descent. These included Lamine
Senghor, the French West African who represented the Comite de la defense de la race
negre (CDRN)31 and who was elected during the Congress to serve on both the Executive
Committee and the Bureau of the League. Senghor, who was accompanied to the
Congress by Narcisse Danae, Max Bloncourt and other members of the CDRN,32 made an
impact upon the proceedings by launching a scathing attack on French colonialism.33
During the Congress, he chaired a Commission 34 which compiled a resolution on the
Negro Question calling for the liberation of the Negro race, which was presented to the
Plenary Session on the Negro Question by the Afro-American, R.B. Moore.35
As Nehru had recognised, one of the most important functions of the Conference was that
it presented a unique opportunity for colonial activists to meet together and to experience
wider influences, particularly during the many informal meetings which preceeded the
Conference proper. For example, the South Africans I.A. La Guma and J.T. Gumede
accepted an invitation to visit the U.S.S.R. during the autumn of 1927, as did Nehru.36
29 A number of Pan-African Congresses were convened during the early decades of the century; these
were held in Paris in 1919, in London and Brussels during 1921, in Lisbon and London during 1923 and in
New York in 1927. Largely the initiative of the Afro-American writer and campaigner, W.E. Bois, working
in collaboration with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples, the early gatherings
tended to be politically moderate events, essentially concerned with creating a sense of positive identity.
The 1923 manifesto for example, included the request, 'we ask in all the world, that black folk be treated as
men', (Quoted in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism. a short political guide, Greenwood Press, Connecticut,
1976, p.29.) - aspirations to self-determination were as yet largely unkindled.
30 Primarily through the auspices of Munzenberg.
31 Senghor was president of the CDRN,
32 See J.A. Langley, 'Pan-Africanism in Paris 1924-1936', in theJournal of Modern African Studies, Vol.
7, No. 1, 1969, pp.78-81. The CDRN, which was formed in March 1926 by Senghor, a member of the
French CP since 1923, was regarded as pro-communist by the French authorities.
33 Senghor's address is quoted in Ibid, p.82.
34 Other participants included R.B. Moore; Martins; Bloncourt and J.T. Gumede, representing the African
National Congress.
35 In addition to members of the Commission, the Session was attended by Hafiz Bey Ramadan, who took
the chair, and the Senegalese Deputy to the French Assembly, Blaise Diange, who appeared under a
pseudonymn. See Imanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement,Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1974, p.329.
36 In November 1927 Nehru, accompanied by his father Motilal, visited the Soviet Union where he met
Roy for the first time, and appeared to have been 'considerably impressed by the social experiments that
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They and E. A. Richards, otherwise known as I.T.A. Wallace Johnson, chair of the Sierra
Leone Railway Workers' Union, toured the Soviet Union and attended the tenth
anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution, an experience which impressed
them deeply.37
A recognition of pluralism and spirit of tolerance, implicit in the Resolution on the United
Front in the Struggle for the Emancipation of the Oppressed Nations,38 ensured that the
Congress proceedings ran smoothly. Such sensitivity was also behind the low profile
Communist presence. The delegates themselves generally reacted with enthusiasm to the
event; Nehru39 for example, pronounced it 'A milestone in Indian foreign relations', 40 and
the editorial of New Leader for 18th February, 1927, echoed this favourable reaction.41
Even the Comintern, although unable to exercise total control, was satisfied,42 while the
general consensus of opinion among friend and foe alike was that the initiative had been a
great success.
Buoyed by such optimism the LAI, which pledged to fight 'for the political and social
emancipation of all peoples', began with high hopes. 43 According to a foreword by James
Maxton44 in the July 1928 edition of the Anti-Imperialist Review,45 the League 'has
were being carried out there.' See L.P. Singha, 'Marxism and Nehru's Concept of Socialism', inPolitical
Science Review, Vol. 12, Part 314, 1973, p.213.
37 E.T. Wilson, op.cit., p.153.
38 'The United Front in the Struggle for the Emancipation of the Oppressed Nations', Resolution, Brussels
Congress, 1927, (IISH).
39 During the Congress, Nehru mingled with Marxists such as Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and 'on his
return. . . Loudly applauded the achievements of the Soviet Union'. See L.P. Singha, op.cit.
40 Quoted in M. Haikel, op.cit., p.32.
41 Editorial Comment, New Leader, 18th February, 1927, described a 'very remarkable conference', which
could influence nationalist movements to be concerned with economic liberty as well as political liberty and
'to incorporate their nationalism within a wider Internationalism'. The event also led European Socialists to
'see capitalism as a closely knit world tyranny'.
42 The Resolution on Imperialism passed by the Congress followed Leninist theory in describing
imperialism as; 'not an accidental phenomenon from which capitalism can rid itself of its own volition, it is
the logical sequence of historical development.' Resolution on Imperialism, Brussels Congress 10th.-14th.
February 1927, LA! (51-101), (IISH).
43 Statutes of the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence, n.d., c1928, ID/CI136/9,
(LPA).
44 Maxton was chair of the ILP and editor of that organisation's newsheet,New Leader.
45 A single issue of the Anti-Imperialist Review, journal of the LA!, was issued in 1928; publication
resumed in September 1931.
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established contact with every part of the world and is amassing exact information about
the conditions of the workers everywhere'. 46 This was an extravagant claim, but in the
months immediately following the Brussels Congress, the anti-imperialist struggle was
certainly given a new organisational impetus.
Even as the success of the Congress was being celebrated, however, the attitudes of the
Communist leadership were hardening into the sectarian policies of the Third Period. The
implementation of Stalin's hardline 'class against class' policy at the Sixth Comintern
Congress in 1928 was the result of a combination of factors; notably the Communist's
growing belief in the radicalisation of the masses and an increasing hostility towards the
Communist movement from leaders of the Second International. In Britain both these
developments were thought to have accelerated after the 1926 General Strike. 47 But it
was the split between Chinese nationalist forces and Communists in April 1927, 48 which
highlighted for the Comintern the dangers inherent in united front policies.49
From the time of the League Against Imperialism's inaugural General Assembly, held in
Brussels on 9th-11th December 1927, the Communists stepped up their attacks on the
social democrats50 - whose theory of the gradual road to self-determination was described
as 'a direct aid to imperialism 51 - and the colonial national bourgeoisie. Significantly, the
defence of the Soviet Union 52 was given greater priority in League business; it was
46 Anti-Imperialist Review, op.cit.
47 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., pp.113-114.
48 During the 1925-7 Chinese Revolution, Chinese communists joined forces with the nationalist
Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai Shek in a classic united front operation, but on 12th April 1927, Chiang
turned on his erstwhile allies, massacring the Communist fractions.
49 In December 1927, the League condemned the KMT's betrayal of the anti-imperialist struggle, and
warned that a similar betrayal was to be expected in other colonial countries, citing the Indian landowners
and 'big bourgeoisie' as elements ready to compromise with imperialism in return for concessions. See
Resolutions of the General Council of the LA!, December 1927, Resolution on China, LA! 51-101, (IISH);
Resolutions of the General council of the LA!, December 1927, Political Resolution, op.cit.
The League's General Council denounced the Simon Commission, established in Britain in 1927 to
examine avenues towards Indian self-government, as an 'impudent farce' and attacked the Labour Party's
support of it. See Resolutions of the General Council of the LA!, December 1927, Resolution on India,
op.cit.
51 Resolutions of the General Council of the LAI, December 1927, Political Resolution, op.cit.
52 The Soviet Union had proposed total disarmament at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
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maintained that since the Brussels Congress, increasingly aggressive imperialist policies
had been implemented and the danger of war through inter-imperialist rivalry was
increasing.
Communist Front
Hostility to the Brussels Congress and the LAI sprang from two main sources - the
colonial governments, which banned League literature and colluded to restrict the
movements of those involved in League activities, 53 and the Labour and Socialist
International (LSI). The LSI's opposition to the League was predicated on the belief that
it was a Communist front organisation whose ultimate aim was to discredit the Second
International whilst promoting the spread of Communist ideology throughout the
colonies. 54 The motives and independence of many of the Brussels delegates were also
called into question by the Socialist body, which queried the accuracy of the official
Congress minutes. 55 After some deliberation, the LSI concluded that 'the fact that the
initiative for the Brussels Congress and for the foundation of the League derives from the
Communists permits no doubt whatever'.56
One of the most immediate ramfications of the LSI's stance was that George Lansbury,
who was in line to become chair of the British Labour Party, resigned his position as chair
of the International LA! in June 1927, as it became clear that the two posts were
incompatible. Fenner Brockway, a leading ILP member, took over the post at a meeting
of the League held in Cologne on August 19th and 20th. 57 But he was obliged to follow
Lansbury's example after a decision of the LSI's Executive on the 2nd September, which
53 See Jean Jones, The League Against Imperialism, Occasional Papers Series No. 4, The Socialist
History Society, 1996, pp.8-9.
54 The LSI accused the League of being 'intent on subordinating the interests of oppressed peoples and of
nationalist movements to the political interests of an unnamed power' - the Soviet Union.International
Information, op.cit., p.424.
55 Jean Jones, 1996, op.cit.
56 See Report of E.C. meeting of the LSI, September 1927, ID/Cl/3615i, Supplementary Notes, (LPA)
57 Letter, Friedrich Adler to Fenner Brockway, 13-4-27, ID/C1/36/5iv, (LPA).
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passed a resolution stating that 'it cannot be any part of the tasks of the LSI or of parties
affiliated thereto, to join the so-called League Against Colonial Oppression'.58
There is no doubt that the Comintern was determined that the Brussels Congress and the
LAI should not fall under the sway of its rivals in the Second International. In its
Insfuctions for Delegates to the Brussels Congress', the ECCI's Political Secretariat
A
admitted that 'the purpose of the (Communist) delegation is to gain control of the
Congress' 59 and three months later, Munzenberg wrote, 'Every effort must be made to
bring communist sympathisers, men and women, into the League'.69 The Comintern
hierarchy was prepared to countenance a limited degree of co-operation with social
democrats in the belief that their involvement would encourage the participation of those
who would otherwise shun an all-Communist body. Figures from the British labour
movement were particularly useful in this battle for hearts and minds. 61 But it was an
uneasy alliance, based on mutual suspicion and fear.
Despite the machinations of the Comintern and the disparagement of the LSI, the
principles upon which the Brussels Congress was founded - of freedom, equality and
international brotherhood - proved stronger than the political manoeuvring. The
Communist initiative was unprecedented and responded to a need which no other political
movement, and in particular the LSI, had attempted to address. 62 Delegates met together,
exchanging ideas, cementing alliances, pledging mutual support and, in so doing, ensured
that the initiative was a remarkable success. However, the LAI, conceived as a great
58 International Information, op.cit., p.424.
59 M. Haikel, op.cit., p.28.
60 Ibid., p.35.
61 Ibid. Following the formation of the British section of the League, Munzenberg was able to claim that,
'Our great advantage is that we can exploit the fact that the League has been established in England and thaL
Lansbury and Fenner Brockway are spearheading it against the Second International, which constantly
denounces us as a Communist sham.'
62 The words of Einstein encapsulated the spirit which the Congress briefly awakened: 'I wish success to
your noble endeavour', he wrote, 'and I am convinced that the success of the work which you have
undertaken will be of great benefit to everyone who has at heart a sense of human dignity'. Quoted in
Opening of the Brussels Congress, op.cit., (IISH)
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mass movement against imperialism and for Socialism, was unable to sustain this
goodwill for more than a brief period of its existence.
The Second World Congress
An Executive Committee meeting of the League held in Cologne on the 15/16th January,
1929, where the Russians led by Melnichansky 63 played an active role for the first time,
marked the point at which the League was brought fully into line with the Comintern's
new hard-line policy. 64 In the wake of Brockway's resignation, James Maxton had been
elected chair of the International League at the first session of the General Council held in
Brussels on December 8th, 1927. 65 But by February, 1929, Communists and their
sympathisers were taking control of the E.C..66
The impact of the new Comintern line was evident from the structuring of the Second
World Congress of the LAI, which opened in Frankfurt-am-Main on July 21st, 1929.67
While the official Congress report gives the number of delegates present as 263; 68 these
being representatives of trade unions, nationalist organisations and the League's national
sections,69 J.R. Hooker maintains that of the delegates present, only 84 were genuine
63 A leading member of the Central Council of the All-Russian Federation of Trade Unions.
64 E.T. Wilson, op.cit., p.170. During 1929, the Comintern moved its headquarters from Moscow to
Berlin, the latter bring more accessible to foreign activists and geographically removed from Soviet
responsibility.
65 Anti-Imperialist Review, op.cit.
66 Munzenberg had replaced Gibarti as general secretary and the Indian communist Chattopadhyaya was
joint secretary. Other appointees were; Mme Duchesne, Saklatvala, Nehru, Melnichanski, Dr. A. Marteaux,
Reginald Bridgeman, the American Roger Baldwin, Mohammed Hatta, Mustapha Chedli and the Mexican
artist, Diego Rivera. See Invitation to the Second World Congress of the LAI, 20th-31st July, 1929,
ID/Cl/36/19, (LPA); Agenda of the Second World Congress of the LAI, Paris (original venue), 20th-31th
July, 1929, (IISH).
67 The Second Congress was originally intended to meet in Paris. Labour Monthly, Vol.11, No.7, July
1929, p.420 see also Invitation to the Second World Congress, op.cit.
68 Among the British delegation was Sam Elsbury, leader of the short-lived United Clothing Workers
Union and a CPGB member until his expulsion in late 1929; Len Bradley, brother of the CPGB activist, Ben
Bradley, who was imprisoned that same year for his role in helping to establish trade unions in India and
A.J. Cook - a founder member of the CPGB who resigned in 1921, but remained active in the National
Minority Movement.
69 The list of affiliated organisations in 1929 were given as: INC; AITUC; Independence for India
League; a total of sixteen trade unions in India; Sarekat Karem Boeroeh Indonesia; Egyptian National Party;
ANC; Railwaymen's Union, Sierra Leone; twenty trade unions in Mexico; IRA, Ireland; Sinn Fein and LAI
sections in Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, San Salvadore, Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador, Porto Rico,
Uraguay, Argentina, Brazil, France, Holland, Germany, USA. Sympathising organisations were listed as:
63
colonial representatives and of these only 15 had travelled directly from the colonies."
The Congress, a carefully controlled affair offering little opportunity for spontaneity,
opened to the symbolic presentation of a blood-stained flag by General Sandino 71 of
Nicaragua, 72 a reflection of the growing awareness of the USA's imperial ambitions in
this area.73
In an attempt to commit delegates to a line sympathetic to the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union, a manifesto was drawn up which undermined many of the aims formulated at the
Brussels Congress. 74 The Frankfurt manifesto referred to an 'imminent imperialist war . .
. for the monopolist right to rob' colonies,' while stressing that 'the chief danger is the
danger of war against the Soviet Union'. 75 It was stressed that in the 'decisive world
conflict between imperialism on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other', 76 the
League had to support the latter. The Soviet Union was held to be both a model and a
stimulus for the colonial peoples - the reason, according to Communists, for the
imperialists' war preparations against her.
The manifesto launched a scathing attack on Social Democracy, 77 the prelude to an
orchestrated campaign to rid the League of its non-Communist members to which
the Arabian National Congress (Palestine), Wafd Party, South African TUC, Gold Coast Farmers'
Association, Pan-African Congress (USA), NAACP, Universal Negro Improvement Association.
7° J.R. Hooker, op.cit., p.13.
71 General Augusto Caesar Sandino, a member of the International Executive Committee of the LAI, was
subsequently accused of collaborating with US imperialism, but was cleared of the accusations by August
1930.
72 B. Gross, op.cit., p.195.
73 By June 1929, League sections had been established in a number of South American countries
including Mexico, Argentina, Nicaragua, Brazil and Cuba. In recognition of American imperialism, an
important position was afforded to the Phillipines' delegation - Reginald Bridgeman claimed that the
Phillipines' Confederation of Peasants was the most important group at the Congress because that country
represented the 'spearhead of US interests in the Orient'. See Labour Monthly, July 1929, op.cit., p.423.
74 The International Anti-Militaristic Commission, IAC, which sent delegates to the Frankfurt Congress,
reported that 'as a result of the attempts of the 4icial communists to make the League subservient to the
Third International, our delegates had a very difficult task.' IAC Press Service Report, No. 39, 28th. March,
1930, p.2, Sylvia Pankhurst Papers, (IISH). The Commission, which was founded in the late 1920s and
based in the Hague, was clearly inspired by Gandhi's methods.
75 Manifesto of the Second World Congress of the LA!, 1929, p.2, (IISH).
76 M. Haikel, op.cit., p.42.
77 In its Resolution on the Trade Unions and the Struggle Against Imperialism, the League pledged co-
operation only with those who went beyond 'lip service' - the League regarded the trade unions in the
6\
Maxton, who presided over the second World Congress, succumbed in September 1929.
Maxton was obliged to listen with discomforture as speaker after speaker attacked the
colonial policies of the British Labour Government and its 'apologists' within the ILP
leadership. 78 At the time of the Frankfurt Congress, Labour was again in power and
winning approval for its foreign and colonial policies from Conservative opponents and
their allies in the press. 79 Critics included Harry Pollitt and Saklatvala, who described the
ILP as 'the left outpost of the Labour Party against the revolutionary workers in Britain
and the colonial masses in the British Empire'.81)
Those sections of the colonial nationalist movement which failed 'to join wholeheartedly
with the revolutionary movement of the masses' 81 also came under attack from
Communists. The Declaration of the Second World Congress included a diatribe against
the Nanking government for alleged anti-Soviet acts such as the isiezure' of the Chinese
Eastern Railway and criticism of the INC's preparations for a non-cooperation campaign
by Harry Pollitt, who described it as a waste of opportunities and of lives.82
By 1931, many of the prominent figures whose support had been warmly welcomed in
Brussels and who had substantiated the LAI's claim to be open to all individuals and
organisations supporting the anti-imperialist struggle, had either resigned or been
expelled. Chattopadhyaya wrote to Nehru at the end of 1929, condemning his signing of
the Delhi Manifesto, which declared support for Domnion status, and accusing him of a
'betrayal of the Indian masses'.83
capitalist countries from this point of view -and engaged in a real fight against colonialism. Resolution on
the Trade Unions and the Struggle Against Imperialism, Second World Congress of the LA!, Frankfurt,
1929, (IISH).
78 A hard-line resolution on the issue was proposed by Melnichansky, who denounced Labour's record in
India.
79 The Times, 29-8-29; Letter from Sir Michael O'Dwyer (a former prominent Indian civil servant of
autocratic, right-wing persuasion), to The Times, 11-6-28.
80 The Sunday Worker, 28-7-29.
81 Manifesto of the Second World Congress of the LA!, op.cit., pp.2-3.
82 Declaration of the Second World Congress of the LA!, 21-7-1929, p.3, (IISH).
83 J. Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1988, p.81; Dorothy Norman,
op.cit., p.152.
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Nehru was furious at this insult, his relationship with the LAI deteriorated and in April
1930, in his capacity as President of the INC, he directed Congress to cease all
correspondence with the League. However, the Communists, concerned at the danger of
'a faction of certain elements' forming against the League, held their decision to expel the
Indian leader in abeyance until the following year. 84 Others who found it impossible to
work within the organisation under the new discipline included Roger Baldwin, Director
of the American Civil Liberties Union, who was expelled in Spring 1931 for his support
of the INC, 85 Edo Fimmen and Mohammed Hatta, who resigned from the League.
There was a price to pay for the Communist monopoly; as the League lost its broad-based
support and became increasingly sectarian, so it forfeited much of its integrity and
influence. Most of the leading figures whose involvement had raised the League above
other, less enlightened political organistions had withdrawn their support, leaving it
vulnerable to attack from all quarters. Nevertheless, at the time of the Second Congress,
the League's message was still being spread among colonial activists, particularly among
Africans and peoples of African descent.
The Comintern and Black Liberation
The Sixth Comintern Congress, held in July 1928, had accepted the thesis put forward by
Dr. Otto Kuusinen which called for American negroes to be recognised as a national, as
opposed to a racial, minority and to be allocated their own autonomous state. 86 It was
hoped that the generation of a 'black belt' nationalism 87 would boost CP support among
84 Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Political Bureau, 15-5-30, Reel 11, (CPA).
85 J. Nehru, op.cit., p.99.
86 This was in line with the Stalinist theory on national minorities and echoed Lenin's reference to black
Americans as a subject nation in his Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Question, put to the Second
Comintern Congress in 1920. The issue had been discussed at the Fifth Congress, but was not pursued,
probably in deference to opposition from the CPUSA - Lovett Fort-Whiteman, the only black delegate at the
Fifth Congress, apparantly opposed the idea. See H. Heywood, op.cit., pp.218-244.
87 This strategy was also applied to South Africa, where there was an established Communist Party,
through the proposal for an independent Native South African Republic. A similar scheme, drawn up during
discussions held in Moscow in 1927, had been rejected by the CPSA in favour of a Workers' and Peasants'
Republic (See H. Heywood, op.cit., p.23'7) but, after 1928, objectors were dismissed as 'individual right-
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Afro-Americans, 88 by combining Communism with nationalist aspirations already
kindled by pan-Africanist ideas such as those propagated by Marcus Garvey's Universal
Negro Improvement Association, which spearheaded the once-popular 'Back to Africa'
movement.89
Interest in the African colonies arose from the belief that they were helping to sustain
capitalism in its time of crisis - as financial markets collapsed following the Wall Street
Crash and the system itself appeared to be on the brink of disaster. Confidence in the
African peoples' ability to rise against their oppressors was based on the analysis that an
increasing rate of imperialist exploitation in Africa since the first World War required an
African proletariat, a class which had hitherto barely existed. Communists argued that, in
order to create a ready supply of wage labour, the imperial powers were imposing poll
and hut taxes to force people to work within the capialist system. This was sowing the
seeds of dissent in Africa, with signs that revolt was spreading throughout the sub-
continent.90
In recognition of the importance now ascribed to the question of black liberation, the
Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern established a Negro Bureau in 1928. Among its
members were William Patterson, Earl Browder, James Ford and Harry Heywood. 91 At a
meeting of the Bureau held in the summer 1930, a resolution was passed which endorsed
the policy of blacks as an oppressed national minority, 92 but the scheme was ill-conceived
wing opportunists'. See G. Safarov, 'The World Economic Crisis and the Development of Revolutionary
Ferment in the Colonies', in'The Communist International, Vol. 6, No. 31, 15-2-30, p.1235.
88 Afro-American communists Harry Heywood, James Ford and William Patterson held talks with
Bukharin, Kuusinen, Dmitri Manuilsky and others to urge that more emphasis be put on the role of black
Americans in the colonial struggle. See W. Patterson, op.cit., p.110.
89 Communists originally regarded Garvey's organisation as a potentially important ally.
90 Reel 1, Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 11/12-1-1930, (CPA).
91 Other members included Bill Dunne, William Weinstone, Mingulian - head of the Anglo-American
Secretariat, Mikhailov - Comintern representative to the CPUSA, Nasanov and several students from KUTV
and the Lenin School. See H. Haywood, op.cit., pp.331-2.
92 Ibid.
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and rapidly proved to be both unworkable and damaging, exposing Communists to
accusations of promoting a form of apartheid.93
At the time of the Frankfurt Congress, concerted efforts were being made to recruit black
activists. In its Resolution on the Negro Question, which included demands for equality,
manumission, and workers' rights, the League declared that 'all theories of superior and
inferior races are lies calculated to deceive the masses'. 94 This followed an earlier 'Memo
on Forced Labour' to the International Labour Organisation, issued by Munzenberg,
Chattopadhyaya and Emile Burns, which attacked the use of forced labour by private
firms engaged in public works programmes.95
Communists were now emphasising evidence of reformism among black nationalists.
During a special Congress session held on July 26th, 1929, 96 the Afro-American delegate,
J.W. Ford,97 launched a scathing attack on those bourgeois-reformist elements with
whom the Communist movement was competing for the allegiance of black and coloured
workers. These included the American-based, integrationist, National Association for the
Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP), the moderate pan-Africanism of Dr. Du
93 G. Padmore, op.cit., p.306.
94 Resolution on the Negro Question, Second World Congress of the LAI, Frankfurt, 1929, p.3, (IISH).
95 This memo. gave the example of Griffiths and Co., who in 1925 were given the contract to build a
railway into Uganda with up to 4,000 workers in forced labour, also of Pauling and Co., who built the
harbour at Lobito and the terminus of the Benguella railway (Angola) in 1924/5, and the situation in
Southern Rhodesia, where boys under fourteen without work or parents could be handed over to work for an
employer for six months. Indentured labour was often worse, in the Dutch East Indies, for instance, 22,000
indentured workers were brought from Java to work in Surinam. See Memo on Forced Labour, 1st. June
1929, LAI (51-101), (IISH).
96 It was during this session that Jomo Kenyatta, the future Kenyan leader, first appeared in Frankfurt. J.
Murray-Brown claims that Kenyatta was recruited by an Afro-American, possibly Ford, (see J. Murray-
Brown, Kenyatta, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1972, p.164) but the Kenyan had been in contact
with Bridgeman and the British League since his earlier arrival in England.
97 James W. Ford, an ex-postal clerk, was recruited from the American Negro Labor Congress, (formerly
the African Blood Brotherhood), by the Communists. He stood as the Communist candidate for the Vice-
Presidency of the USA on several occasions.
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Bois, Garveyism, the West African Students Union, (WASU),98 and the black South
African labour leader, Clemens Kedourie.99
A decision was taken during this session to convene an International Congress of Negro
Workers which would meet in London and Ford was elected chair of a provisional
committee set up to organise this. In 1930, the Committee wrote to the Executive Bureau
of the National Minority Movement, asking for information on negro organisations in
Britain, and the NMM was subsequently given responsibilty for organising the first Negro
Congress, originally scheduled for July 1st in London. wo The Comintern expected
national Communist Parties in the colonial powers to address the issue of black liberation
with enthusiasm, and the CPGB itself was instructed to put more emphasis on the Negro
question. m But, following the MacDonald Government's refusal to allow the staging of
the Conference in London, 102 the venue was switched to Hamburg.
During the Conference proceedings, held on the 7th and 8th July, 1930, an International
Trade Union Congress of Negro Workers (ITUCNW) was founded, its purpose being to
organise Africans and the black diaspora on a class-struggle basis. Specifically, its
programme was based on decisions of the Fourth RILU Congress regarding
organisational work. The ITUCNW's objectives included 'organising the unorganised
workers and drawing these into the international revolutionary class struggle'. 103 In
addition to a series of pamphlets a monthly journal, The Negro Worker, which was
initially edited by Ford, was issued by the Congress and generally carried news of strikes,
injustices and repression.
98 Although the WASU, essentially an organisation of middle-class intellectuals, avoided adopting a
definite political stance, its wider political aims included the establishment of a united Africa and many of
the Union's ex-members became leading players in the development of political movements in West Africa.
99 Imanuel Geiss, op.cit., p.333; J.R. Hooker, op.cit., p.13.
100 Minutes of NMM Executive Bureau meetings, 31-1-30; 27-6-30, Box 1, (JTC).
DM M. Sherwood, 'The Comintern, the CPGB Colonies and Black Britons, 1920-1938', a paper presented
to a Conference on the History of the British Communist Party, Manchester, January 1994.
102 Allegedly in response to — 	 pressure from the South African authorities.
103 In particular, to recruit black workers into white trade unions where possible and to establish contacts
in West, Central and East Africa, for the purpose of linking up the workers there with the South African
centre'. See The Negro Worker, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1928, p.2.
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The inaugural conference of the ITUCNW was attended by seventeen full delegates,
representing 20,000 workers from seven countries, including Jamaica, Gambia, South
Africa, Nigeria, the Gold Coast and the Camaroons. 104 The organisation's E.C. included
Ford; Tiemoho Garan Kouyaute, who replaced Lamine Senghor as leader of the
CDRN; 105 the Trinidadian, George Padmore; Albert Nzulu of the Federation of non-
European Trade Unions, (South Africa); Frank Macaulay, leader of the Nigerian Workers
Party, and E.F. Small, founder of the National Congress of British West Africa,
NCBWA, 106 who represented Gambia's Labour Unions. 107 The involvement of Macaulay
and Small, both of whom belonged to the traditional African establishment, can be seen as
evidence that during its formative years, Communists were among the first to organise a
black African labour movement.
George Padmore and Ford both travelled to Europe on false passports in order to attend
the Frankfurt Congress. Padmore, who was elected as a West Indian delegate to the LAI's
General Council at an E.C. meeting of the International League, held in Berlin on May
14th, 1931. 108 was one of the Comintern's most useful black recruits. He was based in
Hamburg during the early 1930s as a representative of the International Negro Workers
Bureau and took over as editor of the Negro Worker. During his years in the Comintern,
104 Harry Heywood, op.cit., pp.328-9.
105 Following Senghor's death in 1927 the CDRN, renamed the Ligue de la defense de la race negre
(LDRN), continued to move left under the leadership of the Sudanese activists Tiemoho Garan-Kouyate and
Abou Koite, developing close links with the French CP and the RILU. But divisions within the organisation
led to a split in 1931, when Kouyate created the Union des travailleurs negres and its pro-communist
journal, Les Cris des Negres, which was secretly distributed in the colonies. Although the LDRN reformed
in 1934, its members by this time were increasingly turning towards Pan-Africanism - Kouyate, for example,
left the Comintern that same year.
106 The NCBWA was formed in March 1920, one of the earliest political organisations in Africa. The
organisation, which established sections in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia, folded in the
1930s. See E.T. Wilson, op.cit., p.119.
107 I. Geiss, op.cit., pp.333-334. Small was subsequently seen by Gambian police as a 'link subversive',
despite his essential lack of militancy. See Basil Davidson, Africa in Modern History, Penguin Books,
Middlesex, 1978, p.184.
108 Other participants in the congress included the West Indian writer, C.L.R. James ( See J. Murray-
Brown, op.cit., p.164); William Pickens of the NAACP and Kouyaute. Padmore was particularly impressed
by Kouyaute, with whom he worked on the editorial staff of theNegro Worker. See J.R. Hooker, op.cit.,
p.25; J.A. Langley, 1969, op,cit., p.85.
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Padmore constructed a valuable network of international contacts, it was he who recruited
Frank Macauley to Communism while in Nigeria in 1931)09
Formation of The British Section of the LA!
Initial damage caused by the decision of the British Labour Party and TUC not to send
delegates to the Brussels Congress was to some extent ameliorated by the positive
reaction to the event of many individual British Socialists. However, the consistent
antagonism of the Labour leadership towards the organisation which had emerged from it,
exacerbated by the increasingly sectarian policies of the Communists, did eventually have
a profound effect upon the development of the League's British Section. For example,
despite the League's claim that Labour's membership ban had been ineffective at grass-
roots level, attendence at the 1931 National Conference of the British League showed a
fall of nearly a third on the 1928 total.m
According to Saklatvala, the idea of forming a comparable anti-imperialist organisation
was discussed in Britain as early as 1924, when it was suggested that the Countess of
Warwick might lend Easton Lodge as a venue where colonial nationalists and their
supporters could meet to discuss its foundation. Preparations were made for the
formation of the League in 1926, when twelve selected members of the Labour movement
were appealed to, including Lansbury, Ellen Wilkinson, Kelly, Ernest Thurtle and
Colonel Malone. Reginald Bridgeman was also approached. Detailed subjects for
investigation were sent out to various countries and, when the answers were completed,
meetings were called, 111 but initial responses were disappointing.112
Following the Brussels Congress however, interest grew and a decision to provisionally
form a British Section of the League Against Imperialism was taken at a meeting held in
109 I. Geiss, op.cit., p.25.
110 Report of the Annual Conference of the LA!, British Section, February 1931, p.2, ID/CI136/33, (LPA).
111 Report of the First conference of the British Section of the LAI, London, 7-7-1928, (IISH).
112 Only three M.P.s attended this first meeting.
71
the House of Commons on 8th April, 1927. Fenner Brockway took the chair, Reginald
Bridgeman accepted the post of secretary and George Lansbury agreed to act as treasurer.
Also present on this occasion were: Helen Crawfurd; Ellen Wilkinson; John Beckett
M.P.; Mrs Beckett; James Crossley; William Rust - a leading member of the Young
Communist League and later editor of the Daily Worker - Bakar Ali Mirza of the Indian
Oxford Union; Harry Pollitt and Raymond Postgate, the writer son-in-law of Lansbury.113
The strength of support during these early months was reflected in the number and
political diversity of the figures involved. In addition to those instrumental in its
establishment, the League won the allegiance of Dorothy Jewson, the feminist and early
Labour M.P.; Ben Riley; Ernest Thurtle; Sam Viant; Wilfred Wellock; Wilfred Paling and
Rennie Smith - all serving Members of Parliament. Other prominent members included
Father Conrad Noe1, 114 the Vicar of Thaxted and well-known Christian Socialist; Arthur
Homer, a CP member and leading figure in the South Wales Miners Federation; Elinor
Bums; the pacifist Runham Brown - one of the founders of the War Register's
International - and A.M. Wa11, 115 secretary of the London Trades Council and a CPGB
member who contested Streatham for the Party in the 1924 General Election.
By the spring of 1928, several new names had appeared on the Executive Committee.
These were: the miners' leader A.J. Cook,; T.I. Mardy Jones, M.P.; Alex Gossip; Clemens
Dun; Dr Robert Lyons; Joan Beauchamp - a CPGB member and author of British
Imperialism in India, (1934) - who replaced Dorothy Jewson as treasurer and Mrs Baruch,
the organiser. The changes prompted John Beckett to resign his position on the grounds
that the E. C. had admitted communists to its ranks, and his departure was followed six
months later by that of Ellen Wilkinson.116
113 Report of the Annual Conference of the LA!, British Section, February 1931, op.cit., p.3.
114 The Rev. Conrad Noel was the Vicar of Thaxted, often referred to as the 'red' vicar, because of his
radical beliefs.
115 Report of the Annual Conference of the LA!, British Section, February 1931, op.cit., p.5.
116 Ibid., p.7.
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By 1929, developments in the British section mirrored those within the International
League as many non-Communist members left the organisation. In September of that
year, the CPGB applied to affiliate to the British Section of the League which - in line
with its parent organisation - no longer considered it necessary to play down Communist
involvement. The Communist faction included a member of the CPGB's Political Bureau,
who attended League meetings on a regular basis and reported back to Party
colleagues. 117 Maxton's expulsion was followed by the resignations of Mardy Jones,
Dorothy Jewson and A.J. Cook. Conrad Noel took over the post of chair and Alex
Gossip, 118 general secretary of the National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association
(AFTA), accepted the position of vice-chair.
In the wake of these departures, the National Section was dealt a further blow by the
decision of the Labour Party's NEC at its November 27th meeting that the LAI was an
organisation ancilliary or subsidiary to the CP and therefore ineligible for affiliation to the
Labour Party. This move effectively debarred League members from membership of the
Party and prompted Labour's refusal to endorse Reginald Bridgeman's continuing
candidature for the Uxbridge Division of Middlesex.
Bridgeman - who was expelled from the Labour Party in 1930 - had contested the seat for
Labour in the 1929 General Election when, standing on an anti-imperialist platform
against the victorious Unionist candidate, Major J.J. Llewellin, he had increased the
Labour vote by 7,963. 119 Dr. Lyons, who was the prospective Labour Party candidate for
Hendon, was also affected by the decision and subsequently left the League.
117 By 1930, five national organisations were affiliated to the British League; the CPGB, the NMM,
NAFTA, UCW and the INC. See Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Political Bureau, 17/18-6-1930,
Reel 11, (CPA).
118 When a request by the League in 1927 for temporary use of the London Trades Council's postal
address was refused on the grounds that such a move constituted a possible contravention of the Trade
Union and Trades Disputes Act of 1927, Alex Gossip had agreed to allow the League to use his office
address in Theobalds Road.
119 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, The Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vol. 7, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984,
p.32.
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Evidence shows that British Communists were confused over the role of the LAI
following the abandonment of united front tactics, 120 perhaps reflecting a divergence
between official Comintern policy and the views of some British Party leaders. While
supporting the ultra-left line in relation to the situation in Britain, Rajani Palme Dutt, the
Party's leading theorist, continued to adhere to Lenin's position on collaboration with
colonial nationalists.121
The initial enthusiasm felt by many on the non-Communist left in Britain for the idea of
an anti-imperialist organisation which united colonial activists and their European
supporters, was evident. Their perseverence in the face of antagonism from colleagues
and abuse from Communists emphasised their frustration with the LSI's lack of action on
the issue of colonial liberation. Brockway, who would later use the League as a model for
his own anti-imperialist initiative, The Movement for Colonial Freedom, fought
particularly hard to convince leaders of the labour movement to lend their support, while
Maxton continued to cooperate with the British League despite the humiliating treatment
he received from the organisation's leadership.
Work of the British Section
Despite many setbacks, the British Section of the League Against Imperialism was
rapidly acknowledged to be the most active of all the national sections, continuing to
develop its operations as most of its counterparts in Europe declined. Initially, the
organisation's work consisted mainly of formulating questions on the colonies and semi-
colonies for sympathetic M.P.'s to raise in the House of Commons, a task to which
Bridgeman, the League's secretary, was eminently suited. But at an E.C. meeting of the
League, held in Brussels during April 1928, a decision was taken to reorganise the British
Section in order that it should play a more active role - reflecting its importance as an
anti-imperialist organisation operating within a leading imperialist nation.
120 Minutes of Meetings of the CPGB's Central Committee, 11/12-1-1930 and 21-7-1930, Reel 1, (CPA).
121 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., pp.106-7. See R. Palme Dutt, Modern India, op.cit., for Dutt's views on
this aspect.
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As a first step, trade unions and labour organisations were invited to send delegates to a
general conference in London on July 7th, 1928. The official number of delegates present
at this event was given as 343, representing 170 branches, a claim which must be regarded
as inflated, given the League's subsequent history. Alex Gossip took the chair and
speakers included Harry Pollitt; Saklatvala; Fenner Brockway; Reginald Bridgeman; Tom
Mann; Charlotte Despard; Srinivasa Iyengar of the INC and A.J. Cook. 122 Cook moved
the first resolution of the conference, 'World Imperialism and War', which warned that
British miners and their colonial colleagues were 'victims of mutual assassination'.123
The relationship between British unemployment and cheap labour in the colonies formed
an important part of the League's message, 124 not least because many on the Labour left
had come to share this view by the mid-1920s. The domestic burden of imperialism was
constantly stressed - rising unemployment, increased taxes and intensified repression of
domestic labour organisations were claimed to be a direct result of capitalist investment
and general involvement in the Empire. 125 A League manifesto against Empire Day,
(24th May, 1933), quoted the figure of £109 millions per annum required from the British
budget to police the Empire. 126 Leading CPGB member, J R Campbell, in his 'Resolution
on Imperialism and War' to the 1934 Annual Conference of the British Section,
dismissed the British worker who fought for improved wages and Socialism in Britain
whilst ignoring the colonial peoples' plight as a 'half emancipated slave'. 127 The
promotion of such arguments was judged to be an essential method of countering the
122 Anti-Imperialist Review Vol. 1, op.cit Intriguingly, messages of support to the conference included
the best wishes of Fung Saw of the London KMT, by that time an organisation denouncd by the Communist
hierarchy.
123 The coal mining industry in China was cited as an example - here British investment was raising
output, a growing quantity of which was exported, while wages remained as low as 6d for a twelve-hour
day. See Report of the First conference of the British Section of the LAI, op.cit. The resolution was
seconded by Pollitt, who concluded by appealing to all those opposed to imperialism to sink their
differences,
124 The Brussels Congress had addressed this issue in its Resolution on Imperialism. See Brussels
Congress, 10th-14th February 1927, Resolution on Imperialism, (IISH).
125 What Is The LAI?, British Section document, n/d, ID/Cl/36/8, (LPA).
126 'What is Empire Day?', The Negro Worker, Vol. 3, No. 6-7, June-July 1933, p.11.
127 J.R. Campbell, Resolution on Imperialism and War, November 1934, (RBP).
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imperialist propaganda which surrounded the British working class and which the Labour
movement did little to refute.
A number of journals were produced by the International League in an effort to
disseminate its message to as wide a readership as possible. In addition to the Anti-
Imperialist Review, which first appeared in July 1928, two editions of Colonial News
were produced, of which some three thousand copies were distributed. The Indian Front
monthly and Zipnima, a monthly bulletin for Cypriots were also published, financial aid
was granted to the French Section's newsheet, Le Journal des Peuples Opprimes and help
given in the distribution of L'Orient ArabaI28 The journal Emancipation was printed in
Chinese and the League's monthly review of the situation in the Far East, China News,
was described by Arthur Clegg as offering, 'the only reliable news in Britain about the
Soviet areas of China established by the beleaguered Communists.' 129 A number of
pamphlets covered events in China, India, Abyssinia, and Palestine, 130 supplemented by
more general propaganda such as Conrad Noel's The Meaning of Imperialism and The
British Empire (nd) and A. Rysakov's National Policy of the Soviet Union (nd).
The League's work focused primarily on India and China, I3I and a succession of
resolutions, leaflets, lectures, seminars and public meetings were organised by the British
section. The British section's first demand was for a recognition of China's independence
and the withdrawal of British and Indian troops from Chinese territory. I32 This call was
128 Report of the International Secretariat of the LAI, 1934, (RBP).
129 A. Clegg, Aid China 1937-1949. a memoir of a forgotten campaign New World Press, Beijing, 1989,
pp.15-16.
130 These were:
A. Rysakov, China's Appeal to British Workers, 1930.
Bradley and Hutchinson, India and a New Dictatorship.
The International Secretariat, Abyssinia,
T. Johnstone and J.F. Sime, Exploitation in India..
Palestine, 1936.
China, 1936.
131 One specific case in which the League played a prominent part was that of Paul Reugg, secretary of the
Pan-Pacific TUC, and his wife, who were arrested in June 1931 while living in the International Settlement
in Shanghai. See Jean Jones, 1996, p.22.
132 Arthur Clegg, op.cit., p.17.
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repeated in following years - in 1932 Harry Pollitt moved a resolution on 'China and War',
which accused the Second International of openly supporting Japanese aggression against
China. China's Appeal to British Workers was published in February 1931 and in
December 1934, the League joined with the International Labour Defence Committee,
ILD, 133 in a demonstration to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the Canton
Commune. 134 As the threat from Japanese forces grew, the British section intensified its
efforts on behalf of the Chinese people. 135 The League supported the formation of the
Friends of the Chinese People and the International Peace Campaign and assisted in the
creation of the China Campaign Committee, of which Bridgeman and Ben Bradley were
members.136
The importance of the struggle for national self-determination in India was underlined at
an extraordinary meeting of the International Secretariat of the LAI, held on 10th May,
1930, when it was agreed to launch an India campaign The British section was able to
establish a number of useful contacts within India, one of whom was the Reverend
Michael Scott, Chaplain to the Bishop of Bombay, and later to the Bishop of Calcutta.137
It played a pivotal role in the campaign to obtain the release of the Meerut activists,
drawing praise from Francis Jourdain of the French Section in his presentation of the
International Secretariat's statement for 1932, and League members were involved in
organising the Fourth Indian Political Conference on October 20-21st, 1934.138
133 The Communist-led ILD was known as International Class War Prisoners Aid, (ICWPA), until the
early 1930s. ICWPA was a branch of International Red Aid, which was established by the Comintern in
1922 to aid victims of the class struggle.
134 Letter, Reginald Bridgeman to the Labour Party's National Secretary, 29-11-1934, ID1CI136149, (LPA).
The Canton Commune was part of an unsuccessful Communist rebellion which occurred in December 1927.
135 A statement warning of the danger of war was released in April 1936 and a conference was convened in
Manchester to discuss the issue.
136 A. Clegg, 1989, op.cit., p.18.
137 Michael Carritt, A Mole in the Crown, published by M. Carritt, Sussex, 1985.
138 The New Indian Political Group, circular letter, 11-10-1934, ID/C1/54/4i, (LPA). This was organised
in collaboration with the ILP, the Council for Civil Liberties, the League of Coloured Peoples, the Negro
Welfare Association, the Young Communist League, the CPGB, Friends of the Soviet Union and the Irish
Republican Congress. Those involved were Saklatvala, C.B. Vakil, Bridgeman and Bradley.
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The League attacked both the composition of the Simon Commission139 on India and the
Commission's report, submitted in 1930. On one occasion, a public meeting was called to
protest against the Labour Party's participation in the Commission. According to a report
of the proceedings, which took place in Limehouse Town Hall during October 1928, the
platform party consisted of Sam Elsbury, 14° Tarini Sinha, 141 Bridgeman, James Maxton,
Saklatvala and two leading INC figures - Mrs Sarajini Naidu, 142 and Maulana Mohammed
Ali. Speakers attacked the Labour Party's record in India - Saklatvala accused Labour
M.P.'s of complicity in the shooting and imprisonment of strikers in India, and labelled
them 'Downing Street Flatterers', 143 and the proceedings ended with an appeal to the
workers of the area to vote for the CP candidates in the November local elections.144
Bridgeman was extremely adept at exploiting the Labour Movement's confusion over the
colonial issue. On January 19th, 1934, the General Secretary of the East India Railway
Workers Union contacted the British League with an appeal for aid in the wake of an
earthquake which had badly affected the area. Bridgeman immediately lobbied the
British press and TUC for donations, eliciting a sharp rebuff from its General Secretary,
Walter Citrine. 145 The League was able to make the point that this dismissive attitude
was hardly compatable with Citrine's position as chair of the International Federation of
Trade Unions, to which the Indian T.U. Federation had recently applied for affiliation. It
subsequently reported that a mass meeting of workers in Calcutta had passed a resolution
praising the League for its solidarity and regretting the attitude of the British TUC.
Obviously stung by this criticism, Citrine issued a press statement claiming that League
139 The Simon Commission was appointed by the British Government in 1927 to enquire into the workings
of the dyarchic system of limited power sharing in India.
140 At that time the CPGB's prospective Parliamentary candidate for South West Bethnal Green. See L.J.
Macfarlane, The British Communist Party. its origins and development until 1929,Macgibbon and Kee
Ltd., London, 1966, p.56.
141 Sinha, who chaired the meeting, was secretary of the ILP's Parliamentary Committee on Indian Affairs.
142 Mrs. Naidu was the sister of Virandranath Chattopadhyaya.
143 Report for the International Department of the Labour Party on a public meeting held on 19-10-1928,
p.2, ID/Cl/36/14i, (LPA).
144 Ibid.
145 Report of International Secretariat of the LAI, 1934, (RBP). Citrine was General Secretary of the TUC
from 1925.
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members were primarily concerned with 'exploiting the masses of India for their own
ends'. 146
The British League continued to foster a broad range of involvement despite the
Comintern's pursuit of a policy of separateness after 1928. A Youth Section was formed
and special activities arranged. 'Workers' Theatres', which dealt with colonial conditions,
were set up, special pamphlets and leaflets produced, study circles and debates organised.
It was considered vitally important to counter the influence of imperialist propaganda in
schools and to oppose 'Empire Day' celebrations and similar imperialist diversions. A
'Down with Empire' demonstration was organised on Empire Day, 24th May, 1930,
leading to the arrest of fourteen communists at an open air meeting in Porth, South
Wales. During December 1934, the League was involved in organising an International
Students' Congress against War and Fascism, held in Brussels. Delegates - to whom
Bridgeman, then International Secretary of the L.A.I., was able to 'render assistance . . . in
the preparation and presentation of their statements and in the drafting of colonial
resolutions: 147 - included students from Indonesia, India, North Africa, French Guyana,
Latin America and Afro-Americans.
Tactics included forging links with colonial students studying at British universities.
Indian students in particular were targeted, but also Egyptians and Iraqis ( who were
notoriously difficult to contact because of close supervision by their respective legations)
Chinese, West Indians and Africans. 148 The British League also provided a point of
contact for the increasing numbers of African and West Indian nationalists who were
arriving in Britain, offering invaluable practical help and encouragement at a time when
African nationalist and labour movements were in their infancy.149
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 This work was mainly confined to the capital - Harry Pollitt complained to the 1936 League Congress
that 'so many of the students from colonial countries confined their activities to the West End of London'.
See LAI Conference Report, in The Daily Worker, 27th January, 1936.
149 Annual report of the British Section of the LAI, May 21/22nd., 1932, (RBP).
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This work was in accordance with the Comintern's new emphasis on Africa and the
African diaspora after the sixth world congress. The emphasis was apparant in the
attention given to the exploitation of black workers in Britain, as well as Africa, by the
conferences of the League and the Minority Movement. Also in Padmore's contributions
to Labour Monthly from 1930 150 and Palme Dutt's 1931 pamphlet, Free The Colonies, in
which he argued for a workers charter for Africa. But this was a difficult area for the
British League to expand. Prior to the Brussels Congress, British Communists had little
contact with black Africa - unlike their French counterparts, whose theories had obtained
considerable credit within French-speaking areas of the continent. Their success was
principally a consequence of a larger, and more politically active African population of
Paris compared to that of London. Groups such as Lamine Senghor's Comite de defense
de la race negre for example, which aligned itself with the Communists.151
In Britain, the only significant organisation representing black and African interests at this
time was the West African Students' Union, WASU, established in August 1925.152
During 1934, the British League collaborated with the WASU in the Aggrey House
controversy. Because African students in London had their own hostel accommodation
independent of the authorities, the League was able to maintain close contact without
alerting British officials. Thus, when the Colonial Office, with the support of the
politically conservative League of Coloured Peoples, L.C.P., announced its intention to
provide the students with a luxuriously furnished hostel in Bloomsbury, 153 the League
joined with WASU in opposing the plan as a move to destroy the independence of the
150 See Labour Monthly. June 1930, February 1931, April 1931, June 1931, May 1932 and September
1935 respectively.
151 See J.A. Langley, 1969, op.cit.
152 George Padmore, Jomo Kenyatta, CLR James and Nnamdi Azikwe were among those who attended
WASU meetings during the 1920sand 1930s.
153 Report of the International Secretariat of the LA!, 1934, (RBP). The hostel was named after the
respected African intellectual, Dr. J.E. Kwegyir Aggrey.
80
African and West Indian students. 154 A mass meeting of students resulted in the
establishment of a West African Students Hostel Defence Committee, on which
Bridgeman served as a representative of the LAI.
In 1931, the Negro Welfare Association (NWA) was established as the British branch of
the ITUCNW. Its officers included Reginald Bridgeman, chair; CPGB treasurer Hugo
Rathbone, who took the post of treasurer, and secretary Arnold Ward. The organisation's
aims were both social - it undertook regular community work among London's negro
population, organising events such as annual summer excursions for the children i55 - and
political - it functioned to expose exploitation in the British Empire and to support the
struggle for colonial workers' rights. For example, the Association joined with the
ITUCNW and the LAI to campaign against the setting aside of the 1930 Native Lands
Trust Ordinance, which assigned land for use by African natives, following the discovery
of gold in 1932. Throughout the early 1930s the NWA was absorbed in a campaign to
free nine black American boys on trial for their lives, unjustly accused of raping two
white women - the so-called Scottsboro case. In 1933 the Association, in collaboration
with the LAI and the ILD, formed the Scottsboro Defence Committee, on which
Bridgeman served as financial secretary.156
An important point of contact with colonial workers was among the dockworkers and
seamen in British ports. In December 1931, the League instigated a campaign to raise the
consciousness of black and coloured people working or seeking work in the docks of
154 These fears were reinforced by the revelation that the hostel would be administered by a management
committee appointed by the Colonial Office itself. Harold Moody, founder of the LCP, was appointed as a
mediator between the C.O. and WASU.
155 The Negro Worker, No. 6-7, Vol. 4, June/July 1933, Copenhagen, p.32, ID/C1/36/40, (LPA).
156 Other committee members were; Professor H. Levy, president; Mrs. Carmel Haden Guest, chair;
Professor Lascelles Abercrombie, treasurer; Mrs. Gladys White and Jomo Kenyatta, joint secretaries; Vera
Brittain; Norman Collins; Isaac Hutch; Prince Kessie; Naomi Mitchison and Eleanor Rathbone M.P. See
Report of the International Secretariat of the LAI, 1934, (RBP). Nancy Cunard, daughter of the wealthy
shipping family, organised British fund raising - efforts which included appeals to trade unions and a
concert of black artists. The Committee also produced a pamphlet entitled We Were Framed, the first
account of the trial to be published in England.
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Cardiff and Liverpool. 157 Bridgeman took issue with the National Union of Seamen
when, in 1933, the Union supported proposals by British shipowners to remove coloured
seamen from their ships in order to qualify for government subsidies. The Daily Herald
of December 8th reported that, 'stricter application of the law affecting the employment of
coloured seamen on British Ships' had been demanded by the NUS in the light of some
50,000 unemployed white seamen. It was a demand supported in Parliament by the
Labour M.P.s Arthur Greenwood and Lord Stabolgi. In contrast, Bridgeman argued the
point that unless equal pay and conditions applied to all seamen, a general lowering of
standards would follow.158
The British League lobbied on behalf of the Kikuyu Central Association, KCA, on the
question of land rights in East Africa, providing detailed questions and information to
sympathetic M.P.s. Jomo Kenyatta, who was sent to London by the KCA in 1929, became
closely involved with the LAI and the Communist movement for a time. 159 During his
time in England, Kenyatta fell heavily into debt and relied upon assistance from the KCA
and 'various Communistic organisations' to survive. 160 George Delf claims that the
British League gave Kenyatta 'as much financial aid as its meagre resources permitted',161
while Norman Leys maintained that 'Communist money is his only possible sourse (sic)
of getting the necessities of life'. 162 In May 1933 he went to Moscow to study at the
Lenin School, returning to Britain in the early Autumn and soon after he took a course of
study in newspaper publication at the Marston Printing Company, which printed a number
of Communist periodicals in the U.K..163
157 I. Geiss, op.cit., pp.343-7.
158 Report of the International Secretariat of the LA!, 1934, (RBP).
159 Kenyatta was initially introduced to the League by Isher Dass - later a member of the Kenyan
Legislative Council - with whom he travelled to Britain. See D. Savage, %Tomo Kenyatta, Malcolm
MacDonald and the Colonial Office 1938-9, in The Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3,
1970, p.617.
160 Ibid., p.628.
161 George Delf, Jomo Kenyatta, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1961, p.70.
162 Letter, Norman Leys to Winifred Holtby, 18-11-33,, Winifred Holtby Papers, Hull Central Library.
163 D. Savage, 1970, op.cit., p.627-8.
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The League submitted evidence to the International Labour Organisation on the use of
forced labour in Africa, publicising the high death toll among forced labour during the
construction of the Co9,-Ocean railway through French Equatorial Africa 164 and the
rebellion of these workers in 1928. It also reported the issues behind the Nigerian general
strike of 1929. In 1932, Padmore put Bridgeman and Ward in touch with Kobina Sekyi, a
Gold Coast barrister and businessman who led the Gold Coast Aborigine's Rights
Protection Society, ARPS. 165 The Society was not a mass organisation, having been
created to protect middle-class interests, but it was the only politically active group in the
Gold Coast at that time and as such was a valuable contact.
When in 1934, the ARPS sent a delegation 166 to London to protest against the
implementation of two unpopular Bills by the Gold Coast Legislative Council, I.T.A.
Wallace Johnson, an NWA member who wrote for the Negro Worker 167 and Bankole
Awoonor Renner, president of the Ashanti Freedom Society, 168 contacted Bridgeman who
arranged for Eleanor Rathbone and J.P. Mallalieu to put questions on the issue to the
Secretary of State in the House of Commons. In 1934-5, the League publicised the
suspension of civil liberties and the free press in the Gold Coast and campaigned in
Britain for constitutional reforms in the colony, working in close association with the
ARPS.169
164 The official death toll among the 127,250 African men who laboured to build the railway between 1921
and 1932, was 14,100. See Basil Davidson, 1978, op.cit., p.108.
165 S. Rhodie, 'The Gold Coast Aborigines Abroad', in Journal of African History, Vol. 6, Part 3, 1965,
pp.389-411. The ARPS , established in 1897 and based in the Gold Coast, was essentially a middle-class
organisation which liaised between the British authorities and the African ruling elite. Sekyi was also the
founder of the Gold Coast section of the NCBWA.
166 The ARPS delegation, which arrived in England in June, 1934, and consisted of S.R. Wood and
Tufuhin Moore, was a rival to the earlier Gold Coast and Ashanti delegation, led by the Paramount Chief of
Akim Abuakwa, Nana Ofori Atta.
167 Johnson, who wrote as W. Daniels or Abdul Mohammed Afric, also founded the Nigerian Workers'
Union.
168 Johnson and Awoonor Renner organised a West African Youth League in the Gold Coast during 1934.
By the end of 1935, twenty branches had been established throughout the country. Wallace Johnson was
prosecuted under the Sedition Bill in 1936 for an anti-imperialist article which appeared in Azikiwe's
African Morning Post See S. Rhodie, op.cit., pp.399-402.
169 Bridgeman arranged for questions on the issue to be put to the House of Commons by Eleanor
Rathbone and J.P. Mallalieu M.P. See Ibid., pp.401-2.
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Following the invasion of Abyssinia by fascist Italy in 1935, the League supported the
International African Friends of Abyssinia, IAFA, until 1937, when Bridgeman gave LAI
funds to Padmore and others to establish a central anti-colonial directorate in London,
which was known as the International African Services Bureau, IASB. The IASB, who
published a monthly journal was entitled Africa and the World170 and launched
International African Opinion in July 1938, was founded to co-ordinate black
organisations and promote Pan-Africanism.
Demise of the LAI
As the political climate of Europe darkened, the League's position became increasingly
precarious. In December 1931, its head-quarters in Friedrichstrasse, Berlin, was raided by
police l71 yet - despite the threat posed by the growing power of the far-right in Germany
and in the face of plummeting popularity in Britain In - the Communists persisted with
sectarian policies until 1934, a position which continued to take its toll on League
membership.
At the 1932 Annual Conference of the British Section, held on 21st and 22nd May, the
number of delegates present had fallen to 209. 173 Although attacks upon the ILP
continued unabated - successful resolutions included one which accused the ILP of
confusing the minds of the workers and of support for 'imperialist agents', namely the
T.U.C. and Labour Party - Harry Pollitt's closing speech struck a sadly muted note. He
acknowledged that many had left the League since the Brussels Congress; some had 'died
at their posts', others had been expelled. In a divergence from the Comintern line, he
regretted that only twenty-four trade union delegates had attended the Conference and
urged those present to broaden the base of the League's work. The League, he insisted,
170 The early editions of this journal were financed by League money.
171 The German authorities sought to justfy their actions by claiming that the LAI was directed by the
Comintern. See R.N. Carew Hunt, op.cit.
172 The 1931 general election produced disastrous results for CP candidates.
173 Those elected to the E.C. were; Alex Gossip, Saklatvala, Conrad Noel, Bridgeman, Olive Driver, Percy
Glading, Clemens Dutt, Arnold Ward, H.P. Rathbone, Dr. Vakil, Hannah Laurie, W.P. Hodge, Joan
Beauchamp, W. Raylock and A.E. Fruitnight.
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was not a party organisation, but one which endeavoured to bring together all who shared
its aims.174
Persecution of all sections of the left in Germany intensified following the Reichstag
elections of July 1932, in which the National Socialists were returned as the strongest
party. 175 The offices the WIR were subjected to police operations in September of that
year, but it was the consolidation of Nazi power in 1933 which finally forced the LAI's
International Secretariat to flee to Paris, where it remained for several months before
moving to London in November. 176 The impact of these political developments and the
lack of will within the Comintern to support the League was illustrated by Munzenberg
who, in August 1933, asked to be relieved of his duties within the organisation, claiming
an 'absence of any clarification, information or assistance in the work of the Leaguel.177
It is likely that the choice of London as the site for the International LAI's relocation was
prompted to a large degree by an appreciation of Reginald Bridgeman's qualities. This
remarkable man, who was totally dedicated to the struggle against colonial oppression,
was a tireless worker for the anti-imperialist movement. A familiar sight in the cluttered,
third-floor offices of the British League was that of Bridgeman, the smooth, elegant
aristocrat, with sleeves rolled up, energetically sweeping the floor. 178 Following its
transference to Britain, he took control of the organisation - now in considerable disarray -
174 Report of the Annual Conference of the British Section of the LA!, 1932, (RBP).
175 Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Political Bureau, 4-2-33, Reel 14, CPGBA, MMLH.
176 Meetings of the League's Controlling Body held between 1927 and 1933: 
First World Congress (Brussels) - 10-15th February, 1927.
E.C. Meeting (Amsterdam) - 29-30th March, 1927.
E.C. Meeting (Cologne) - 20-21st August, 1927.
General Council Meeting (Brussels) - 9-11th December, 1927.
E.C. Meeting (Berlin) - 18-20th August, 1928.
E.C. Meeting (Cologne) - 15-16th January, 1929.
E.C. Meeting (Frankfurt-am-Main) - 20th July, 1929.
Second World Congress (Frankfurt) - 21-27th July, 1929.
General Council Meeting (Berlin) - 30th May-2nd June, 1931.
Meeting of Enlarged International Secretariat (Berlin) - 30th January, 1933.
This information illustrates that the period between the first and second World Congresses was a decisive
one for the League. Following the Frankfurt Congress, there was a delay of nearly two years before the
General Council met, during which time non-Communists left or were expelled from the organisation.
177 Haikel, op.cit.,
178 Author's interview with Arthur Clegg, 10-7-93.
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and quickly became its mainstay. In the 1934 Report of the International Secretariat, he
described the transition thus, 'All that was handed over to me on my appointment as the
International Secretary of the League was a list of addresses which was not up to date and
so of little value. It was necessary to reconstitute the work of the League from the
beginning'.
Despite its parlous state, the re-constituted International Secretariat met eleven times
throughout 1934, heralding a brief revival of the Leagues fortunes. In the course of that
year, the undefatig able Bridgeman travelled to Brussels where he liaised with
Commander Woodson of the Negro Bureau, undertaking to supply him with fresh outlets
for the Negro Worker journal. He also surveyed the work of the International of Seamen
and Harbour Workers Union, ISHW, in Dutch and Belgian ports in an effort to establish
links with this organisation. 179 But circumstances continued to militate against the
League. Bridgeman complained that the League had escaped Nazi persecution only to
suffer increasing censorship and harrassment from the British authorities and when
questioned on the organisation's legal status the Home Secretary, Sir John Gilmour,
confirmed that it was 'under observation'.180
It was at this stage that some colonial militants, Padmore included, broke with the
communist movement and turned to Pan-Africanism. They argued that Soviet Russia's
search for 'collective security' had led to a softening of the Communist's anti-imperialism,
pointing to the Soviet Union's decision to join the League of Nations in 1934, and to the
policies of the Popular Front in France and in Spain from February 1936, as evidence of
this retreat. At the October, 1935 E.C. meeting,which was attended by Bridgeman;
Saklatvala; Pollitt; Bradley - now secretary of the British Section - and Percy Glading,
Bridgeman addressed their claims.
179 Report of International Secretariat of the LA!, 1934, (RBP).
10 Ibid.
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He reported allegations of a tendency among the French comrades to 'concentrate
attention on the strengthening of the united front, tacitly allowing the colonial question to
be left alone.' 18I In response, Harry Pollitt stated that the position of the League in Britain
was quite clear; 'it must continue the struggle for the national independence of the
conquered peoples as it had done in the past.' 182 No Popular Front Government had been
established in Britain and the CPGB was still able to exercise a considerable degree of
autonomy in its colonial work, which it conducted in accord with the anti-imperialist
united front advocated by Lenin.
By 1935, the LAI could no longer be described as an international organisation - most of
the European national sections were struggling to survive - and its activities began to
wind down. Bradley's report to a meeting of the E.C. of the International Secretariat held
on October 9th, 1935, highlighted problems faced by the organisation by this time. While
agreeing with his suggestion that the International Secretary should be relieved of all
work relating to the British Section and that a regular League bulletin be issued by the
International Secretariat, members acknowledged that 'with the present staff it was very
difficult to undertake fresh work1.183
Nevertheless, plans were made to form a Committee for the Defence of the Democratic
Rights and Independence of the Egyptian People, in Britain and in France, which would
aim to establish contact with the WAFD and possibly send a delegation to Egypt. Even at
this stage, Bridgeman was anxious to extend the League's organisation in Europe,
especially in Holland, Spain and Belgium, and Dumont undertook to investigate the
possibility of developing a League in Belgium.I84
181 These allegations arose following Bridgeman's attendance at an international conference organised by
the Committee for the Defence of the Ethiopian People, in Paris on September 3rd. See Report of the
Executive Meeting of the International Secretariat of the LAI, 9th October 1935, (RBP).
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Minutes of an LAI International Executive Committee Meeting, 4th December 1935, (RBP).
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By June the following year, Saklatvala's death had cut the E.C. to four. His portrait was
reported to have dominated the 1936 Conference, during which many speakers paid
tribute to his work. I85 Alex Gossip chaired the Conference proceedings, during which
messages of support were received from the INC and the Rev. Conrad Noel. Harry
Pollitt, who spoke on India, had earlier urged Communist members to ensure that this
Conference was not a narrow one, but the 'medium through which we can develop a
progressive line'. I86 Bradley sent out printed invitations reminding their recipients that
'the British ruling class have for many years carried on a brutal system of Colonial
Government and have maintained their Empire by ruthless supression and slave-driving
methods.'187
The scope of the Congress I88 - which was devoted to 'the British Empire and World Peace
and the Mandatory System of Colonial Government' - was ambitious. I89 Communists
were concerned to draw attention to the imperialist expansion of fascism and the danger
of a new carve-up of territories through a broadening of the Mandates system. I90 In the
second resolution of the conference, Lester Hutchinson claimed that after 1918, the
Mandatory system was implemented as a device to achieve further annexation without
attracting odium, I9I while Bradley had earlier likened the extension of the Mandatory
system to 'a gang of thieves sitting round and deciding on a redistribution of the swag.'192
Neil Hunter, the 'anti-war delegate to Abyssinia', attacked the National Government's
stance over the Italian action, while conference welcomed the 'heroic stand of Abyssinia
against. . . modern armed forces' of imperialism and demanded Abyssinia's independence
185 Report of the LAI's 1936 Conference, in The Daily Worker, January 27th, 1936. The official figures
given for attendence at the conference was 236 delegates from 153 organisations, plus 44 visitors.
186 Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Central Committee, 4-1-36, Reel 7, (CPA).
187 League Against Imperialism document, 1936, p.1, Sylvia Pankhurst Papers, (IISH).
188 The Congress was held on the 25th and 26th January, 1936.
189 League Against Imperialism document, 1936, p.1, Sylvia Pankhurst Papers, (IISH).
190 Fears were intensified by events such as the visit by members of the Imperial Policy Group of the
Foreign Affairs Mission to Berlin in January 1936. See The Daily Worker, 16th January, 1936.
191 Statement of the E.C. of the British LAI on the Proposed Extension of the Mandates System, 21-4-36,
(Working Class History Library, Salford).
192 Ben Bradley, 'British Empire and the Colonies', in The Daily Worker, 22nd. January, 1936.
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as a member of the League of Nations. I 93 Bradley's report for the League's E.C. was
followed by a 'lively discussion' in which Negro, Indian and other delegates
participated. I94 But by this time the League's decline was irrevocable; the impending end
was foreshadowed by a decision to reply to enquiries by the Pan-African Congress, PAC,
regarding possible affiliation with the LAI thus; that while all associations with the PAC
were welcome, the whole question of affiliation was being reviewed.I95
The sixth and final conference of the British Section was held in February 1937.
Fraternal delegates in attendence were Krishna Menon of the India League, Isha Das of
the Kenya Legislative Council and Dr. Wickhenasinehe, representing the Sama Samaj
Party of Ceylon. Resolutions covered Abyssinia, I96 India, Palestine, Spain, Fascist Aims
in Colonial Countries and Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights for Colonial People. In
its final resolution, the League prioritised the struggle for democratic rights and civil
liberties and pledged itself to win the support of the labour movement and all progressive
organisations for the right of self-determination; universal adult suffrage; compulsory free
universal education; freedom of speech, press and organisation; repeal of pass and poll tax
laws; release of all political prisoners and the repeal of all anti-democratic and anti-
working class laws. The decision to cease League activities was taken in the Spring of
that year.
Conclusion
In a circular letter dated 11th May 1937, which announced the establishment of the
Colonial Information Bureau - the Communist organisation which replaced the L.A.I. -
Ben Bradley admitted that the League's work had been 'seriously hampered' by the Labour
Party's ban and expressed sentiments in line with the Communists' popular front policy.
193 Report of the LAI's 1936 Conference, in The Daily Worker, 27th. January 1936.
194 Ibid.
195 Report of an E.C. Meeting of the International Secretariat of the LA!, 7-6-36, (RBP).
196 In its resolution on Abyssinia, the League resolved to 'establish contact with all organisations working
on behalf of Abyssinia, to render all assistance to Abyssinian refugees abroad and to demand the right of
assylum of Abyssinians in Kenya and other British countries adjacent to Abyssinia.' See Report of the Sixth
Annual Conference of the LAI, 27th-28th February 1937, (RBP).
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'Since its foundation in 1927', he wrote, 'the League Against Imperialism has done
consistent work in connection with the different aspects of the colonial struggle; but it is
essential that we should advance from the position of a small group of people interested in
the colonial struggle, seriously restricted in their activities because of their association
with a 'banned organisation', and activise the working-class. . . in the confident hope that
they be brought into co-operation with the colonial peoples in the struggle against
exploitation, war preparations and for democratic rights and freedom.'197
The League had never fulfilled the aspirations of its creators - expectations that it would
develop and function as a mass movement floundered in Britain, as elsewhere in Europe.
Although regarded as the most successful of the national sections, there is no evidence to
support Brockway's claim that the British League's foundation conference represented
over 100,000 organised workers in the greater London area alone, 198 suggesting that such
figures were produced for propaganda purposes only. A major stumbling-block was the
lack of interest in colonial questions among the general population in Britain, a
dissociation to a large extent reflected in the attitudes of the broad political left. It was
peculiarly difficult to generate activity around colonial issues which many regarded as
peripheral to their own lives and circumstances.
That this should be the case in Britain is less surprising when the situation in France is
considered. French Communists reported in December 1926 that they had encountered
'total apathy' in their efforts to establish a LACO. 199 Yet colonial issues were promoted by
sizeable emigre organisations in Paris and the anti-colonial milieu can be fairly presumed
to have been larger than that of 1920s London. La Ligue Francaise contre l'Oppression
Coloniale was eventually founded in January 1927, but even after the establishment of the
LA!, the French section was unable to attract a large membership200 and soon found itself
197 Ben Bradley, Circular Letter, 11-5-37, Ben Bradley Papers (henceforth 13BP), Manchester Museum of
Labour History.
198 Report of the first Congress of the British Section of the LA!, 7-7-28, (!ISH).
1 99 Dr. M. Haikel, op.cit., p.22.
200 Figures reached around two hundred in 1928.
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in financial difficulties.201 In Holland, the national section's initial membership figure of
1,400 began to fall after twelve months, mainly as a result of Social Democratic
opposition. 202 When Bridgeman visited the country in June 1933, Roestam Effendi, one
of four Communist members of the Dutch Parliament, estimated the Dutch membership to
be nine hundred.203
Bradley added a short footnote to the history of the LAI in 1943, when he wrote that it
'carried through a very important function during a certain period, and like other
organisations that outlive their usefulness has passed into history'. 204 If the criterion used
to judge the effectiveness of the League is its self-avowed aim to coordinate the activities
of colonial radicals and their sympathisers within the colonial powers, then the period
between the 1927 Brussels Congress and the end that year must be regarded as its most
fruitful period.
There is no doubt that the success of the Brussels Congress and the launch of the LAI was
facilitated by the united front policy, which allowed organisers to build on the nucleus of
sympathy which existed for individual causes. But the reversal during 1927 of this more
benign attitude towards non-Communists in Europe and bourgeois-national movements in
the colonies, had a profound effect upon the League's fortunes. In the event, the League's
main success was as a lobbying and propaganda organisation on colonial issues, through
which it exercised an important impact on left-wing politics.
Despite the obstructive political environment in which it operated, the involvement of
members such as Reginald Bridgeman - who provided unswerving commitment to the
anti-imperialist cause - enabled the organisation to act as the informed conscience of the
left on this issue. The campaigns initiated by the British League with regard to China,
201 The French League's failure to grow also stemmed from the fact that France's strong Communist Party
tended to monopolise anti-colonial agitation in the country.
202 Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol. 1, op.cit.
203 Report of International Secretariat of the LA!, 1934, (RBP).
204 Letter, Ben Bradley to A.G. Barker, 18-10-43, (BBP).
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India and more specifically, to the Meerut case, ensured that the anti-imperialist issue
could not be altogether ignored by the labour movement. It also generated publicity for
colonial causes, was for many years an important source of information for Labour MPs,
and provided an important contact point for colonial nationalists visiting Britain.
Evidence of the League's influence upon colonial nationalists is provided by Gopal, who
cites the Brussels Congress as the 'turning point' in Nehru's political development, 205 and
by Padmore who praised the British section's 'work of enlightenment' long after his own
break with Communism. He also acknowledged that the League attracted support from
among a 'wide selection of progressive middle class people outside the narrow ranks of
the Communist Party.
in Europe helped to create an international network through which radical ideas could be
disseminated - E.T. Wilson even claims that the organisation had a 'marked effect' on the
political development of Africa.207 For the CPGB, which was pursuing its anti-imperialist
policies in India, the ideas and influences radiating from the Brussels Congress and the
League did something to draw important furture allies such as Nehru.
'206 The gathering together of colonial activists and their supporters
205 S. Gopal, op.cit., p.52.
206 G. Padmore, Pan Africanism or Communism? the coming struggle for Africa Dennis Dobson, London,
1956, p.328.
207 E.T. Wilson, op.cit., p.226.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MEERUT TRIAL AND ITS AFTERMATH
CPGB Activists in India
In the aftermath of the First World War, India witnessed a surge of nationalist agitation
spearheaded by the Indian National Congress, which had found a new, radical and
populist leader in Gandhi. This was an alarming development for Britain which had
£1,000 million of capital investment in India by the mid-1920s, as well as a reservoir of
Indian troops to help police the Empire. On the industrial front, an independent India
posed a very real threat to the British textile industry, which was protected from full
competition with its colonial counterparts at that time. For the Communists, who
regarded India as the 'Achilles Heel' of the British Empire, the unrest presented an
opportunity both to disrupt rule in the foremost imperialist power's most valued territory
and to sow the seeds of Communist ideology in a region of major geographical and
political import to the Bolshevik state. Consequently, the task of winning Indian
nationalists to the anti-imperialist cause was prioritised by the Comintern and the CPGB
carried full responsibility for the undertaking.
The British authorities in India, aware of Roy's efforts and of the potential for disruption,
decided in the mid-1920s to stifle the Communist embryo. As early as the 25th
November, 1919, the Indian Home Secretary, Sir William Marris, had warned that
'Though actual proof of Bolshevik activity in India is small, a serious situation might
develop unless systematic protective measures are taken.'1
The Government subsequently appointed two officers to advise on the Bolshevik question
and most local governments attached a Bolshevik 'expert' to their staff. In 1924, an
offensive was launched against the Communists, resulting in the arrest and trial of four
1 Quoted in Richard Popplewell, British Intelligance and Indian Subversion: the surveillance of Indian
revolutionaries in India and abroad, 1904-1920, Cambridge University PhD Thesis, 1988, p.287.
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activists - S.A. Dange, Muzaffar Ahmed,2 Shaukat Usmani and Nalini Gupta - in what
became known as the Cawnpore Conspiracy Case. The imprisonment of these activists
considerably hampered the progress of Communism in India and represented a major
setback for Roy, who was also tried and convicted of conspiracy in his absence.3
By the mid-1920s, the Comintern had lost patience with Roy's attempts to establish a
Communist Party in India and decided to pass responsibility to the CPGB, reasoning that
British subjects had easier access to the British colonies and that direct contact could be
maintained with Indian nationalists through British Communists. Percy Glading, who
was sent to India to ascertain the strength of the Communist movement there, reported in
July 1925 that he had not met any Indian Communists and that those contacts he had
made were unfit for party work. 4 These findings were hotly disputed by Roy, but
perceptions of his personal failure, combined with his consistent opposition to the
Comintern's line on the national and colonial question and the hostility of a number of his
colleagues, 5 all weighed against him. By February 1926, he was presiding over the sixth
Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI as the speaker on Chinese affairs, having been sent to work
with Michael Borodin in China.6
In response to Glading's report, a series of emissaries were dispatched to India by the
CPGB, each charged with the task of organising Indian labour and co-ordinating the
activities of the Indian left. The strategy which they employed involved the infiltration of
existing trade unions and the INC through the medium of Workers' and Peasants Parties,
2 Dange launched the Socialist journal in Bombay and Ahmed, who had been one of the Tashkent
revolutionaries, the Langal, in Calcutta.
3 In Britain, an Indian Defence Committee was formed from Communists and Labour Party members but,
despite their campaign, the defenders were each sentenced to four years imprisonment.
4 Communist Papers, op.cit., p.81.
5 Notably Saklatvala and Rajani Palme Dutt.
6 Roy was expelled from the Comintern in 1929 on the grounds of his 'right-wing orientations' -
ironically, his movement towards a united front stance coincided with the Comintern's adoption of an ultra-
left position.
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(WPPs). 7 The rationale behind these WPPs 8 was the organisation of a mass membership
in a legal party, functioning with a nucleus of Communists at its centre. As a bolster to
these activities, Saklatvala embarked upon a hugely successful three-month tour of India
in January 1927, during which he lectured on imperialism, attended a gathering of the
embryonic CPI and met with two of the British emissaries - Philip Spratt and George
Allison, a Communist ex-miner. Spratt, a Cambridge University graduate, had been
instructed to take over the work begun by Allison, a Scottish coalminer sent to India by
the RILU in the spring of 1926.
One of the emissaries was Ben Bradley, 9 a London engineer and trade union activist - he
was also an original member of the National Unemployed Workers' Committee
Movement I ° - who joined the CPGB in 1923." Bradley had worked in India between
1921 and 1922, an experience which helped shape his political views. He later wrote
'It was during this short sojourn in India that I was brought into direct touch with the
conditions of the Indian workers and I was extremely impressed by the terrible poverty
and distressing conditions under which the working classes in India were forced to
exist1 . 12 Doubtless these earlier experiences of conditions in India and the strength of his
reaction to them, coupled with his proven organisational skills, led to Bradley's inclusion
in the small, select group of men sent to India in the late 1920s. In September 1927 he
was directed to Bombay to join Spratt, his first task being to meet with Indian
Communists to discuss their response to threatened wage cuts in the textile industry.I3
7 P. Sprat, Blowing Up India. reminiscences and reflections of a former Comintern emissary,Prachi
Prakashan, Calcutta, 1955, p.30. Also S.R. Chowdhuri, Leftist Movements in India: 1917-1947, South Asia
Books, Columbia, 1977, pp.75-6.
8 The WPPs were first proposed by the Comintern in June 1923.
9 Jean Jones, Den Bradley. fighter for India's freedom,The Socialist History Society, 1994.
10 The NUWM, a CPGB initiative, was formed in April 1921 and led by Wal Hannington.
Ben Bradley, Notes, (BBP).
12 Bradley's Defence Statement, p.558, (BBP).
13 New Age Weekly, 1-5-55, (BBP).
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Operating in Bombay under the guise of a representative of his brother's 14 firm, which
boasted the unlikely name of the Crab Patent Under-drain Tile Company, 15 Bradley
joined his colleagues in the task of building a WPP as a legal cover for Communist
activities and of organising the textile and railway workers. The clandestine nature of the
emissaries' work involved methods which appear farcical by today's standards; cryptic
messages, ciphers, invisible ink which failed to remain invisible and the use of
pseudonyms. 16 British CP organisers, who were novices at this stage of the operation,
were redeemed by the fact that the clumsiness of their methods was surpassed by the
incompetence of the Indian authorities. Money was channelled to the emissaries from
London by various means; the prosecution at Bradley's subsequent trial named his
younger brother Len as a co-conspirator, accusing him of transmitting party funds through
the 'family business'.17
In the eighteen months prior to the end of January 1928, Bradley received £100 from the
CPGB treasurer, H.P. Rathbone and £300 from the Workers' Welfare League of India,
whilst Spratt received nearly £1000 from sources in London. 18 However, as the CPGB
lacked access to any substantial funds at this juncture it is fair to assume that most of the
money was supplied by Moscow. In July 1925 the British Party had only £100 in hand
for the purpose of sending Clemens Dutt to India on party business, yet was assured by
Roy that Dutt's visit would not involve them in any expense - the implication being that
Moscow would fund it.'
Indian Trade Unions
In a labour climate sharpened by the introduction of the 1926 Indian Trade Union Act -
which restricted legality to those trade unions which were registered - the AITUC was
14 W.G. George Bradley.
15 S.R. Chowdhuri, op.cit., p.76; Letter, Ben Bradley to Len Bradley, 9-1-32, (BBP)
16 P. Spratt, op.cit., p.39; M.R. Masani, The Communist Party of India: a short history,Derek Verschoyle,
London, 1954, p.29. Bradley's pseudonym during this time was 'Fred'.
17 Letter, Ben Bradley to Len Bradley, 9-10-32, (BBP).
18 M.R. Masani, op.cit., p.28.
19 Communist Papers, op.cit., pp.86-7.
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targeted extremely effectively by Communists using the WPP 20 as their entrance ticket.
At the seventh session of the Congress in March 1927, where a resolution supportive of
the WPP was adopted, they succeeded in securing the election of G.C.Ghate, one of their
number, to the post of assistant secretary.
In November of that year the Cawnpore Session witnessed the efforts of the British TUC
to counter the progress of Communism by attempting to establish links with the Indian
TU movement. A.A. Purcell and J. Hallsworth attended as TUC delegates and were
instrumental in the defeat of a resolution calling for the AITUC to affiliate to the LAI, as
well as the displacing of the WWLI 21 However, the left did make some advances; D.G.
Thengdi, Dange and Jhabvala were elected to office for the following year and it was
agreed that a sub-committee be formed under the direction of Philip Spratt, to formulate a
labour constitution for implementation by a future Indian government. It was during
1927 that the Indian working-classes celebrated May Day as international labour day for
the first time.22
But the highpoint of Communist success within the AITUC was reached at the 9th session
at Jharia in December 1928, when their candidate for the presidency, D.B. Kulkami, was
narrowly defeated by Jawaharlal Nehru. The Communists Muzaffar Ahmad and Kulkami
were elected to serve as vice-presidents, S.A. Dange and Bakhole as assistant secretaries
and Thengdi, Spratt and Bradley as Executive Council members, thus securing a bloc of
Communist officials within the Indian TUC. Furthermore, there was compensation for
Kulkarni's defeat. Nehru, one of the leaders of the left faction in Congress, was regarded
as a potential ally at this time. He had developed a sympathy with Communist ideas
through his participation in the Brussels Congress and he later used his casting vote at the
20 The first WPP was created in Bengal in February 1926. Following Saklatvala's consciousness-raising
visit later that year, more WPPs were established in the provinces and, in 1928, an All-India WPP was
launched in Calcutta. See John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.103.
21 V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov (ed.), A Contemporary History of India,People's Publishing
House Private Ltd., New Delhi, 1964, pp.170-171.
22 Prem Sagar Gupta, A Short History of the AITUC 1920-1947,AITUC Publications, 1980, p.94.
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1929 Nagpur Conference of the AITUC to support a bid by the Communist-led textile
workers' union, the GKU, for affiliation to the trade union body. This decision was taken
against the advice of trade union leaders like N.M. Joshi, who challenged the GKU's
membership figures.23
The Communist group in Bombay led by Dange, Nimbkar, Mirajkar and Bradley was
particularly effective. On 16th April, 1928, Indian labour flexed its muscles when three
thousand workers struck at the Mahomedbhoy Currimbhoy Mill, a dispute which rapidly
progressed into a general strike in the textile industry. 24 The trigger for this was the
introduction of a rationalisation process by Bombay mill owners which had resulted in the
dismissal of fifteen thousand operatives since the beginning of the year. 25 The authorities
responded to the workers' resistance with violence - police killed trade union activist,
Paraswami Jadad, as he agitated for a general strike during a GKU meeting, thus
providing the strikers with their first martyr.26
Initially, the strike call was not a unanimous one. Dissent within the trade unions led to
the Communist section of the Girni Kamgar Mahamandal joining with the Bombay
Millworkers' Union to form the GKU, which was officially registered on 23rd May,
1928.27 But the overall response to the strike was a testimony to the efforts of the
activists; 150,000 workers struck and tens of thousands attended mass meetings, which
were almost the only method of conveying information in the fact of widespread illiteracy
and government censorship. The WPP organ, Kranti l , was the only Indian Communist
publication at that time and any Comintern-connected literature, such as M.N. Roy's
23 Bipan Chandra (ed.), The Indian Left - critical appraisals, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., New
Delhi, 1983, p.23.
24 S. Roy (ed.), Communism in India - unpublished documents. 1925-1934,Ganashakti Printers Ltd.,
Calcutta, 1972, H/P 28 FI/28, 1-3rd. May, 1928.
25 V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, op,cit., p.196.
26 Ibid.
27 B. Chandra, op.cit., pp.19-20.
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and A.M. Dyakov, op.cit., p.68.
for Independence 1857-1947,Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1989,
Workers and Unions in Bombay 1918-1929. Australian National
Masses of India, which was published in Berlin, had to be smuggled in from outside,
often wrapped in 'acceptable' books and newspapers.28
It is important to understand the weakness and instability of the Indian trade union
movement prior to Communist activity, in order to appreciate the enormity of the task
facing the CP. The Bombay textile workers had 'no effective union until 1926% 29 many
trade unions were formed spontaneously during the course of industrial action and
consequently folded when the dispute ended. Furthermore, the number of workers
employed in Indian industry tended to fluctuate wildly, making it extremely difficult to
organise Indian labour.30
Inefficiency and ineptitude within the immature trade union movement also helped to
facilitate Communist influence. For example, the secretary of the Bombay Millworkers'
Union D. R. Mayekar, who was expelled after being accused of embezzlement, was
replaced by the Communist K. N. Joglekar. 31 However, throughout the action
Communists were careful to function as part of a joint strike committee which included
non-Communists, an alliance made possible by the belief amongst more constitutionalist
trade union leaders that unity was vital during the formative stages of the Indian labour
movement.
The Communists worked tirelessly to build the Girni Kamgar Union into the most
powerful textile union in India, taking its membership from less than four hundred at its
inception to approximately fifty-four thousand by the end of 1928. 32 The GKU was built
around a democratic structure - one particularly effective method was to encourage the
28 New Age Weekly, op.cit., (BBP
29 S. Joshi, op.cit., p.80.
30 Ibid., p.95; V.V. Balabushevich
31 S, Roy, op.cit.
32 Bipan Chandra, India's Struggle
pp.217-219; Also Richard Newman,
University, Canberra, 1981, p.216.
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rank and file workers to start factory or mill committees on the Soviet model with the
intention of drawing the ablest of these into the leadership of the union and the party.33
Concurrent with their efforts to organise the textile industry, British Communists were
also active within the oil industry, the jute and paper mills and the railway unions.
Bradley was vice-president of both the the Bombay Railworkers' Union, BBCI, and the
Great Indian Peninsular Railworkers' Union, GIP. He often travelled across India to
speak to and advise workers on these lines, relying upon the hospitality of the men and
their families. 34 The rail workers, who 'acquired an anti-imperialist consciousness with
far greater ease that any other section of the working class', 35 were willing to demonstrate
their solidarity during the strike and employees on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway
downed tools in support of the textile workers. 36 Such loyalty was all the more
commendable as many of these people suffered a high price through the loss of their
livelihood. Despite this militancy however, efforts by Bradley and K.N. Joglekar to
widen the action into an all Indian Railway strike were unsuccessful.37
The strike held firm for six months despite government attempts to split the workers
along a religious divide by using Patham Muslims - seasonal workers in Bombay - as
strike breakers. This sustained resolve was attributable in large measure to the formidable
organisation behind the strikers. Volunteer corps were formed to keep order in the streets
and to ensure that strike breakers did not gain entry to the mills, whilst the WPP
undertook the task of collecting food donated by sympathetic villagers. 38 In the face of
such determination, the mill owners were forced to make concessions - pickets were
33 S. Roy, op.cit., H/P 18N11 KW Secret; Labour Monthly, Vol.11, No.12, December 1929, p.471; B.
Chandra, 1983, op.cit., pp.21-22.
34 New Age Weekly, op.cit., (BBP).
35 S. Joshi, op.cit., p.210; L. Jagga, 'Colonial Railwaymen and British Rule:a probe into railway labour
agitation in India', in B. Chandra, 1983, op.cit.
36 On one occasion a local trade union leader, Kuppuswamy Naiker, and twenty-four workers lay across
tracks at Villupurum station, preventing a train carrying police reinforcements from entering Bombay. See
V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, op.cit., p.198.
37 S. Joshi, op.cit., p.201.
38 V.V• Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, op.cit., pp.195-7.
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allowed to man the mill-gates, the employers agreed to meet union representatives and, by
the end of October, they had recognised the GKU. When the strikers returned to work in
September, they did so at the old rate of pay, but with the Fawcett Commission appointed
by the Indian Government to investigate their wage rates and conditions and with a
pledge that strike leaders would not be persecuted. Ironically, the Commission was due to
submit its report just three days after mass arrests of the labour leaders began.39
Government Reaction
Between 1927 and 1929, there was an intensification of strikes and demonstrations by
workers and radical nationalists, the latter being particularly incensed by the appointment
of the Simon Commission. The Commission, which had no facility for Indian
representation, was boycotted by the AITUC and the Labour Party was criticised by
Nehru for participating in the process through its representatives, Clement Attlee and
Vernon Hartshorn. When the Commission arrived in India, it was met by a general strike,
demonstrations and widespread rioting during which workers in Bombay burned effigies
of Ramsay MacDonald, the Secretary of State and other British officials in the streets.40
Percival Griffiths, the author of a history of the Indian police, maintains that during this
time the necessity of anti-Communist work 'imposed a very heavy burden on the police,
and was indeed one of their most important tasks'. 41 By the end of 1928 the Government
of India believed the Communists to be in complete control of the labour situation, 'hardly
a single public utility service or industry remained which had not been affected by the
wave of Communism that swept the country that year'. 42 Communist representatives on
strike committees were described as 'virtual dictators', who had managed to marginalise
the voices of moderates like N.M. Joshi and Chamanla1.43
39 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, The Dictionary of Labour Biography Vol. VII, Macmillan PressLtd.,
London, 1984, pp.84-91.
40 S. Saklatvala, The Fifth Commandment,Manchester Free Press, Manchester, 1991, pp.391-2.
41 Percival Griffiths, To Guard my People - the history of the Indian police,Ernest Benn Ltd., London,
1971, p.352.
42 S. Roy, op.cit., H/P/1934 F7/16; B. Chandra, op.cit., p.219.
43 Ibid, H/P/1928 F118Nii KW Secret.
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Despite this concern, the authorities did not consider the Communist movement itself to
be a serious threat at that time. Their anxiety stemmed from the belief that, 'there is a
tendency for the political and the Communist revolutionaries to join hands'." This
anxiety was reinforced when, at the end of 1928, a letter from M.N. Roy to Muzaffar
Ahmad, which disclosed the Communist tactic of using WPPs as legal cover for their
activities, was intercepted by the authorities. Commensurate with the CP's policy of
using seamen as couriers to deliver letters, literature and even monies, this particular
message had been given to a seaman, Abdul Haquin, to deliver to the WPP offices.
Haquin forgot to hand over the letter, which he found during his next voyage and posted
on from Aden. The contents were subsequently read aloud to the Legislative Assembly
and became Exhibit number 377 in the prosecution case at the notorious Meerut
conspiracy case.45
Thus, the Government of India, besieged by the mill owners' associations and
increasingly nervous of the growing spectre of co-operation between radical nationalists
and the far left, reacted with a cocktail of measures. 46 The prime concern of the
authorities was to drive a wedge between Communists and the nationalist movement and
in their view, the most effective method was to expose the true nature of Communist aims
and tactics, thereby proving that Communism was essentially antithetical to the
nationalist cause. H.G. Haig, secretary to the Home Department, wrote to the prosecuting
counsel in the Meerut Case, J. Langford James, 'from the political point of view it would
be an advantage to be able to convince in general as early as possible that Communism is
not the kind of movement that should receive the sympathy of nationalists'.47
44 Ibid. HIP 28 F1/28 May 1-3rd.
45 Muzaffar Ahmed, 1970, op.cit., pp.456-457.
46 This prompted George Allison, who had recently been released from an eighteen-month prison sentence
imposed for his political activities in India, to inform the LA! Conference that 'it takes a brave man to be a
trade unionist or a nationalist', in that country. See Report of the first Conference of the British Section of
the LA!, op.cit.
47 S. Roy, op.cit., Draft D-D, No. 347, p.2, Letter, H.G. Haig to Langford James, 9-4-29.
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Disagreements ensued over the most effective way with which to proceed. Memories of
Philip Spratt's arrest and trial on charges of sedition in August 1927, when he was
released after a jury found in his favour, counselled caution. One suggestion was the
possibility of a prosecution case being brought against Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash
Bose, leaders of the INC's left wing and organisers of the Independence for India
League," as a deterrent to others. Nehru's links with the LAI had exposed him to scrutiny
by the authorities, who regularly intercepted his correspondence with Virendranath
Chattopadhyaya - then the League's International Secretary - and others." However, it
was eventually decided not to risk the mass resistance which this course of action might
trigger. It was also originally proposed to deport Bradley and Spratt and a Bill designed
for this purpose was prepared, 50 but as Isemonger, the Director of Intelligence Bureau
pointed out, deportations would be unlikely to deter future Communist emissaries.
Furthermore, to prosecute Indian Communists whilst merely deporting British
Communists could justifiably be interpreted as racial discrimination.51
Following months of discussions and consultations between the Government of India,
local governments and the Secretary of State, it was finally decided to run a
comprehensive conspiracy case against Spratt, Bradley, a third Briton, Lester
Hutchinson52 - who was not a CP member - and leading Indian Communists such as
Muzaffaf Ahmad; S. A Dange, General Secretary of the GKU; K.N. Joglekar and R.S.
Nimbkar, the charge being that of 'Conspiracy to Deprive the King-Emperor of the
Sovereignty of British India'. The Deportation Bill was nonetheless proceeded with as
another weapon to use against future Communist infiltration and following its rejection
by the Legislative Assembly on 11th April, 1929, the Viceroy issued a Public Safety
Ordinance on April 13th.
48 The Independence for India League was formed in 1928.
49 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, op.cit.; B. Chandra, 1983, op.cit., p.61.
50 S. Roy, op.cit., Telegram P., Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8-7-28.
51 Ibid., Isemonger to S.G/ Haig, 20-9-28.
52 Hutchinson was a twenty-four year old British journalist who went to India to work on the Indian Daily
Mail and later became editor of the WPP paper, New Spark. One of his activities was to organise study
circles for young Indian intellectuals to read Marxist literature.
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The Meerut Trial
Arrests began on 20th March, 1929, three days before Sir Charles Fawcett's Committee -
set up by the Government to look into the Indian cotton industry - published its report.53
Thirty-one people, including Bradley 54 and Spratt, were detained in the initial trawl, with
one more - Lester Hutchinson - arrested on June 14th. Most of these were Indian trade
unionists, including the majority of the GKU officials. This triggered protests, which the
government had hoped to avoid, that the authorities were intent upon persecuting
organised labour. Nehru himself defended the men: 'How little do these accused persons
know about the Comintern', he asked, 'I know a lot more than they'.55
The choice of Meerut as the trial venue was based on several considerations. A small
town in the United Provinces, it was suitably remote from the major industrial centres of
unrest - eight hundred miles from Bombay and Calcutta, for example. Because there was
a branch of the WPP in Meerut, the authorities reasoned that conspiratorial acts must have
taken place there. Furthermore, in the large Presidential towns where a High Court of
Justice existed, defendants would have been entitled to a trial by jury with its potential for
acquittal. Jury facilities were not available in Meerut, where the case would be heard by
an unqualified District Judge. 56 In the event, Judge R. L. Yorke presided, a civil servant
who was assisted by five lay assessors. 57 In this context alone, the trial highlighted the
absurdity of the system of justice operating in India at that time. Michael Carritt, when
writing of his experience as a civil servant in India in the inter-war years, recalled that
about half the Indian Civil Service at any one time could not speak or understand Bengali
53 Circular Letter, 1-1-31, Box 6, File 1, (JTC).
54 Bradley was conducting rail union business in northern India at the time of the arrests, staying at the
home of the left-wing Congressman, Arjanpal Sethi, and was not detained until several days later. See
Shaukat Usmani, Tribute to Ben Bradley, The Daily Worker, 7-1-57.
55 Quoted in S, Gopal, op.cit., p.69.
56 S. Roy, op.cit., 1110/1929 F10/1V.
57 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, op.cit.
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at all. This included 'officers who were engaged full-time in trying court cases where all
the proceedings were (notionally) in Bengali'.58
Defence applications for the trial to be transferred to the High Court were rejected and
bail was refused for the majority - the defence was conducted by Dr K.N. Katju, who later
became Minister of Defence in the Indian Government. The preliminary proceedings
opened in April 1929 and lasted for eight months, most of which were devoted to the
prosecution's case, after which the actual trial began on 31st January, 1930. Prosecuting
Council, J. Langford James, described by Spratt as a 'witty lawyer', opened for the Crown
on June 12th and spoke for several days, but he did not live to develop his case.
Following his death three months after the trial's commencement a rather more plodding
Mr Kemp took over as prosecuting solicitor.59
In its entirety, the Meerut Trial lasted nearly four years and cost approximately
£250,000. 60 The charges against the accused, which did not include any allegations of
overt violence or illegality, cited sixty-three organisations and individuals as co-
conspirators including Rajani Palme Dutt, Harry Pollitt, M. N. Roy, and 'other persons
known and unknown and not before the court 1 . 61 The prosecution called nearly three
hundred witnesses, including specialists such as a handwriting expert, 62 and submitted
nearly three thousand books and documents, including many classical texts on Socialism
and Communism which, it claimed, made their authors co-conspirators.63
Apart from the duration and sheet complexity of the trial, there were additional problems
for the authorities. Because the prosecution made liberal use of Marxist publications, the
accused - many of whom were, as Nehru suggested, largely ignorant of Marxist theory -
58 M. Carritt, op.cit., p.56.
59 P. Sprat, op.cit., p.51.
60 New Age Weekly, op.cit., (BBP).
61 'The Meerut Case',13/5, (BBP).
62 Letter, Meerut Prisoners Defence Committee, MPDC, to Hindustan Times, copy received by London
branch of MPDC on 7-2-31, (BBP).
63 'The Meerut Case', op.cit., (BBP).
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needed to be equally well-informed. The British Meerut Prisoners' Defence Committee
provided a well-stocked library and 'so thorough was the study that many of these works
were translated ... into vernacular languages. These translations all found their way out
for publication.'64 In addition, the prisoners took full advantage of the platform which the
court case provided to expound their ideas and policies. As a result, the country's leading
newspapers reproduced long speeches which, under normal circumstances, would
certainly have been banned.
During the first six months of the trial, the demand for Marxist literature in India
increased twentyfold. 65 The publicity gave the Communists a truly national profile for
the first time, and made heroes of behind-the-scenes plotters such as Rajani Palme Dutt
and M.N. Roy. 66 K.N. Joglekar noted of the authorities in his Commital Order Statement
that 'They have done the greatest service to Indian Revolution by gloryifying our ordinary
elementary trade union and national emancipatory work to the heights of scientific
revolutionary deeds'.67
The trial finally ended in August 1932, after a prosecution summing-up which spanned
nearly two months. The judge took approximately five months to complete his
deliberations; judgement was delivered on 16th January, 1933 and covered 675 foolscap
pages. The sentences, when pronounced, reflected the importance which the government
attached to the case. Muzaffar Ahmed was condemned to transportation for life: Dange,
Ghate, Joglekar, Nimbkar and Spratt received twelve years; Bradley, S. Mirajkar,
(secretary of the British-India Steam Navigation Company's Staff Union), and Usmani,
ten years. Lester Hutchinson and the remaining defendants were each sentenced to four
years imprisonment.68
64 New Age Weekly, op.cit., (BBP).
65 Minutes of a CPGB Central Committee Meeting, 11/12-1-1930, Reel 1, (CPGBA).
66 Before the conclusion of the Meerut trial, Roy returned to India secretly, but was apprehended by the
police and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for his part in the Cawnpore Conspiracy. This was later
reduced to six years on appeal.
67 CP/ORG/MISC/6/11, (CPGBA).
68 'The Meerut Case', op.cit., (BBP).
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The Reaction
Reaction to the arrests, rather like the development of the trial, proved to be counter-
productive for the Government. Many leading nationalists sprang to the defence of the
accused. Nehru argued that the affair represented a government offensive against textile
workers which would enable the Master Cotton Spinners' Federation to cut wages in
Lancashire and other textile areas. 69 The INC, which held the principle of not offering
defences before the British courts," was sufficiently disturbed to move from this position
and form a Meerut Defence Committee, MDC, of which Nehru was a leading member
and his father, Motilal, chairman. Congress launched this organisation with a donation of
1,500 rupees and Nehru wrote to Walter Citrine with representations on the subject.71
It is possible that the authorities had failed to appreciate the shift to the left within
Congress. In December 1928, radical delegates had met at a 'Republican Congress',
during which Nehru was elected president and Muzaffar Ahmed became one of the
general secretaries - effectively consolidating the left bloc within the INC. 72 By 1929 this
militant section was gathering strength; at the Lahore session in December of that year a
resolution was adopted which rejected Dominion status and called for the complete
independence of India. Simultaneously, many advocates of non-violence 'began to waver
in that faith'.73
Resistance to the trial in Britian was led by the LAI. Bradley claimed that 'Only the
agitation carried on by the LAI made it possible for the case to be known even after the
sentences', (had been passed). The LA!, took 'the initiative in bringing into existence the
Meerut Prisoners' Defence League, (MPDL), which was the only organisation that made it
69 Reginald Bridgeman, 'The World Struggle Against Imperialism', inLabour Monthly, No. 11, July 1929.
70 S. Gopal, op.cit., p.68.
71 Letter, Nehru to Citrine, 9-9-29, Box 3, File 2, (JTC).
72 B. Chandra, 1983, op.cit., p.18.
73 Kanji Dwarkadas, India's Fight for Freedom 1919-1937: an eyewitness account,Popular Prakashan,
Bombay, 1966, p.368.
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possible for us to conduct the appeal'. 74 The British National MPDL was established in
August 1929, with Reginald Bridgeman, then secretary of the LAI's British Section, as its
secretary, and Joan Thompson, who wrote under the name of Joan Beauchamp, as
treasurer.
Membership included the M.P.s James Maxton, Fenner Brockway, T.I. Mardy Jones, and
W.J. Brown. Trade union representatives were A.J. Cook (Miners Federation), Alex
Gossip (National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association) and George Hall (The
Workers Union), whilst S. Saklatvala, Robert Dunston and J. T. Murphy represented the
CPGB. Other delegates were Helen Crawfurd, Workers International Relief; Bob Lovell,
International Class War Prisoners Aid; C.B. Valcil and C. P. Dutt, Workers Welfare
League of India., (all CP members); T.P. Sinha from the ILP and representatives from
various Indian organisations in England. 75 Local branches were formed throughout the
country, including one amongst Oxford undergraduates.76
One of the Meerut prisoners, Shaukat Usmani, was adopted as the CPGB candidate for
Spen Valley in the 1929 British Parliamentary election in order to highlight the Meerut
trial in Britain. The sitting M.P. in this Yorkshire constituency was Sir John Simon,
architect of the Simon Report. There was no expectation of victory, in the October 1931
election, when Usmani stood as the CPGB candidate for South East St. Pancras, he polled
only 332 votes, but was able to use his candidature to issue an appeal from his prison cell
for support of the colonial peoples' struggle for freedom. 77
The LAI and the MPDL, fought extremely hard to keep the issue of the Meerut prisoners
alive in Britain, proposing resolutions at conferences, instigating demonstrations and
preparing questions for the House of Commons which were put down by sympathetic
74 Bradley's own notes, (BBP).
75 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, op.cit.
76 Letter, Bradley to Len Bradley, 24-11-32, (BBP).
77 Noreen Branson, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: 1927-1941, Lawrence and Wishart,
London, 1985, p.71.
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M.P.s such as Fenner Brockway and James Maxton. Bridgeman sent open letters on the
Meerut case to the sixty-fourth annual TUC Conference, held in Newcastle in September
1932 and to the thirty-first Annual Labour Party Conference, which convened in
Scarborough in October 1931, with additional copies to around a thousand local Labour
Party branches.78
Various pamphlets were published - one contained extracts from eight of the prisoners'
defence speeches, including part of Bradley's speech which dealt with the history of the
Indian trade union movement. 79 April 19th, 1931 was declared Meerut Day - nationwide
demonstrations were organised, including a gathering in Trafalgar Square at which one of
the badges worn by the Meerut prisoners during their trial was raffled for funds. In May
of that year a protest rally was held at the House of Commons and a petition of six
thousand signatures presented to the Government. Numerous letters were written to
various individuals and organisations - Reginald Bridgeman wrote to Gandhi asking for
his support and received a reply which was non-committal.
The campaigners had a wide range of allies on the left. When writing to press Arthur
Henderson - then secretary of State for Foreign Affairs - to halt the trial, Bridgeman was
able to enclose a letter of support from Roger Baldwin, chair of the New York-based
International Committee for Political Prisoners, a precursor of Amnesty International. As
an expression of their support the ICPP had donated $100 to the MDC. 80 Letters
expressing concern over the issue were sent to the Manchester Guardian by such
substantial figures as H.G. Wells and R.H. Tawney, and representations on behalf of the
prisoners were sent to the Secretary of State from the Archbishop of York. 81 Yet the
Labour leadership, which was safely established in government some weeks before the
formation of the MPDL, adopted a somewhat dismissive attitude towards the disquiet of
78 Annual Conference Report of LAI's British section, 21-22nd. May, 1932, op.cit.
79 Ibid.; CP/IND/MISC/17/2, (CPGBA).
B° J. Bellamy and J. Saville, op.cit.
81 Letter, Archbishop of York to Secretary of State, 12-12-29, (13BP).
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its own grass-roots. In reply to letters which began arriving at Transport House as early
as April 1929, William Gillies, the Labour Party's International Secretary, maintained that
the full facts of the case were 'not commonly understood', specifically the fact that 'all the
arrested men were Communists'.82
Following the verdicts in January 1933, a Meerut Prisoners' Release Committee, MPRC,
was established and by November of that year had raised £1,094.72. 83 Officers of the
MPRC were Jack Tanner, who took the chair; Percy Glading and William Howell, both of
whom served as secretary; and Alex Gossip, treasurer. 84 Other members included James
Maxton M.P., George Buchanan M.P., John Jagger of NUDAW, Dr. A.C. Banerji,
Bridgeman, Pollitt, Joan Beauchamp, Joseph Reeves of the Co-operative Movement;
J.P.M. Miller of the NCLC; Ellen Wilkinson; C.E.M. Joad; L. Simms of ILD; J.F.
Horrabin; John Beckett; Maurice Dobb; Middleton Murray; Father Conrad Noel, the
Vicar of Thaxted; W. Neasham of NAFTA and T. Knibbs, Len Bradley, H. Hinshelwood
and Joe Scott, all representing the AEU. 85 By this time the Comintern was rethinking its
hard-line stance on co-operation with Social Democrats, enabling the CPGB to set up a
broad organisation, 'embodying as far as possible many influential people outside the
revolutionary movement'. 86 It was suggested that the campaign should be built on the
scale of that launched by the CPUSA in defence of the radicals Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti.87
The British Labour Movement
By June 1929, political developments in the Imperial Power had sparked some optimism
amongst the defendants. The election of a Labour Government the previous month
seemed to offer the possibility of a review of the case, especially as the 1927 Labour Party
82 A.J. Williams, Labour and Russia, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989, p.83.
83 Annual Conference Report of LAI, 20-11-33, (RBP).
84 Letter, Bridgeman to Bradley, 24-2-33, (BBP).
85 J.Bellamy and J. Saville, op.cit.; CP/IND/MISC/17/2, (CPGBA).
86 Percy Glading, Report on Meerut, Minutes of a Meeting of the Political Committee, 4-2-33, (CPGBA).
87 Sacco and Vanzetti were Italian immigrants to the US who were unjustly accused of murder and armed
robbery and eventually executed.
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Conference had passed a resolution calling for the release of political prisoners in India,
and Labour's 1929 election programme, 'Labour and the Nation', included a statement on
the desiriability of self-determination for India. However, such optimism was unfounded.
Attlee's role in the Simon Commission should, perhaps, have served as a warning. A
defiant Bradley declared to Jack Tanner, 'Let the Labour Government take the
responsibility of refusing the most elementary right of a jury trial', 88 and the new
government did prove to be, as H.N. Brailsford described, 'weak and impotent' on this
issue.89
Prior to 1929, Labour had relied on the Advisory Committee on Imperial Affairs to
formulate its colonial policies, but once in office, the opinions of the Civil Service held
sway.9° Wedgwood Benn, the newly appointed Secretary of State for India, accepted the
assurances emanating from the Indian authorities that this case did not constitute an attack
upon Indian trade unions, but was a necessary offensive against Communist insurrection.
He rejected all calls for an amnesty, despite protestations that the prisoners had been
arrested for criticism which 'would have been legitimate in any democratic country'.91
Drummond Shiels, the Under-Secretary of State for India, was forced to defend the
Government's stance in response to questions from Fenner Brockway and Alex Gossip at
the October 1929, Labour Conference, where he confirmed that permission had been
given for a CPGB member to travel to Meerut to act as an advisor to the defendants. This
was to have been John Ross Campbell, but his permit was later withdrawn.92
88 Letter, Bradley to Jack Tanner, 21-1-30, Box 3, File 2, (JTC).
89 H.N. Brailsford, Rebel India,. Leonard Stein and Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1931, pp.63-65.
90 Sir Drummond Shiels, 'Sidney Webb as a Minister', in Margaret Cole (ed.), The Webbs and their Work,
Frederick Muller, 1949, p.206.
91 Fenner Brockway, The Indian Crisis, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1931, pp.63-65.
92 The official reason for this withdrawal was that Campbell was not intending to travel in the company of
a British Counsel as originally agreed, but a different reason is cited in P.S. Gupta, Imperialism and the
British Labour Movement 1914-1964,Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1975, p.204. It was the dropping of a
prosecution against Campbell under the incitement to Mutiny Act by the 1924 Labour Government which
contributed to its subsequent defeat. Labour was sensitive to any move which might recall the episode. See
also J. McNair, op.cit., pp.135-7.
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Elements of the Labour left were increasingly unhappy with their Party's policies. As
early as 1924, the ILP had pressed the then Labour Government to initiate discussions
with Indian politicians on a formula for immediate independence and, at its 1929 Annual
Conference, pledged support of colonial independence on demand. 93 Brockway, who
acted as joint secretary of the British branch of the INC prior to 192094 and served as
chair of the ILP's Imperialism Committee, 95 played a leading role in persuading his
colleagues to support India's right to freedom. 96 The Meerut trial provided further cause
for unease - the ILP organised a public meeting demanding the release of the prisoners in
May 1931 97 and, according to A.J. Williams, it was that Party which gave Ramsay
Macdonald 'his most uncomfortable moments' 98over India. Throughout the second
Labour administration, Indian affairs continued to cause internecine strife and
embarrassment for Labour leaders - during 1930 for example, Brockway was suspended
from the House of Commons for challenging the decision to imprison Gandhi.99
Whilst in office, the Labour Party hierarchy presented a consistent obstacle to the Meerut
campaigners. In 1931 a donation for the MPDL of $500 from the Labour Defence League
in New York was intercepted and returned by the British authorities. According to
Wedgwood Benn the reason for this action was a statement in the covering letter that the
money was intended for distribution to 'victims of British Imperialism'. This, he argued,
proved that it was to be used for the furtherance of Communism in India. 103 Approaches
by the LAI to rank and file Labour Party members were also blocked. When South
93 Report of the N.E.C., ILP Annual Conference, 1929, pp.15, 32, 47-8; Conference Agenda, p.19, (LPA).
94 Fenner Brockway, Inside the Left. Allen and Unwin, London, 1942, p.119; M. Nicholson, op.cit., p.88
95 Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics, Oxford, 1993. p.70.
96 P.S. Gupta, op.cit., pp.93-4. The ILP claimed to be the main supporter of Gandhi in Britain. Brockway
and Tarini Sinha, secretary of the ILP's Parliamentary Committee on Indian Affairs, were consulted by
Wedgewood Benn and prepared a paper which recommended the release of political prisoners in India and
the espousal of a clear commitment to Indian self-rule, but their views were not accepted. See Fenner
Brockway, 1942, op.cit., pp.203-4.
97 Notification of a Public Meeting to Demand the Release of the Meerut Prisoners, n/d, (BBP). Speakers
were David Kirkwood M.P., John Kinley M.P. and Jack Dallas.
98 A.J. Williams, op.cit., p.83.
99 This was followed by a demonstration in the House by John Beckett, who siezed the mace and carried it
across the floor. New Leader, 9-5-30, 25-7-30.
100 Letter, Wedgwood Benn to Fenner Brockway, 25-6-31, (BBP).
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Croyden Constituency party asked the National party for guidance over a resolution on
Meerut submitted by the League, the reply merely re-stated the party line that the
organisation was subsidiary to the Communist International and should therefore be
shunned.om
The response of the TUC leadership echoed that of its Labour Party counterparts. There
is little doubt that the Communists had stolen a march on the British TUC over India -
Marjorie Nicholson maintains that the three Commonwealth Labour Conferences of
1925,1928 and 1930, were 'the only forum in which representatives of colonial labour
organisations could join their British colleagues in an effort to thrash out a long-term
colonial policy'. 102 In April 1928 the TUC had debated a report compiled six months
earlier by Hallsworth and Purcell, in which they urged the British trades union movement
to give practical assistance to Indian workers. They recommended that the TUC General
Council appoint four representatives to work with four AITUC colleagues in organising
Indian workers. Their advice was ignored after the Council decided that the cost of
sending full-time trade union organisers to India - an estimated £8,000 a year - would be
too high, and that the money was needed at home. The Communists' work with Indian
labour was thus allowed to continue virtually unchallenged - except by police action.103
The TUC General Council's report to the 1929 Conference did express concern that the
arrests of Indian labour actvists would have a 'deterrent effect' on trade union work and
that the Government of India was 'taking action against Indian trade unions behind the
proceedings against those charged with conspiracy' 104 But it nevertheless insisted that the
majority of the Meerut prisoners were Communists or 'fellow travellers' and, at the 1930
101 Letter, South Croydon Labout Party to National L.P. secretary, 1-12-32, and reply, 2-12-32, (BBP).
102 Marjorie Nicholson, op.cit., p.134.
103 P.S. Gupta, 'British Labour and the Indian Left', 1919-1939', in B.R. Nanda, Socialism in India, Delhi,
1972, p.87; P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit, p.110; M. Nicholson, op.cit., p.159.
104 TUC General Council Report, 1929, p.227.
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and 1931 conferences, the TUC leadership rejected moves to support the prisoners.los
Indeed, an accusation was laid before Manchester and Salford Trades Council by the TUC
representative and erstwhile advocate of Anglo-Soviet co-operation, Albert Purcell, that
Spratt and Bradley had misappropriated TUC funds sent to aid Indian trade unions, and
used them to further their Communist activities.106
There is evidence that this attitude was adopted in the face of grassroots opinion. Gupta
refers to the Government being 'inundated' with protests from trade union branches. m7 At
a meeting of the CPGB's Political Bureau in February 1933, Lytton spoke of 'a big
response from trade union officials, Labour Party delegates, trades council secretaries and
delegates and they are ready to attach their signatures to any memorial', of the Meerut
prisoners, 108 while Lancashire textile workers joined with their counterparts in Moscow
and elsewhere to raise substantial revenue for the cause.109
Bradley's union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, AEU, was closely involved with
the campaign to release the prisoners, but not in an official capacity. The National MPL
received a donation from Thomas ICnibbs, London District Secretary of the AEU, in
August 1929, but could not ackowledge it publicly, as the union was unable to associate
itself directly with the MPDL. 110 In Spring 1929, The WWLI organised a deputation to
the Secretary of State for India, with the help of the AEU," and Jack Tanner - the union's
105 Walter Citrine stubbornly refused all requests for official TUC backing, including a plea from Lala
Girdharilal, secretary of the Central Meerut Defence Committee, made on behalf of Nehru. See J. Bellamy
and J. Saville, op.cit.
106 Document, n/d, n/t, (BBP).
107 P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit., pp.203-4 , n.15. Gupta writes that Wedgwood and Walter Citrine discussed
the issue and concluded that these protests were not a genuine reflection of the views of the British working-
class, but were orchestrated by Bridgeman's committee. He adds that it is impossible to verify or disprove
this conclusion as most of the protests were according to the India Office records, destroyed when the
papers were bound.
108 Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Political Bureau, 4-2-33, (CPGBA).
109 New Age Weekly, op.cit.; V.V. Balabushevich and A.M. Dyakov, op.cit. Many Indian students in
Britain who supported the Labour Government were bewildered by its stance on the Meerut prisoners and
consequently did not take part in the campaign; there was also a fear that if they were involved, the
authorities would stop their funding. See Nirmal Sen Gupta, op.cit., Chpt.3.
110 Letter, R. Bridgeman to Jack Tanner, 3-8-1929, in Box 3, File 2, (JTC).
111 Letter, J.E. Potter Wilson to Jack Tanner, 21-6-29, also Letters from R. Bridgeman to Jack Tanner, 23-
6-29, 27-7-29, in Box 3, File 2, (JTC).
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District Organiser -addressed a special meeting of Brixton AEU on the subject of Meerut
in October of that year. 112 At the beginning of 1931, a letter signed by Jack Tanner, Joe
Scott and Percy Glading was circulated to all AEU branches, appealing for funds to fight
the case."3
Although not all of Bradley's fellow trade unionists approved of his activities, they
generally wished him well. 14 In 1930 a 'London committee for the Defence of B. F.
Bradley' was formed at the instigation of Brixton branch of the AEU, and proceeded to
organise an unofficial meeting of union members in Essex Hall on 16th August 1930.
Speakers were Reginald Bridgeman, Tom Mann and Jack Dallas of the AEU with Jack
Tanner in the chair.115
Bradley later wrote that he believed the trial had a great impact upon British workers, he
was often told by CP members that they had joined the party as a result of the Meerut
campaign. 116 This view is shared by Professor John Saville, who claims that, 'there is no
doubt ... that the practical agitation around the trial deepened the growing sentiment in
favour of the Indian independence movement' and that the national MPDL 'obtained a
much wider general sympathy than the Communist and labour left'.117
By the Spring of 1933, the pressure of grassroots opinion nudged the labour leaders, now
in opposition, into action. Claud Cockburn's newspaper The Week, claimed that the
opposition to the right-wing bosses within the labour movement forced them 'into
following the Communist lead in protesting against the outcome of the Meerut Case,1118
and into organising a national demonstration in Hyde Park on May 7th 1933. Around the
112 Letter, R. Bridgeman to Jack Tanner, 2-11-29, Box 3, File 2, (JTC).
113 Circular, 1-1-31., Box 6, File 1, (JTC).
114 Letter, Knibbs to Bradley, 28-7-31, (BBP).
115 Document, nit, n/d, (BBP).
116 New Age Weekly op.cit., (BBP).
117 J. Saville, 'Britain: Internationalism and the Labour MovementBetween the Wars', in Fritz van
Holthoon and Marcel van der Linden (eds.), Internationalism and the Labour Movement 1830-1940,E J
Brill, New York, 1988.
118 Patricia Cockburn, The Years of the Week. Macdonald and Co. Ltd., London, 1968, p.71.
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same time the National Joint Council of the Labour Party, TUC and Parliamentary Labour
Party, finally issued a pamphlet on the affair entitled Meerut - Release the Prisoners,
which included a foreword by Walter Citrine. As far as Bridgeman was concerned it was
too little, too late. He complained that it dealt only with the legal aspects of the case and
studiously avoided any political conclusion; it omitted any appeal for funds and failed to
offer suggestions of possible action to serve the prisoners' release.' 19
In Prison
Throughout their time in prison, the Communist fraternity remained well-organised,
holding and minuting regular meetings and producing a journal, The Indian Soviet
Weekly, which was sold to raise funds for their defence. I20 The Defence Fund was held
jointly in Muzaffar Ahmed's and Bradley's names and Bradley was responsible for
sending regular reports to London, included with weekly letters to his brother, Len. The
climate in Meerut was particularly harsh for the British prisoners - extremely hot in
summer with temperatures often rising to 115 degrees Fahrenheit, and falling bitterly cold
at night. At one point an outbreak of cholera in which two prisoners unconnected with
the Conspiracy Case died, led to the Meerut group being transferred to Dehra Dun prison
for a short period I21 and between September and November 1932 they were moved to
Almora gaol, where the weather was cooler.
Some months after their arrest, the political prisoners became involved in a hunger strike
precipitated by complaints over prison conditions, and by September 15th all the group
were fasting. The action ended on the 29th of that same month, after Nehru sent a
telegram to the Superintendent of Meerut gaol outlining an INC resolution appealing to
the prisoners to end their hunger strike, I22 and an INC Working Committee elicited a
pledge from the Government to review prison procedures. It was the practice to allot
119 Letter, R. Bridgeman to Bradley, 19-5-33, (BBP).
120 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, op.cit.
121 Ibid.
122 Telegram, Nehru to Surerintendent of Meerut Gaol, 28-9-29, Box 3, File 2, (JTC).
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terrorists Class 'C' status - which allowed few basic amenities, but in reality the conditions
under which the Meerut group were kept were fairly lenient - there were few complaints
regarding the food, for example.123
Lice and boredom were cited as the main irritants by Spratt, although there were
complaints that correspondence was being censored. Problems did occur on an
ideological level however - the fact that the prisoners were from diverse political
backgrounds inevitably led to disagreements. Even so, differences were not confined to
those between Communists and non-Communists, but surfaced amongst the Communist
group itself - the implementation of the 'class against class' policy being a root cause of
friction among the prisoners.
Undoubtedly, the arrest of its leaders constituted a severe setback for the fledgling Indian
Communist organisation. J.T. Murphy stated gloomily in January 1930 that there was
'no CP at all' in India, adding that, with the Meerut prisoners in the dock, the authorities
were 'beheading the Indian revolutionary movement.' 124 But the truth was that the
Communist International itself had dealt Indian Communism a blow with the introduction
of the new line. Under this strategy - which was scheduled to be discussed by the Indian
Communist leaders in March 1929, had their arrests not pre-empted the meeting 125 - the
INC was denounced as a bourgeois party, a supporter of imperialism and duper of the
masses, 126 while erstwhile allies such as Nehru were dismissed as national reformists.127
The policy was refuted by the majority of CPGB delegates to the sixth Congress,
including Clemens Dutt, the official representative of the CPI. But such dissent was
123 Letter, Ben Bradley to Len Bradley, 30-9-32, (BBP).
124 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, Reel 1, 12-1-30, (CPGBA).
125 B. Chandra, 1983, op.cit., p.24.
126 The Egyptian Wafd Party was similarly denounced as a 'party of national betrayal', while Gandhi was
accused by Saklatvala of 'playing for and working for the capitalists'. SeeAnti-Imperialist Review,
November-December 1932, p.38.
127 John Callaghan, 'The Heart of Darkness: Rajani Palme Dutt and the British Empire- a profile', in
Contemporary Record, Vol. 5, No. 2, Autumn 1991, Frank Cass, London, p.267.
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short-lived, the CPGB had no choice but to accept the new line once the Congress had
ended, although many of its leading members continued to believe in the wisdom of
working with colonial nationalist elements sympathetic to the Communist cause. The
Workers' and Peasants' Parties, established to encourage the masses to participate in
political activity, lost Comintern support and were dissolved. This move was also
opposed by British Communists, who argued that they should be retained as intermediate
organisations controlled by the CP,128 and by many Indian Communists who regarded the
WWPs as CPs in 'Indian shape'.129
The sectarian policy also caused divisions within the Indian trade union movement,
resulting in a sharp fall in GKU membership to around 800 by the end of 1929. 130 The
right-wing of the AITUC broke away to form the National Trades Union Federation,
citing the decision of the 9th Session 131 to affiliate with the LAI, together with the
organisation's affiliation with the Pan-Pacific Secretariat - the Asian Bureau of the
Comintern 132 - as the cause of its discontent. The Communists, led by B.T. Ranadive and
S.V. Deshpande, subsequently attempted to split the AITUC from the INC and, when
their efforts failed, left to form the Red TUC from around twelve newly-established trade
unions.
These same divisions were reflected amongst the prisoners. One clash occurred between
adherents to official policy and sympathisers of Roy who, having been expelled from the
Comintern in December1929 for his opposition to the new line, I33 returned to Indian in
128 J. Degras, op.cit., Vol. 3, 1971, p.20.
129 Inprecorr. Vol. 8, 8-11-28, p.1473.
130 B. Chandra, 1989, op.cit.,p.219; B Chandra, 1983, op.cit., pp.24-5.
131 The ninth session of the AITUC was held in Jharia in 1928.
132 S.C. Bose, The Indian Struggle 1920-1942, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p.154; M. Brecher,
Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1959, p.141.
133 Roy's expulsion was secretly decided at the tenth Plenum of the EEC!, in July 1929, but not officially
announced until December of that year.
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1930 in an attempt to reclaim his former position.134 In another incident, Shaukat Usmani
broke with the Communists towards the end of 1932 and moved into separate barracks.135
Lester Hutchinson, who had played a prominent part in building a youth movement in
Bombay, was one of those who rejected the new ultra-leftism. 136 Bradley faithfully
reported Hutchinson's 'transgressions', (which appear to have consisted of affiliations
towards the INC), to London. In a letter to Percy Glading he accused Hutchinson of
'individualism', described him as a 'bad egg' and complained that he appeared to have won
Kulkarni, then president of the Red TUC, to his side. 137 This dispute was not without
repercussions for the British operation. Hutchinson's mother, Mary Knight, was a founder
member of the CPGB in Manchester and an active campaigner for the Meerut prisoners in
that area. 138 She was a staunch supporter of her son and Bridgeman complained that the
Manchester MDC was undermining the British campaign by promoting the Hutchinson
line. 139 The Manchester District Party had issued a leaflet stating that the bourgeois
revolution meant revolution by the bourgeoisie and that when the workers took control it
134 S.R. Chowdhuri, op.cit., p.96. Roy was arrested in Bombay on 21st July, 1931. Following his release
from internment in 1936, he set up the Radical Democratic Party, RDP, and his support for the war effort
led to his being courted by the British authorities as the authentic voice of Indian workers. Critics attacked
his alliance with Jamnadas Mehta, president of the Railwaymen's Union, who was described as a former
'puppet' Minister, 'closely allied to financial circles in Bombay'. SeeNewsIndia, Vol. 3, No. 7, September-
November 1941, p.10. At the end of the war, he turned away from Marxist ideas, abandoned party politics
and dissolved the RDP in 1948.
135 Letter, Bradley to Len Bradley, 11-11-32, (BBP). According to Spratt, Usmani, who had been a
member of the Indian emigres group in Moscow in the early 1920s, took this action following the revelation
that three Indian companions who had accompanied him to the VI Comintern World Congress in Moscow
had been shot as spies. See P. Spratt, op.cit., p.42
136 S. Roy, op.cit., HIP/29 F10/IV.
137 Letter, Bradley to Glading, 16-9-32, (BBP). There was an attempt to heal the rift after the sentences
were reviewed, Bradley wrote in November 1933 that Hutchinson had expressed certain regrets over some
of the things which had occurred and the two later collaborated on the pamphletIndia Under Dictatorship 
and shared a platform at a House of Commons meetingin January 1934.
138 Ruth and Eddie Frow, The Communist Party in Manchester, North West History Group, Manchester,
1979. Mary Knight was Labour Party representative for the New Cross ward of Manchester City Council
between 1938-58, and served as an Alderman from 1958-65. Lester Hutchinson eventually became the
Labour M.P. for Manchester Rusholme in 1945, but was expelled from the Party in 1949 because of his
criticisms of the Labour Government's foreign policy and - along with D.N. Pritt, Konni Ziliacus and others
- became part of the group of ex-Labour M.P.s who called themselves 'Labour Independents'. Nevertheless,
many of his erstwhile comrades continued to regard him as a careerist who repudiated parts of his Meerut
defence statement in order to become 'respectable'.
139 Annual Report of the LA! British Section, 1932, op.cit.; Letter, Bridgeman to Bradley, 30-9-32, (BBP).
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became a proletarian revolution. This was counter to the current tenet, that the Indian
working-class would wage a single struggle.I40
The sectarian position constrained the work of the CPGB in Britain during this period and
raised the doubts of many members. In August 1930, the Political Bureau of the CPGB
decreed that the Meerut campaign should be broadened from the defence of the Meerut
prisoners into a crusade to cover all repression in India. 141 It was decided that MPDCs
should be absorbed into the LAI as 'Hands Off India' Committees; letters were sent to
local Meerut committees asking them to re-form into League branches and in most cases
this was agreed to.142
The logic behind the dissolving of the Meerut Committees was to slough off the so-called
'sham lefts' who had been associated with the campaign and thus strengthen the role of the
Party. The network of united front organisations which grew so successfully under
Munzenberg's direction were no longer seen to be the way forward; 'The Party must
liquidate the tendency to substitute the auxilliary organisations for the Party, or to transfer
the leadership of the masses to the auxilliary organisations.' 143 But, as George Allison
pointed out, the new Committees would merely 'consist of the Party meeting itself under
another name.'144
There is no doubt that the merging of the MPDCs with the LAI had a deleterious effect
upon finances - a Political Bureau meeting held on October 1st, 1931, reported a
substantial fall in the amount raised, 145 but the isolationist policy was having wider
repercussions. By January 1930, Pollitt was reporting the virtual collapse of the Party's
Colonial and Industrial Departments - a consequence of those in charge having to direct
140 Minutes of a CPGB Central Committee Meeting, 31-5-30, Reel 1, (CPGBA).
141 Minutes of a CPGB Central Committee Meeting, 31-5-30, Reel 1, (CPGBA).
142 Annual Report of LAI's British Section, February 1931, op.cit.
143 Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Political Bureau, Reel 11, 17-6-30, (CPGBA).
144 Minutes of a Meeting of the CPGB's Central Committee, 5-4-30, Reel 1, (CPGBA).
145 Minutes of a Meeting of the GPGB's Political Bureau, 1-10-31, Reel 12, (CPGBA).
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their attentions towards the Daily Worker, which was suffering from falling circulation
figures and a precarious financial situation.I46
In India, confusion reigned within the Communist camp - its leaders imprisoned and its
policies overturned just as the INC's great Civil Disobedience Campaign of 1930 was
taking off. 147 The result was isolation from mainstream political activity at a crucial
moment in India's political development. The prisoners were obliged to watch as the
organisational base they had worked to build began to crumble away. The Central MDC
was wound up several months after the trial's conclusion, its central defence fund in
debt 148 and most of the Committee, including Nehru, gaoled for their activities in the
Civil Disobedience Campaign.149
Faced with a number of uncoordinated district CPs, the Comintern refused to recognise
any one over the others, 150 but responded to appeals from the gaoled Communist leaders
by sending a number of emissaries to try and salvage the operation. At this time the
British CP had no cadres ready to send; 151 J.T. Murphy had complained as early as May
1930 that the CPGB was too passive on the question of training members to work in
India, urging that 'The Colonial Department should seriously consider the question of a
school in London to train people to specialise on the colonial question: 152 Consequently,
those sent were mostly American Communists who made little impact, although one
146 Minutes of Meetings of the CPGB's Political Bureau, 9-1-30, 11-1-30, Reel 11, (CPGBA).
147 On the 12th March, 1930, Gandhi began a campaign of non-cooperation during which peasants refused
to pay rent or taxes. The Government responded by introducing a number of Ordinances - the INC was
banned in June, sixty-seven national newspapers were shut down and mass arrests ensued, including Gandhi
and Subhas Bose. Hundreds were killed or wounded. In one incident, two Hindu platoons of the Second
Battalion of the Garwhali Rifles refused to fire on a Muslim crowd, forcing a military and police
withdrawal. For the authorities, a disturbing example of Indian unity.
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B.T. Ranadive, and immediately laid claim to being the official CPI. The organisation made little headway
and in 1932, Ranadive and his supporters broke away. At the end of 1933, Bradley and Dr. Gangadhar
Adhikari worked to stabilize the Party, and in 1934, the Deshpande and Ranadive groups were reconciled.
S, Joshi, op.cit., pp.318-9.
151 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 12-1-30, Reel 1, (CPGBA).
152 Minutes of a Political Bureau Meeting, 10-5-30, Reel 11, (CPGBA).
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agent, Amir Haider Khan, who posed as a seaman until his arrest and imprisonment in
May 1932, did make some headway. 153 In despair, the prisoners complained to Moscow
and requested that only British citizens be used in the future.
By 1933 the authorities 154 believed that they had defused the threat from the Communists
who were 'not a danger at the present moment'. 155 The so-called Round Table Talks -
talks which Page Arnot dismissed as resembling 'the ceremonial mumblings of the priest
that walks behind the hangman' 156 - had led to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931 and the end
of the Civil Disobedience Campaign. 157 In a climate of growing self-confidence, the Mill
owners began a new offensive against wages and conditions through a speeding-up of the
production process, this time picking off mills individually. A dispirited Bradley wrote to
his brother in December 1933, that Indian trade union organisation was in a 'state of
chaos' and that not a single mill workers' union was 'worthy of the name'.158
Confidence by the authorities that they had neutralised the Communist threat was
reflected in the result of the Meerut prisoners'Appeal. On July 24th 1933, following an
eight-day Appeal Hearing at Allahabad High Court, the Judges confirmed the findings of
the Meerut trial, but dramatically reduced the sentences. Nine prisoners, including P.C.
Joshi, Gopal Basak, Shakshul Huda and Dr. Adhikari, were released immediately.
Muzaffar Alunad's severe sentence was reduced to three years, Spratt's prison term was
cut to two years and Bradley's to one year. In the event, all of the Meerut prisoners had
gained their freedom by the autumn of 1935.159
1 53 S.R. Chowdhuri, op.cit., p.100.
154 Sir Samuel Hoare had taken over the India Office in 1932 and Lord Willingdon was Viceroy.
155 S. Roy, op.cit., p.165.
156 Labour Monthly, September 1930, p.534.
157 The INC was legalised in May 1934.
158 Letter, Bradley to Len Bradley, 11-12-33, (BBP).
159 The Leader, 6-8-33, (BBP).
122
Conclusion
By 1928, British Communists and their Indian comrades had made startling progress in
their task of organising the Indian workforce in a number of key industries, so much so
that voices within the Indian authorities were warning that they were on the brink of
gaining control of the entire trade union movement. The greatest threat however, lay with
a possible alignment of Communists and radical nationalists - a scenario which seemed to
have substance, given Nehru's sympathetic approach to Communist ideas. In order to
defuse this threat, it was considered necessary to isolate the Communists and expose their
true motives which, it was believed, would prove to conflict with those of the nationalists.
After due reflection, the Meerut Trial was the method which the authorities used in an
attempt to achieve this end.
As a strategy, the arrest and trial of those leading the labour unrest backfired badly. The
Indian Government misjudged the political mood of the INC, which issued protests at
what it deemed to be attacks on ordinary Indian trade unionists. The trial itself gave the
Communist accused an excellent opportunity to put forward their ideas with maximum
publicity, as well as schooling the other defendents in Marxist-Leninist theory. As the
trial unfolded, the Communists were allowed to cast themselves in the role of
revolutionary heroes and the draconian sentences only served to reinforce this image.
In Britain, the Meerut Prisoners' cause won many important allies from a far wider
constituency than the Communist and Labour left. This did not include the leadership of
the labour movement, which initially treated the issue as a defensive action against
Communist incursion, but there is evidence of widespread grass-roots support for the
campaign in the trade unions. The CPGB was able to make full use of the issue of trade
union repression in India and, by early 1933, pressure from the rank and file persuaded
the Labour leadership to back the calls for action on the case.
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Although the arrest of its leaders was a serious setback for the Indian Communist
movement, longer-term damage resulted from the Comintern's isolationist policies after
1928. The decision to turn on the Congress left was opposed by the majority of British
Communists, who adhered to their belief in co-operation with radical colonial nationalists
as a further means of contact with the masses, but the Communist International refused to
tolerate any diversity of opinion. As a result, Communists were excluded from the great
popular upsurge of opposition to the colonial power led by the nationalists and were
powerless to halt the disintegration of their base in the trade union movement. In Britain,
moves to squeeze out non-Communists from the Meerut Committees seriously hampered
the progress of the campaign.
The importance of the Meerut campaign for the Comintern and the CPGB was
emphasised by Robin Page Arnot in 1930. It was 'the focus of the Indian revolution and
the Indian revolution is the storm centre of the whole world revolution at this moment.'160
There is no doubting the impact that the trial had on opinion in India and on the left in
Britain. The work of the British Communists was greatly valued by the Indian workers
and is remembered in some circles even today. Rajani Palme Dutt, describing his fiftieth
birthday party held during a visit to India in summer 1946 wrote that amongst his guests
were 'grizzled old veterans of the Bombay workers who remembered the days of Ben
Bradley and were full of fire and animation',161
The progress of Communism in India was a cause of great concern to the authorities in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. Between 1920 and 1934, the colonial police published
three books on Communist activities and circulated them to the lower ranks of the civil
service in an effort to inculcate anti-Communist attitudes. The potential existed at this
time for great Communist advance but the inability of the leadership of the Communist
movement to adopt a flexible attitude in response to diverse national conditions, or to
160 Reel 1, CCMM, 12-1-30, (CPGBA).
161 J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.226.
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accept advice from those directly involved, severely weakened the offensive. Bhagwan
Josh claims that 'Given the correct strategy and conditions prevailing in India, the
Communists and Socialists along with the militant nationalists had every chance to
become a powerful force, if not the dominant force in national life'.162
162 Bhagwan Josh,	 . .1- for e mon in In la 20114 Vol. II, 1934-1941, Sage Publications,
New Delhi, 1992, p.114.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INDIAN STRUGGLE 1933-39
Indian Communists Regroup
If the effect of the Government of India's offensive against Communists and their allies at
the end of the 1920s was to temporarily behead the Indian Communist movement, the
policy changes imposed by the Comintern during the 'third period' threatened to halt its
advance altogether. Yet, between 1933 and the outbreak of the Second World War,
Communist ideas played an important part in shaping the vision of a future, independent
India which was nurtured and promoted by Nehru. That he continued to identify with
such ideas despite the Communist movement's disparagement of his position throughout
its ultra-left phase and its relative neglect of the Indian liberation struggle thereafter, was
in some measure reflected in his close relations with the leaders of the CPGB.
Following the decision of the Seventh Comintern Congress to prioritise the struggle
against the fascist threat in Europe, the Communist International was vulnerable to
accusations of neglecting Indian concerns and even of subordinating the colonial
revolution in order to placate those imperialist powers now considered to be potential
allies of the Soviet Union. Undeniably, Moscow was preoccupied by the situation in
Europe at this time and this had inevitable repercussions for the Comintern, which had
increasingly operated as an expression of Stalin's foreign policy since the eixthVorld
Congress.
However, the relatively low priority accorded to colonial work at the centre by the mid-
1930s ensured that responsibility for liaison with the CPI lay even more under the day-to-
day control of the CPGB and its Indian specialists, Duff and Bradley. Malcolm MacEwan
claims that, 'neither the Party nor the Daily Worker deferred to the Soviet Union on
Colonial or Indian matters, for the simple reason that we knew far more than they did."
1 Malcolm MacEwan, The Greening of a Red, Pluto Press, London, 1991, p.114.
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Although this exaggerates the autonomy of the British Party, the CPGB and Dutt in
particular, endeavoured to steer the intractable Indian Communists through the policy
labyrinth constructed by Moscow while continuing to demonstrate a strong commitment
to the cause of Indian freedom.
Gandhi, who favoured an 'honourable compromise' with the British Government, had
suspended Civil Disobedience on 8th May 1933, a decision which Nehru condemned
from his prison cell. 'I am', he wrote, 'afraid I am drifting further and further away from
him (Gandhi) mentally . . . what a tremendous contrast to the dialectics of Lenin and Co.
More and more I feel drawn to their dialectics'. 2 His words heralded a period of
contention between the Congress left, of which he and Subhas Bose were leading figures,
and the organisation's right-wing, during which the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was
formed. This was the significant development of 1934 in that the left had, for the first
time, formed an organised group within Congress which argued from a class perspective
and called on the INC to support the economic struggles of the workers and peasants.
As the mass protest movement was curtailed, paradoxically, Communist activity revived.
Following the release of the Meerut prisoners, moves began to re-establish the Party, a
process in which Bradley - who gained his freedom in November 1933 - played a leading
role. Activities commenced with a conference, held in Calcutta in December 1933, during
which a new statute was adopted and a Central Committee formed, with Doctor
Gangadhar Adhikari elected to the post of General Secretary. This body was
subsequently recognised by the Comintern as the official Communist Party of India.
Throughout 1934, Indian Communists were involved in a number of spontaneous strikes
which erupted in the textile industry. Under the anti-imperialist united front - an aspect of
popular front policy - co-operation with bourgeois nationalists and non-Communists was
2 Quoted in Bhagwan Josh, The Struggle for Hegemony in India 1920-1947, Vol. 2 1934-41, Sage
Publications, London, 1992, p.81.
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no longer frowned upon, allowing for the formation of a Joint Council of Action from the
followers of M.N. Roy, N.M Joshi and the CPI. The aims of this alliance, to co-ordinate
working-class action and launch a general strike in the mills, seemed achievable when, on
April 23rd, 90,000 textile workers in Bombay downed tools. 3 It was a development to
which the authorities reacted swiftly; the strike leaders were arrested and Communist
literature was seized.
Prior to 1934, action against Communism was conducted mainly by the Intelligence
Bureau in New Delhi. But with the prospect of renewed collaboration between
Communists and nationalists, the main body of the police force in Bombay was utilise&
as the Government, determined to learn the lesson of Meerut, adopted a pre-emptive
strategy of repression. On July 28th 1934, the CPI and its constituent branches and
committees were declared unlawful bodies under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of
1908, the terms of which rendered all the party's monies, securities and credits liable to
forfeit. 5 Although this created obvious problems for the CPI, it was not a totally
successful tactic, as many Communist organisations managed to avoid sanctions by
various manoeuvres, such as a simple change of designation.
By 1935 the Communists had regained their position in the AITUC which, together with
the Bombay textile mills, was the main power base of the CPI. Even the authorities
admitted that, despite their repression and imprisonment, the Communists were able to
'integrate themselves with the workers in a remarkably short span of time t6 once they were
released, and were instrumental in the increasing number of disputes in the period leading
up to the Second World War.
3	 Ibid., p.121.
4	 Sir Percival Griffiths, op.cit., pp.353-360.
5 Report of the LAI's British section, November 24-25th, 1934; S. Roy, op.cit., Home Dept., notification
no.F/7/8/34, dated 23-7-34.
6 Quoted in Bhagwan Josh, 1992, op.cit., p.113.
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Whilst practising co-operation with Congress, Indian Communists were required to
simultaneously build an independent base. Throughout the second half of the 1930s the
CPI, despite being forced to operate underground, made great progress in organising
agricultural workers and poor peasants into Kisan Sabha, or peasants' unions, which were
involved in numerous rent strikes and riots. 7 Their success in organising the rural
population was due in part to championing local causes. But it was also related to the
association of landlords in some districts with the INC. There was a reluctance among the
rural poor in some areas to join forces with their immediate exploiters and the nationalist
cause could seem abstract for those for whom the British administration remained too
remote to be identified as the common enemy. Nehru acknowledged this fact when he
admitted that, in some areas, the peasantry did not 'find the same field within Congress',8
as it did within the Communist movement.
The Dutt-Bradley Theses
The drastic policy change represented by the popular front against fascism presented real
problems for Indian Communists who were in effect being instructed to execute another
'U' turn. Because the two CPI delegates to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, S.V.
Deshpande and S.S. Mirajkar, were arrested in Singapore on their way to Moscow, 9 the
task of explaining the implications of the new policy to Indian Communists was passed to
the CPGB. More specifically, the undertaking was assigned to Bradley - now regarded as
a specialist on colonial questions because of his practical experience - and Rajani Palme
Dutt.
The Dutt-Bradley Theses, as this interpretation became known, was printed in Inprecorr
in February 1936. 10 It was an essentially pragmatic presentation, calling for all anti-
imperialist forces to join together in an all-India United People's Front, which
7 The All-India Kisan Sabha was formed in 1936, reaching a membership of 800,000 by 1939. See The
Revolution in India, Tait Memorial Committee, Edinburgh, n.d.
8 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 1-2nd July, 1938, Reel 9. (CPGBA).
9	 S.R. Chowdhuri, 1977, op.cit., p.103.
10 'The Anti-Imperialist People's Front' in Inprecorr, Vol. 16, 29th February, 1936.
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acknowledged the hegemonic position of the INC in relation to the masses. The Congress
left was rehabilitated, allowing the Congress Socialist Party, which was established in
October 1934, to be credited with the potential to become, The form of realisation of the
anti-imperialist people's front'."
Nevertheless, the policy drew a distinction between the Congress hierarchy and its
membership, arguing that it was possible to be a member of that organisation without
being a dupe of its 'treacherous bourgeois leadership'. Although the people's front
allowed the Communists to function as part of the broad left, this did not signify that they
had renounced their ambitions to power. In fact, the objective was to participate in order
to expose and ultimately displace the 'counter-revolutionary' leadership - a strategy which
caused dissent among the 1934 strike committee and led to the defeat of the general
strike.
It was this dichotomy of purpose which caused relations between the CSP and Indian
Communists to cool. Shortly after its formation in 1934, the CSP had agreed to permit
Communists to hold membership - an alliance which was discussed the following year at
the Seventh Comintern Congress in a meeting between Palme Dutt, Harry Pollitt, Ben
Bradley and M. R. Masani of the CSP. I2 Dutt and Bradley had directed their exposition
of the new policy at the non-Communist left through a letter entitled, 'An Open Letter to
Indian Patriots', which was printed in the March 1936 edition of The Congress Socialist,
organ of the CSP. I3 But following the discovery in 1937 of a CPI document I4 which
revealed that Communists were merely using the organisation as a 'Trojan Horse', the
relationship became strained. The break was not final however; although Communists
11 Bhagwan Josh, 1992, op.cit., p.125. For more details of the Dutt-Bradley see: B. Chandra, 1983,
op.cit., pp.180-182; S.R. Chowdhuri, 1977, op.cit., pp.102-112 and M.R. Masani, 1954, op.cit., pp.57-59.
12 S.R. Chowdhuri, op.cit., p.161.
13 M.R. Masani, op.cit., p.59.
14 The document was entitled 'Plan of Work - CSP'.
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were subsequently banned from joining the organisation, those already inside the CSP
were allowed to remain as members.15
For leading Indian Communists such as P.C. Joshi, the new line presented a formidable
challenge. Faced with the refusal of many Indian Communists to accept the changes,
Party officials spent months summarising and translating policy reports into the numerous
Indian dialects. Intensive discussions produced the view that the CPGB's interpretation,
'failed to distinguish the problems of the industrial workers in the West from those of the
peasantry and unskilled workers in backward economies', and even that the advice of the
two British Communists was 'particularly vacuous'.16
The anti-fascist rationale behind the new policy was resented as a shift away from the
anti-imperialist struggle which was the Indian Communists' primary concern, while the
apparant abandonment of revolutionary certitudes left many activists disordered and
defiant. As late as March 1937, the Political Bureau of the CPI considered it necessary to
issue a statement clarifying the Dutt-Bradley Theses in order to dispel confusion among
the rank and file as to the class basis of the peoples' front. 17 This statement warned
against attempts to build a United National Front which excluded the national
bourgeoisie; a ruling to which many in the CPI found difficulty conforming.
Despite the Party's apparent acceptance by 1938 that the INC was 'the central mass
political organisation of the Indian people ranged against imperialism', 18 the question of
leadership of the peoples' front continued to be one of contention. For example, many
were unsure at which point the national bourgeoisie were to be shed from the struggle.
Such uncertainties were to cause prolonged internicine strife within the CPI and great
problems for its supervisors in the British Communist Party. One manifestation of the
15 See Bhagwan Josh, 1992, op.cit., pp.140-141.
16 M. Carritt, op.cit., p.164.
17 Bhagwan Josh, 'Nationalism, Third International and Indian Communism', in Bipan Chandra (ed.), Tbe
Indian Left - critical appraisals, Vikas Publishing House Ltd., New Delhi, 1983, p.195.
18 Quoted in Bipan Chandra, 1989, op.cit., p.304.
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Indian Party's confusion was its support in1939 of Subhas Chandra Bose's candidature for
a second term as Congress President, despite evidence of his fascist sympathies.
In January 1938, whilst presiding over a reception held for Bose in London, Duff had
listened to Bose proclaim that; 'our struggle against imperialism and fascism in India is a
struggle not only for our own salvation, but for the salvation of humanity', and concluded
that he had uttered 'inspiring words for all of us 1 . 19 Bose later remarked of this visit to
Britain; 'I am greatly encouraged by the attitude of the leaders of the British Communist
Party, whose general policy with regard to India seems to me to be in keeping with the
INC'. 20 However, by March the following year, Pollitt was expressing concern that the
CPGB was mistaken to form a bloc with Bose, who was 'an enemy of everything that the
Communist Party stands for'.21
Prior to the outbreak of war, Bose founded the Berlin-based, anti-British, Indian Students
Association with the aid of the German Foreign Office, and he continued to collaborate
with the German regime using his 'Forward Bloc' organisation. 22 His 1939 election
programme,23 which issued an ultimatum on independence to the British Government,
split Congress opinion and precipitated the resignations of more than a dozen members of
the Working Committee, including Nehru.
The zeal with which the CPI subscribed to any attempt to disrupt the Congress leadership
caused great concern within the British Party. Dutt warned of the danger of fascist
penetration in India, reminding colleagues that Bose had shown signs of reflecting the
19 Colonial Information Bulletin, No.19, 15-1-38, p.4.
20 Colonial Information Bulletin, No. 22, 1st. March, 1938, p.2.
21 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 19-3-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
22 The Forward Bloc, formed in May 1939, with Bose as president, was pledged to overthrow the British
authorities which declared the organisation illegal in June 1942. Bose was arrested following the outbreak
of war, but escaped to Germany in 1941, where he helped establish a Central free India Bureau. See
Percival Griffiths, op.cit., p.368.
23 Opposition to Bose's programme led to a resurgence of the right at the Triparti Congress. His
'Forward Bloc' organised a number of All-India demonstrations which rapidly developed into anti-Congress
leadership rallies, prompting Nehru to publish a condemnation in the press. See H. Pollitt, Political Bureau
Report to the CPGB's Central Committee, 23-7-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
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tendency to regard fascism as 'Britain's enemy, therefore our friend', 24 while Bradley
warned against 'disruptive elements on the left', 25 emphasising the danger to the unity of
the nationalist movement posed by a ill-timed, Communist-inspired, leadership bid.
According to the CPGB, the Indian comrades tended to overestimate their successes,
believing that they had no need of any other organisation in the building of Socialism in
India. It was a position, British Communists complained, which had 'alienated some very
good elements in the Congress Socialist Party'.26
The CPGB was committed to a policy of 'Socialist Unity' in India and well aware of the
value of the CSP in providing Communists with a respected platform. The Party's
fifteenth National Congress welcomed the 'growing unity of the people of India behind
the INC, and the strengthening of the mass movement of workers and peasants'. 27 In
pleading for a more conciliatory approach by Indian Communists, Dutt warned against 'a
sectarian tendency in Socialism in India, a tendency. . . to aim. . . at a restricted selected
membership.' 28 The message was even clearer in a statement to the British Party in
March 1939; 'we want them (CPI) to drop this notion that they are a ready-made
Communist Party ready to go into a broad movement in order to manipulate and
manoeuvre inside it.'29
A Meeting of Minds?
With the adoption of the new line, Nehru in particular became once more the focus of
Communist aspirations, as it was believed that he possessed the ability to lead Congress
away from Gandhi's influence and towards the left. However, the sensitivity of Nehru's
position as a Congress leader required the CPGB to camouflage its attempts at
24 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 19-3-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
25 Quoted in J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.161.
26 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 19-3-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
27 Colonial Information Bulletin, No.11, 30th. September, 1938, p.2.
28 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 1-2-38, Reel 9, (CPGBA).
29 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 19-3-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA). Despite their resistance,the
majority of Indian communists eventually accepted the revised position, including the criticism that the CPI
had been guilty of 'sectarianism' during the years that it had followed the edicts of the sixth Comintern
Congress!
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proselytism. For example, in 1936, just weeks after Nehru was elected to the Presidency
of the INC, he and Dutt met in Lausanne. According to Duff, this meeting was purely
fortuitous. He claimed to be visiting Bradley who, he alleged, was receiving treatment at
the same clinic as Nehru's wife, Kamala." But the falsity of this account is revealed by a
letter from Harry Pollitt to Victor Gollancz which asserts that Duff had been sent to
Lausanne specifically to rendezvous with Nehni.31
During this encounter, the two held extensive talks and reached agreement on a range of
issues including the need to promote the left within Congress, to consider the economic
and social claims of the masses and, in line with a demand for full independence, the
rejection of the 1935 Constitution.32 In the provisions of this document, a product of the
Simon Commission, the British Government was attempting to defuse the nationalists'
message by broadening the base of British rule.33
Nehru and the CSP, anxious to reject any move by Congress towards constitutionalism,
were adamant that the Congress leadership should not accept ministerial office under the
terms of the constitution. They feared that such a move would inevitably lead to co-
operation with Brititsh imperialism. Communists, however, were critical of the CSP's
non-acceptance policy. Calling for militant mass action, they claimed that the elections
could be transformed into 'large scale anti-imperialist mass mobilisation'. 34 Whilst
believing that the 'slave constitution' was a democratic cloak to hide autocratic British
30 S. Gopal, op.cit., pp.108-9.
31 R.D. Edwards, Victor Gollancz: a biography, V. Gollancz Ltd., London, 1987, p.234; John Callaghan,
1993, op.cit., pp.156-7.
32 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., pp.157-9.
33 The provisions enfranchised approximately twelve percent of the population, enabling this small
minority to elect representatives to Provincial Legislatures, which in turn elected members to a Federal
Legislature. Critics claimed that the Act would bolster reactionary forces and exploit divisions in Indian
society; for example, Muslims were allocated proportionately more seats than Hindus and the
'untouchables' were set apart from the rest of the population. The so-called autonomous provinces would
be presided over by a Governor with virtual dictatorship powers, while the office of Governor-General
would retain the existing wide powers with which to carry out its 'special responsibilities'.
34 B. Josh, 1992, op.cit., p.181.
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rule, they argued that the left should support the Congress right's bid for office and, once
accepted, should expose their reformism and eject them through mass action.
During their 1936 meeting, Dutt had a 'long argument' with Nehru over the issue35 and, in
the event, his advice proved to be sound. Despite the nationalists' opposition to these
provisions, the 1937 elections brought remarkable victories for the INC, which succeeded
in establishing Congress administrations in seven of the eleven provinces and coalition
governments in two others. The Muslim League, whose claim to be the main
representative of Muslim opinion was upheld by the British, won only one in twenty of
the seats set aside for Muslims in specifically communal constituencies.36
The formation of the Congress Governments generated a new sense of confidence among
the workers and peasants and led to a surge in activism. Nehru confirmed this in a speech
to the INC's Calcutta session in October 1937. 'My personal view was against office
acceptance', he admitted, but 'office acceptance has benefited us. The country is pulsating
with a new life and new vision.'37 During 1938, 647,000 workers, whose leaders had been
released from gaol by the new nationalist administrations, took part in some four hundred
strikes.38
In his first Presidential address at the Lucicnow Congress of 1936, and later that same year
at the Faizapur Congress, Nehru delighted British Communists by calling for the
establishment of socialism in India and promoting an internationalist ethos which was
pro-Soviet and anti-fascist. Described by Dull as 'having a clear international viewpoint
on the unity of the national struggle with the international democratic movement', 39 the
35 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 19-3-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
36 H. Palmer, India, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., August 1942; Dorothy Hewitt, Truth About India,
London, n.d..
37 Quoted in B. Josh, 1992, op.cit., p.277.
38 India's Demand for Freedom, Lawrence and Wishart, London, n.d., c1942, p.13.
39 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 19-3-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
135
Congress leader retained little faith in the ability of capitalism or parliamentary
democracy to solve India's problems"
In contrast Soviet Russia, seemingly untouched by the West's economic crisis as she
implemented the Five Year Plan, and socialism seemed to provide the answer. He wrote
that 'A study of Marx and Lenin provided a powerful effect on my mind and helped me to
see history and current affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social
development appeared to have some meaning, some significance and future lost most of
its obscurity •'41 It soon became apparant, however, that such tendencies would be
constrained by Nehru's less radical colleagues, who constituted a majority on the
Congress working committee. With Gandhi's support, they succeeded in frustrating all
Nehru's efforts to move the organisation to the left.
Nevertheless, his continuing empathy with the Communists was apparant when he chaired
a Conference on Peace and Empire in London in July 1938, 42 during which Dutt extended
a warm welcome and Paul Robeson expressed the sympathy of Negro Americans towards
India's struggle for self-determination. 43 It led to his addressing a Central Committee
meeting of the CPGB in July 1938, an exceptional event - not even left-wing Socialists
like Fenner Brockway were invited to do so - which indicates how close Nehru was to
Communists at this time. Here he declared that, 'it is very desirable and necessary for this
unity of the two movements (the CSP and the Communists) to be maintained. . . and it is
within that framework, therefore, that I try to think.'44
All the signs point to Nehru's Marxist convictions, his admiration for Soviet achievements
and his readiness to listen to old friends in the Communist movement such as Dutt and
413 He was particularly affected by the economic Depression of 1929-33 and the rise of fascism in Europe.
41 Quoted in L.P. Singha, 'Marxism and Nehru's Concept of Socialism', in Political Science Review, Vol.
12, Part 314, 1973, p.221.
42 Stafford Cripps gave the opening address at this Conference.
43 Colonial Information Bulletin, No.5, 1st. July, 1938, p.1; Conference on Peace and Empire, 15/16-7-
38, DBN27/5, (RBP).
44 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 1-2nd July, 1938, Reel 9, (CPGBA).
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Chattopadhyaya, with both of whom he maintained a long-standing correspondence. But,
as Dutt recognised, Nehru was 'essentially a representative of the centre', 45 whose left
sympathies would always be subordinate to nationalist unity. Ultimately, he preferred to
work alongside Gandhi, the leader who had delivered a mass base for nationalism, rather
than the communists, who merely sought a mass base for Socialism.
India Today
The more relaxed climate engendered by the popular front enabled Dutt to develop his
work on India, the results of which were set out in India Today, published in 1940. In
this, he argued that India was undergoing a process of de-industrialisation - a reversal of
his earlier rapid industrialisation theory. Citing the wealth of the country prior to British
rule and its trade in silks, cotton, sugar, indigo and other commodities, he maintained that
the basic conditions existed for the establishment of a modern industrial economy. But,
while constructing the means of a 'unified system of exploitation' on the ruins of the old
economy, imperialism had 'retarded the economic development of India'.46
The view that India's industrial development was being neglected or deliberately held
back in order to protect British capitalism from Indian competition was in line with the
nationalist view. Nationalists also complained of the lack of industrialisation in India,
claiming after 1939 that any progress was restricted to existing industries and those set up
for war requirements. Furthermore, the advocacy of a planned economy as a means of
achieving social and economic reconstruction in an independent India was broadly in line
with the views of Nehru and the Congress left.
The overall impression of India Today was an optimistic one. Divisions in Indian society
were a special product of the latest period of British rule, or 'of the declining imperialist
45 Quoted in J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.157.
46 Rajani Palme Dutt, Jndia Today, Victor Gollancz, London, 1940, p.37. However, the more pragmatic
approach of the communists was implicit in the assertion that, 'We should not let people run away with the
idea that our constructive policy can be summed up in the slogan, 'Smash the Empire'.
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ascendency's./ according to Dutt. He claimed that communal antagonisms should not be
seen as part of the consciousness of the masses, but were rooted in inequalities and could
be overcome by social and economic advances. Socialism was perceived to be in the
ascendent within the INC and problems arising from the inter-relation of the national
struggle with the class and social struggle could be solved, 'given unity of all the decisive
forces of the people in the common aim of the national struggle against the common
enemy, imperialism.'" But whilst asserting that 'Of the outcome of this struggle there
can be no doubt, the defeat of the black forces is bound up with the victory of the national
democratic liberation of India',49 he warned that a united, classless society could not be
achieved in one step - Socialism did not necessarily represent the immediate next stage in
India.5°
Conclusion
The isolation of Indian Communists during the ultra-left 'third period' constituted a severe
setback for the movement, severing its connections with the masses at the beginning of a
great wave of national consciousness and provoking dissension within its own ranks.
There are those who argue that the strategy also affected the internal politics of the INC.
Jayaprakash Narayan, president of the CSP, argued that if the Communists had not
shunned the nationalist movement on the eve of the civil disobedience campaign in 1929,
'the radicalisation of Congress would have gone much further.'51
But despite the problems generated during 1928-1935, Communism in India survived to
make its mark in the latter half of the 1930s. Many of the nationalists who were of a left
persuasion continued to maintain links with Communists and Nehru in particular proved a
durable ally, 1936-45 being his most radical phase. The CPGB worked to retain the





51 Quoted in Bhagwan Josh, 1992, op.cit., p.137.
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close personal touch with Nehru and seems to have been genuinely enthusiastic about
united front work between Communists and nationalists. Certainly, Dulls writings on the
Indian struggle were far less copious during the ultra-left phase of 1928-35 than they were
either before or after it and we have seen that the majority of the CPGB leadership
vociferously opposed the sectarian turn in the first place. Once the Popular Front policy
permitted a return to the original alliance strategy, Dun was able to produce some of his
best analyses of the Indian struggle, including India Today (1940).
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST NETWORK
Empire Socialism
During the inter-war years, the doctrine of 'trusteeship' was employed by the Labour
Party to justify the continued existence of the colonial Empire. This stressed Britain's
responsibilities towards her colonies and the peoples over whom she ruled. The principle
of 'sacred trust' was enshrined in the League of Nations Covenant and applied through the
League's permanent Mandates Commission, established to oversee the administration of
subject territories. In 1918, the Party referred in its new Constitution to the 'moral claims
upon us of the non-adult races', and pledged to support democratic self-government only
for those territories which, in its judgement, were capable of self-rule.'
The ILP had always provided those voices calling for a 'Socialist foreign policy' within
the Labour Party. Resolutions on imperialism were passed at its Annual Conferences in
1920, 1921 and 1922 2 and, by the mid-1920s, leading figures on the left were attempting
to formulate a distinctive policy towards the colonies. It was during this period that the
Party gravitated towards the Communist position, in that it identified a direct link
between British unemployment and cheap imports from the colonial Empire. The
CPGB's stance on this issue was outlined in a resolution to the 1925 TUC Conference,
which stated that British imperialism functioned to 'exploit cheap and unorganised labour
and to use the competition of that labour to degrade the workers' standards in Great
Britain'.3 The ILP echoed these views, but in other respects the colonial policies of the
two parties diverged until the ILP's shift to the Left in 1932.
1 'Labour and the New Social Order', Report of the Labour Party Conference, 1918, p.22, (LPA).
2 Reports of IL? Conferences, 1920, 1921 and 1922, (LPA).
3 The resolution, on the right of colonial peoples to self-determination, was proposed by A.A. Purcell of
the Furnishing Trades Association, seconded by CPGB member Harry Pollitt for the Boilermakers Union
and passed with a substantial majority. See Report of the 57th Annual TUC Conference, Scarborough,
1925, pp.553-555.
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In 1925, the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on Imperial Affairs4 put the case for a
Socialist Commonwealth of self-governing states. George Lansbury argued that the
imminent political dominance of the workers placed upon them the responsibility of
constructing 'a new idea of International relationships' based on the common good. 'Our
duty', he wrote, 'is to transform the British Empire of Domination into a Commonwealth
of free nations', within which 'production, distribution, and exchange of goods shall be
organised for and on behalf of the community.' 5 This, according to Dutt, was 'a crass
example'6 of confused reasoning. He dismissed the idea of socialising the Empire as akin
to socialising slavery and claimed that the concept ignored the power relations upon
which the Empire was built.
On the domestic front the ILP, applying a Hobsonian analysis, blamed domestic
underconsumption for Britain's economic ills and advocated economic planning, social
reforms and a national minimum wage as part of their Living Wage programme.
Remedies included using the Empire as 'a bloc against world capitalism 17 - a view which
led some to align themselves with Baldwin's Conservative Government on the issue of
imperial preference in the summer of 1925. 8 It was a strategy denounced by the CPGB as
a 'desperate expedient', intended to 'retain the White colonies a little longer as a field for
favourable investment for British capital, and induce the British workers to agree to the
continued sweating of the slave colonies.'9 Dutt insisted that large capital and not the
working-classes were the beneficiaries of imperial preference lo and declared the
4 In 1925, the colonial sub-committee of the Advisory Committee on International Affairs - the body from
which much of Labour's thought on foreign and colonial policy originated - was reorganised into the
Advisory Committee on Imperial Affairs.
5 George Lansbury, 'Empire Day', in Lansbury's Labour Weekly, May 23, 1925, p.5.
6 Maurice Spector, 'The Empire Labour Conference', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 7, No. 9, September 1925,
p.550.
7 David Howell, A Lost Lek Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986, pp.261-262.
8 Even figures on the left endorsed this stance - Lansbury, for example, in his journalLansbury's Labour
Weekly, and Tom Johnson, editor of the Glasgow Forward. See S. MacIntyre, Autumn 1975, op.cit., p.16.
9 'Editorial View', in The Communist Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1925, p.109.
10 Rajani Palme Dutt, Empire Socialism, CPGB, London, 1925.
141
Chamberlainite programme of social imperialism and imperial federation to be The
British form of Fascism'.I1
The ILP's advocacy of social reforms and wage increases was repudiated by Communists
as ignoring realities, especially in the severe economic climate which prevailed prior to
the 1926 General Strike. Dutt argued that capitalism was deliberately neglecting
domestic industry in order to build up more profitable foreign and colonial industry which
functioned in direct competition with its British counterparts. By peddling the false
solution of reformism, the ILP was merely weakening the revolutionary development of
the workers. Given this analysis, he argued, the Living Wage campaign should be just one
aspect of a much wider workers' struggle.I2
The ILP Moves Left
The impatience of the Labour left with its leadership's 'politics of gradualism' grew
steadily throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, heightened by its sensitivity to
Communist claims that it functioned to protect the reformist leadership by operating as an
impotent, left debating chamber. Such concerns manifested themselves in the ILPs
growing desire for more radical policies as evinced by the 1928 Cook-Maxton Manifesto
campaign and the demand for 'Socialism in our time'. Under these circumstances, the
election of a second minority Labour Government in 1929 was almost certain to lead to
ILP disappointment o and, on 24th August, 1931, their worst fears were confirmed.
Confronted by a deteriorating world economic situation, MacDonald dissolved his
administration and, together Philip Snowden, J.H. Thomas and Lord Sankey, helped to
create the Conservative-dominated National Government.
I I R. Palme Dutt, 'The British Empire', in Labour Monthly. Vol. 5, No. 4, October 1923, p.215.
12 Pajani Palme Dutt, Socialism and the Living Wage, CPGB, 1927.
13 On imperial issues, the Government found itself in trouble almost immediately. The ILP refused to
support the Colonial Development Bill until an amendment submitted by Fenner Brockway, which included
provisions for minimum wage levels and restrictions on the use of child labour, was adopted. See 23 House
of Commons Debate, 5s, c864, 19-7-29.
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As the Labour Party, now under Henderson's leadership, was perceived to have moved to
the right, open rebellion took place within the ILP. Following a campaign for
disaffiliation from the Labour Party by the Revolutionary Policy Committee (RPC)," a
decision was taken at a special ILP conference in June 1932 to initiate the break," while
those elements on the left who resisted the call began to consolidated around the Socialist
League (SL). 16 One of the League's central demands was the adoption of a Socialist
colonial policy 17 - Frank Horrabin, editor of the organisation's journal The Socialist
League, rejected the Labour vision of a 'Socialist Commonwealth', advocating instead a
'Workers' United States of Europe'.18
During the ultra-left period of 1928-1934, CPGB attacks upon the Labour left intensified.
Harry Pollitt, in a debate with Brockway in 1932, accused the ILP of colluding in the
exploitation of the colonial peoples, in contrast to the CPGB which stood for 'the
complete independence of all colonial countries'. 0 By the mid-1930s however, popular
front tactics had led to a softening of criticism in the interests of anti-fascist unity (that is,
collective defence of the USSR). It was a strategy justified by Hugo Rathbone when he
wrote of a 'large body of opinion in the rank and file of even the Conservative, as well as
14 The RPC, a body of young, left-wing, working-class activists, was led by Dr. C.K. Cullen and solicitor
Jack Gaster - son of a leading Rabbi.
15 Those in favour of disaffiliation cited the imminent collapse of capitalism and the low level of support
for the Communists at that time to back their call for a reconstituted socialist party to take the political lead.
By 1932, the CPGB's fortunes had reached a nadir - membership stood at its lowest ever level, Communist
influence in the trade unions was declining and their share of the 1931 election vote reflected this position.
The RPC believed it could replace the CPGB leadership, whom it regarded as 'bad maneouvrers', within the
Comintern. See Minutes of a Political Bureau Meeting, 20-4-33, Reel 4, (CPA).
16 The SL was founded in 1932 through a merger of the National ILP Affilation Committee and the
Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP). Stafford Cripps became chair in 1933 and other
prominent supporters included E.F. Wise, William Mellor, Sir Charles Trevelyan, J.T. Murphy - who left
the CPGB in 1932 - H.N. Brailsford, Harold Laski, Ellen Wilkinson, Aneurin Bevan, G.R. Strauss and D.N.
Pritt.
17 The League's militancy grew throughout the 1930s, bringing it into frequent conflict with the Labour
leadership and giving rise to Cripps' resignation from the Party's N.E.C. in 1935. See Ben Pimlott,Labour
and the Left in the 1930s, Cambridge University Press, London, 1977, p.49.
18 J.F. Horrabin, Pamphlets, No. 4, Socialist League, n.d.
19 Which Way for the Workers?, CPGB, London, 1932, p.5, p.9.
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the Liberal and Labour, Party (sicro who, while not prepared to recognise the right of
colonies to secede, were now willing to join in protests against their exploitation and
denial of elementary rights. This, he argued, was the beginning of a process of
enlightenment as to the true nature of imperialism.2i
British Communists now concentrated on attracting IL p members. As early as February
of 1933, Dutt had informed his colleagues that a number of important proposals had been
drawn up in an effort to win over sections of the Party. 22 These overtures were greeted
with mixed reactions; James McGovern declared it 'impossible and unthinkable' that the
ILP would work with the Communists, while Maxton - so reviled during his chairmanship
of the LA! - asked why his fellow members should be so afraid of this 'tiny, insignificant
party.23 Maxton's support of the united front was an important prize to Communists; he
was courted assiduously by Pollitt24 and received a warm welcome when he attended the
CPGB's thirteenth Congress. But the RPC continued to offer the CPGB its best hope of
advancement with the ILP rank and file, and Communist members operating within the
RPC were instructed to stay put and fight for the CP line.25
During the summer of 1936, the ILP, the SL and the CPGB - which now believed that the
bulk of the ILP membership, albeit with some 'unclearness and inconsistencies', accepted
in principle the basis of Marxism-Leninism 26 - launched a Unity Campaign. 27 In contrast
20 H. Rathbone, 'The Problem of African Independence', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1936,
p.248.
21 As part of the rapprochement, Communists launched a campaign to affiliate with the Labour Party in
1935, but this period marked the advent of Stalin's show trials and Labour leaders, still smarting from earlier
Communist advances in the labour movement through the use of 'united front from below' tactics, steered
their Party's 1935 Conference to a rejection of both Communist affiliation and the popular front alliance.
22 Minutes of a Political Bureau Meeting, 16-2-33, Reel 4, (CPA).
23 Minutes of a Political Bureau Meeting, 20-4-33, Reel 4, (CPA).
24 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 6-1-36, Reel 4, (CPA).
25 Minutes of a Political Bureau Meeting, 20-4-33, (CPA). An agreement on united front co-operation
between the CPGB and the ILP was finally reached in May 1933.
26 R. Palme Dutt, For a United Communist Party, CPGB, 1935, p.3.
27 A resolution of the Thirteenth CPGB Congress, 1935, proposed to the ILP the holding of a joint
Congress for the formation of a United Communist Party. See Ibid., p.l.
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to the declining fortunes of the ILP, 28 which saw the campaign as an opportunity to renew
its lost contact with the masses, the Communists' popularity was steadily rising at this
time,29 although the figures suggest that their cause still had a long way to go. For the
CPGB, the aim of the campaign was to effect a defeat of the National Government and
replace it with a popular front administration which would ally with Soviet Russia. At the
outset, this uneasy alliance produced some notable achievements - the organisation of a
massive Hunger March in the autumn of 1936, for example, and the halting of a march by
Moseley's British Union of Fascists through London's East End. But, following Labour
action against the SL, the campaign collapsed in the autumn of 1937.
During the 1930s an increasing number of writers and intellectuals were attracted to
Marxist ideas. Neal Wood writes of a 'dazzling array of intellectual virtuosi' 39 who,
Iniluencea by the country's economic and social problems, the threat of fascism and the
failure of Labour to respond effectively, turned to Communism in the 1930s.31 The
Spanish Civil War in particular had a radicalising effect and many of the country's most
promising talents travelled to Spain to fight for the Republican cause. In the spring of
1936, the highly successful Left Book Club was established by Victor Gollancz,32 its aim
being to promote the Communists' popular front initiative. The sympathetic view of
Communism promoted in these texts was reinforced in Sir Stafford Cripps' Tribune33 and
in the pages of the New Statesman during this period.
28 The ILP's membership had dropped from 16,773 in 1932 to 4,392 in 1935. See Barry Winter,The ILP
Past and Present, ILP, Leeds, 1993.
29 By 1939, the Party's membership had reached over 17,000, its highest recorded figure, and weekend
sales of the Daily Worker topped 200,000. See Noreen Branson, op.cit., p.191.
30 W.H. Auden, Christopher Isherwood, Stephen Spender, Naomi Mitchison, Hugh MacDiarmid and
Cecil Day Lewis were all attracted by Communist ideas.
31 The politics of Edward Mosely lent credence to the accusations of 'social fascism' which Communists
had levelled at the Party.
32 Membership of the Club rose rapidly to 57,000 and its titles, which mainly covered political and
international affairs and the impact of fascism, were widely read. See Willie Thompson,The Good Old
Cause. British Communism 1920-1991, Pluto Press, London, 1992, pp.55-6.
33 Tribune was founded by Cripps in 1937.
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On an economic level, the apparent success of Stalin's first five year plan which allegedly
achieved full employment and modernisation of the Soviet economy, won praise from
earlier critics such as the Webbs. 34 They interpreted the bureaucratic Soviet system as a
model of the organised society run by experts to which they aspired, imbuing the order
with an integrity and altruism which better fitted with their ideals than with Soviet reality.
Their support, together with that of figures like the economist Professor Harold Laski, did
much to popularise the cause of Communism.
Many on the non-Communist left were nudged towards a Leninist position on the issue of
Empire-Commonwealth. In his essay, 'Not Counting Niggers', George Orwell criticised
those who claimed to defend democracy against fascism whilst tolerating a far greater
injustice - the British Empire. 'What we always forget', he wrote, 'is that the
overwhelming bulk of the British proletariat does not live in Britain but in Asia and
Africa. It is not in Hitler's power, for instance, to make a penny an hour the normal
industrial wage; it is perfectly normal in India, and we are at great pains to keep it so'.35
The irony of the situation was that as the Communist movement gathered itself for the
looming battle against the forces of the far-right, it became vulnerable to claims that the
ILP - now embracing aspects of Lenin's theory of imperialism - was 'well to the left of the
Communists at that time'.36 A conference called by the India League and London
Federation of Peace Councils on 16th. July, 1938, debated whether the CP policy of
giving priority to anti-fascism in order to strengthen the world democratic front or the ILP
proposition that 'imperialism is as much a menace to peace and liberty as are the Fascist
34 They praised the system in their two-volume work,  Soviet Communism: a New Civilisation Neal
Wood, op.cit., pp.44-5.
35 S. Orwell and I. Angus (eds.), The Collected Essays. Journalism and Letters of George Orwe1l,Vol.1,
Penguin, London, 1970, p.437.
36 Reginald Reynolds, My Life and Crimes, Jarrolds Publishers Ltd., London, 1956, p.116. By the end of
the 1930s, ILP policy aspired to 'a classless society in which all economic resources would be communally
owned and controlled. The power to live by rent, interest or profit would be ended and all would perform
work of social value according to their need'. The Socialis Challenge to Poverty. Fascism, War, ILP,
London, n.d., c. early 1940's.
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Pow ers',37 NA as the ay forward for colonial workers. Six hundred delegates, including
representatives of the IASB and forty-fie ILP members, listened to speakers who
included Ras Makonnen for the ILP. At the conclusion of the debate, 'most of the
delegates from the colonial workers' organisations' supported ILP criticism of the French
Popular Front, and around a quarter of those present agreed with the ILP's position.38
In 1938, George Padmore described the ILP as 'the only working-class party in Britain
that has a correct theoretical approach on questions of imperialist war and the colonies.'39
In fact, despite its adoption of Leninist views, humanitarianism continued to be the well-
spring of the Party's anti-imperialism and its calls for colonial emancipation were
qualified with demands for specific reforms in the interim. 40 In contrast, the main
impetus behind the Communists' support of colonial nationalism remained, not the
principle of self-determination or the benefits which would accrue to the colonial peoples
once they were masters of their own destiny, but the achievement of Socialism. This
message was occasionally confused by individual members who articulated other aims,
but it was always the central imperative of Communism. Moreover, Communists judged
such matters - albeit it often an unspoken assumption - in terms of the preservation and
strengthening of the Soviet state. With this proviso in mind, their view of colonial
liberation remained sincere enough in that they believed that 'In breaking a way for
themselves from historical non-existence to the future, they (colonial nationalists) at the
same time clear the path to the Socialist Revolution in the leading countries'.41
Africa Stirs
The economic recession which swept through Europe in the late 1920s and1930s was
seen by Communists as part of a general world crisis of capitalism - one which was
37 'ILP or CP Policy for Colonial Workers', in New Leader, 22-7-38, p.5.
38 Ibid.
39 New Leader, 25-2-38.
40 Democracy in the Empire, ILP Conference decisions and chairman's speech, ILP, 1942.
41 G. Safarov, 'The Theory of the National Colonial Revolution', inCommunist Review, Vol. 4, No. 6,
June 1932, p.289.
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prophesied at the sixth congress of the Comintern in July 1928. 42 In the light of this crisis
and its perception of the African colonies as the last remaining prop of a decaying
capitalist system, the Comintern's interest in Africa intensified during this period. The
economic depression had a devastating effect on the colonies themselves from the
autumn of 1929 - Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Gambia were particularly affected as the
price of their most important exports such as tin, palm oil and cocoa, fell sharply.43
Comintern reasoning, that such circumstances would fan anti-colonial activity on the
continent, proved valid to the extent that labour unrest and general discontent in the
Africa colonies developed at an accelerated rate during the world depression. 44 Padmore
called upon the international revolutionary movement - especially the CPGB and the
British section of the LA! - to 'render every possible assistance to this growing
revolutionary movement in Africa', 45 But, in acknowledging the rising tide of African
resistance, the Comintern's expectations of what was possible continued to be modelled
on developments in Asia. 'We cannot understand', Padmore wrote to Kobina Sagis 'why
there is no organised national movement. . . for independence (in the Gold Coast).. .You
42 Communists argued that the powers of production had grown too great for systems of private capitalism
and class society. (See R. Palme Dutt, Capitalism or Socialism in Britain?, CPGB, 1931, p.3.) Dutt quoted
official figures of the League of Nations Economic section which showed that between 1913 and 1928,
world production of foodstuffs increased by 16%, of raw materials by 40% and world population by 1000.
Between 1925 and 1928, world production of iron, steel, engineering, shipbuilding, motor and electrical
industries increased by 25°0. Ibid., p.11.
43 The total value of the export/import trade of Britain's West African colonies fell from £40 millions in
1929 to £21 millions in 1931. ( See B. Davidson, 1978, op.cit., p.132.) Land and labour policies, devoted
to producing cash crops, had already destroyed the existing economic system in Africa, leaving its people at
the mercy of the vagaries of world capitalism. (See P. Cain and A. Hopkins,British Imperialism. Crisis and 
Decolonisation 1914-1990, Longman, London, 1993, p.224.) Yet in the face of this crisis, colonial
administrations cut public expenditure and increased taxes. (See Motilev, 'Year of World Crisis', inThe
Communist International Vol. 7, No. 14, 1-12-30, p.326; G. Padmore, 'Agrarian Crisis in British West
Africa', in The Communist International Vol. 8, No. 13, 1-7-31, p.373.)
44 In Gambia during 1929 a general strike was led by E.F. Small, then editor ofGambia Outlook and
associate editor of Negro Worker. He was assisted by Bridgeman, who used the threat of Parliamentary
questions to pressure the Secretary of State to conduct a full inquiry into the situation. (See E.T. Wilson,
op.cit. p.241.) Eighty -three people were shot during a revolt against punitive taxes in Nigeria during
December 1929, and subsequent unrest on the Nigerian railways led to the formation of the Nigerian
Railway Workers' Union in 1932. Following the creation of the Labour Trade Union of East Africa in
Kenya during 1934, a three year strike wave ensued, prompting Padmore, who also reported armed clashes
between black workers and Government forces in South Africa, to warn of a potentially volatile situation in
the colony. See G. Padmore, The Negro Worker, Vol. 1, No. 6, June 1931, pp.3-4.
45 G. Padmore, The Negro Worker, Vol. 1, No. 6, June 1931, p.5.
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lack the sustained organised movement, as in India, China. . . 146 Padmore might have
added that Britain's colonies in West and East Africa also lacked an indigenous
bourgeoisie and the level of economic development that could produce an organised
nationalist movement of the type desired. 47 The fact that he ignored such factors is at
least partly attributable to his schooling in Marxism-Leninism as it was preached in the
ultra-left 'Third Period'.
If the Comintern regarded the time as ripe for extending its influence among black
activists and African nationalist organisations, political events in Europe were to prove a
major distraction from this objective. Early in 1933, the offices of the ITUCNW were
attacked by Nazi forces and publication of the Negro Worker stopped. Padmore, who was
deported from Hamburg after spending some weeks in a German gaol, wrote in April of
that year; 'Most negroes in Europe and America as well as in the colonies do not yet fully
realise that fascism is the greatest danger which confronts not only the white workers, but
is the most hostile movement against the Negro race.' 48 'The Soviet Union', he
continued, 'is the only country in the world free from all forms of national oppression.' 49
The ITUCNW was initially transferred to Copenhagen so but, by August, Comintern funds
had dried up and the organisation folded. Padmore reacted bitterly to the development,
46 Letter, G. Padmore to Sekyi, 9-7-32, quoted in S. Rhodie, 'The Gold Coast Aborigines Abroad', in the
Journal of African History, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1965, p.394.
47 The CPGB's analysis of the African situation was more measured. Hugo Rathbone argued that, as
Britain had 'deliberately stifled' African attempts to develop their economy, 'while advanced colonial
countries such as India can very well achieve independence prior to the imperialist countries .. . it may very
well happen that the backward nature of Negro African economymay result in African independence being
achieved only parallel with the revolution in imperialist countries'. Hugo Rathbone 'The Problem of
African Independence', in Labour Monthly. Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1936, p.247. See also Hugo Rathbone,
'The Problem of African Independence', in Labour Monthly. Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1936, pp.161-172. It is
possible that Rathbone's speculations were informed by the fact that the Comintern, despite the assiduous
efforts of its central agencies as well as the work of its metropolitan national sections, had been unable to
establish an African base for its activities outside of the Republic of South Africa.
48 G. Padmore, The Negro Worker, Vol. 3, Nos. 4-5, April-May 1933, p.l.
49 G. Padmore, The Negro Worker, Vol. 3, Nos. 4-5, April-May 1933, p.3.
50 The editorial board of The Negro Worker in Spring 1933, consisted of: Padmore, editor and G.
Kouyate, managing editor. Contributing editors were; Ford and Cyril Briggs (USA), Otto Huiswood, M.A.
Ward (London), C. Alexander (West Indies), H. Crichlow (British Guiana), W. Daniel (West Africa), M.
Nelson (Liberia), A. Nzula and E.T. Mofutsanyana (South Africa), Raoul Marquez (Angola), Lulcu Tate
(Congo) and J. Kenyatta (East Africa).
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accusing the Communists of deserting the colonial peoples in order to curry favour with
their new imperialist allies as part of the popular front stategy. Such suspicions were
intensified the following year, when the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations - an
organisation dismissed by Palme Dutt in 1931 as 'nothing but a war-pact in peace-
clothing.' 51 Moscow's response to Padmore's complaints was to level accusations of
'black chauvinism' at its most effective black activist and to expel him from the movement
in 1934. 52 It was an incident which marked the beginning of a period of heightened race
consciousness among representatives of the African and West Indian peoples, which
culminated in a new, more radical form of Pan-Africanism.
The ILP and Black Activists
During the 1930s, a number of British-based colonial activists and groups developed
close relationships with the ILP and the Labour left. Padmore, following his split from
the Communists, was a notable example. Whilst in France during the early 1930s, he
met John McNair, an ILP activist from Tyneside and future Party secretary who almost
certainly influenced his political views and inspired his long-term association with the
ILP. Following his arrival in Britain, Padmore's activities included addressing ILP Day
and Summer Schools, attending public meetings and conferences called on behalf of the
colonial peoples and writing for New Leader on questions affecting Africans and people
of African descent. 53 He also served on the editorial board of Left, a monthly ILP
publication, and contributed to International African Opinion. Although there is no
evidence that Padmore ever became an ILP member - it is possible that his
disappointment with the Communists persuaded him to avoid the constraints of organised
political parties - he remained a loyal friend.54
51 R. Palme Dutt, Capitalism or Socialism in Britain?, CPGB, 1931, p.30.
52 E.T. Wilson, 1974, op.cit., p.260.
53 Padmore's articles for New Leader included: 'Hands off the Colonies' (25-2-38), 'Colonial Fascism in
the West Indies' (29-4-38), 'Why Moors Help Franco' (20-5-38), 'The British Empire is the Worst Racket
Yet Invented by Man' (15-12-38).
54 Letter, Len Edmondson to author, February, 1994.
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Other colonial activists who worked with the ILP and contributed articles to New Leader
during the 1930s and 1940s included Wallace Johnson, the Barbadian Chris Jones 55 - a
former Communist who had been active as an organiser for the Seamen's Minority
Movement56 - and Jomo Kenyatta. 57 Kenyatta also wrote articles for The Manchester
Guardian and The New Statesman, spoke to the Fabian Society and lectured for the
Workers' Education Association during the late 1930s. Paul Robeson's lifelong
Communist affiliations 58 did not prevent his developing relations with leading members
of the Labour movement in this period. Stafford Cripps was a close friend, as was
Norman Leys who, with fellow members of the Friends of Africa Committee, 59 attempted
in vain to persuade Robeson to become involved with the South African Industrial and
Commercial Workers' Union, ICU.60 Even more sympathetic was the West Indian
businessman and pan-Africanist, Ras Makonnen, who noted that non-Communist figures
on the British political left such as Harold Laski, Arthur Creech Jones and Nancy Cunard
were 'stridently taking up the burden of black injustice', and decided that 'the best place' to
say what he had to say was in the ILP.61
55 Chris Jones, originally known as Braithwaite, also worked for the IASB and contributed to its journal
International African Opinion.
56 Jones, who described his erstwhile comrades as 'opportunists', (R. Reynolds,My Life And Crimes,
Jarrolds, 1956, p.118.) came to be highly regarded by the ILP, an organisation with which he established
close ties. After his death on September 9th, 1944, a committee was formed to raise money for his widow
and children. Members included Padmore, secretary; Ethel Manin, treasurer; Reginald Reynolds; Ras
Makonnen and John McNair, general secretary of the ILP. See 'Chris Jones: Fighter for the Oppressed', in
New Leader, 23-9-44, p.7; 'The Late Chris Jones', in New Leader, 2-12-44, p.8.
57 Kenyatta claimed in his article 'Hitler Could Not Improve On Kenya',New Leader, 21st. May, 1937,
that the colonial peoples had not only been exploited and oppressed by various imperialist governments, but
were living under conditions 'similar to those imposed by the Fascist Dictators of Europe.'
58 Robeson visited London on many occasions during the 1920s and 1930s and often liaised between
black radicals and the CP. He was a sponsor of the WASUand supported the Unity Theatre, under whose
auspices he appeared in Ben Bengal's 'Plant in the Sun'.
59 The Friends of Africa Committee was formed in 1934.
60 Winifred Holtby, the Yorkshire novelist, Vera Brittain and William Ballinger were among those who
tried to involve Robeson in ICU affairs. Ballinger, a representative of the Scottish Engineering Union, had
been sent to South Africa in July 1928 to advise the ICU's leader, Clement Kadalie, on trade union matters.
See P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit., pp.120-5. Robeson did travel to Spain in December 1937 to support the
Republican forces in the company of Charlotte Haldane, wife of the scientist, J.B.S. I-Ialdane - both of whom
were Communists.
61 Ras Makonnen, pan-Africanism From Within, K. King (ed.), OUP, 1973, p.112.
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The South African campaigner Peter Abrahams, E.N. McKenzie - editor of The Negro
Citizen - and Krishna Menon62 also collaborated with the ILP. During the late 1930s,
Menon's India League was 'quite close to Labour advocates of a popular front with the
Communists'. 63 George Lansbury and Tom Williams both served on the League's
committees and its officers were drawn mainly from the ILP and Labour left. 64 The issue
of Nigerian trade unions was covered for New Leader in 1945 by Oladipo Davies, general
secretary of the WASU and former secretary of the Nigerian Youth Movement. This
organisation drew close to the Labour Party during the 1930s and 1940s. According to
Philip Garigue, the relationship became 'the dominant political colouring of the members
of the Union'65 and many of its supporters worked for the Labour Party during the 1945
general election.
Abyssinia
One issue which cost all British political parties support among the African diaspora was
the invasion of Abyssinia by fascist Italy in October 1935. The Abyssinian crisis was an
episode which demonstrated for many that the age of aggressive imperialism was not
over. 66 It had the effect of galvanising the African diaspora, of persuading Africans and
peoples of African origin that they should in future build upon their own resources, rather
than trust their political allies in Europe. There was a perceived abandonment of
Abyssinia by the West - the British Government, for example, imposed an embargo on
arms and munitions to Abyssinia whilst selling oil to Mussolini - and this was
62 Menon, who studied under Harold Laski at the LSE, became joint secretary of the declining
Commonwealth of India League in 1928, building it into a radical organisation campaigning for Indian
independence, which was renamed the India League at the end of 1930. For Menon's biography seeT.J.S.
George, Krishna Menon, Taplinger, New York, 1965.
63 P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit., p.231.
64 Brockway, Brailsford, Wellock, Longden, Horrabin and Laski all served as officers in the India League.
Menon also worked with Stafford Cripps and the Reverend Reginald Sorensen M.P., Brockway's brother-in-
law. In addition to the India League, Brockway served on the Socialist Committee for Indian Independence
together with Maxton, Campbell Stephens, J.M. McGovern and G. Buchanan - all M.P.s - and G.S. Dara,
who ran the Indian Mission in London.
65 Philip Garigue, 'The West African Students Union, a study in cultural contact', inAlrisa, Vol. XXII,
January 1953, p.62.
66 It was also seen to expose the hypocrisy of Christianity - the Catholic church in Rome blessed Italy's
victory over the Abyssinians.
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compounded by claims of a parallel betrayal by the Soviet Union following press reports
claiming that the Bolshevik state traded with Italy during the invasion.
In fact, Soviet policy simultaneously supported independent action by the workers and
League of Nations sanctions. A condemnation of Italian aggression, signed by Italian
Communists and colonial representatives was issued by the Comintern in August 1935
and supplemented by a $5,000 gift to the Abyssinian people, donated by the Soviet Union
through the auspices of the Red Cross. 67 Palme Dun claimed that, in formulating its
position on the issue, Moscow had half an eye on British imperialist strategy. Whilst
categorising the conflict as a war of colonial conquest which would mobilise the
international working-class on behalf of the Abyssinian people, Communists also saw the
invasion as the 'prelude of the Fascist offensive', 68 which would endanger the interests of
British imperialism.
The Soviet Union's prior campaign for collective security was bound to emphasise the
Italian aggression as evidence of the need for concerted measures to stop future fascist
expansionism. But the effect of this position was to reinforce the belief among some
colonial activists that promotion of the popular front alliance was taking precedence over
the colonial liberation struggle in the priorities of the communist movement. It was a
view which encouraged some black supporters to turn from the CP and concentrate their
energies on promoting Pan-Africanism
The ILP was also affected by the Abyssinian crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the
Abyssinian invasion, New Leader's stance stressed the need for independent working-
class action against the Italian Government - primarily a boycott of war materials and oil.
A number of such actions were instigated world wide; among Greek seamen and dockers
67 Noreen Branson, op.cit., pp.I36-141; Milene Charles, The Soviet Union and Africa, University Press of
America, 1980, pp.36-39.
68 Rajani Palme Dutt, 1936, op.cit., p.253.
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in France and South Africa, for example, while in Britain, the National Union of Boot
and Shoe Operatives refused to work on orders for boots destined for the Italian troops.69
The most enthusiastic supporters of this policy within the ILP were the small number of
Trotskyist members, led by the Trinidadian, C.L.R. James. James, who was chair of
Finchley ILP at this time," argued that only independent and united action by British and
African workers could overthrow imperialism and that sanctions would simply lead to
another war which was of no interest to the working-class. He wrote to New Leader on
5th June 1936, explaining his position and the fact that it differed from that of the
International African Friends of Abyssinia, which supported sanctions.
This approach was opposed, 7i by the Parliamentary group, led by Maxton, which
maintained that working-class sanctions would be indistinguishable from League of
Nations sanctions and would only increase the risk of war. Such conflicts, they argued,
should be regarded as clashes between the rival imperialist powers - furthermore, Hail e
Selassie was a dictator, presiding over a repressive system which sanctioned slavery.
The ILP should concentrate on the overthrow of capitalism in Britain and leave such
matters alone, the victory of either side being a matter of indifference for Socialists. It
was an argument which revealed how far removed from Leninism some ILP leaders
remained in their conception of imperialism.
A heated debate ensued at the Party's Easter Conference - 'the most exciting for years',
according to New Leadern - during which James moved a resolution condemning the
decision to stand aloof from the conflict and recommending an international boycott of
Italy by the working-class, in particular the blocking of arms and troops shipments. This
was supported by conference, but the vote was overturned when the Party's three MPs;
69 Noreen Branson, op.cit., p.I40.
70 New Leader, 4-10-35.
71 The ILP produced a pamphlet in which Bob Edwards, Brockway and James put the case in favour of
workers' action and Maxton, McGovern and Joseph Southall argued against. SeeNew Leader, 1-5-36.
72 New Leader, 17-4-36, p.4.
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Maxton, Buchanan and McGovern, threatened to resign over the issue. 73 For the RPC,
the decision not to support Abyssinia as the victim of imperialism proved to be the last
straw, the Committee announced on 31st October 1935 that it was splitting from the ILP
and joining the CPGB. 74 The Trotskyists, also disillusioned by the ILP's stance, left the
Party in November 1936. 75 Despite his disappointment, James continued to co-operate
with the Party until he left London for the USA in 1938. 76 But by this time, he was
simultaneously advocating both Trotskyism and pan-Africanism.
The Communist movement itself rejected criticisms of its stance on Abyssinia by black
activists and the Daily Worker published extensive coverage of the Abyssinian crisis by
W.M. Holmes, the paper's correspondent there. William Patterson dismissed as reformist
calls to 'go to Abyssinia' and 'die for Abyssinia', 77 arguing instead that 'the struggle
against the imperialism directly oppressing them is the method the Negro people
everywhere can best use to help the oppressed and enslaved masses of Abyssinia.' 78 The
actions of Italian Communists and Socialists, he maintained, 'throw back into the
cowardly traitorous face of Messrs. George Padmore and Co. the lie that white workers
will not fight side by side with the black for the liberation of the black masses:79
73 McGovern and Buchanan were subsequently congratulated by the organ of the British Union of Fascists
for their line in the debate. See New Leader, 24-4-36.
74 In a letter of resignation, Jack Gaster regretted that 'The ILP, in the face of the war menace, has
abandoned struggle in support of Abyssinia, has refused to face up to the revolutionary implications of the
fight against war, and adopted a line of opposition that is purely that of reliance upon pacifist resistance to
war.' See Daily Worker, 5th November 1935; Quoted in Noreen Branson, op.cit., p.I42.
75 Padmore who, as a Marxist, was opposed both to the war and to the rule of the Abyssinian emperor,
Haile Selassie, was reprimanded by James for accepting the argument that 'enlightened and far-sighted
sections of the ruling-class in Europe with colonial interests in Africa' would co-operate with Africans. (See
C.L.R. James, 'Civilising the Blacks', in New Leader, 29-5-36, p.5.) Ras Makonnen argued that Selassie's
position with regard to his subjects - slavery was not abolished in the country until a decree of 1941- was an
'internal matter' to be settled 'amongst ourselves'. See R. Makonnen, 1973, op.cit., p.114
76 James did not return to Britain until after 1947.
77 For example, the New York Pan-African Construction Association was urging blacks in Harlem to
volunteer for Abyssinia in 1935.
78 William Patterson, 'The Abyssinian Situation and the Negro World', inThe Negro Worker, Vol. 5, No.
6, June 1935, p.17.
79	 Ibid., p.18.
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The IAFE and the IASB
In response to the Abyssinian invasion, an ad hoc committee formed to welcome to
Britain the 1934 ARPS delegation was reconstituted into the International African Friends
of Abyssinia (IAFA or IAFE 80) by C.L.R. James.81 The Committee consisted of James,
chair; Kenyatta, secretary; Padmore; Dr. Peter Milliard from British Guiana; the
Grenadian T. Albert Marryshaw; Sam Manning of Trinidad and Mohammed Said from
Somaliland. The London office was run by Mrs A.A. Garvey, wife of Marcus Garvey,
who also acted as Treasurer. 82 According to Makonnen, the IAFE enjoyed great support
from the black diaspora and was 'swamped' by letters from Africans on three continents
who wished to register with the organisation.83
In the month that Italy entered Addis Ababa, a weekly publication, New Times and
Ethiopia News appeared, edited by Sylvia Pankhurst," who was assisted by Nancy
Cunard and Isabel Fry. Surprisingly, the journal carried no information on the IAFA,
though a Friends of Abyssinia League of Service was advertised from the first issue. Also
mentioned was the Abyssinia Association, of which Reginald Bridgeman was a
prominent member, 85 and the International Committee for the Relief of the Victims of
Italian Fascism. 86 Pankhurst's journal, praised by Padmore in June 1937 for 'excellent
80 Ethiopia was often preferred to Abyssinia.
81 James had initially shared the Corn intern's view of the Afro-American as a leader in the colonial
revolution; they were, he wrote, 'designed by their whole historical past to be, under adequate leadership, the
very vanguard of the proletarian revolution.' (Quoted in Scott McLemee and Paul Le Blanc (eds.),
James and Revolutionary Marxism - selected writings of CLR James 1939-194R Humanities Press, New
Jersey, 1944, p.5.) He later modified this to one of Afro-Americans beingin the vanguard and attacked the
Corn intern's support of colonial self-determination as mere sloganising. James was one of the first to
challenge the accepted view of Britain's role in the abolition of slavery in his book,Black Jacobins. After
joining the ILP in 1934, he came into contact with British Trotskyists, subsequently becoming a leading
figure in this group and one of the founding members of the Fourth International in 1938.
82 G. Padmore, 1956, op.cit., p.145 also see I. Geiss, op.cit., pp.354-356.
83 R. Makonnen, 1973, op.cit., p.116.
84 Pankhurst was a staunch supporter of the Abyssinian cause; she regarded Selassie as a 'great reformer,
an heroic patriot and a defender of the ideals of international law and justice'. (Letter, Sylvia Pankhurst to
the News Chronical, 28-5-36, Sylvia Pankhurst Papers, (IISH).) In June 1940, she wrote to Churchill
demanding rejection of the Anglo-Italian agreement which officially recognised Italy's claims in Abyssinia.
See Letter, Sylvia Pankhurst to Churchill, 25th June, 1940, Sylvia Pankhurst Papers, (IISH).
85 New Times and Ethiopia News, No. 4, 30-5-36.
86 George Rude, the communist historian, served oAn the Provisional Committee of this body, which held
conferences on 15th July and 23rd September, 1936. SeeNew Times and Ethiopia News, No. 4, 30-5-36.
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ork . on behalf of Ethiopia and humanity',81 transmogrified in September 1939 from
'the 1, oice of ictim nations and defenceless minorities', into 'the national anti-fascist
weekly'. It did not share the Communises anti-war hiatus during 1939-41 and rejected
the view of the Second World War taken by many black activists, including William
Patterson, that it was a 'white man's war, let them keep it imperialist.' 'Fascists are racists
and imperialists', the journal proclaimed in October 1940, 'This war will touch upon the
future of the colonial peoples sooner or later.' 88
The formation of the IASB in 1937 was reported as an unstructured event, without a 'clear
membership', and with around thirty people present. 89 The Bureau, described in New
Times and Ethiopian News as 'an organisation representing internationally progressive
and enlightened opinion among Africans and people of African descent'," campaigned for
democratic rights, civil liberties and self-determination for Africans and other colonial
peoples. It protested vehemently against the National Government's treaty of friendship
with Italy, which recognised the latter's conquest of Abyssinia, and the movement to
placate the fascist powers by meeting their demands for colonies.
Membership of the IASB was open to all Africans, peoples of African descent and
members of other races who sympathised with the aims and objectives of the
organisation. Those who worked for the Bureau included Padmore; James; Wallace
Johnson;9I Dorothy Pizer; Kenyatta, who was reportedly appointed vice-chair of the
organisation in February 1938; 92 Nancy Cunard; the Rev. Reginald Sorensen; Chris Jones
and Ras Makonnen. 93 Among its patrons were D.N. Pritt; Sylvia Pankhurst; Arthur
87 New Times and Ethiopia News, 12th. June, 1937, p.5.
88 New Times and Ethiopia News, 7th. October, 1940, p.2.
89	 Ibid., p.118.
90 New Times and Ethiopia News, 30-4-38, p.6.
91 In 1933 Wallace Johnson had visited the Gold Coast, where he was arrested and deported. During
1934-6 he worked with Nnamdi Azikiwe on theAfrican Morning Post, organ of the West African Youth
League, and he also edited the African Standard.
92 D. Savage, 'Jomo Kenyatta, Malcolm MacDonald and the Colonial Office 1938-9, inThe Canadiari
Journal of African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1970, p.628.
93 G. Padmore, 1956, op,cit., p.48; I, Geiss, op.cit., pp.354-6,
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Creech Jones and Victor Gollancz. In later years the organisation became especially close
to the ILP - according to J.R. Hooker, it became 'in effect the colonial section of that
declining party'. 94 Fenner Brockway printed IASB notices in New Leader, including its
'Manifesto Against the War', in November 1939, 95 and the Bureau itself operated from the
ILP offices. But the surge of radical Pan-Africanism in the mid-1940s overtook the
Bureau and, in 1944, it became one of thirteen groups which amalgamated to form the
Pan-African Federation.
Colonial Seamen's Organisations
During the early 1930s, Communists intensified their efforts to establish links with
colonial seamen who, they believed, had the potential to provide an international courier
service for the Party. At the October 1930 International of Marine Workers, an
International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISHW) was created as a special
committee of the RILU.96 One of its first acts was to form a Colonial Committee, which
attempted to recruit colonial seamen for work in the colonies, and this was followed by
the establishment of a Negro sub-committee in 1931. The organisation subsequently set
up International Seamen's Clubs (ISC) - regarded as important points of contact with
coloured workers97 - in a number of key ports.
As the ITUCNW's first secretary, James Ford was charged with the task of making
contact with African seamen who had settled in British ports during the inter-war years.98
But under his direction progress was limited and there were complaints that not enough
had been done to build up a network of ISCs. It was also argued within the CPGB itself
that the Party regarded colonial work solely in terms of smuggling agents into colonial
94 J.R. Hooker, op.cit., p.50.
95 IASB, Manifesto Against the War, in New Leader, 24-11-39.
96 Resolution adopted by the International Representatives of Seamen and Cokers, Hamburg, 3-10-30,
Box 1, (JTC); George Hardy, Those Stormy Years, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1956, p.215. Hardy
was president both of the Transport Workers' Minority movement and the International of Marine Workers
and subsequently took charge of the Party's work with colonial seamen.
97 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 1112-1-1930, Reel 1, (CPGBA)
98 Permanent communities of colonial seamen and their families had taken root in Liverpool, Cardiff,
Manchester and London.
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countries, and that they had thus far only flirted with the idea of campaigning among the
colonial seamen in Britain. When Padmore replaced Ford in 1931 however, the new
secretary set about improving relations with the ISHW and establishing links with the
Interclubs. By the end of that year, Chris Jones and his colleague Josh Headley were
conducting work for the Seamen's Minority Movement among negro seamen in the dock
areas and an ISC had been established under Headley in the East End of London.
During the First World War, foreign and coloured seamen were employed in the British
merchant fleet as replacements for those men who had joined the Royal Navy. When the
war ended, there were feelings of resentment on the part of the demobilised men towards
the coloured communities which had sprung up as a consequence - resentments which
sparked a number of riots during 1919.99 Such attitudes were encouraged by the British
authorities, which sought to give white seamen preference in employment - the 1925
Special Restriction (Alien Seamen) Order, which sought to deprive black seamen ofjobs
by classing them as aliens, and the Tramp Shipping Subsidy Act of 1935, which induced
shipowners to employ white labour, were examples of this policy.mo
These discriminatory measures were supported by the NUS leadership, anxious to secure
jobs for its white members, and many Labour M.P.s. Newspapers such as The
Manchester Guardian and The Daily Herald colluded in the campaign; in June 1930 the
Daily Herald wrote of the 'Negro Menace at Ports', and published calls to ban black
workers from British ports. m In addition to such threats against their employment,
hardship was caused by the payment of a lower rate of benefit for unemployed coloured
seamen than for their white counterparts. 1 °2 In 1935, The Negro Worker revealed that
99 Riots occurred in the ports of Cardiff, Liverpool, Barry, Newport and South Shiels. See Neil Evans,
'The South Wales Race Riots of 1919', in Llafur, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1980.
100 Marika Sherwood, 'Race and Resistance: Cardiff in the 1930s and 1940s' inLlafur, Vol. 5, No. 4,
1991, pp.52-3; The Keys, Vol. 3, No. 2, p.20.
101 Margaret Clyde, 'Race Prejudice in 'Democratic' England', The Negro Worker, Vol. 1, No. 6, June
1931, p.13.
102 Alan Sheppard, 'Old Tiger Bay', in The Alliance, No. 1, July 1971.
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transitional unemployment pay for black seamen in the port of Cardiff totalled 13s,
compared with 15s 3p for whites.' 3
This 'whites first' movement was seen by the CPGB as an opportunity to rally coloured
workers to the Party. It stressed that the racial question would only be settled with the
solving of the social question and that 'Only through the overthrow of the capitalist
system will the exploited masses of all races and nationalities be freed'. 104 From the early
1930s, Communists worked in the ports through organisations such as the NWA; the LAI;
the Coloured Seamen's Union (CSU), 105 and the Colonial Defence Association (CDA),
which was formed in 1927. 106 Leading colonial activists and CPGB members who spoke
at public meetings in the dockland areas included Ben Bradley, Wallace Johnson, Peter
Abrahams, Padmore, C.L.R. James, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, Krishna Menon and Peter
Koinange, the Kenyan political activist.I07
Communist party member Harry O'Connell, a British Guyanan who settled in Britain
before the First World War, was active among the coloured communities in the South
Wales ports, attending the 1932 ISHW Conference in Paris, possibly as a representative
of the Seamen's Minority Movement. 108 A tireless campaigner for the rights of coloured
seamen, he took an active part in building up the CP in Cardiff, 109 standing as the
Communist candidate for the Adamstown ward in the General election of February 1950.
Despite this involvement, O'Connell's commitment to black and coloured workers took
precedence over his political allegiances - he had earlier fallen foul of the Comintem's
103 The Negro Worker, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 1935, p.24.
104 Margaret Clyde, op.cit.
105 The CSU was probably established during the mid-1920s.
106 St. Clair Drake, Value Systems. Social Structures and Race Relations in the British Isles unpublished
PhD., University of Chicago, Illinois, June 1954.
107 Dilip Hiro, 'Three Generations of Tiger Bay', New Statesman, 21-9-67; M. Sherwood, 'Racism and
Resistance: Cardiff in the 1930s and 1940s', in Llafur, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1991, p.62. Petitions, public meetings
and demonstrations were organised by the various organisations working for the civil rights of the black
seamen.
1 °8 M. Sherwood, 1991, op.cit., p.60.
109 Although he had little formal education, O'Connell was a passionate speaker and spoke for the CP on a
range of issues. Ibid.
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ambitions while attempting to found a West Indian Association in Britain. The initiative
was allegedly obstructed by the Cl's representative in Britain, Jan Valtin, because
O'Connell refused to act as an intermediary between the International and activists in the
West Indies."
O'Connell was active in the CDA - whose news sheet Coloured Worker was produced
using the local CP's facilities - and in 1942 represented that organisation on an advisory
committee which liaised with the Colonial Office on the question of a centre for colonial
seamen. His work , " on behalf of coloured seamen brought him into contact with the
WASU and the LCP and, in March 1935, he travelled to London where he sought
assistance from the LAI, the Society of Friends and the local Conservative M.P., Captain
Arthur Evans. Evans, the Member for Cardiff prior to 1945, and Maxton both put down
questions on the issue in the House of Commons."2
In the course of her excellent research on coloured seamen's organisations in Cardiff
during the 1920s and 1930s, Marika Sherwood discovered that O'Connell worked closely
with fellow Communists Alan Sheppard and Jim Nurse. Sheppard was a Guianese
seaman who led the CDA during the 1940s and nurtured connections with Kenyatta and
Cheddi Jagan, leader of the progressive left in British Guiana." 3 Nurse, a Barbadian,
served as an early vice-chair of the CDA. Aaron Mossell, an Afro-American who chaired
the United Committee of Coloured and Colonial Organisations (UCCCO) 114 and
represented that organisation at the fifth Pan-African Congress, attLnded regular political
meetings with O'Connell, Nurse and Sheppard, although Sherwood could find no
evidence that Mossell was a CP member."5
110 J. Valtin, Out of the Night, Alliance Books, 1940, pp.385-6.
111 In all probability, O'Connell's work led to an intensification of the discrimination to which he was
personally exposed - the Shipping Federation barred him from employment on their ships and he was even
excluded from the docks. See M. Sherwood, 1991, op.cit., pp.60-62.
112 M. Sherwood, 1991, op.cit., p.59.
113 Ibid, p.63; St. Clair Drake, op.cit., pp.402-5.
114 The UCCCO was established in 1943.
1 15 M. Sherwood, 1991, op.cit., p.66.
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Two other colonial organisations which fought against employment discrimination were
the British Somali Society, BSS II6 - in whose formation and running the CDA was
involved - and the British branch of the Somali Youth League, SYL, which was
established in the mid-1940s with the assistance of Makonnen, Padmore and Kenyatta.
Both of these organisations campaigned for an independent Somalia in addition to aiding
Somalis residing in this country - a minority which was particularly vulnerable to
isolation and discrimination because of religious and linguistic differences. Duallah
Mohammed, a prominent member of the BSS and leader of the SYL, had been a CP
member since 1923 117 and British officials considered the British League to be a means of
contact between Communists in Somali and the CPGB. I 18 Their suspicions of British
Communist involvement in Somalia rested on such flimsy evidence as a call by the
League's president in Somalia, Mohammed Ahmed Ottavio, for the organistion to
embrace Communism during a speech in 1950 119 and the fact that its leader, Abdullahi
Issa - who became Prime Minister of his country in 1956 - was in contact with Duallah
during the late 1940s.120
The proliferation of groups claiming to represent the needs of coloured workers in the
maritime industry - O'Connell claimed that 'Cardiff is a breeding ground for coloured
organisations' I21 - inevitably led to rivalries and division. The League of Coloured
Peoples, under pressure from its more radical members, also campaigned on behalf of the
coloured seamen but tended to be regarded as interlopers and were unable to establish a
permanent presence among the community. Communists did not encourage LCP
involvement locally and played on suspicions raised over Moody's relationship with the
116 The BSS was formed around the mid-1930s.
117 Ras Makonnen, op.cit., p.194, n.6.
1 18 A Survey of Communism in Africa, 2-11-50, CO 537 5263, (PRO).
119 Ibid.
120 M. Sherwood, 1991, op.cit, p.65. Issa was a particularly close associate of Mohammed Jama, secretary
of the SYL's Cardiff branch, who arrived in Britain in 1949.
121 Negro Welfare Association, Annual Report, 20-10-35.
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Colonial Office - which was exposed during the Aggrey House controversy. Despite this,
the CPGB was not averse to working with the League on a national level.
O'Connell worked hard to persuade his white comrades of the importance of involving
themselves more deeply with the day-to-day struggles of black and coloured workers in
Britain and urged the Party to instigate a mass recruiting campaign in London, Cardiff,
Liverpool and other dockland areas. That he had to do so was a sad reflection on their
commitment, but whether a more active role on their part would have been welcomed by
the local population is not clear. It was argued on occasions that organisations claiming
to represent the interests of black and coloured workers failed precisely because they were
perceived to be led by white Communists, intent on serving their own political ends.
Nevertheless, at the CPGB's 13th Congress in 1935, in his report on Party work among
colonial seamen, O'Connell appealed for 'a little more political attention' from the Party.
'We have coloured members in Cardiff of the CP (sic) taking part every day in the
struggles of building the Party in Cardiff.' This commitment was made, he noted, despite
the warnings of 'reformist' leaders that they were being used for political purposes.122
The Negro Welfare Association
According to Peter Blackman, who joined the Negro Welfare Association in September
1937 and became its chairman shortly afterwards, the organisation was established during
the 1920s 123 by the ex-seaman, Arnold Ward, under the auspices of the CPGB.
Blackman, a CP member who settled in Britain in 1938, was active in the LAI and its
successor, the Colonial Information Bureau, and was later involved in the Committee for
West Indian Affairs, (see below). He also served on the E.C. of the LCP and edited that
organisation's journal, The Keys, a surprising appointment given the League's moderate
political stance. Blackman later became disillusioned with the Communists and left the
122 Report on the 13th CPGB Congress, 1935, Resolution on the Colonial Question, in R.P.Dutt, 1935,
op.eit.
123 This is an earlier date than that given by the LA!.
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CP towards the end of the 1950s, although, like many other colonial activists, he retained
his adherence to Marxist ideas,124
Another prominent member of the NWA was J. Desmond Buckle, a medical student from
the Gold Coast who became secretary of the Association in April 1939. Buckle, who
joined the CPGB in the early 1940s, served as a member of the CP's Colonial Committee
in addition to working on the Party's International Affairs Committee and Africa
Committee. He edited the Africa Committee's Africa Newsletter between 1950-1954,
worked as a Tass correspondent during the 1940s and remained a member of the CP until
his death in the mid-1960s.125
From the mid-1930s, the NWA was in close contact with individuals and organisations
promoting the anti-colonial cause in Britain. 126 R.J. Macdonald, in his introduction to the
volume of reprints of 'The Keys', states that 'Emphasis in the past has been placed upon
the ideological and philosophical differences that separate the LCP from such other
organisations as the Communist-backed Negro Welfare Association, WASU or the West
African Students Union, and the militant International African Service Bureau. In fact,
throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s a series of issues provided them with a
common ground for either joint or parallel action:127
Even during the early 1930s, when the Comintern was still pursuing the ultra-left line
adopted in 1928, British Communists obtained a degree of co-operation with other anti-
colonial organisations, the Scottsboro case (see above), is an example of this. 128 The
LCP was willing to pass information to the LAI for action during this period. When in
February 1932, Reginald Bridgeman wrote to the Secretary of State for the Home
124 M. Sherwood, 'Peter Blackman, 1909-1993', in The Association for the Study of African. Caribbean
anclAijan Culture and History in Britain, Newsletter 7, September 1993.
125 H. Adi, 1994 Paper, op.cit.
126 NWA, Annual Conference Report, 20-10-35.
127 Roderick J. MacDonald, Thtligys,/ht DraciaLprgarLa_thg.i_CPAg- prim.), Kraus Thomson, 1976,
p,14
128 ThLKLY,i, Vols. 1-7, 1933-39.
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Department, Sir Herbert Samuel, in connection with the colour bar in Britain, this action
as a result of information supplied to the League by David Tucker, Publicity Secretary
of the LCP. 129 But such interaction did not prevent attacks on Moody in the pages of the
Negro Worker. In a report on the NWA's activities in autumn 1934, Ward accused
Moody of trying to crush all other Negro organisations, including the Negro Welfare
Association. 13
In line with Comintern policy, the organisation missed no opportunity to attack the
Communists' social democratic rivals. One example occurred in June 1932 at a meeting
of white and coloured workers and colonial students convened by the Association in
Charter Hall, London, where the chief speaker was A.A. Cipriani, President of the
Trinidad Labour Party. During the proceedings, a resolution was passed which severely
criticised the British Labour Party for its policy of continuity in colonial affairs. 131 There
is no doubt that such attacks adversly affected the NWA's credibility with the British
labour movement - when gathering information and advice on colonial matters, the
mainstream labour movement tended to shun the organisation,
Despite political differences however, the Association was able to extend its collaboration
with non-Communist groups on certain issues during the popular front period. This was
evident at a conference held on 18th September,1937, to coincide with a League of
Nations meeting, which was attended by the LCP, IASB, NWA and Friends of
Abyssinia. 132 A further example is provided by the NWA's Annual General meeting in
January 1939, when Keith Alleyne of the LCP expressed the League's desire to cooperate
with the NWA in the drive for solidarity among coloured peoples. 133 A memo submitted
to the Bledisloe Commission - appointed to explore the possibility of closer union
between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland - was jointly drawn up and submitted by the NWA,
129 The Negro Worker, 2 3rd.March, 1932, pp.30-31.
130 The Negro Worker, 4 6th. October-7th. November, 1934.
131 The Negro Worker, 2-4-1932.
132 New Times and Ethiopia News. 18-9-37, p.3.
133 NWA, Annual Conference Report, 1939.
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the IASB and the LCP,I34 The Association also recieved some practical support from Co-
operatix e societies, trade unions and other labour organisations - Ben Bradley argued with
some ON erstatement that this v,as e%idence of the great support forthcoming from the
British v‘orking-class for colonial peoples.135
During 1937-8, the NWA sent speakers to a total of sixty-three meetings organised to
discuss the unrest which was breaking out in the West Indies, 136 and was one of a number
of pressure groups consulted by the Labour Party's Imperial Committee and the TUC's
Colonial Committee during the West Indian revolts. In May 1938, a deputation lobbying
the Colonial Office on the issue included Bridgman; 137 Moody; Dorothy Woodman.,138
ho represented the Union of Democratic Control; Ronald Kidd and Ben Braclley.
joint memo from the LCP, NWA and IASB was submitted to the Moyne Commission,140
hich'vas appointed in the summer of 1938 to look into the deteriorating situation in the
West Indies, and Moody and Blackman subsequently appeared before the Commissioners
to submit oral evidence. 141 In June 1938, the LCP convened a meeting to discuss the
question at which the speakers included Reginald Bridgman, Peter Blackman, Ronald
Kidd, I42 Leslie Webb 143 and W. Arthur Lewis. The resolution which resulted from these
discussions included the demand for universal adult suffrage, the removal of the property
qualification for members of the Legislature and for the Federation of the West Indies
with complete self-govenunent.144
134 The Keys. Vol. 6, No. 2, p.15.
135 NWA, Annual General Meeting report, 29-1-39.
136 NWA, Annual Report, December 1937-December 1938.
137 During 1938, Bridgeman resigned from the NWA's E.C., but continued t assist the organisation within
the limits imposed by his position as a prospective Parliamentary candidate for the Labour Part).
138 Dorothy Woodman - who married Kingsley Martin, editor ofNew Statesman - was secretary of the
Union of Democratic Control from 1930.
139 The KC.) S, VOL 6, No. 1, p.15.
140 The Commission's chair, Lord Moyne, later became Secretary of State for the Colonies; the
representatives of British labour were Walter Citrine and Morgan Jones - there were no representatiA es of
West Indian labour serving on the body. See Peter Brown, 'Royal Commission to the West Indies', inWorld
Ng_vvs and Views. Vol. 18, No. 55, 19-11-38, pp.954-5.
141 The Keys, Vol. 6, No. 1, p.15.
142 Kidd represented the National Council for Civil Liberties.
143 Webb represented the Methodist Church.
144 The Keys, Vol. 6, No. 1, p.10.
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Virtually from its formation, the NWA - initially hamstrung by Comintern policies and
passed over by Labour leaders, later viewed with mounting suspicion by a community
increasingly turning away from the traditional 'white dominated' political parties I45 - had
problems recruiting members. Between 1933 and 1935 it was only able to attract fifteen
new recruits, I46 despite advertising in the newspapers and extending invitations to every
black person known to the Association in London. Under the popular front strategy, all
efforts were made to extend the membership. When, in October 1935, it was suggested
that black activists were dissuaded from joining the organisation because it had been
initiated by whites, Bridgeman proposed that the NWA be put under total black
leadership. He also pointed out that the NWA was greatly modifying its phrasing and
presenting a milder, less radical image in its new constitution. I47 But this was to no avail,
by 1939, Blackman was warning that a membership drive was essential to combat the
dwindling membership figures and in 1940 the organisation folded, its demise hastened
by war conditions.
Communism in the West Indies
As with the African colonies, the depression of 1929-34 took its toll on the economies of
the British West Indies; throughout the period sugar prices plummeted, wage levels were
cut and unemployment soared, triggering a period of unprecedented militancy. From
1933, labour unrest spread throughout the region - the unemployed demonstrated in Port
145 An example of this was provided at a Conference on African Peoples' Democracy and World Peace,
which was organised jointly by the NWA, the LCP, the Coloured Film Artists Association and the Gold
Coast Students' Association in 1939. The event, held in London from 7th-9th July 1939, was a
heterogeneous affair, speakers included Stafford Cripps, Creech Jones, W. Mainwaring M.P., Padmore,
William Ofori Atta of the Gold Coast and Dudley Collard. Harold Moody presided and Peter Blackman
was vice-chair. As the event proceeded, there were complaints that the Conference should be run
exclusively by Africans and these were backed by noisy demonstrations from the floor led by Jomo
Kenyatta. Harry O'Connell, representing the CDL, and Sawyer from the NWA argued for co-operation with
whites and on this occasion, managed to carry the majority with them. Nevertheless, this episode illustrated
the problems faced by the CPGB in its efforts to propagate a class-based ideology among a section of the
population whose experiences were built on their race origins. See Report of a Conference of African
Peoples' Democracy and World Peace, 1939, M.Sherwood Papers.
146 NWA, Annual Report, 20-10-35.
147 NWA, Annual report, 20-10-35.
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of Spain and workers struck on sugar plantations in Trinidad, British Guiana and Jamaica.
Discontent initially focussed on economic issues but soon encompassed demands for
political independence and it was during this period that the nascent trade union
movement and first modern political parties began to emerge.148
A series of strikes during 1937-1938 149 particularly alarmed the authorities and led to the
suppression of many West Indian political activists. In reply to an occupation of the
Trinidad oil fields by workers in June 1937, the Government despatched H.M.S. Ajax and
a company of marines to the area. Despite the scale of this response, the strike rapidly
spread to other industries and the workers began to organise into unions and to demand
collective bargaining. Similar unrest occurred in Barbados, where six workers were killed
during a demonstration in Bridgetown, and in Jamaica, where such clashes resulted in a
rising death to11.150
The Forster Commission and later the Moyne Commission - publication of which was
delayed until 1940 because it was judged to be injurious to the reputation of the United
Kingdom - were set up as a response to these developments. Critics pointed out that the
substance of the reports produced by these Commissions indicated the path that Britain
would take in order to quell the colonial workers' resistance - this included the
development of 'tame' trade unions, susceptible to Government manipulation, in an effort
to undermine genuine, more militant labour organisations.151
148 Richard Hart, Aspects of Early Caribbean Worker's Struggles in Caribbean Societies: Collected
Seminar Papers, Vol. 1, No. 29, 1982. Some limited trade union rights had been granted in Jamaica and
Guyana after 1919, but elsewhere, in Trinidad and Tobago for example, workers' rights were sacrificed in
deference to the oil industry. See also W. James 'The Hurricane That Shook the Caribbean',New Left
Reyie33; 138, March-April 1983, pp. 85-91.
149 This unrest was triggered by the poverty, malnutrition, starvation wages and coercion of the people in
the face of soaring super profits for companies such as Tate and Lyle, United Trust and Apex Oil. SeeNew
Leader, 19-8-38, p.5.
150 G. Padmore, 'Colonial Fascism in the West Indies', in New Leader, 29-4-38.
151 Jack Woddis, The Mask is Off, Thames Publications, London, 1954, pp.5-6.
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Communists, and therefore received the most attention from the British CP. 156 Following
PoIlitt's visit to Jamaica - ostensibly during a convalescent cruise of the Caribbean - Hart
struck up a correspondence with Bradley, who wrote that the PNP was an organisation in
which 'all the best elements of various sections of people in Jamaica should find a
place.' 157 Bradley despatched copies of Inside The Empire and other CP publications to
Hart, who reciprocated with information on the situation in the colony and literature
which included copies of Public Opinion and The Masses, journal of the Jamaican left.
By the end of 1943, the situation appeared promising; many of those imprisoned during
the 1938 riots 158 had been released to resume their activities within the PNP and the trade
unions and, by the end of that year, Communists had gained control of the Federation of
Government Employees Association, and the Jamaican TUC.
However, by 1944 the PNP's right wing was taking the initiative and the Communist
movement, cautious not to disrupt the Allied war effort, ceased its tentative
encouragements. The CPGB advised the Jamaican left against an offensive within the
organisation, fearing that a fragmented and weakened labour movement would result. In
July of that year, Bradley wrote to Hart warning that, 'Anything that would cause a split in
the PNP should be vigorously avoided.' 159 This advice put the Communist faction in the
untenable position of participating fully in PNP affairs whilst simultaneously seeking to
preserve its political independence. As a result of this contradictory stance, Communist
influence diminished and the Jamaican left became disoriented and disillusioned.
In Trinidad, the main workers' organisation was the Trinidad Workingmens'
Association, 160 which was renamed the Trinidad Labour Party (TLP), in 1934. The
organisation was led in the 1920s by the white Trinidadian nationalist Captain Arthur
Cipriani, who built up a mass labour movement and developed links with the British
156 Ken Post, op.cit., p.431.
157 Quoted in 1bid, p.429.
158 The riots developed from a strike in the Tate and Lyle sugar industry.
159 Ken Post, op.cit, p.457.
160 The TWA was founded in 1897.
170
Labour Party. In the years following the first world war, C.L.R. James had embraced the
ideas of Cipriani and wrote his biography, The Case for West Indian Self-Government 16I
However, James' views moved to the left following his years in Britain from 1932,162
whereas the TLP developed into an essentially reformist organisation which was rejected
by more militant Trinidadian workers.
When riots broke out in the colony's oil fields during June 1937, they were led by T.
Uriah Butler, a radical campaigner for trade union and workers rights. Butler stressed that
the unrest was a direct result of the oil company's policy of freezing wages in the face of
soaring living costs, a policy which continued even after the Depression ended and
company profits rose. The Trinidad authorities, fearful of a threat to economic and
political stability, arrested Butler in December 1937 and sentenced him to two years hard
labour for sedition. But their actions failed to halt the organisational process and several
new trade unions emerged in the wake of the clashes, including the Oilfield Workers
Trade Union, the All-Trinidad Sugar Estates and Factory Workers Union and the Public
Workers Union. Government responsed by introducing compulsory registration of unions
as a way of controlling organised labour - a move which was supported by the British
TUC.
A small group of Marxists operated in Trinidad during the 1930s, meeting regularly to
study Communist literature and debate ideas. Although the Negro Worker and
publications of the RILU and ITUCNW, which carried attacks on both Cipriani and the
MacDonald government, were banned by the Trinidad government in April 1932, this
literature was still smuggled in. There is also some evidence of a CPGB link - the
political activist and Trinidadian barrister Cola Rienzi, also known as Krishna D.
Narayan, had earlier connections with Shapurji Saklatvala 163 and when, in November
161 Richard Hart, op.cit.
162 During this time James worked as a cricket correspondent for theManchester Guardian. See C.L.R.
James, Beyond a Boundary. Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London, 1963, p.123.
163 M. Nicholson, op.cit., pp.235-6.
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1938, the newly-formed Oilfield Workers Trade Union went to an Arbitration tribunal
one of the workers' nominees on the board was Dudley Collard, a British barrister with
Communist associations. I64 But these were small inroads; only a handful of Communists
operated in Britain's West Indian colonies, where political consciousness was still in its
infancy during the 1930s and1940s. Under such conditions it was extremely difficult for
the CPGB to construct a base from which to extend its activities and spread the
Communist message.
CWIA
As a result of the deteriorating situation in the British West Indies, the Committee for
West Indian Affairs was formed at a meeting held in the House of Commons on 8th
November, 1938. The purpose of this body, which included a significant Communist
presence, was to publicise conditions in the West Indies, make representations to relevant
government departments and to mobilise support in Britain for the West Indian peoples.
Members included the Labour M.P. Arthur Creech Jones - later to serve as Labour's
Secretary of State for the Colonies - who at one point acted as chair for the organisation;
secretary Peter Blackman, who represented the NWA; Harold Moody; Sir Stafford
Cripps; Rita Hinden; Hyacinth Morgan; 165 John Jagger M.P., 166 Alex Gossip of the
NAFTA; Dr. C.B. Clarke from Barbados; Reginald Bridgeman; Dr. H.B. Morgan of the
TUC; C.Rienzi, Trinidadian OWTU; D.N. Pritt M.P. and Dudley Collard.167
The number of Communists and Communist sympathisers serving on the Committee
coloured the labour movement's reaction to the organisation from the outset. When
Blackman wrote to William Gillies, informing him of the Committee's formation and
offering the CWIA's assistance to the Labour Party, he did not receive a reply. He wrote
again on December 8th, notifying Gillies that Charles Roden Buxton and the M.P.s
164 Ibid.
165 The Grenadian-born, right-wing Labour M.P.
166 Jagger served with Dudley Collard on the OWTU's arbitration tribunal: see above.
167 Letter, P. Blackman to W. Gillies, 16-11-38, William Gillies Papers (WGP), MMLH; S. Howe, op.cit.,
pp,104-5.
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Benjamin Riley, H. Tomlinson and Arthur Pearson had joined the Committee. 1 68 Gillies
subsequently put the organisation in touch with Leonard Woolf, secretary of the Party's
Advisory Committee on Imperial Affairs, and Beresford Kemmis of the TUC's
International Department. The Committee was told that formal co-operation with the LP
was 'unnecessary', but that any communications would receive consideration.169
Despite the lukewarm response by labour leaders, the Committee continued to grow and
was later joined by the Labour M.P. David Adams, Desmond Buckle, Mr. T.R. Cox,
Olive Crutchley, Dr. O.H. Wallen, Elmer Worrel, Sir William Jowett M.P. and Wilfred
Paling M.P. 170 Links were established with organisations and individuals in the West
Indies, including Norman Manley, Ken Hill and Amy Bailey of Jamaica.
On 22nd December 1938, a CWIA deputation met with the TUC's Colonial Department
to ask for their assistance in bringing West Indian activists to Britain to train as
organisers, and for financial help in building the trade union movement in the West Indian
colonies. The deputation also requested assistance in pressing for political and economic
reforms. The Colonial Department representatives were Dr. Drummond Shiels, chair;
Roy MacGregor; H.S.L. Polak; C. R. Buxton; T. Reid; Philip Cox; Creech Jones; Dr.
H.B. Morgan and H.B. Kemmis. The deputation consisted of Moody, Blackman and
Keith Alleyne - who represented the Colonial Students Association on the CWIA.
By the conclusion of the meeting, the Colonial Committee had agreed in principle to the
Committee's requests. 171 However, when Blackman contacted the TUC again in April
1939 to discuss the training of colonial trade union activists, Citrine refused to meet him
and the issue was delegated to Kemmis. In order to counter the threat from what they
168 Letter, P. Blackman to W. Gillies, 8-12-38, (WGP).
169 Letter, W. Gillies to L. Woolf, 10-12-38; Letter, L. Woolf to W. Gillies, 12-12-38; Letter W. Gillies to
P. Blackman, 12-12-38, (WGP).
170 CWIA, Membership list in Annual Report, November 1938-9.
I ll Report of CWIA Delegation to the TUC's Colonial Committee, 22-12-38.
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now regarded as a 'dangerous body', Citrine, Woodcock, Kemmis, Wray and others set up
a West Indian sub-committee in an attempt to marginalise the work of the CW1A.172
By the early 1940s, splits were appearing in the Committee itself, culminating in an
acrimonious correspondence between Blackman and the chair, David Adams, in May
1943. In the course of these exchanges, Adams informed the CWIA's secretary that the
group of Labour M.P.s involved were severing their links with the Committee. He went
on to dispute the CWIA's claimed connections with 'organised and other workers in the
colonies' and denied that the organisation had played a significant part in the progress of
reforms in the West Indies.173
Conclusion
Increasingly throughout the 1930s, in line with the growing influence of Marxist ideas
among British intellectuals, elements of the Labour left and, most significantly, the ILP,
moved towards the Leninist position on imperialism and colonial independence. The
failures of the 1929-31 Labour Government followed by the introduction of the popular
front, which left the door open for Communists to work within a wider constituency,
encouraged this development. But the central thrust of the new strategy - the Communist
movement's determination to meet the threat to the Soviet Union from Nazi Germany and
its fascist allies - was claimed to have cost the support of many black members.
One aspect of this policy was the Soviet Union's interpretation of the Italian invasion of
Abyssinian - an event of great significance to the African diaspora - as the beginning of
the fascist move against the Soviet Union rather than simply an act of imperialist
annexation. It was an issue which also caused dissent and confusion within the ILP,
which was torn between a call for working-class action against imperialist aggression and
a policy of distance from a dispute between imperialist nations. The result was a growing
172 minutes of a TUC Meeting held on 23-5-39.
173 Letters, D. Adams to P, Blackman, 7-5-43; P. Blackman to D. Adams, 17-5-43; D. Adams to C.W.W.
Greenridge, 24-5-43; D. Adams to P. Blackman, 24-5-43.
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determination by black activists to construct their own road to freedom 1 74 which adversly
effected the Communist Party's efforts to recruit colonial radicals in Britain despite
interaction between Communists and British-based black support groups such as the LCP
and the IASB.
But the extent to which the Communist movement's anti-colonial work was damaged by
popular front tactics and the prioritising of the fight against fascism is unclear. Black
activists did not completely desert the CP and turn away from Marxist theories in France
for example, where French colonials such as Cesaire worked with the Communists after
the Popular Front Government was established. C.J. Robinson maintains that many black
radicals retained 'aspects of Marxism for their critique of capitalism and imperialism',175
and Imanuel Geiss, while claiming that Communism merely 'filled the gap' in Pan-African
development between 1927 and 1934, concedes that Marxist ideas helped shape the
political views of some African leaders.176
Even Padmore refrained from attacking his erstwhile Communist allies in public because
he was unwilling to undermine Soviet Russia's support of colonial liberation. It was a
measure of his belief in the fundamental worth of Communist anti-imperialist ideas that
he retained much of his Marxist philosophy and regard for the USSR. By the late 1930s
he had conceded that the experiences of Abyssinia and China and of Hitler's demand for
colonies proved what Marxists had been arguing for decades - that the proletariat and the
colonial peoples were allies and that the problems of self-determination and imperialist
war were inseperable. Whilst he considered the Party's popular front stance 'a tragedy' -
on the grounds that their advocacy of collective security misrepresented British
imperialism as a 'good imperialism' - he concluded in 1938 that, 'from recent indications.
174 Padmore wrote that, 'With the realisation of their utter defencelessness against the new aggression from
Europeans in Africa, the blacks felt it necessary to look to themselves.' G. Padmore, op.cit., pp.145-6.
175 C.J. Robinson, 'Black Intellectuals at the British Core: 1920s-1940s', in J.S. Gundara and Ian Duffield,
e 1 1 '	 1 a I 1	 1 t • ,• 1 Aldershot, 1992.
176 Imanuel Geiss, op.cit., pp.339-340.
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. . Stalin is preparing the way for a Communist reversion to the 'old line'. Let us hope
so.'177
There has been criticism of the CPGB's level of committment to anti-colonial politics and
suggestions that this was a cause of its failure to progress further in its work with black
militants, yet it was the case that the Party leadership consistently urged its membership
towards a greater interest in colonial issues. 178 British Communists faced an uphill task in
this work simply because, unlike the situation in France, the number of black activists in
Britain remained very sma11. 179 This was not the main problem for the CPGB, however.
The hurdle which prevented the Party from progressing in its attempts to foster
Communism in the British colonies of Africa and the West Indies remained the lack of
organised nationalist movements there and, despite political stirrings during the 1930s,
the continuing low level of political consciousness in these territories.
177 G. Padmore, 'Hands Off Colonies', in New Leader, 25-2-38, p.2.
178 There was an attempt in the early 1930s to set up Party machinery which would ensure a more efficient
transfer of anti-colonial theory into practical initiatives. Robin Page Amot put forward a number of
proposals along these lines; these included a national department solely concerned with colonial work,
district colonial committees which would call regular colonial conferences and a Party member in each
district who would carry responsibility for colonial work. Most importantly, Amot stressed that colonial
work should arise out of the lives and experiences of the members, rather than as a response to directives
from heaquarters. Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 1112-1-1930, Reel 1, (CPGBA). But this
was a time whem CP membership had fallen sharply - to a little more than 2,000 in 1930 - and sectarianism
insisted that activists took on a burgeoning workload, including the establishment of red trade unions to rival
the TUC.
179 From the mid-1920s Paris was host to a number of radical African groups which had close links with
the French CP. See J.A. Langley, 1969, op.cit., p.74,
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CHAPTER SIX: THE WAR YEARS 193945
Anti-Fascists
Prior to Britain's declaration of war with Nazi Germany on 3rd September 1939, the
CPGB's main fear was that the British Government would reach an accomodation with
Hitler. Consistent with its chief priority - the defence of the Soviet state - the Party had
argued for a military alliance between the Western powers and the USSR, this being
Moscow's preferred method of containing Hitler until the summer of 1939. 1 The CPGB
was also concerned that sections of the left, in their desire for peace, were prepared to
placate the fascist powers by backing their demands for the return of their former
colonies. In August 1939 Labour Monthly argued that 'Fascism, aided by the pro-Fascist
elements in the imperialist countries, is attempting to entrench itself in the colonies. At
the same time it uses the misguided elements in the progressive movement who support
its demands. In this way, behind a smoke screen of the demand for the return of its
former colonies, Fascism actively prepares its machinery for the eventual repartition of
the globe:2
A further danger was the championing by Germany of national independence for the
colonial peoples. 'Fascism is gaining important footholds in the colonial countries,' the
Party warned, 'entrenching itself in the progressive liberation movements' so that they
should serve its war aims. It was consequently essential to stress that, 'Heavy and
oppressive as the lot of the colonial peoples is under existing imperialist rule, it would be
immeasurably worse under Fascism', 3 and to warn against a distortion of the slogans of
colonial freedom in the interests of fascist domination of the colonial peoples. The Party
reasoned that it had the right to carry this message precisely because 'Communists are the
1 W. Thompson, op cit., pp.65-66.
2 'Colonies and Fascism', Labour Monthly, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1939, p 466
3	 Ibid., p 468.
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most serious and consistent fighters for the right of self-determination of the colonial
peoples'.4
The British Communist Party's initial reaction to the outbreak of hostilities therefore, was
to cautiously welcome what it regarded as the next step in the struggle already engaged in
Manchuria, Abyssinia and Spain, although it still regarded the National Government as an
obstacle in the path of a thorough-going 'People's War' against fascism and Nazism.
Hitler-Stalin Pact
It was onto this canvas that the the Hitler-Stalin pact was spilled in August 1939, though
it was not until after the British and French declarations of war against Germany on 3rd
September that this arrangement gave rise to a new attitude of Communist Parties towards
the fascist states. 5 In what appeared to be an astonishing policy U-turn, Moscow now
condemned the conflict as an inter-imperialist war and urged Communists to resist their
national governments' participation in the hostilities. It was stressed that fascist states
were no worse than bourgeois democratic states, indeed, British capital had helped to
build up Hitler and fascism as an anti-Soviet force, an experiment which backfired as
these new forces developed into colonial rivals and turned against their sponsors. The
CPGB's task therefore, was to expose these facts and work to undermine the British state,
not encourage war against the fascist states.
The British government was accordingly attacked for its hypocrisy in portraying the war
as one fought on behalf of democracy and self-determination, while Labour was
denounced for being a 'tame opposition'. 6 A statement on 'The Colonies and War',
adopted by the Central Committee in December 1939, claimed that 'the people of India
and the Colonies are not deceived by false slogans of war for democracy; they see no
4	 Ibid., p.469.
5 Kevin Morgan, Against Fascism and War, Manchester University Press, 1989, pp.87-91.
6 Robin Page Arnot, 'The Communist Party and the Colonies', World News and Views, Vol. 20, No. 31,
24-8-40, pp.423-4.
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reason why they should place their lives and their resources at the disposal of their foreign
rulers, when in their own countries democracy and freedom are denied to them. . . The
Colonial people have nothing to gain from another imperialist war, save a further loss of
freedom and heavier burdens: 7 Communist literature of this time also stressed the
adverse affects of the war on British workers. 'We and the colonial people must starve. . .
in order to pay for the war and the profits which monopoly capital is making out of the
war:8
As the focus of Communist propaganda swung back onto the colonies, the colonial
peoples were once again placed in the forefront of the struggle to end imperialism and
topple the capitalist system. In this new stage of imperialist conflict, their conditions
were 'even more intolerable', their determination to win independence greater than ever.9
In a statement on The Colonies and War, adopted by the CPGB's Central Committee, it
was maintained that the war had awakened rebellion in every part of the British Empire,
even those areas which had previously lacked a national consciousness - an argument
which was vindicated by subsequent events, as nationalist and workers' movements
developed in the African colonies.10
The Communist newspaper, World News and Views reported the 1939 Mombasa strike, a
dispute sparked by dock workers' demands for higher wages which spread rapidly to other
sections of the work force - a total of six thousand workers in all. This was met with
force and repression by the authorities, as was the widespread labour unrest in Tanganyika
7 'The Colonies and War', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 21, No. 12, December 1939, pp.751-2.
8 The Empire and the War, CPGB, n d, c1940, p.8.
9 Clemens Dutt, 'The Colonial Question and the War', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 22, No. 6, June 1940.
Labour Monthly, December 1939, op.cit.
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which occurred soon afterwards" and the strike by Rhodesian copper miners during
August 1940.12
The distressing economic and social situation in Jamaica, where high unemployment, low
wages and increased taxation were having a radicalising effect on the local population,
was also covered by communists. 13 Michael Carritt reported on the huge amount of taxes
and goods raised for the war effort in the colonies and the effect on the colonial peoples,
giving the examples of Malaya, Trinidad and sub-Saharan Africa." He revealed the
record profits reaped by Tate and Lyle in the West Indies, at a time when the people were
starving 15 and their civil liberties under attack. 16 Colonial peoples were now considered
to be 'front-line fighters' 17 in the struggle to end imperialism and advance Socialism.
Repercussions
David Springhall, the CPGB member charged with the task of explaining the latest volte
face by Moscow to his British comrades, urged them to understand that it was a decision
based on the Soviet Union's need to react defensively to unfolding world events. He
added that there was no question but that the Party, in implementing the new line, would
continue to carry responsibility for the colonies and assist them in every way. 18 But
despite such efforts at reassurance, the directive stretched the loyalty of many key
11 'Labour Advances in East Africa', World News and Views, Vol. 44, No.19, 9-9-39, p.964. The
newspaper subsequently reported that the Peoples' National Party of Jamaica had reversed its decision to
shelve its demands for responsible self-government for the duration of the war, in the face of government
intransigence. 'An Appeal from Jamaica', in World News and Views, Vol. 21, No. 6, 8-2-41, p.91.
12 R K. Robertson, 'Strike of the Rhodesian Copper Miners', in World News and Views, Vol. 20, No. 34,
24-8-40, pp.463-4.
13 B. Ashe, 'Jamaica Feels the Pinch', World News and Views, Vol. 20, No. 24, 5-6-40, pp.30-1. The
article stressed that the amount which the colony was expected to receive from the proposed Colonial
Development Fund was unlikely to alter the economic situation to any great extent.
14 Michael Carritt, 'Allies - and Proud of it', in World News and Views, Vol. 20, No. 50, 14-12-40,
pp 718-720. The article pointed out that a steep rise in the price of vital imported foodstuffs and the
consequent drop in popular consumption was causing a very serious food situation to develop in Trinidad.
See 'War, Food and Halth in Trinidad', in Ibid.
15 Michael Carritt, 'West Indies and the Sugar Racket', in World News and Views, Vol. 20, No. 51, 21-
12-40, p.73I.
16 B. Ashe, 'The Attacks on Civil Liberties in the West Indies', in World News and Views, Vol. 20, No.
47,23-11-40, pp.670-1.
17 The Empire and the War, op.cit., p.12.
18 J. Callaghan, 1993,  op.cit., p.181.
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members to breaking point and placed the CPGB under great strain. Several leading
associates of the Party turned from it in disgust; John Strachey and Victor Gollancz, for
example, believed the Communists to be guilty of a 'the worst betrayal of the working-
class in modern history'.19
Harry Pollitt, whose pamphlet How to Win the War was published at the same time as the
new line was conveyed from Moscow, was one of those most reluctant to accept the
change of analysis. He was replaced as Party secretary by Palme Dutt20 - who
accomodated the policy change with rather more enthusiasm. 2i Only a continuing belief
in the central importance of the Soviet Union to the cause of international labour coupled
with deep scepticism towards a British state perceived to be built on the subjugation of
colonial peoples, allowed many who were repulsed by fascism and its allies to remain
within the Party at this time.
Ben Bradley was one of those imprisoned for publicly expounding the new line. In May
1940, he and fellow Communist Arthur Clegg were arrested after speaking in support of
Indian independence at separate Empire Day rallies. They were charged with attempting
to cause a breach of the peace and gaoled for three and two months respectively. 22 Yet
Bradley's fortnightly Colonial Information Bulletin, journal of the Colonial Information
Bureau, had been supportive of the war effort prior to its issue of 30th November 1939,
after which the Party ceased publication.23
It is perhaps of some significance that the Home Secretary at the time of Bradley's arrest
was Sir John Anderson, an ex-Governor of Bombay with a hardline reputation. Anderson
had expressed his approval of fascist regimes whilst in India and had aquired the
19 Quoted in Ibid., p.192.
20 Kevin Morgan, 1989, op.cit., Chapters 4-6.
21 J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit.,pp.181-190.
22 Jean Jones, 1994, op.cit., p.28.
23 S. Howe, op.cit., p.119; Noreen Branson, The History of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1941-
.L, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1997, p.67.
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nickname 'Black and Tan' Anderson during his period in Ireland after the First World
War24 - in many ways he typified the system which activists like Bradley had spent much
of their lives opposing.
In a wider context, the Communists' policy change caused the Party to loose a great deal
of sympathy in Britain - membership fell by about a third during this period - and placed
it under threat of illegality. In an attempt to win back some of its ebbing support, the
party launched the Peoples' Convention in September 1940. The strategy behind this
initiative was to present a pacifist front - its stated aims being to defend the democratic
rights and living standards of British workers and cultivate a pro-Soviet foreign policy.
The coalition Government was attacked during the campaign as a government of 'the rich
and privileged, ruling the country in their own interests and against those of the masses of
the people', the formation of which had destroyed the 'normal functioning of a
Parliamentary Opposition'. 25 It was a position which attracted over two thousand
delegates26 to the inaugural conference, at which the speakers included Krishna Menon
and Paul Robeson." Although, in truth, its appeal did not extend much beyond pacifists,
Communists and their sympathisers, the Convention did present an alternative to the
coalition government's call for sacrifices in the prosecution of a just war. The conference
was successful enough to sting the Government into issuing a ban on the Daily Worker
and The Week in January 1941,28 but other Party publications escaped proscription,
presumably because they tended on the whole to avoid anti-war propaganda.
During 1940, most of the CPGB's coverage of colonial affairs was to be found in Inside
The Empire, the first issue of which promised to 'shatter the smoke-screen of lies,
24 M. Carritt, op.cit., p.154.
25 'The People's Convention', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 22, No. 11, November 1940, p.601.
26 Purportedly representing around one million people.
27 Labour Monthly, November 1940, op.cit., p.194.
28 Patricia Cockburn, op.cit., p.276.
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deception and suppression' 29 erected by the British Government, and publish the 'real
facts' of what was happening to the peoples of the British Empire. The journal narrowly
escaped a complete ban on its publication in January 1941, although its export continued
to be prohibited. 30 In fact, the publication proved to be fairly restrained, tending to
produce straightforward reports on conditions within the colonial Empire and often
quoting from the British and colonial press.3i
India
If the Soviet-German accomodation was virtually impossible to justify to the British
public and a source of much soul-searching within the British CP, it was welcomed by the
majority of colonial nationalists who perceived their chief adversary to be British
imperialism. It also allowed the CPGB to support the [NC's anti-war stance. In the years
leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War - even as the British Government
was practising a non-interventionist strategy with regard to German aggression and
participating in the Munich negotiations - the INC's opposition to fascism had been
clearly stated in numerous resolutions and speeches. But nationalist leaders' awareness of
the fascist threat did not lessen their resistance to British imperialism. While Palme Dutt
was able in June 1939 to 'definitely repudiate' the idea that fascism and imperialism were
indistinguishable, 32 Nehru made no distinction between the two in his presidential
address to the Conference on Peace and Empire, held in London on July 15th and 16th,
1938. 'Fascism is indeed an intensified form of the same system which is imperialism', he
maintained, 'you cannot distinguish between the two conceptions of fascism and
empire'.33
29 R.P. Dutt, 'The Empire and War', in Inside the Empire, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 1940.
30 Noreen Branson, 1997, op.cit., p.67.
31 The journal temporarily ceased publication during the blitz, reappearing in March 1943. Noreen
Branson, The Communist Party of Great Britain 1941-51, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1997, p.67.
32 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 8-6-39, Reel 10, (CFGBA).
33 J. Nehru, Peace and Empire, India League, 1938, p.4.
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The British Government could not claim to be ignorant of such sentiments; an INC
resolution passed at the Haripura session in February 1938 had bluntly warned that 'In the
event of an attempt being made to involve India in a war, this will be resisted: 34 Thus,
when the Viceroy proclaimed India to be a belligerent only hours after the British Prime
Minister's speech in the House of Commons declaring a state of war between Britain and
Germany, nationalist opinion was incensed. Without consent or consultation, India's
economic and manpower resources were used to prosecute the war. The Government of
India promulgated Ordinances which severely restricted the freedoms of the Indian people
and - through the Government of India Amending Bill - took measures to limit and
circumscribe the powers and activities of the provincial governments.
On the 15th September, 1939, in its Resolution on India and War, Congress condemned
Nazi ideology and fascism but declared that 'India cannot associate herself in a war said
to be for democratic freedom when that very freedom is denied to her.'35 The organisation
invited the British to 'declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to
democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged, in particular, how these
aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect in the present. Do they include the
elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will be
guided in accordance with the wishes of her people?'36
In his reply, the Viceroy merely reaffirmed the old pledge to grant India Dominion Status
in due course and blamed communal disunity for the delay in conceding self-
determination, a response which did not satisfy even the most moderate opinion in
India.37 'It goes without saying', Lord Linlithgow declared in summer 1940, that the
34 !bid, p.28.
35 INC and War, Congress Resolution, 15-9-39, p.13.
36 Quoted in R. Palme Du g, India Today, Victor Gollancz, London, 1940, pp.13-14.
37 In protest at this dismissal of Indian views, Congress Governments resigned from nine of the eleven
provinces at the beginning of November 1939, and Jinnah and his supporters in the Muslim League
subsequently followed suit. Nehru scathingly predicted that an India under Dominion status would be ruled
by 'bejewelled maharajas, belted knights, European industrial and commercial magnates, big landlords and
taluqadars, Indian industrialists, representatives of the imperial service, and a few commoner mortals', all
intent on preserving British interests. (J. Nehru, The Parting of the Ways, Lindsay Drummond Ltd., 1940.)
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British government 'could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the
peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly
denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties
to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government.'38
It was an argument repudiated by British Communists, who blamed economic inequalities
and the Government's divisive policies for much of the communal strife in India.39
William Gallagher rejected the interpretation of India as a hopelessly divided society in a
House of Commons debate held on the 26th October, 1939. He insisted that the INC
represented the legitimate demands of the Indian people for freedom and self-
determination and must be recognised as the decisive political force in India. If Britain
was fighting this war to defend democracy, he reasoned, it followed that India must be
given her freedom.4°
During 1940 widespread strikes and civil disobedience were met by a series of police
raids in which Congress leaders, Socialists, Communists, trade union and peasant leaders
were arrested and gaoled. For Indian Communists, the Second World War offered an
opportunity to direct the nation onto the path of revolutionary struggle; it was a challenge
which the colonial state was determined to meet. The Governor of Madras, speaking on
the 3rd of December, 1940, urged that the 'hidden organisers' of the Communist
movement 'be tracked down, and every effort made to protect society from their
His vision of India as a free, united, democratic country, closely associated in a world federation with other
independent Eastern nations such as China, Ceylon, Burma, Afghanistan and Persia and his desire to 'cut
adrift' from the financial domination of the City of London, mirrored that of the CPGB.
38 Viceroy's Reply, in INC and War, op.cit., p.19. He was supported by Lord Zetland, Secretary of State
for India, who maintained in an interview with the Sunday Times that 'there are great and important
sections of the Indian people themselves who refuse to acquiese in the hegemony of the country which
Congress are claiming'. Quoted in Notes on India, No. 10, January-February 1941, India League, London.
39 Muslims had come late to the fields of business and education and suffered economically because of
this.
40 Notes on India, No. 8, January-February 1940, India League, London.
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misguided and insidious attempts.'41 Among those arrested were B.T. Ranadive, S.A.
Dange, R.S. Nimbkar and S.S. Mirajkar, all veterans of the Meerut Conspiracy Tria1.42
New Allies
CPGB support of the Indian nationalists at this time was expressed most strongly by
Harry Pollitt in the June 1941 edition of Labour Monthly. 'We hope', he wrote, that the
'mighty wave of revolt that is now sweeping that great country will succeed in finding the
road to the complete victory over British imperialism.' 43 As in 1939, Pollitt's words
narrowly preceded a drastic change in Comintern policy. The commencement of Hitler's
Russian campaign" on the 22nd. June, 1941, heralded the entry of the Soviet Union into
the war and the Allied camp. According to the Comintern, the attack on Soviet Russia
had transformed the character of the imperialist war into a People's War.
The Anglo-Soviet Pact was signed on 12th July, following which the CPGB
wholeheartedly embraced the war effort, campaigning for a united fight against fascism,
and in defence of democracy and the Soviet Union. Over the next two years, as the Soviet
people battled against the Nazi onslaught, the British CP was a leading voice in the call
for the Allies to move from a defensive to an offensive strategy, to begin the Second Front
in Europe.45
Now it was important to strengthen the coalition Government as a government of national
unity. In May 1941, Dutt had portrayed Churchill as an 'imperialist swashbuckler. . .the
41 Quoted in NemIndia, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1941, India League, p.21.
42 One of those charged with criminal conspiracy and the making and possessing of prejudicial literature -
namely copies of Labour Monthly and Moltov's speeches - in what became known as the Madras
Conspiracy Case, was the former president of the Cambridge Union, Mohan Kumaramangalam.
aws1ndia, Vol. 3, No. 7, September -November 1941, India League, p.20
43 Labour Monthly, June 1941, p.265.
44 Code-named Operation Barbarossa.
45 During this period, the Party was able to rally up to 50,000 for Second Front demonstrations, at which
Labour, Liberal and even Conservative M.P.s spoke. See R. Palme Dutt, Britain in the World Front,
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1942, p.208; Douglas Hyde, I Believed, The Reprint Society Ltd., London,
1952, p.183.
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enemy of the workers';46 the following year he wrote, 'The whole nation recognises that
the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, stands for complete victory over Hitler, for
maintenance of the alliance of the United Nations, and for rejection of every proposal of
appeasement with the Nazi gang.' 47 But this development did not constitute an admission
that previous policy was wrong; Dutt went on to argue that the Soviet-German Pact had
smashed the policy of the Munichites and won time for the Soviet Union to equip itself
for the war. Furthermore, 'the common front against fascist war and aggression' was 'still
incomplete, still full of imperfections.' 48 The fight against pro-fascist forces within the
Government and ruling-class which had occupied a large place in Communist arguments
before September 1939, was now rekindled. Figures such as Leo Amery, Lord Halifax,
Lord Simon, Sir James Grigg and Sir Samuel Hoare were all regarded with suspicion.
This policy, and perhaps more importantly, the Soviet war record, brought a remarkable
upturn in the fortunes of the Party in Britain, with individual membership reaching around
50,000 by 1943,49 the year in which the Comintern was dissolved. But the position did
not rest easily with the demands of the anti-imperialist struggle, and the anti-war
movement in the colonies now presented a problem for the CPGB. Communist support of
colonial independence movements was no longer based on their capacity to topple the
British Empire; but on the premise that self-determination was essential if the people were
to be persuaded as to the deadly nature of the fascist threat and the necessity of mobilising
behind the Allied war effort. Nehru, who was himself imprisoned for four years in
November 1940, 50 declared after the Soviet Union entered the war, that 'Only freedom
and the conviction that they are fighting for their own freedom can make a people fight as
the Chinese and Russians have fought: 5i This was what the CPGB stressed continuously
after 22 June 1941; India would fight, if India was free to choose.
46 Quoted in .1. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.196.
47 R.P. Dutt, Africa. Europe. Victory, CPGB, 1942, p.13.
48 R.P. Dutt, 1942, op.cit., p.1.
49 Ibid., p.207.
50 His ninth gaol term.
51 J. Nehru, Whet India Wants, India League, London, 1942.
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Dutt made the point in Britain In The World Front, published ml 942, that the Atlantic
Charter of August 1931 had supported the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they will live. Churchill however, had excluded India, Burma
and other parts of the British Empire from this principle. 52 The loss of Burma and
Malaya, the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942, was therefore seen as a
warning; 'The peoples of these countries could have been won for full co-operation, and
the people and resources rallied in co-operation with us to defend their country if their
right to freedom had been declared'. 53 It was imperative that the British Government
realised why these countries were lost and avoid the same occurring elsewhere in the
Empire. The collaboration of the colonial peoples in the war effort had to be won 'on the
basis of their own understanding of their own interests, as voluntary allies, and not as
servants called on to give their lives in the interests of their masters.'54
The Party argued that the path of democratic anti-fascist advance in the West Indies
needed to be pressed forward by the 'immediate establishment of full self-government'. In
the African colonies, the way forward lay in the extension of civil rights, rights of
organisation and of a free press, the release of political prisoners, removal of racial laws,
labour and social legislation and economic assistance. 55 The Communist press also
reported the intensified repression in Africa as a result of wartime conditions. 56 By 1944,
they were expressing doubts that the African peoples would be granted their freedom after
the war and calling on the labour movement to insist that the principles of the Atlantic
Charter be implemented in regard to the African colonies.57
52 R.P. Dutt, 1942, op.cit., p.109.
53 Draft Document on the Colonial Question, CPGB. 1942, p.2, 21B 2b (RBP).
54 R.P. Dutt, 1942, op.cit., p.103.
55 R.P. Dutt, 1942, op.cit., p.111.
57 J, Shields, 'The Future of the African Colonies', World News and Views, Vol. 24, No. 23, 3-6-44, p.80.
56 J. Shields, 'New Perspectives in Africa', World News and Views, Vol. 24, No. 40, 30-9-44, p.316.
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The refusal of the British government to concede independence was losing valuable allies,
the Communists insisted, notably Nehru - 'one of the world's most pronounced anti-
fascists'. 58 However, despite this verbal pressure for a new British policy in India, they
also argued that the colonial people could not make their involvement in the anti-fascist
fight conditional on the granting of independence. In Palme Dutt's words, 'The interests
of .. . all the colonial peoples, as of all the peoples of the world, is bound up with the
victory of the peoples against fascism; that interest is absolute and unconditional, and
does not depend on any measures their rulers may promise or concede'. 59 At this juncture,
independence was considered possible only for those strong enough to withstand the
fascist threat. As Dutt explained, even in India the Communists 'support the demand for
independence .. . (only) on the basis of taking into account the world situation and the
ability to maintain the independence against fascism.'6°
Concern at the implications of this shift in emphasis caused Reginald Bridgeman to
express reservations over the content of the draft document on the Colonial Question
prepared for the 1942 CPG13 Annual Conference. It was important, he wrote to Harry
Pollitt, that the Party did not give the impression that its approach 'is primarily governed
by the desire to enlist all colonial peoples in the struggle to smash Fascism, rather than by
the determination boldly to proclaim in Britain that the immediate need as far as all the
nations, free and subject, is (sic) concerned is the liberation of the colonial peoples from
alien determination'. The right of the colonial peoples to freedom should be 'plainly
announced as a matter of principle by the CPGB before the question of the importance of
their participation in the fight against Fascism is defined 1 . 61 His suggestion was politely
received by Pollitt,62 but not acted upon. Bridgeman subsequently noted that 'as at
present published the Reports of the Conference appear to me to be hardly adequate in
58 NeWSIndia, Vol. 4, May 1942, India League.
59 Rajani Palme Dutt, 'Notes of the Month, in Labour Monthly, September 1941.
60 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 8-6-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
61 Letter, Reginald Bridgeman to Harry Pollitt, 21-5-42, 21B, 2b, (RBP).
62 Letter, Harry Pollitt to Reginald Bridgeman, 29-5-42, 21B, 2b, (RBP).
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bringing out the importance of freedom for the subject peoples in reference to a maximum
anti-Axis effort.'63
Ironically, the reversal of the Comintern's previous instructions to the Indian Communist
Party fell to Harry Pollitt - the CPGB's General Secretary who had opposed the 1939 Pact
and was removed from office for his pains. He was instructed to write to the imprisoned
Indian Communist leaders informing them of the new line 64 and urging them to give
uncompromising support to the war effort against Nazi Germany and its fascist allies.
As with previous policy shifts, Indian Communists initially resisted the changes, but by
mid-1942 they had wholeheartedly adopted a pro-war position. P.C. Josh i was able to
write in 1942 that 'War now unites the nation in a just cause, for the nation must perish if
the war is lost. The purpose now becomes positive and immediate - Victory; and the
activities of all are related to one single issue.' 65 The CPI was rewarded for its co-
operation during that year, when it was legalised by the British government and many of
its leaders were released. Although the Party's membership grew as a consequence of its
privileged legality, it alienated many of its nationalist sympathisers, particularly as the
difference between the positions of the Communists and nationalists was brought into
sharp relief with the initiation of the Quit India campaign in August of that same year,
following the failure of the Cripps Mission.
Cripps Mission
On March 11th, 1942, Churchill announced that Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy Seal,
was being sent to India with a set of proposals for the colony's future. Cripps was widely
regarded as a friend of India - during earlier discussions in the House of Commons on
63 Letter, Reginald Bridgeman to Harry Pollitt, 5-6-42, 21B, 2b, (RBP).
64 S. Roy, op.cit., pp.263-5.
65 P.C. Joshi, Thtindian_CpmmuniaTatty 	 — , CPGB, 1942,
p.7.
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Indian opposition to the war effort, 66 he had blamed the uncompromising attitude of the
British government for the impasse and declared the communal strife argument invalid.
Democracy, he had warned, could not be invoked to justify depriving the majority of its
rights in order to protect a minority. 67 However, the proposals of his Mission - which
were made public on March 29th - were rebuffed by all the main Indian political parties..
Congress leaders rejected as undemocratic the blueprint for a constitution-making body
and condemned provisions for the possible future division of India 68 These latter
measures were also criticised by the Muslim League, which complained that they did not
go far enough in meeting its recently-formulated demand for a separate Pakistan nation.
However, the major stumbling block, as senior Labour Party figures later admitted,
concerned India's defence. 69 Nehru, who envisaged the development of a citizen's army,
maintained that proposals relating to defence rendered the transfer of power illusory.
Under the Cripps plan - which was not intended to be implemented until after the war was
over - Britain would retain control of all the principal areas 70 leaving the Indian Defence
Minister with only minor responsibilities. Cripps was also accused of reneging on an
earlier commitment by refusing in the final stages of the talks to give any assurances on
the Viceroy's use of veto and powers of interference.
In answer to his critics, Cripps raised the spectre of communal divisions 71 and,
contradicting his earlier stance, warned of the 'rule of the tyrannical majority'. 72 But the
" According to the Prime Minister, the purpose of the Mission was to give precise form to the general
declaration of 6th August 1940, which had formulated the Government of India's policy.
67 Notes on India, No. 8, India League, January- February 1940. The House of Commons Debate was
held on 26-10-39.
68 Under Cripps' proposals, the unelected Princes who ruled the Indian States would have been
empowered to nominate representatives to the Constituent Assembly and, at the same time as enjoying
influence through their nominees, these rulers would also have the option to remain outside the proposed
Indian Union. J. Nehru, An Authoritative Statement on the Breakdown of the New Delhi Negotiations,
India League, April 1942.
69 Joint meeting of the Labour Party's International sub-committee and the India Committee of the P.L.P.,
13-10-43, Box J88, File 1, Fabian Colonial Bureau Papers (FCBP), Nuffield College Library, Oxford.
70 The British Commander-in-Chief, George Wavell, also assumed the post of Defence Minister.
71 H. Palmer, India, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1942, p.33.
72 'Nehru Answers Cripps', Newslndia, Vol. 4, May 1942.
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CPGB, which saw the failure of the Cripps Mission as a major strategic defeat for the
alliance against Fascism, argued that the Mission had failed, not because of communal
differences, but because demands from all sections of Indian opinion for the formation of
a responsible National Government had been refused.73
While rejecting the Cripps Mission as an exercise undertaken purely to establish an
'unanswerable case against future critics of British power in India', 74 the CPGB was also
highly critical of Gandhi's campaign which, they reasoned, would allow reactionary
elements to accuse the nationalist movement of surrendering to fascism. Non-cooperation
was seen by British Communists to be 'a disastrous step';75 it was vital that the nationalist
movement should not use the British government's rebuff of India's aspirations to
independence to adopt a policy which would leave the Indian people 'passive spectators
while the fate of the world is being decided'.76 Besides, there were wider concerns, as
Harry Pollitt explained to Nehru; 'I hate British Imperialism as deeply as you yourself do.
.. But. . . when Socialism is being butchered and battered as it is in the Soviet Union,
v.hen our Soviet comrades are dying in their millions to hold the one-sixth of the earth
that is ours, I am ready to cooperate with all who are prepared to fight against fascism'.77
CPI wages the People's War
As a combination of war conditions, political conflict and inefficient administration took
hold in India, food prices rose by 1,200 0 0, giving rise to the devastating Bengal famine of
19434. 78 Conditions of such poverty and hardship prevailed that some of the British
servicemen stationed there were moved to reassess their view of British rule in India. In
letters home, they wrote of men, women and children dropping in the streets from
73 R. Palme Dutt, 1942, op.cit., p.110.
74 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, September 1942, p.264. Ben Bradley attacked the
proposals in a pamphlet entitled India What We Must Do and the Party's 1942 Conference adopted an
emergency resolution urging that negotiations with the INC be reopened.
75 Clemens Dutt, 'India and Freedom', in Labour Monthly, August 1942, p.247.
76 Ibid, p.250.
77 Quoted in Kevin Morgan, Barry Pollitt, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993, p.130.
78 Krishna Menon, 'Famine in India', in Labour Monthly, October 1943.
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exhaustion and hunger, of troops being prevented from helping the local Food
Committees and of the British Government's responsibility for the situation. 79 Bradley,
who was familiar with the system operating in India, attempted to publicise the people's
suffering" the cause of which, he believed, ultimately lay with the British Government's
failure to deal with Indian affairs competently.8i
In the wake of its Quit India campaign the INC suffered intensified repression from the
authorities; its leaders were imprisoned, severe penalties were introduced - whipping was
administered for offences arising from political disturbances - while a news blackout was
operated by the British press to screen the discontent from the public. In a telegram to the
British Labour Party, the General Secretary of the AITUC, N.M. Joshi, deplored the
intransigence of the authorities and urged the immediate release of Mahatma Gandhi and
the other political prisoners as an essential step towards political pacification.82
Under these circumstances, the spectacle of a CPI restored to legality and rapidly
expanding its membership through cooperation with the war effort, was an outrage to the
nationalists. The CPI, which in compliance with instructions from the CPGB not to be
deflected from the fight against fascism had urged Congress to negotiate a settlement with
Cripps, reacted to disturbances which followed the arrests of Congress leaders in August
1942 by condemning the 'chaotic outbursts', 83 and blaming provocateurs for trying to
instigate acts of violence. It was imperialist policy to goad the people into anarchy which
it could meet with force in order to crush the working-class, the Indian Communist
79 Arthur Olorenshaw, Our Forces in India, CPGB, c1944.
He blamed the Zamindari system of land tenency, the intransigence and complacency of the Secretary
of State, Leo Amery, and opposition by Governent officials to the People' Food Committees, in which
communists played a leading role.
81 Ben Bradley, India's Famine, the facts, CPGB, November 1943.
82 Joint meeting of Labour's International sub-committee and the India Committee of the PLP, op.cit.,
(FCBP). When, in November 1943, Home Secretary Herbert Morrison announced that Oswald Mosley was
to be released from gaol on health grounds, the Communist M.P. William Gallagher demanded to know
why he was afforded such treatment when Gandhi, who was also in poor health, remained in detention.
H.F. Srebrnik, London Jews and British Communism 1935-45, Vallentine Mitchell and Co. Ltd., Essex,
1995, p.61.
83 India's Problems, CPGB, 1942, p.7.
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leaders claimed; the only way to react was to build national unity in order to hold the
Indian front against the Fascist invaders.84
The CPI's line - elaborated in P.C. Joshi's booklet Forward To Freedom - called for the
unity of all political sections on a common platform of anti-fascism. Such an alignment
could press for a National Government of India whilst giving full cooperation to the war
effort and the mobilisation of the people. 85 The people's war against fascism, the CPI was
forced to argue, would transform itself spontaneously into a war of national liberation at
some unspecified stage in its development.
Furious nationalist leaders denounced this strategy as a form of collaboration with India's
imperialist enemies and subsequently barred Communists from Congress membership.86
But far from being constrained by the bitter response of nationalists to their newly aquired
'respectability', Indian Communists went even further in their prosecution of the 'People's
War' by supporting the demands of the Muslim League - an organisation previously
condemned as a tool of British imperialism - for a separate nation. In a resolution
adopted in September 1942, the Party not only accepted the legitimacy of a Pakistan
nation, but went so far as to recognise a total of seventeen separate nationalities within
India's borders.
The CPI's theoretical position was set out by G. Adhikari in a speech to an enlarged
meeting of the CPI's Central Committee in September 1942. This cited the Marxist
theory of development of a nation - that nationalities 'emerge and grow in the process of
historical evolution.' Invoking Stalin's authority to support his reasoning, Adhikari
declared that the argument must develop beyond that put by Dun in India Today, which
84 P.C. Joshi, 1942, op.cit., p.16.
85 Labour Monthly, September 1942, op.cit., pp.263-5.
86 Calls for Congress-League agreement were attacked by Nehru, who considered the CPI to be
'committing suicide'. India's Problem, op.cit., p.28.
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depicted India as a single entity ranged against British imperialism, and recognise the
'awakenings to national consciousness of new nationalities.'"
The position was based, at least in part, on political expediency; essentially because the
Muslim League favoured the war effort and also because the Party was strongest in those
regions where separatist movements existed. Following independence, it was able to
exploit regional differences in the face of a national government struggling to unify the
nation, but for now the CPI stressed the increase in support for the League which they
construed to be evidence of a developing political consciousness among the Muslim
population.88
The CPI's stance confounded the Indian Communist Party's British mentors, although
John Callaghan quotes correspondence between Dutt and P.C. Joshi, the CPI leader,
which suggests that the CPGB encouraged such policy inovations by default;
concentrating on the campaign for independence while the CPI was expected to focus on
support for the war. 89 The CPGB, which looked exclusively to the Congress left for
allies, warned that a considerable amount of literature was being distributed among the
Muslim population by the forces of fascism in India, who claimed to be the 'defenders of
Islam'. It was significant, the Party argued, that this propaganda concentrated its fire
against Nehru as the principal enemy." Nehru himself was greatly alarmed by the
development91 and he found a strong sympathiser in Dull, who believed fervently in the
desirability of a single, unified Indian nation, and had earlier urged Congress to make 'far-
reaching concessions' for the sake of national unity.92
87 'Pakistan and National Unity', in Labour Monthly, Vol. 25, No. 3, March 1943, pp.87-91.
88 Congress claimed that the bulk of Muslim opinion did not support the League or its aims - the
incumbent president of the INC, Maulana Abut Kalam Azad, was himself a Muslim and in the North-West
Frontier Province Muslims had formed a Congress Ministry. See Howard Whitten, Muslims of India and
Ihe Muslim League, Peace News Ltd., n.d., c.1942.
89 J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.200.
90 Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, 8-6-39, Reel 10, (CPGBA).
91 Following his release from gaol in August 1945, Nehru contacted the CPGB to express his concern.
'They (the CPI) have worsened the communal problem by their attitude.' He wrote, 'Communists who have
joined the Muslim League appear to be more rabid Leaguers than others'. S. Gopal, op.cit., p.305.
92 Rajani Palme Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, September 1942, p.266.
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Despite the hiatus in nationalist-Communist relations which resulted from the CPI's
enthusiastic pursuit of Comintern directives, a complete breakdown was avoided,
primarily because of the CPGB's consistent support of Indian independence. Although
coverage by the Communist press of colonial issues in general during this period was
poor, Labour Monthly devoted considerable space to Dutt's comments on India. 'When all
the charges and criticisms in the world have been laid against the Congress leadership and
tactics,' he wrote in September1942, 'the fact remains that the Congress was asking for the
recognition of a free India as an ally of the United Nations; and this demand, because it
was accompanied with the threat of civil disobedience in the event of refusal, has been
met with police cells, lathi charges, whipping ordinances and firing squads'.93
Two years and a policy U-turn after publication of India Today, Dull was able to
denounce the situation there as one which aided the fascist enemy. British imperialism,
he claimed, would 'rather lose the colonial territories temporarily to the fascist invaders
than yield power to the colonial peoples themselves'. 94 His articles called for the
formation of an emergency Indian National Government which could rally the Indian
people in the common struggle for the defence of India, the victory of the United Nations
and for Indian freedom.95
As a consequence of such analysis, the British CP's relationships with important Indian
nationalists like Nehru and his ally, Krishna Menon, remained friendly. Dull was able to
maintain a co-operative relationship with Nehru, who confirmed his continued support of
the Soviet Union following his release from prison in December 1941, 96 while Menon
93 Ibid., p.259.
94 R. Palme Dutt, Britain in the World Front, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1942, p.108.
95 Rajani Palme Dun, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, June 1944, pp.163-4.
96 H. Palmer, op.cit., pp.29-30. Nehru's early release was partly a result of public pressure in Britain,
where a campaign for the release of political prisoners in India was launched by Michael Foot M.P. at a
public meeting on 23rd. November, 1940. The India League set up a campaign sub-committee which
included Reginald Sorensen M.P. as chair and Krishna Menon as secretary. See NewsIndia, Vol. 3, No. 2,
February 1941.
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became particularly close to the CPGB during the Communists anti-war period of 1939-
41.97
The India League secretary was a regular contributer to Labour Monthly and it was a
measure of his understanding of the Communist position that his articles - which
expounded the nationalist view of independence as a precondition for India's participation
in the war effort - were all written after the Communists had changed to a pro-war
policy.98 Menon was a valuable contact for the CPGB, he held various government posts
after independence, including that of Minister of Defence, and may have continued to
provide Dutt with information on Indian and international affairs whilst in office.99
The Colonies: the way forward
The significance of the change which was instituted in Communist politics after the
Soviet Union's entry into the Second World War was manifest in the decision to dissolve
the Comintern in May-June 1943. Defended by Stalin as a means of facilitating 'the work
of patriots of all countries for uniting the progressive forces of their respective countries.
• . into a single camp of national liberation', 100 it was an act which announced conclusively
that the movement had turned from the path of world revolution. This had profound
implications for the tiny CPGB. Shorn of its revolutionary centre yet continuously
rebuffed by the Labour Party, 101 the British CP clung to the chimera of international co-
operation symbolised by the Teheran agreement, negotiated between the three major
powers in November-December 1943.
97 When Ben Bradley and Arthur Clegg were released from prison in the summer of 1940, Menon
arranged a dance evening in their honour at the Indian High Commission in Aldwych. (Author's interview
with A. Clegg, op.cit.) Menon's connection with the CPGB cost him the Labour Party nomination as
prospective Parliamentary candidate for Dundee. See S. Howe, op.cit., p.130
98 Both the articles and the general tone of India League publications were sympathetic towards the
Soviet Union - The India League published Newslndia, a news bulletin, and League News, which was
printed every two weeks primarily for members, in addition to various pamphlets.
" John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.257.
100 Quoted in Claudin, op.cit., p.45.
101 The Labour Party, which tended to regard the CPGB as a 'very different and very much less
responsible body than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', continued to reject Communist attempts at
affiliation. Report of the Annual Labour Party Conference, 1943, p.166, (LPA).
197
Participation by the CPGB in the wartime united front did not leave the Churchill
coalition totally unopposed, however. The ILP mounted a challenge to the war policy of
the government, as did the Trotskyists and Common Wealth, 102 a new party which
emerged in 1942. This organisation, which placed Indian independence at the centre of its
programme, succeeded in attracting several left-wing intellectuals, including the former
CP members, Tom Driberg and Tom Wintringham, and achieved a number of by-election
successes. The proposal by Common Wealth to establish a new, narrower form of
Popular Front 103 was attacked by Communists, who feared that it would split the socialist
ranks and disrupt the existing unity against Fascism. Besides, the new party - which
leaned towards a Christian socialist stance - adopted a hostile attitude to Communism,
arguing that political democracy did not exist in the Soviet Union.104
In 1944, the CPGB's Executive Committee issued a major policy document entitled The
Colonies: The Way Forward. This document, while attacking British imperialism on
several fronts, was far less inflamatory than the rhetoric of the inter-war years. The
Party's stated task was now to 'win the Labour and progressive movement as speedily as
possible to support the demands of the colonial peoples, and at the same time to put
forward a practical policy of support of these demands: 105 The arrest or regression of
economic development in the colonies as a result of British rule was discussed, as was the
creaming off of superprofits by monopoly capitalism and the detrimental effects of
imperialism on the British worker. 106 But there was little reference to radical political
change; the emphasis being on economic and industrial development, social services,
workers' rights and constitutional reform as a first step towards a future, as yet unspecified
102 Common Wealth was formed in July 1942, from an amalgamation of Forward March, a group inspired
by the former Liberal M.P. and baronet, Sir Richard Acland, and the 1941 Committee, led by the writer,
J.B. Priestly.
103 It was envisaged that this would be drawn from the labour movement, Socialists, Communists, radical
Liberals and Commom Wealth's own constituent groups.
104 R. Page Arnot, What Is Common Wealth?, CPGB, 1943.
105 Ben Bradley, Colonies and the Future, CPGB, 1944, p.3.
106 Colonies: The Way Forward, CPGB, 1944, pp.8-10, 7-11, 52-3.
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date of independence. The concept of colonial revolution as a means of achieving
freedom for the subject peoples and ultimately destroying world capitalism did not inform
this moderate programme, which adopted a particularly conciliatory tone towards the
Labour Party. The 'principles of democracy and freedom being applied to all peoples', it
claimed, was the 'true expression of Labour outlookl.107
Conclusion
Prior to August 1939, Communists believed they were conducting a 'struggle on two
fronts' - against both the forces of fascism and the imperialism of the Western powers.
With Moscow's designation of the Second World War as an imperialist war and its claim
that Hitler was pressing for peace however, this policy was no longer valid and the CPGB
was directed to switch the focus of its attack onto British and French imperialism alone, a
position which caused much soul-searching among Party members.
In contrast, colonial activists welcomed the new direction as a return to a more full-
blooded anti-imperialist stance. Indian Communists in particular initially saw the war as
an opportunity to lead the working-class in a nation-wide uprising and intensified their
activities accordingly, until halted by a Government offensive which saw most of their
leaders gaoled. Ironically, the CPI was reprieved by the pro-war policy adopted by
Moscow following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, although its progress
under these conditions left a legacy of bitterness among the Indian nationalist movement
and caused the CPGB - which continued to adopt a co-operative attitude towards left
nationalists - great concern.
107 Ibid., 1944, pp.54-55. Communists responded positively to the British Government's plans for Africa,
for example. The report on 'Labour Supervision in the British Empire 1937-43', was cited as evidence that
the Government was prepared to encourage the growth of colonial trade unions, the 1940 Colonial Welfare
and Development Act allegedly recognised British responsibility for conditions in the colonies while a
document entitled 'Mass Education in African Society' advocated the widespread development of education.
All these measures were welcomed by the CPGB. See E. Palmer, 'Colonial Education', in Labour Monthly,
April 1944, pp.124-125.
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Throughout 1942-45, far less attention was paid to colonial issues by the CPGB. This
was due in large measure to a reluctance by Communists to upset the Soviet Union's
Western allies by raising the spectre of anti-imperialist revolt. It was also a fact that the
Party suffered from the desertion during the 1930s of some of its most important African
activists and that war-time conditions made contact with Party sympathisers in Britain's
African and West Indian colonies exceptionally difficult. The Party itself remained
concerned that 'we have not secured the fullest realisation of the importance of the
colonial question'; existing members too easily forgot the Leninist principles on which
their movement's anti-colonialism was built whilst the Party needed to equip new
members with the Party line on the imperial and colonial question.108
Communists within the British armed forces stationed in India, Egypt and the Middle East
did conduct some valuable educational work among both the local populations and their
fellow servicemen and women. 109 But this was mainly undertaken on an individual basis
and had limited impact. Overall, the most attention to colonial issues was devoted to
India by Dutt in the pages of Labour Monthly, where he endeavoured to preach
unqualified support of the war effort while maintaining that Indian self-government was a
prerequisite for its efficient prosecution in South Asia.
108 Draft Document on the Colonial Question for the CPGB's National Conference, 1942, 21B 2b, (RBP).
109 For accounts of these activities see Clive Branson, British Soldier in India. the letters of Clive Branson,
CPGB, 1944; Richard Kisch, The Days of the Good Soldiers. communists in the armed forces in World
War Two, Journeyman Press, 1985. CPGB members Bill Carritt, brother of Michael, and Jim Fyrth both
established contact with the CPI while stationed in India. See Noreen Branson, 1997, op.cit., pp.65-6,
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CHAPTER SEVEN: COLD WAR AND COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE
After a brief flirtation with the idea of a continuation of the wartime coalition, 1 the
Communists welcomed Labour's victory in July 1945. In the August 1945 edition of
Labour Monthly, Palme Dutt declared that Labour's victory was a 'glorious political leap
forward in Britain. . . the sequel of military victory in the people's war of the United
Nations against fascism2 2 There was no critique of Labour's programme, Let us Face the
Future, for its ommission of a committment to timetables for colonial freedom;
Communists merely called for the practical implementation of the Party's pledge on self-
government for India, Burma and Ceylon.
Although Britain's growing dependence on US aid was a source of concern to British
Communists and the Labour left alike, even this had positive aspects. Dutt, for example,
saw the anti-protectionist conditions attached to the American Loan as evidence of
America's adoption of an 'aggressive imperialist world role',3 but noted with satisfaction
that it also marked the end of Chamberlainite visions of the empire as a closed bloc.
Accentuating the positive was a condition of the wartime alliance, perhaps, but it also
contained a purely domestic element in that Labour was given the benefit of the doubt as
it implemented its legislative programme. Great popular hopes resided in this
administration which the Communists probably shared. But Labour's foreign policy, with
its high military spending, was identified as a problem from the outset and was said to be
holding back its ability to implement its domestic programme.4
3 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, January 1946, pp.8-9, hand December 1945,
Maurice Dobb, 'The Economic Situation and the Labour Party', in Labour Monthly, October 1945,
p.300-302; John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.219.
Douglas Hyde, op.cit., p.200.
2 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month, in Labour Monthly August 1945, p.225.
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Economic Problems
There is no doubt that Britain's economy was in poor shape after the war; export levels
had fallen sharply, 5 around a quarter of her pre-war foreign investments had been sold and
the country had accumulated massive debts in the form of sterling liabilities. 6 During the
early post-war years, the country's economic problems manifested themselves through a
series of balance of payments crises which dominated the political agenda. The balance
of payments deficit was caused in the main by two factors; the outflow of British capital
through the sterling area7 - which carried no controls on foreign investment - and the scale
of government overseas expenditure
The sterling area, which was justified during the war as a means of gathering resources for
the fight against fascism, involved the pooling of colonial hard currency resources which
Britain could then buy at a fixed rate of exchange whilst crediting the colonies with
sterling balances. When the Attlee administration assumed power, it decided against
policies which would reduce its sterling balance liabilities, 8 agreeing instead that the
problem was 'basically how to prevent accumulated sterling from being liquidated against
imports'.9
5 In 1945, only 2°0 of the country's labour force were producing for the export market compared to 9.5°0
prior to the war. See David Coates, The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.67.
6	 In 1945 the UK's sterling liabilities to the colonies totalled £454 million.
7 Some £1,500 million in 1947-49.
s India had accumulated huge sterling balances during the war - the Reserve Bank of India was holding
around £1,300 million in 1946- a figure which included India's total overseas earnings. In a 1946 report to
the Fabian Society, A.C. Gilpin identified three ways in which Britain could reduce India's outstanding
balances; by selling more overseas investments, by funding the Indian Government's liability in respect of
pension charges etc., and by selling war-time factories, equipment and stores owned by the British
Government in India. See A.C. Gilpin, India's Sterling Balances, a report prepared for the Indian Affairs
Group of the Fabian Society, Fabian Publications Ltd. and V. Gollancz Ltd., Research Series No.I12, June
1946, p.5, p.1 1.
9 This was agreed at a meeting between the Colonial Office, the Treasury, and the Bank of England in
February 1946. See A.E. Hinds, 'Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances 1943-56', in Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1991, p.29.
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One of Britain's biggest problems was her substantial trade deficit with the dollar areas.
Following the abrupt termination by America of the Lease-Lend agreement at the end of
the war, the Government was faced with a pressing need to increase exports to these areas
in order to earn the vital gold and dollars necessary to pay for her balance of trade deficit,
circumstances which made the dollar-earning colonies particularly important to the
British economy. Under the sterling area system, Britain enjoyed low interest loans as
well as support for the pound against the dollar, whilst the colonies, forced to spend their
dollars within the sterling area despite the fact that Britain could not supply the goods
they required, suffered shortages and deprivation.10
The debate which surrounded the issue of overseas military expenditure was conducted
principally between Attlee and the Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, both of whom were prepared
to consider reductions, and the Chiefs of Staff, who were supported by Bevin in their
determination to resist any cuts. Many other influential voices were arguing by the mid-
1940s that Britain's overseas commitments needed to be reduced. In addition to John
Maynard Keynes" and Sir Roger Makins, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign
Office, I2 those expressing unease on the issue included the Bank of England, the Balance
of Payments Working Party and the (unpublished) Economic Survey for 1946. In spite of
such disquiet, coupled with Soviet and American hostility I3 to the continuing existence
of Britain's Colonial Empire, British policy showed no intention of scaling-down the
i Britain would not allow the colonies to buy from the dollar area because the consequential drain on her
f
old and dollar reserves would have further weakened the economy and threatened the status of the £.
i See J. Tomlinson, 'the Attlee Government and the Balance of Payments, 1945-1951, in R. McKibbin
and J. Rowlett (eds.), 20th Century British History, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1991, p.50.
12 Makins admitted in 1951 that' Foreign policy is based on national strength, and cannot safely get too
much out of line with the resources, moral and material, which a country can control.' See FO 371/124968,
no. 2412, 11th August 1951, 'Some notes on British foreign policy': memorandum by Sir R. Makins (FO), in
R Hyams, The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951: part 1 High Policy and
ministration, HMSO, London, 1992, pp.373-378.
Roosevelt interpreted the pledge of self-determination contained in the Atlantic Charter as applying to
all nations, including the colonies, but the central motivation of US opposition to the British Empire was
the desire to establish a global free-market economy in order to expand her own trade. The 1944 Bretton
Woods Agreement had already created the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both
effectively under US control, as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a free trade agreement. The US Loan and subsequent
Marshall Aid programme were not without strings and were accompanied by an expectation of
contributions to 'defending the West' against communism.
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world role which it could no longer technically afford." On the Left the suspicion was
soon aroused that the circle could be squared only by persuading the USA to underwrite
the Empire-Commonwealth as a bulwark against Communism.
Constructing the Enemy
As early as January 1945, Harry Pollitt had expressed misgivings over the support given
by Attlee, Bevin and Dalton to the decision of the wartime Coalition Government to
intervene against the Communist-led partisans in Greece. I5 His warning that London and
Washington would react against any elected Communist governments in Western Europe
as 'too radical' or 'too Red', I6 was soon substantiated. British officials saw the
establishment of a 'special relationshipTi with the USA as a means of curtailing Soviet
power and preventing Communism from gaining a foothold in Western Europe and the
colonies, although they were at pains to stress that this co-operation between Britain and
14 Over £200 million of the £600 million balance of payments deficit in 1947 was accounted for by
military spending - the Attlee Governments had increased armament spending to six times that of the pre-
war Conservative Government in order to maintain the imperial commitments it claimed to eschew.
15 Greece was of particular stategic importance to Britain because of its position in the Eastern
Mediterranean. An essential part of Britain's European policy was to maintain 'close and friendly relations
with Italy, Greece and Turkey, so as to secure our strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean' -
necessary to keep open channels between Britain and her interests in India, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand
and her oil supplies in Persia and Iraq. A victory for ELAS would have bolstered Soviet power and
threatened British interests in the region. FO 371 50912, no.5471, August 1945, 'Stocktaking after VE
Day': memorandum by Sir 0. Sargent (11th. July, revised), in R. Hyam, op.cit., pp.297-303.
16 Harry Pollitt, 'Lessons of the Labour Conference', in Labour Monthly, January 1945, p.24.
17 Britain saw her role within the 'special relationship' as one of elder counsellor rather than junior
partner. (See FO 371 50912, 'Stocktaking after VE Day', op.cit. ) Superior diplomacy was supposed to
compensate for the manifold disabilities that might be thought to stand in the way of achieving this
relationship. (F0 371 50912, 'Stocktaking after VE Day', op.cit.; FO 371 44557, no.2560, 9th. August
1945, (Anglo-American relations and the position of Britain): despatch from Lord Halifax (Washington) to
Mr. Bevin (F0), in R. Hyam, op.cit., pp.304-306.) But Bevin accurately reflected British condescension
towards the Americans when he told Nehru, years later, that the US administration was 'apt to take
unreflecting plunges.' 'We made it our business', he confided, 'to restrain them'. (Quoted in Peter G. Boyle,
'Britain, America and the transition from economic to military assistance, 1948-1951, in The Journal of
Contemporary Histou, Vol. 22, No. 3, July 1987, p.533.) This was the view expressed in Cabinet too, as
for example in discussions of US policy in Asia. (CAB 129 41, CP (50) 200, 30th. August 1950, 'Review
of the international situation in Asia in the light of the Korean conflict': Cabinet memorandum by Mr.
Bevin, in R. Hyam, op.cit., pp.369-370.) In 1951, the Foreign Office expressed concern over US policies,
her political and administrative system, lack of diplomacy, even the 'emotional disposition' of her people.
See FO 371 124968, 'Some notes on British foreign policy', op.cit., pp.373-378.
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America would not detract from the goal of attaining the maximum strength and
independence of the UK.I8
Although the Foreign Office admitted that it would be extremely difficult to analyse the
policy decisions of the secretive Soviet regime, I9 this did not prevent the British
Government from either speculating or drawing conclusions. Labour's Foreign Secretary
Ernest Bevin2° and the FO were at one in identifying certain Soviet policies in Europe2I
and Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East as causes on which to risk
confrontation. A grandiose canvas of responsibilities was accordingly set out in the
summer of 1945 - when Britain was technically bankrupt - by the Foreign Secretary's
advisers. Chief Adviser Orme Sargent, for example, counselled that 'we must maintain
our interests in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, even
though we may have to acquiesce in Russian domination in Roumania and Hungary. .. In
the immediate future we must take the offensive in challenging communist penetration in
as many of the Eastern countries of Europe as possible.' 22 The considered view in London
18 See FO 371 124968, 'Some notes on British foreign policy', op.cit. Ernest Bevin was particularly
anxious that Britain's foreign policy should as far as possible remain independent of American constraints
and also be 'in keeping with British fundamental traditions', that is not of the left. (CAB 129/23, CP (48)7,
5th. January 1948, 'Review of Soviet policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr. Bevin (Extract), in R. Hyam,
op.cit., pp.319-326.) In the immediate post-war years, Bevin proposed a 'western union', based on the joint
exploitation of colonial resources by the Western European powers, with the aim of building Europe into a
strong alternative to US and Soviet power. See A.J. Stockwell, 'A Widespread and Long-Concocted Plot to
Overthrow Government in Malaya? the origins of the Malayan Emergency', in The Journal of Imperial and 
F
clommonvt ealth History, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 1993, p.82.
FO 371 50912, 'Stocktaking after VE Day', op.cit, pp.297-303.
2 For details of Bevin's career, see; Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin, Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1993.
21 Ministers were particularly sensitive to the spread of Communist ideas in France and Italy and the
Soviet Union's extensive use of propaganda. It was suggested that the Labour Party, rather than the
Government, might be a more effective vehicle for conducting anti-Communst propaganda among the
Social Democratic parties in Western Europe.
22 FO 371 50912, 'Stocktaking after VE Day', op.cit. The CP was more influential in Continental Europe
than in Britain and there were real fears that it could flourish in the chaotic aftermath of the war, though the
economically backward Eastern European countries were seen to be more susceptible than their neighbours.
(CAB 128 12 CM19 (48), 5th March 1948, 'Foreign Policy in Europe': Cabinet conclusions on the Soviet
threat, in Hyam, op.cit., pp.331-332.) The defeated German population, suffering economic chaos and
deprivation, was also considered to be vulnerable to Communist ideology. Faced with this possibility, the
British initially argued against the installation of a liberal regime in Germany, believing that a temporary
dictatorship might be necessary to oversee that country's reconstruction, (See CAB 129 23, 'Review of
Soviet Policy', op.cit.) and were prepared to renege on agreements with the Soviet Union by supporting the
creation of a divided Germany. See Peter Weiler, 1993, op.cit., p.157-160.
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was that 'If we cease to regard ourselves as a World power we shall gradually cease to be
one. 123
Towards the end of 1945, Dutt speculated on the emergence of a Western European bloc
from which the Soviet Union would be excluded at the expense of 'the real unity of
democratic anti-fascist Europe', 24 and subsequently identified imperialism as the common
factor which united Britain and America in a 'common front against the advancing tide (of
colonial nationalism) which threatens to engulf all imperialist interests.' 25 The situation in
the colonies, where peoples' expectations had been raised by their wartime experiences26
and the principles of democracy and self-determination enshrined in the Atlantic
Charter,27 was considered by some British officials to be almost as serious as the danger
in Europe. Here Britain faced a double challenge through the spread of Communist ideas
and the rise of national liberation movements - many of which were Communist-led -
both of which posed a threat to British and growing American economic interests in the
colonies.
Although, as Curtis points out, 'The secret planning documents are often explicit about the
absence of any real threat from the Soviet Union to Western interests in the Third
World,'28 Communism and nationalism were routinely conflated. 29 In this manner,
23 FO 371 50912, 'Stocktaking after VE Day', op.cit., pp.297-303. These pretentions to power provided
the impetus behind Britain's acquisition of the former German colony of Cyrenaica in Libya as part of the
post-war settlement, a 'defensive' action which in the long-term served to intensify Soviet insecurity and
fuel Libyan nationalism. Yet Soviet encroachment on surrounding territories such as Bulgaria was
condemned as expansionist.
24 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, September 1945, p.264. Two months later, he
wrote that the 'aim of a strengthened Germany under British patronage, and a Western European bloc led
by Britain, and excluding the Soviet Union, is the consistent red thread running through all the turns and
manoeuvres of British foreign policy in the years between the wars'. Rajani Palme Dutt, 'Notes of the
Month', in Labour Monthly, November 1945, p.326.
25 R.P. Dun, 'Britain and Empire', in Labour Monthly, February 1947, p.37.
26 The war had offered the colonial peoples new opportunities - in Africa, the need to recruit for the war
effort sparked an information revolution which raised literacy levels and disseminated new ideas. In
addition, Britain's wartime reverses such as the fall of Singaore, had exposed the vulnerability of the
imperial power and given colonial nationalists new hope.
27 Colonial troops returned home from a conflict fought in the name of democracy and self-determination
expecting that these same principles would be applied to their own peoples. As a result, colonial trade
unionism and nationalist movements blossomed throughout the Empire from the mid-1940s.
28 Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreigvince 1945, Zed Books, London,1995. p.29.
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attacks against nationalists were justifed by claims that the action was aimed at
containing what Bevin called 'the internal canker of Communist-inspired subversion and
treachery'. 3° These were attitudes already discernable in the Attlee Government's decision
to assist the French and Dutch Governments reposses their former colonies of Vietnam
and Indonesia at the end of the war.3I
'After one year of Labour Government,' the CPGB claimed in May 1946, 'the subject
people are asking with growing impatience in what way Labour's colonial administration
and policy differs from the Tories'. 32 By 1947, the political climate had deteriorated to
the extent that Dutt was arguing that the central objective of the Labour Government's
foreign policy was 'to maintain the Empire, to maintain the world strategic and economic
interests of British imperialism.' 33 This objective, he claimed, guided every phase of
Britain's foreign policy - from the tolerance of Franco's Spain, to the intolerance of the
Left in Greece and the continued occupation of Cyprus.
29 While Bevin admitted that colonial independence movements were 'often nationalistic rather than
Communist', (CAB 129/23, Review of Soviet Policy, op.cit.), he explained the dangers thus; 'In the general
state of ferment in Asia, Soviet policy seeks to exploit local nationalist sentiment through local Communist
parties which, in many cases, contain Moscow-trained elements' (Ibid). It was a technique which he claimed
was adopted by CPs in Burma, Malaya, Borneo, Indonesia and French Indo-China. Bevin's view was
backed by Trafford Smith, an assistant-secretary at the Colonial Office during 1945-1950. See CO
537/2758, -11th October 1948, (Communism in the Colonial Empire): minutes by Trafford Smith and Mr.
Rees-Williams, in R. Hyam, op.cit., p.333.
3	 Quoted in Richard Rathbone, 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s', in the Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 1993, p.118.
31 In August 1945, Britain intervened to restore Dutch colonial power in Indonesia following the
e tablishment of a provisional government under President Soekarno. Despite the fact that the Indonesian
national liberation forces played a leading role in defeating the Japanese during the war, Britain used these
same Japanese soldiers to resist the nationalists until the Dutch were able to reclaim authority. A similar
situation arose in Vietnam, where a popular uprising led by Ho Chi Minh had established the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. Although both British and US officials admitted to Ho's popularity and competence,
Indian troops, again with the help of defeated Japanese soldiers, kept the colony in check for France. See
Curtis, op.cit., p.31.
32 The Party claimed that a mixture of violent repression, as in South East Asia, and insignificant formal
concessions were being used against the national movements. See 'The Colonial Resolution', in World
News and Views, Vol. 26, No. 21, 25-5-46, p.395; 19th National Congress: resolutions and proceedings,
CPGB, 1947, p.15.
33 R. P. Dutt, Report to the Conference of the Communist Parties of the British Empire, 26th February-
2nd March 1947, in We Speak for Freedom, CPGB, pp.13-14. In the Middle East for example, where
Britain was the pre-eminent power in the immediate post-war years, with commitments linked to the large
oil monopolies operating in the region. Bevin admitted that 'If these interests were lost to us, the effect on
the life of this country would be a considerable reduction in the standard of living ... to the wage packets
of the workpeople of this country.' Quoted in R.P. Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire,
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1953, pp.336-7.
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Discontent with Bevin's foreign policy was not confined to the Communists during the
Government's salad days. Rumblings within the Labour Party itself coalesced into
organised opposition inside the Parliamentary Labour Party in January 1947, when twelve
Labour M.P.s formed the Keep Left group. The group's publication, Keep Left, warned of
a betrayal of Socialist principles 34in March of that year and claimed that Britain was being
driven into 'a dangerous dependence on the USA'. 35 The task of British Socialism was,
wherever possible, 'to save the smaller nations from this futile ideological warfare and to
heal the breach between the USA and the USSR1.36
It was a stance with which the CPGB could empathise - Dutt pressed the point that the
Labour administration had willingly agreed to increase military spending as a contribution
to the 'special relationship' at a time of domestic austerity. 'The price of Bevin abroad is
Cripps at home', he wrote. 'Both mean the surrender of the hopes of the Labour
movement to the plans of the monopolists. Both mean the surrender of Britain's future to
the crazy compass of Wall Street and the mad dog war aims of Washington.' 37 The
arguments of the Keep Left group also carried some weight within the labour movement
for a time. 38 However, the continued promotion of Britain as a world power, regardless of
her diminished circumstances,39 thwarted the Left critics in general and advocates of a
constructive involvement in the process of European unity in particular (which some
advocates of a 'third road' desired).
37 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, December 1947, p.2. British officials confirmed
that 'The foreign policy we are pursuing to-day calls for austerity, restraint, and a sustained productive
effort from the British people ... The key to success abroad lies in the mines, blast furnaces and factories at
home'. FO 371 124968, 'Some notes on British foreign policy', op.cit., pp.373-378.
38 Jonathan Schneer claims that 'between the springs of 1946 and 1947 Labour left critics were provided
with what seems in retrospect, to have been their most favourable climate during the post-war period.' See
Jonathan Schneer, Labour's Conscience - the labour left 1945-1951, Alan Unwin Inc., London, 1988, p.5.
39 ,We want Europe to be strong', stated a Foreign Office memorandum, 'but if we were classed as just a
European Power and bound in an organic relationship to a predominently Latin and Catholic grouping, we
should soon lose our world position and a great deal of our liberty of action without strengthening either
Europe or ourselves'. FO 371 124968, 'Some notes on British foreign policy', op.cit., pp.373-378.




Cold War Sets In
The more temperate stance adopted by elements of the Labour left was in part a
consequence of the fact that the insider's view of the Soviet Union's territorial ambitions
was nothing like as frightening as the image projected for public consumption. Orme
Sargent at his most pugnacious admitted in 1945 that, 'At the present moment the Soviet
Union has been so weakened by the war that Stalin is hardly in a position to force through
ruthlessly his policy of ideological penetration against definite opposition . . . and it is
doubtful whether she aims at further territorial expansion.° Attlee was also prepared
initially to question whether the Soviets were as great a threat as the hard-liners
believed.41 In truth, there was little evidence of aggressive Soviet expansionism in
Western Europe after the war and its grip on Eastern Europe was far from vice-like before
the inauguration of the Marshall Plan 42 in the summer of 1947.
Officially the Russians were denounced for rejecting Marshall Aid43 and turning Eastern
Europe into a fortified encampment. But some Sociaixsts reaitsea Ala A‘e \SSIKs
involvement in the Plan had been contemplated only to make sure that it never
happened. 44 Dutt wrote in December 1947 of an 'Anglo-American offensive. . . directed
to partition Europe'45 and to create a 'cordon sanitaire' of Western European nations under
40 FO 371 50912, 'Stocktaking after VE Day', op.cit. It was unlikely, the Cabinet was told, that the Soviet
Uion was planning war with the West because 'Technically they are still backward compared with the
Americans and ourselves'. See CAB 129/23, 'Review of Soviet policy, op.cit..
41 Peter Weiler, 1993, op.cit., p.161. By early 1947 Attlee, who had twice challenged the view that
Britain needed to maintain a presence in the Middle East and had argued that the strategic worth of the
Mediterranean was exaggerated, (See J.G. Albert, Attlee. the Chiefs of Staff and the Restructuring of
'Commonwealth Defence' between V.J. Day and the Korean War, DPhil, Oxford, 1986, p.4, pp.35-39; J.
Tomlinson, op.cit., p.54.) abandoned his attempts to soften the hard-line taken by the Foreign Office and
the Chiefs of Staff.  His suggestion that the maintenance of oil supplies could be assured through
negotiation with the Soviet Union was firmly rejected by the Chiefs of Staff. Faced with their resignation
threats over the issue and Bevin's scornful denunciation of withrawal as 'Munich over again', Attlee
deferred to the opinions of the hard-liners. See J. Tomlinson, op.cit., pp.55-7; Peter Weiler, 1993, op.cit.,
i.161-162.2 
The Plan, named after the American General Marshall who proposed it in a 1947 speech at Harvard,
was put into effect in 1948.
43 CAB 129123, 'Review of Soviet policy', op.cit., pp.319-326.
44 Jonathan Schneer, op.cit., p.38.
45 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, December 1947, p.2.
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satellite governments. The real problem was the popularity of the European Communist
Parties. George Kennan, US Charge d'Affaires at the Moscow Embassy, revealed that the
point of Marshall Aid was not 'to prevent the Russians conquering Western Europe, but to
prevent Western Europe from deciding that Communism was better able to bring
prosperity than was private enterprise.' 46 By offering the economic revival of the West as
a lure to Eastern Europe, the Marshall Plan formed the decisive factor in a polarisation
process begun the previous March with President Truman's Doctrine of Containment.
As the Soviet Union's estrangement from her erstwhile allies progressed, the CPGB
increasingly found itself an object of criticism in the Communist movement, both for its
sympathetic approach to the British Labour Government and for its line on the
independence of India in particular. In response, the Party intensified its attacks on the
Attlee Government's record and its collaboration with the US, 47 causing some anxiety in
Whitehall. An admission in a 1950 Foreign Office memorandum that, 'they (the US) are
paying the piper, and in the last analysis we are dependent on general American support
for our security', was subsequently deleted after Herbert Morrison described it as 'a gift to
the Daily Worker1.48
However, the Communist position was not balanced by criticism of Soviet policies during
this period. Dutt denied that the alternative to dependence on American imperialism was
to be tied to the Soviet Union, maintaining that the choice was one between 'American
domination and economic subordination, with worsening conditions', or 'national
independence and economic recovery on the basis of the co-operation of Western and
Eastern Europe.' 49 But events such as the Berlin blockade, 50 the Czech coup of 1948 and
46	 •
M Ichae I Balfour, The Adversaries, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, p.82.
47	 .British Communists, assuming the mantle of patriotism, also criticised what was perceived by many to
be Americanisation of British culture - referred to by George Orwell as 'the bland allure of post-war
affluence, which was eroding authentic working-class culture.' Quoted in Dick Hebdige, 'Towards a
Cartography of Taste 1935-1962', in Bernard Waites, Tony Bennett and Graham Martin (eds.), Popular
ig
ulture Past and Present, The Open University, 1982, p.203.
FO 371 124968, 'Some notes on British foreign policy', op.cit.
49 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', in Labour Monthly, December 1 947 , P.3-
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the coercion in Poland appeared to contradict this analysis. It was a position which left
Communists open to accusations of being Stalin's 'puppets' and ultimately contributed to
their estrangement from the Labour Left.
The CP's position was further damaged by the Labour Government's manipulation of
Cold War propaganda to attack its critics. This was used to justify a purge of the Civil
Service, 5I the proscription of various organisations with Communist links and the
expulsion of Labour MPs Konni Zilliacus and Leslie Solley, who had expressed sympathy
with the Communist view. 52 In the face of the economic crisis which gripped Britain in
the winter of 1947, 53 the financial benefits of the Marshall Plan and the opportunity which
this offered for Labour's domestic programme was tempting indeed for Labour dissidents.
When coupled with the negative interpretation which was placed on the SU's reaction, it
was enough to break the back of Labour dissent - and the 'Third Force' movement
fragmented. 54 In January 1949, the British TUC left the World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) - an organisation formed in the fraternal atmosphere of 1945 -
denouncing it as a Communist front organisation, and joined the pro-Western
International Confederation of Trade Unions. 55 The polarisation of East and West was
completed that same year with the signing of the NATO Agreement.56
Colonial Conflict
5 The Soviet blockade of Berlin in summer 1948 was a response to moves by the Western powers to
create a Western-oriented German state.
51 This resulted in a substantial number of dismissals, resignations and transfers. Peter Weiler, British 
Labour and the Cold Wat, Stanford University Press, California, 1988, p.228.
52 Bevin launched a savage attack on the left at the 1947 Labour Conference, winning overwhelming
support from delegates.
53 Factories were operating at a reduced rate because of a fuel shortage, unemployment rose sharply and
imports increased.
54
When the Korean War began in June 1950, the Labour left praised the US Government for taking 'the
correct and inevitable course'. R. Clough, Labour: a Party fit for Imperialism, Counterattack No. 2, Larkin
Publications, London, 1992,p.103.
55 This was essentially a political organisation built with British and US government aid.
56 By this time, Bevin had dropped the idea of a Third Force in favour of full participation in the Anglo-
American alliance.
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From 1947, there was growing concern among British officials at the extent and
impact of Soviet propaganda in the colonies. Bevin, who had no doubt that
'eventual control of the whole World Island is what the Politburo is aiming at',57
complained that; 'The Soviet Government have made much use of the United Nations, the
World Federation of Trade Unions and other bodies for colonial propaganda against us;
their press and radio constantly pursue the colonial theme'. 58 In order to counter this, the
Attlee Government launched the Information Research Department (IRD) 59 at the end of
1947. Originally, it was intended that the IRD should promote the Welfare State as a
model for the colonies to follow, but the organisation rapidly concentrated its efforts on
more negative anti-communist propaganda and activities,' becoming involved in counter-
insurgency operations, particularly in Malaya. The main focus of the Department's work
in Britain was the distribution of propaganda material to newspapers and radio 6I in an
effort to counter the effect of Communist literature, especially the Daily Worker, which
was consistently critical of the government's anti-insurgency operations.
Throughout its handling of the Communist-led, nationalist rebellion in Malaya, where a
'state of emergency' was declared in June 1948, 62 the Labour Government was thrown
onto the defensive by a CPGB campaign, which claimed that Britain's involvement in
such regional conflicts was a direct consequence of her continued pursuance of a world
57 CAB 129/25, CP(48)72, 3rd. March 1948, 'The threat to Western civilisation': Cabinet memorandum
bv Mr. Bevin, in R. Hyam, op.cit., 329.
58 CAB 129/23, 'Review of Soviet Policy', pp.319-326, op.cit.
59 The IRD, formally the Communist Information Department, was established following suggestions by
Christopher Mayhew - a junior Foreign Office Minister in Attlee's Government - that a separate propaganda
department was needed. Bevin played a leading role in its creation. Scott Lucas, 'The British Ministry of
Propaganda' in the Independent on Sunday, 26-2-95.
6o In Britain, the section of public opinion most likely to be influenced by alternative views of colonial
unrest was the trade unions. Denis Healey, then a young Labour Party official, worked to develop IRD
contacts within the unions, who received unattributable briefing material from the IRD through the Labour
Party. See Susan L Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds - British governments, the media and colonial
counter-insurgency 1944-1960, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1995, pp.12-13; 263. During the
1950s, the Department worked to discredit nationalist leaders in Britain's African colonies.
61 The BBC agreed to Foreign Office requests to 'temper its broadcasts to accord with the national
interest'. See the Independent on Sunday, op.cit. The BBC's services to Eastern Europe were designed to
'pillory the Communist regime and display it as being ridiculous as well as cynical and evil.'
62 In common with other enemy-occupied territories, Malaya had been re-claimed by the British at the
end of the war.
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role. The CPGB's position - that Britain, faced with a threat to her control of the colony's
resources, succumbed to calls from the big rubber and tin interests for 'ruthless action'
against workers and nationalists 63 - is supported in more recent studies which also identify
an economic impetus behind the Labour Government's role in Malaya.64
There is no doubt that the stakes were significant, as Malaya constituted the largest net
dollar earner in the whole of the sterling area. During the period 1946-51, the colony's
exports comprised £460 million of the total £515 million British exports to the USA;65
this allowed Britain to enjoy a virtual monopoly on resources which were central to the
American economy. Such facts were used by Dutt to back his argument that the United
States, in line with its own imperial ambitions, had amended its antagonistic position on
the European Empires by 1947 to the extent that the old Imperialist powers retained their
colonial territories - but while they bore the cost of the wars of colonial independence,
American industries reaped the profits.66
British communists rejected Foreign Office attempts to explain the Malayan conflict in
terms of Cold War politics,67 a position for which there was little direct evidence, 68 and
63 E.C. Statement on Malaya, March 23rd., 1950, Presented to the 22nd. National Congress of the CPGB,
(CPGBA).
64 A.J. Rotter, 'The Triangular Route to Vietnam', in International History 	Vol. 6, No. 3, 1984;
R. Clough, op.cit.; M.Curtis, op.cit.; S. Carruthers, op.cit. Rotter further claims that the Attlee Government
was determined to revive the 'triangular trade' facility between Britain, the dollar-earning colonies and the
U S. which was disrupted by the Japanese invasion during the war, allocating £86 million in grants and
loans for the purpose between 1945 and 1949. A.J. Rotter, op.cit. Bevin himself conceded that British
foreign policy in the Far East after the war was dictated by her commercial interests in the area. M. Curtis,
op.cit., p.12.
65 In total, the colony supplied 45 0 0 of the world's natural rubber and 30 0 0 of the world's output of tin. R,
Clough, op.cit., p.88; M. Curtis, op.cit., p.13.
66 R.P. Dutt, 'The Betrayal of Britain'. in Labour Monthly, January 1949, p.6.
67 Britain worked to persuade the US to provide economic and military aid to South East Asia on the
basis that communism was attempting to seize control in the area, especially after the victory of Communist
forces in China in 1949. The F.O. claimed that the Conference of Asian and Australian C.P.s, held in
February 1948, had provided the catalyst for the Malayan Communist Party's action and that MCP
delegates had received tuition from Chinese Communists whilst attending the WFTU's Peking Conference
in November 1949. Former Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald, then Commissioner-General for
South-East Asia, was convinced that the unrest was inspired by Moscow, although he could offer no proof
of this - it was in response to his advice that the MCP was banned some weeks after the emergency was
declared. See S. Carruthers, op.cit., pp.75-6.
68 Shortly after the declaration of the emergency, Sir Alexander Newboult, Chief Secretary of the
Malayan Federation, acknowledged to the American Consul the lack of 'conclusive proof that the violence
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consistently reported the situation as an attack by an imperialist government upon the
nationalist and trade union movement of Malaya. In support of this they were able to cite
the example of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), which was
banned following its involvement in violent protests. The organisation's leaders were
arrested and, during May 1949, its former president and vice-president 69 were both
hanged by the Malayan authorities."
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 71 formed in 1930 mainly from amongst the large
Chinese minority, 72 was portrayed by the British C.P. as an organisation which had led
the struggle against Japanese forces during the war 73 and was now defending the living
standards and trade union rights of the Malayan people in the face of intensified
exploitation by monopolist industries. 74 'The profits of the tin and rubber companies are
swollen with the blood of British soldiers and of the men, women and children of
Malaya', an E.C. statement declared, 'The American imperialists are piling up stocks torn
and murder was due to Communist activities'. (Quoted in A.J. Stockwell, op.cit., p.74.) Some months
later, the US Consul had still not seen documentary proof that communists had instigated the unrest and the
Colonial Office admitted that the rebels lacked 'any substantial organised assistance in arms' as would have
been expected if Moscow or Peking had been involved. (Ibid., p.78.) In November 1950, James Griffiths,
then Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote in a memo; 'there is virtually no evidence of direct assistance
from outside to the MCP.' (Ibid., p.79.)
69 S.A. Ganapathy and Veerasenam, respectively.
70 Report of the Executive Committee, 22nd. CPGB Conference, November I949-December 1951,
(CPGBA)
71 The MCP, which in the early post-war years had concentrated its efforts on building a base in the
Malayan labour and trade union movement, adopted the more militant line prevailing among colonial CPs
by 1948. Colonial Intelligence put the number of rebels at between three and five thousand in the first year
of the conflict, though there were no figures available on the level of support for the Communists among
the Chinese community as a whole. CO 537/2677, Colonial Political Intelligence: Summary No. 1, 1948,
pp.1-2, (PRO).
72 Part of the British propaganda approach was to portray the nationalist movement as unrepresentative of
the Malayan population as a whole by emphasising the predominant Chinese membership of the MCP.
73 The CPGB claimed that the British authorities planned to use defeated Japanese troops in Malaya
against the same Malayan Liberation Armies which were 'feted for their (war) efforts in the London Victory
Parade'. Report of the EC, to the 22nd CPGB Conference, November 1949-December 1951, (CPGBA).
74 Communists maintained that as the profits of the monopolies grew in the post-war years, the real wages
of labour fell. Local rubber producers, already suffer Pg from the effects of the war, were forced to sell their
goods to the British Rubber Purchasing Unit at 80 0 0 less than the pre-war price. See Wu Tian Wang,
'Malaya', in We Speak for Freedom, op.cit., p.62.
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from the sufferings of a whole people, in preparation for a third world war, while more
and more lives are lost in the attempt to make Singapore 'safe' as an anti-Soviet base.'75
During its campaign to end the war in Malaya, the CPGB printed a number of pamphlets
and leaflets, organised meetings and passed resolutions on the issue, some of which were
adopted at national trade union conferences - notably the Electrical Trades Union, the
Firebrigades Union and the Scottish and Welsh Miners. Malayan Plays were performed
at the Unity Theatre and Lim Hong Bee's Malayan Monitor76 was published monthly
from 1947. 77 The Daily Worker in particular persistently condemned the Government's
handling of the situation in Malaya. Reports claimed that particularly brutal methods of
repression were being used against the civilian population including the razing of villages,
collective fines and punishments and the use of headhunters to deter others from joining
the nationalist forces. By 1950, official figures put the number of people interned in
concentration camps at 500,000 and the authorities had put a price on the heads of the
rebels.78
The CPGB's presentation of an alternative view of the conflict had some impact on the
left in Britain. In October 1948, J.D. Higham, Assistant-Secretary at the Colonial Office,
reported 'a mass of correspondence now being received, mainly from trade union branches
and shop stewards' committees on the situation in Malaya', 79 condemning Government
policy in the colony. It was enough to prod the Colonial Office into a counter-campaign;
special press briefings were provided, M.P.s were supplied with model answers to some
75 Executive Committee Statement on Malaya, March 23rd. 1950, Presented to the 22nd. National
Congress of the CPGB, (CPGBA).
76 Cambridge-educated Lim, who formed the Malayan Democratic Union in 1946 and served as the
London representative of the MCP from 1948, appears to have acted as a link between the CPGB and the
Malayan Communist Party. (See S. Howe, op.cit., p.216). Lim was a member of the CPGB's Malayan
Committee. See Noreen Branson, The History of the Communist Party of Great Britain 1941-51, Lawrence
and Wishart Ltd., London, 1997, p.150.
77 Report of the International Department to the Political Committee for discussion on 25-6-53,
CP CENT PC 02 15, (CPGBA).
78 In some instances, the bodies of rebels were publicly displayed.
79 Quoted in S. Carruthers, op.cit., p.97.
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of the more percipient questions on the Malayan situation and pro-Government
propaganda material was issued to Labour Party and trade union branches.8°
Indian Independence
Although the Communists were willing to give Labour the benefit of the doubt with
regard to the Indian question in the spring 1945, this was not indicative of a lack of
vigilance on the issue. Michael Carritt pointed out in November of that year that the
British labour movement was 'unambiguously committed by its own resolutions' to a
democratic solution of the Indian problem. 81 Following its post-war election victory
Labour had the opportunity to negotiate a settlement which would establish a genuinely
democratic Constituent Assembly,82 able to frame a constitution which would meet the
Indian people's aspirations of freedom and sovereignty. 83 The hope among British
communists was that the Attlee Government, armed with its huge Commons majority,
would set the process of Indian independence on the democratic path, but in the event it
chose to continue the policies of Amery and the National Government, its proposals
simply mirroring those put forward by Cripps in 1942.
It was during February 1946 - in the wake of the Indian naval mutiny - that Stafford
Cripps was again despached to India, this time by Attlee, charged with the task of
constructing a solution acceptable to all parties. The ensuing constitutional Plan,
produced on 16th May, was rejected by both Congress and the Communists as
80
Ibid.
81 Michael Carritt, 'A Constituent Assembly for India', in Labour Monthly, Vol. XXVII, No. 11,
November 1945, p.343. The CPGB's Colonial Committee had been extended in 1943 and again in 1944,
when a colonial department was established with Carritt at its head.
82 The Assembly should, according to Carritt, be democratically elected by adult suffrage and have real
power, not merely function as a constitution-making body whose recommendations the British Government
could reject or modify at will. There was particular concern among communists that economic decisions
such as the writing-off or scaling down of India's sterling balances could be taken by Britain before
independence. See Michael Carritt, November 1945, op.cit., p.343-4; G. Adhikari, 'India', in We Speak For
pclom, op.cit., p.52.
Carritt warned that, if the existing proposals were allowed to stand as Britain's last word on Indian
affairs, 'the future is beset with dangers of the first magnitude. The Indian parties, frustrated, embittered
and without the power to tackle their own domestic problems, will be driven aong the barren road of
communal dissension, whilst, in this country, the Press will continue to wash its hands of a deadlock which
it claims to be of Indian concern only.' 'bid, pp.344-5.
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unworkable - 'a complex constitutional structure prolific of deadlock and ensuring
continued British control in practice', 84 according to Dutt. Its proposals, which did not
include partion but contained a clause conceding the right to re-examine the Union after a
ten-year period, were subsequently slammed by Adhikari as likely to inflame Congress-
League differences 'into a fratricidal conflict by raising rival hopes'.85
Dutt later elaborated on these concerns by referring to a Cabinet document 86 produced at
this time, in which it was stated that the 'Egypt-Transjordanian' model of pseudo-
independence was planned for India and that 'important Indian elements' would be offered
permanent British assistance against the possibility of unrest, an attempt, Communists
believed, to ensure the ascendency of pro-British sections of the Indian elite. The
document further revealed that Britain was prepared to invest extensively in India -
generating large profits for Indian firms - if 'India were prepared to be turned into a full-
scale British imperial base of operations on the southern borders of the USSR 1 . 87 As the
grip of the Cold War tightened, such proposals were bound to fuel the belief that Britain
was determined to cling on to her economic and military interests in the region.
Following the lifting of passport restrictions in March 1946, Dull had embarked upon a
four-month tour of India in an attempt to dissuade the CPI from its innovatory views on
the nationalities question. 88 He emphasised the Muslim League's communal character,
warning that the organisation's aims were based upon religious rather than nationalist
considerations and claiming that its rigid demand for the establishment of Pakistan had
become a 'reactionary obstructive tactic which plays into the hands of imperialism'. 89 He
84 'Britain and Empire', Labour Monthly, February 1947, p.41. Under the proposals in the Plan, the
central economic and social planning which communists and the Congress left advocated would not have
been feasible.
85 G. Adhikari, We Speak for Freedom, op.cit., p.54.
86 A report on Cabinet policy presented to the Empire Staff Conference, which was held at the beginning
of March 1946.
87 Quoted in R.P, Dutt, We Speak for Freedom, op cit., p.14
88 During the visit, he tried diplomacy by conceding that the CPI 'first discerned in 1942 the genuine
nationalist element concealed within the Pakistan demand', at the same time as he attacked the League's
presentation of that demand. See R.P. Dutt, 'India and Pakistan', in Labour Monthly, March 1946.
89 Ibid., pp.86-87.
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made clear to Congress leaders his opposition to the CPI line and stressed his continued
support of nationalist unity in India. During his visit, Dutt held intensive discussions with
leading political figures including Nehru, Gandhi, Cripps, and Jinnah as well as
addressing the CPI itself.%
The visit was an undoubted success; by the time Dutt left for Britain in the July he had
communicated the CPGB's distrust of the League and redirected the CPI towards the
policy of a common Indian union. 91 But the suppression of the INC during the war years
had allowed the Muslim League to spread its message, facilitated by a British
administration which, the CPGI3 believed, fostered the organisation as a foil to Congress
power. The League was now in a position to use the demand for a separate Pakistan
nation to impede progress towards Indian independence.
When the Mountbatten Plan92 was formulated the following year, Dutt denounced 'this
enforced retreat of imperialism' which he claimed, qualified in practice the formal transfer
of power and protected the essential political, economic and strategic interests of British
capital in India.93 In the British Parliament, Communist M.P. William Gallagher was the
only member to criticise Attlee's initial announcement of the programme. However, the
CPGB was beginning to re-examine its position at this point. Although the core
difference of this Plan was its acceptance of partition, and it remained Dutt's opinion that
partition was an encouragement both to communal strife and interference from foreign
imperialist powers, British Communists were aware that its implementation would result
in Nehru taking power in India" - a positive development in their opinion. As the
violence escalated and chaos and anarchy threatened the sub-continent, the CPGB was
forced to make the best of the situation and accept the inevitability of the Pakistan nation.
" J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., pp.225-6.
91 M.B. Rao (ed.), Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, Vol. 7, 1948-1950,
People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1976, pp.I74-5.
92 Mountbatten was sworn in as the last Viceroy of India at a ceremony in Delhi on 24th March 1947, and
began work on his compromise plan.




Following Britain's withdrawal from India onl5th August, 1947, the CPI passed a
resolution pledging full cooperation with the newly-established Indian government in its
construction of a nation, and describing Nehru as the person most able to set India 'on the
road to Socialism and prosperity'. 95 This was in line with the CPGB's optimism on the
possibility of cultivating Nehru as a potential ally, but contrary to the view emerging in
Moscow as the Cold War intensified.
The establishment of the Cominform at the nine-Power Conference presided over by
Zhdanov in Warsaw during September 1947, marked a closing of ranks by Communists.
As the breach between East and West widened, communist emissaries were despatched to
colonial Communist Party conferences to preach the new sectarian line - delegates from
the Yugoslavian CP, at that time much favoured by Stalin, were especially in evidence.
The Indian Party itself held discussions with fraternal delegates from the Yugoslav
League of Communists who attended the Second CPI Congress in 194896 and, in
accordance with the new mood of confrontation sweeping through the Communist
movement, adopted a more revolutionary stance.
1948 witnessed a sunburst of nationalist agitation throughout the colonies, beginning in
January, when Burma left the Commonwealth and opted for independence as a republic.97
By August, roughly a third of the Burmese army had defected to the Communists. 98 The
subsequent armed struggle in Malaya, riots in Baghdad and the advance of Communism
95 Mohan Ram, Indian Communism, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1969, p.10; Quoted in P.S. Gupta,
1972, op.cit., p.29.
96 M. Ram, 1969, op.cit., p.19. This policy, which was also urged by delegates from China, Mongolia
and Australia, dominated the congresses of the International Union of Students and the World Federation of
Democratic Youth - which was attended by Vietnamese delegates in military uniform - both held in
Calcutta during 1948. See J. Callaghan, 1993, op.cit.
97 In Burma, Britain had backed the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League as the least radical movement
operating within the colony. Communists attacked the subsequent Attlee-Aung San Agreement as a
national humiliation.
98 Frank Furedi, 'Creating a Breathing Space: the political management of colonial emergencies', in the
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 1993, p.95.
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in China were all reminders of the mutability of Britain's position in the East. 99 To the
remote observers in the Soviet Union, the uncertainties and upheaval which accompanied
Indian independence seemed to represent perfect conditions in which to nurture
revolution. 100 Moscow accordingly attacked the India settlement on the basis that any
action by the British Government sprang from unscrupulous intentions, dismissing
independence as an artifice 101 and instructing Indian Communists to take an anti-Congress
line. The Congress government was initially accused of being a junior partner in the
exploitation of India and later, as the attacks intensified, of being the main protagonist.
Such arguments were seized upon by those Indian Communists who had resisted the
popular front tactics followed since the Duff-Bradley Thesis and disliked the leadership of
P.C. Joshi which was equated with them. In a sharp swing to the left, the Party passed a
resolution in December 1947 accusing the Congress leadership of collaboration with
imperialism. The Nationalist government's domestic policies were criticised for failing to
alleviate the suffering of the masses and its foreign policies for being bound to the British
Commonwealth. At the Second CPI Congress, held in Calcutta during 1948, Moscow's
will prevailed as Joshi was replaced by B. T. Ranadive - a hardliner recruited during the
'third period' - in a move which heralded a strategy of sabotage, violence and
indiscriminate strikes by the Indian CP.1°2
99 The Peoples Republic of China was formally established in October 1949, and in the same month
Bevin expressed concern that the Chinese Communists' success had already led to 'an important movement
of opinion' among the Chinese communities in South-East Asia. (See FO 800 445, if 78-80, 18th. October
1949, (Communist subversive activities in the colonies): minute by Mr. Bevin to Mr. Attlee, in R. Hyam,
op cit., p.340). However, the success of the CPC served as a useful lever to involve the US in the region.
Bevin wrote in August 1950; 'Within the last year ... the US, largely owing to the Communist threat, have
been disposed to take a closer interest in developments in South-East Asia to the extent of being prepared to
give military and economic aid.' CAB 129 41, 'Review of the international situation in Asia in the light of
the Korean conflict', op.cit., pp.369-370.
100 Guy Wint, 'Communism in India', in David Footman (ed.), St. Anthony's Papers, No. IX, International
Communism, Chatto and Windus, London, 1960.
101 E.M. Zhukov, in a report to the nine-party conference, claimed the Congress leadership had accepted
a 'sham independence'. M.B. Rao, 1976, op.cit., Introduction.
102 After the transfer of power, the Commonwealth Relations Office produced a fortnightly report on
political developments in India and Pakistan, including a section on communist activity. The reports were
particularly concerned with the spread of Communist influence in Hyderabad, where fighting had already
broken out. See CO 537/2725, Communism in India and Pakistan, 1948, (PRO).
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The Ranadive faction was encouraged in its militancy by the success of Communists in
Hyderabad's Telengana region, 103 where Andhra Communists following the Maoist
strategy had steered an agrarian movement into a peasant uprising. The situation, which
at one point posed a serious threat to the Congress Government, was one which the
nationalist administration could not afford to tolerate and in the crackdown which
followed the CPI was reduced to a state of disarray - the majority of its activists gaoled,
Communist-controlled trade unions disintegrating, the peasant movement faltering and
links between the Communist leadership and the masses severed.I04
For the next few years the influence of the CPGB inside the CPI was negligible; Joshi,
perceived as Dutt's acolyte, was actually expelled from the organisation and Dutt himself
was regarded by the new leadership as a 'revisionist'. Until the international situation
changed the CPI was allowed to pursue a destructive sectarianism and advice from Britain
was ignored - such as Dutt's warning in a secret memorandum to the CPI in 1949 that
Moscow was beginning to re-evaluate the Nehru government in the light of its movement
towards a non-aligned foreign policy; 105 the Ranadive group stubbornly refused to change
tack. Eventually the CPI leadership became an obstacle in the way of progress towards
establishing friendly relations between the Soviet and Indian Governments and as such
could not be allowed to continue. The replacement of Ranadive's leadership by the
Andhra faction in the summer of 1950 failed to solve the problem however, as the
strategy of peasant revolt favoured by the new leaders was still at odds with the Soviet
and CPGB position. 106 Indeed, the success of Mao in China had an immediate impact on
these Andhra Communists, who soon came to think of themselves as 'Maoists'. With its
customary dishonesty, however, Moscow's role in the division of the Indian Communists
was simply ignored and blame for the CPI's confused and factionalized condition was
103 A fuedal stronghold in Hyderabad state ruled by the Nizam.
1 °4 M.B. Rao, op.cit., Introduction. CPI membership fell from 89,000 in 1948 to just 20,000 in 1950.
105 P.S Gupta, 1972, op.cit., pp.32-3
106 The Andhra tactic of raising large peasant armies contrasted with the Russian experience of a small
workers' party siezing power in the cities, which was favoured by the Ranadive group. P.S. Gupta, 1972,
op.cit., pp.363-4.
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placed firmly at the feet of Trotskyist and Titoist elements - the latter recently added to
the Cominform's demonology. CPGB leaders such as Palme Duff were able to intervene
with effect in the affairs of the CPI once again from 1951.
That the British Communist Party leadership had little sympathy with the insurrectionist
course of the CPI from the outset is evident from the charges of reformism levelled by the
Politbureau against both Joshi and Dutt. 107 It is implicit in the fact that British
Communists judged Indian independence, as it was actually delivered in August 1947, to
be on balance a step forward and in their belief that the CPI should persist with its old
policy of nurturing the Congress left and desist from its support of the Muslim League
and a multi-national subcontinent. It is also striking that once it became clear that Duff
and the CPGB were out of step with Soviet foreign policy, the Party's experts on India did
little to extol the virtues of the new Moscow line. Dutt did protest at the Congress
Government's offensive against the CPI, condemning it as an attack upon democracy and
the working class as a whole. 108 But he also wrote a warm tribute to Gandhi, following
the Congress leader's assassination in January 1948, 109 and Party propaganda as a whole
during this period was confined to descriptive reports on events in Telengana, with no
mention of the factionalism and acrimony which had beset the CPI.
Dutt only acted to repair the damage done to the CPI when it became clear that the
Zhdanov policy had run its course and that Moscow was no longer interested in making
trouble in India. From 1950 he struggled to persuade the Party leadership away from
insurrectionist policies, endeavouring to explain once more its error in labelling the entire
Indian bourgeoisie as the enemy 110 based, allegedly, on its misreading of Cominform
107 M.B. Rao, 1976, op.cit., pp.696-7.
108 R.P. Dutt, Statement on India, presented to the E.0 of the CPGB, 10-4-48, International Department
File, (CPGBA).
1 09 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', Labour Monthly, March 1948.
Ito R.P. Dutt, Programme of the CPI, Report to the E.C. of the CPGB, CCMM (in Volumes), 14-6-51,
(CPGBA).
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literature." During talks with visiting Indian Communists in January 1951, 112 he
stressed that 'we should try to guard against drawing a mechanical parallel with China and
try to evolve a correct policy for India on the basis of the concrete situation in India . . .
The Indian situation presents some essential differences from China'. 113 He might have
quoted Engles' warning that, in pursuing self-determination, 'you must distinguish, not
according to abstract ready-made formulas, but according to political realities and the
stage of political development'.114
These attempts to steer Indian Communists from the revolutionary path bore fruit in early
1951, when a CPI delegation consisting of C.R. Rao, General Secretary of the Party; M.
Basavapunniah; Dange and Ajoy Ghosh travelled to Moscow for a meeting with CPSU
officers 115 to discuss a revised programme. A new, more moderate policy statement was
issued by the CPI's Politbureau in April and in May Rao was replaced as Party leader by
Ghosh. British Communists, discussing the CPI's new programme in June 1951, declared
it to be 'a strong clear practical programme for developing a popular movement in
India". 116 Dutt was satisfied that, while acknowledging general comparisons, the
emphasis was now on specific Indian conditions and the economic analysis was one of
'careful moderation'.117
111 He referred in particular to the Cominform editorial of 27th January 1950, which precipitated
Ranadive's overthrow and which concluded that armed struggle was not appropriate in the present situation.
See Ram, op.cit., p.45; P.S. Gupta, op.cit., pp32-6.
112 Ram, op.cit., p.47.
113 Quoted in P.S, Gupta, op.cit., p.364.
114 Quoted in We Speak for Freedom, report of the Conference of the Communist Parties of the British
Empire, CPGB, 1947, p.28.
H5 The CPI delegation met with Mikhail Suslov, V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov and - an indication of
the importance of India's position to the Soviet Union - with Stalin himself.
116 E.C. Report to CPGB, 14-6-51, op.cit.
117 The document did contain some criticism of the Congress Government's foreign policy - Nehru was
accused of playing between the peace and war camps - which prompted Dutt to argue that India, although
not lined up with the peace camp, could no longer be counted as part of the Western imperialist bloc. R.P.
Dutt, 'Programme of the CPI', Report of the E.C. to the CPGB, 14-6-51, (CPGBA).
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Conclusion
Whilst the CPGB welcomed the election of a Labour Government in 1945 and supported
its domestic programme, British Communists soon realised that Labour's adherence to an
imperialist foreign policy was undermining its plans to lay the foundations of a Socialist
society in Britain. There were concerns that the Attlee Government, burdened with a
weakened economy and beguiled by the nation's pretensions to great power status, was
endeavouring to win US Government backing for the Empire-Commonwealth and to
enlist its help in resisting the rising tide of colonial nationalism by raising the spectre of
an aggressive, expansionist Soviet state with designs on Europe and the colonies.
When US economic assistance to Europe was introduced in the form of the Marshall Plan,
it was dismissed by the Communists as a means of the new imperialist power gaining
political and economic control over Europe. The European Recovery Plan could not
solve the world dollar-shortage, the Party warned, and what benefits it did bring would be
swallowed up by the demands of the Cold War. I is As the gulf between the Western and
Eastern European powers widened, British Communists stepped up their attacks on the
Government's foreign and colonial policies and the effects which its overseas spending
commitments were having upon the domestic economy. This latter point had particular
resonance following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, when defence
spending rose by 50 0 0. The consequent cuts in Labour's domestic social programme
resulted in the resignation of three Government Ministers and almost certainly contributed
towards the1951 election defeat.
The CPGB attacked the Attlee Government for its willingness to intervene militarily to
protect imperial interests - its role in the Malayan conflict being a particular target for
vitupertation. Even the trust which Communists had accorded Labour on the issue of
Indian independence dissipated as the initial euphoria of Attlee's election victory faded.
118 R.P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month, in Labour Monthly, February 1948, p.38.
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Despite claims to have voluntarily handed India her freedom, I19 Britain continued to put
forward proposals which would safeguard her economic and military interests, in the
Communist view, until the nationalist upsurge ensured that she could no longer maintain
her grip on power in the territory.120
It was the claim of British Communists that successive British Governments had
emphasised and encouraged communal differences as a means of 'divide and rule' in
India, a policy which resulted in the ascendency of the Muslim League and the demand
for a separate Pakistan nation. The CPGB's continued opposition to partition and its
efforts to bring the CPI into line on this issue helped to salvage its standing with the INC,
a relationship which was again threatened by the revolutionary policy adopted by
Moscow in late 1947. Disappointing though its terms were to the CPGB, India's
independence settlement promised to bring compensation to the Party in the form of a
Nehru Government; a contingency for which Dutt had long prepared. However, British
Communists were immediately forced onto the defensive by the CPI when, in response to
the new Cold War line and later under the influence of Maoism, the Indian party
identified the Congress Government as the enemy and launched an insurrectionist
campaign against the new state until the early 1950s.
The CPI, whose membership rose nearly five-fold between 1943 121 and 1948, could
feasibly have played a vital role during the construction of the Indian nation if it had
119 
'Br it ish  , Imperialism' is dead,' wrote one British Government official in August 1946, 'in so far as it
ever existed, except as a slogan used by our critics. One illustration of this is our policy in India.' CAB
124 1007, no.62, 'Projection of Britian overseas': proposed statement as revised by Mr. Morrison for
Committee on Overseas Information Services (01(46)10), 17th. August 1946, in R. Hyam, op.cit, p.309.
120 To attempt to do so could jeapordise future access to Britain's strategic needs on the sub-continent,
according to the Chiefs of Staff. (R. Hyam, Part 1, 1992, op.cit., Intro., p.xxv). There was real concern that
Britain should not be seen to exit with unseemly haste as this would upset her allies, be seen as weakness by
her enemies and risk delivering India over to 'the rabble'. (Quoted in Rajani Palme Dutt, 'Gandhi - the last
phase', in Labour Monthly, Vol. XXX, No. 3, March 1948, p.86). Even Aneurin Bevan argued that
'withdrawal from India need not appear to be forced upon us by our weakness, nor to be the first stage in
the dissolution of the Empire. On the contrary, this action must be shown to be the logical conclusion,
which we welcomed, of a policy followed by successive governments for many years ... We should ...
claim credit for taking these initiatives.' Quoted in Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, Phoenix,
London 1995, p.78.
121 Just at the time when the Comintern was dissolved, the CPI's membership began to expand.
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developed a consistent and coherent stategy of alliance with Congress. This is what a
number of Communists, including British Communists, had been promoting - based on an
analysis of Indian political economy - since the 1920s. But the capricious nature of
policies created in Moscow to address Soviet interests caused prolonged confusion and
divisions among Indian Communists and contributed to the CPI's damaging split in 1964.
As the Indian nation took its first steps along the path of independence, Communists were
increasingly turning their attention to the African colonies, which they saw as occupying a
special role in the plans of the imperialist powers. Following the loss of India, Pakistan,
Burma and Ceylon i22 as direct colonies, the African territories constituted the main bulk
of Britain's colonial Empire and in consequence, Communists maintained, were regarded
as an area where future development could offset the recent territorial losses. /23
Furthermore, once the American Government accepted the view that the regeneration of
Western Europe's economy depended upon the exploitaition of colonial resources, it
began looking to Africa as an outlet for its own surplus capital In this way, the CPGB
Central Committee was told in 1949, the African colonies were being used to maintain
and sustain capitalism.I24
-
122 India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon were given degrees of independence within ten months of each
other.
123 The Party gave the example of plans to establish a British base in Mombasa to replace bases which
were under threat in Palestine and Egypt, and the financing by the Colonial Welfare and Development Fund
of military communications projects. Harry Pollitt, Political Report to the 20th. National Congress of the
CPGB, 2Ist. February 1947, p.26, (CPGBA).
124 Minutes of a Central Committee Meetings, Political Report to the 21st National Congress, 26-28th
November, 1949, Section 4, Colonial Liberation, (CPGBA).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: AFRICA - PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
During the second world war, in an effort to counter German propaganda claims of British
colonial exploitation, there was an attempt to re-present the concept of Commonwealth as
one of 'partnership' rather than 'trusteeship'. 1 Though inter-war propaganda had been
careful to depict Britain's colonial role in a benevolent and paternalistic light, associating
it with progressive economic change, the theme of colonial development became much
more pronounced during the war. This emphasised the benefits which a British victory
would bring to her colonies, but the argument was conceived as a measure to deflect
nationalism as well as to appease American opinion and to assist wartime mobilization
requirements. The colonial welfare and development schemes, introduced in the 1940
and 1945 Acts, thus served a variety of purposes. After the war, the necessity of national
reconstruction ensured that the idea of 'partnership' in colonial development continued to
be stressed. 2 Many people in Britain believed Attlee when he claimed in a speech to the
Lord Mayor's banquet in November 1947, that 'Imperialism . . . is certainly not to be
found in the British Commonwealth.'3 Yet it has recently been argued that during the
period of the Attlee administrations, the Empire-Commonwealth was exploited in more
i R. Smyth, 'Britain's African Colonies and British Propaganda during World War II', in theJournal of
Jmperial and Commonwealth History Vol. 14, 1985. Some colonial activists were arguing that a German
victory could not render the colonial peoples' situation any worse than was already the case under British
rule.
2 In the more egalitarian atmosphere of post-war Britain, the idea of Commonwealth had to be accepted
by a much wider social spectrum, as it was the mass of the British people who would be expected to bear the
cost of maintaining colonial interests. Ibid., p.70.
3 Quoted in Rajani Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire, 1953, op.cit., p.32.
Attitudes expressed by elements of Labour's leadership certainly fell far short of international brotherhood.
When Hugh Dalton was offered the position of Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1950, he declined,
remarking later, 'I had a horrid vision of pulsating, poverty stricken, diseased nigger communities, for whom
one can do nothing in the short run, and who, the more one tries to help them, are querulous and ungrateful'.
(Quoted in P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit., p.336) Dalton's suggested alternative for the post, Aneurin Bevan,
who had criticised the Government's bi-partisan foreign policy, was rejected by Attlee as colour prejudiced;
'pro-black and anti-white.' (John Campbell,Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism, Weiderfeld and
Nicolson Ltd., London, 1987, p.216.) The colonies went instead to James Griffiths, a trade union leader and
M.P. with no experience of colonial affairs.
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ways and with more serious consequences than at any time since overseas colonies were
established'.4
Squeeze on the Colonies
Dutt had warned in early 1947 of a sharp conflict of interest inherent in the 'special
relationship' between Britain and the US - especially in the economic sphere 5 - and this
became publicly manifest in July of that year, when the Attlee Government implemented
the terms of the 1945 Anglo-American Loan Agreement which called for free
convertibility of the pound. The move precipitated a drastic fall in gold and dollar
reserves, forcing the Government into a suspension the following month in order to avoid
economic disaster. In the light of this new crisis the colonies, as net dollar earners and
holders of large sterling balances, 6 became even more important to Britain's economic
recovery. In subsequent years these territories were squeezed in a variety of ways by the
British authorities.
In the African colonies, development schemes financed by government investments
through the medium of the Colonial Development Corporation were presented as part of
Britain's progressive programme for the welfare of colonial peoples. But from 1947 the
CPGB was arguing that the system was simply designed to further the economic and
strategic interests of British capitalism and, by involving the use of public money to
create profits for capitalist investors, was ultimately impeding Britain's economic
development. 7 One such development initiative was the infamous Tanganyikan
4 D.K. Fieldhouse, 'The Labour Governments and the Empire Commonwealth 1945-1951', in R.
Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951. Leicester University
Press, 1984, p.95.
5
R.P. Dull, We Speak For Freedom, op.cit., p.13.
6 CO 537 1378, nos. 16 and 18, 1-7-46, (Colonial Sterling Balances): minutes by S. Caine, quoted in R.
Hyam (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951: Part 2. Economics and Industrial
Relation HMSO, London, 1992, p.19. On 31st. March 1946, the figure fell just short of £800 million, the
leading holders being : Malaya, £123 million; Palestine, £119; West Africa, £109 million; East Africa, £100
million and Ceylon, £80 million.
7 By following this line of argument, the CPGB was negating the argument put forward by Dutt, that
Britain's whole political and economic edifice was built on imperialism and that her crisis was in fact a crisis
of imperialism and capitalism.
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Groundnuts project, 8 which was devised primarily to supply fats for the British consumer.
The total cost of this project, which was eventually abandoned because of difficulties with
land clearance and poor yields, was an estimated £40 million.9
Harry Pollitt argued that such schemes, which used cheap labour and raw materials to
boost the profits of British capitalists, brought little benefits to the colonial peoples.
'These schemes do not in any way mean the industrialisation of backward countries for
the sake of their peoples. . . they imply the creation of a proletariat deprived of any other
means of living, and compelled to work at starvation wages so that costs may be low and
profits high." The Marketing Boards, which controlled the corporations involved,
largely represented British monopoly interests. During 1946-7, at a time when their oil
was selling for £110 a ton, groundnuts were bought at £16.15s a ton; similarly the Gold
Coast Cocoa Marketing Board purchased the colony's cocoa crop at £67 a ton in 1947, re-
selling it for £.177 a ton.' I
Communists also highlighted the fact that Africa's sterling-area colonies were exporting
more to Britain than they imported from the metropolitan power. The value of Nigeria's
exports to Britain rose from £28.5 million in1950 to £35.3 million in 1951 - a clear
indication of exploitation, according to World News and Views. The paper pointed out
that, in common with Malaya and other dollar-earning colonies, Nigeria, whose biggest
8 This was launched in 1946 by the United African Company (UAC), a subsidiary of Unilever - a
company which dominated the economy of British West Africa.
9 John Strachey, the Minister of Food, admitted in early 1947 that there was an element of risk in
undertaking the project (CAB 128 9, CM5(47)3, 13th. January 1947, 'Production of Groundnuts in East
Africa': Cabinet conclusions, in Hyam, Part 2, op.cit., p.244.) but, despite obvious problems, a decision to
finally abandon the scheme was not taken until January 1951, for fear of harming the 'prestige of this
country in all the African colonies.' CAB 128 19, CM1(51)7, 2nd. January 1951, 'Production of Groundnuts
in East Africa', op.cit., p.296.
10 In the Rhodesian copper belt, for example, the average African wage was one twentieth of the wage of
Europeans engaged in comparable work, while in West Africa the peoples' land was expropriated for
plantations. (Harry Pollitt, Political Report to the 20th. National Congress of the CPGB, February 21st.
1947, p.28, (CPGBA). Dutt, speaking at the 1947 Conference of the Communist parties of the British
Empire, contrasted the position of the great monopolies such as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Rand
gold companies and Unilevers, thriving under the auspices of British financial organisations, and the
blighted lives of the colonial peoples whom they were exploiting.
H Harry Pollitt, Political Report to 20th National Congress of the CPGB, op.cit.; Clough, op.cit., p.90
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productive enterprises were tin and coal mining, exported large amounts to the US. 12 It is
clear that Bevin viewed the development of Africa in particular in terms of harvesting its
mineral wealth as a means of strengthening Britain's position in her relationship with the
US. The Marshall Plan itself committed the British government to providing America
with scarce raw materials from the colonies and Britain had appealed for US assistance in
providing investment for development projects." An example of this co-operation was
the 1951 loan for the development of cobalt and copper deposits in Northern Rhodesia,14
the repayment of which was provided by the export of cobalt, copper, chrome and
tungsten to the US.15
By the late 1940s, British Communists were claiming that the US intended to 'move in' on
the British Empire - they warned in 1949 that US exports to the colonies already exceeded
those from Britain and that teams of American experts were visiting Africa, searching for
suitable areas of investment. 16 It was Dutt's view that, whilst the continent remained
subject to exploitation by the more established European imperialist nations, it was also
seen by the US as an outlet for her vast capital reserves. He gave the example of old
monopolies such as the United Africa Company, 17 which was intensifying its activities
and increasing its profits, while relatively new companies such as ICI and Leibigs were
moving in, and contrasted the huge profits recorded by these and other industries 18 with
the starvation wages paid to their workers.
12 'What Next in Nigeria?', World News and Views, Nos. 32 33, July 1954. The subsistence economy of
the Nigerian peasantry was rapidly changing to a commodity economy - by 1950, 39°I) of Nigeria's adult
male population was producing for the domestic and foreign market. Prices paid to small farmers for their
produce were fixed by the large British monopolies through marketing boards and were often far below
world market levels.
13 The appeal had been made during talks between Sir Anthony Eden, R.A. Butler and US Government
officials in Washington.
14 The loan was made through the Economic Co-operation Act - an article of the European Recovery
Programme.
15 International Department Report, April 1953, CP CENT/PC 02 14, (CPGBA).
16 , Communist Policy to Meet the Crisis', Report of the 21st National Congress of the CPGB, November
1949, (CPGBA).
17 The UAC saw its profits leap from £165 million in 1949 to £215 million in 1950.
18 These included the Bisichi Tin Company, the Elder Demster shipping line and the Jantar Nigeria cocoa
firm. See R.P. Dutt, 'For a Lasting Peace for a People's Democracy', 9-1-53, Box 134A, (CPGBA).
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Lenin had argued in Imperialism, that monopolies and the export of capital were the main
features of imperialism; in the late 1940s, the CPGB was able to show that monopolies
were playing a more decisive role than ever in Britain's economic life and that, while
capital development was cut in Britain, British capital was flowing overseas.I9
Furthermore, the Party recognised colonial sterling balances as one of the most important
factors in Britain's exploitation of the colonies, 20 and that the Labour Government chose
to take this course rather than to clear its debts. 21 But Dutt's critique of British
colonialism, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire, which he produced during the
the late 1940s and early 1950s,22 extended the analysis beyond these specific issues and
identified Britain's domestic economic difficulties as manifestations of a deeper crisis of
the British Empire, one which had been festering since the first world war. It was a
position which was far more difficult to justify, given the continuing advance of
capitalism.
Earlier studies refute the argument that the Attlee Governments deliberately used the
colonies to 'bail out' the British economy in the post-war period, 23 indeed, Ernest Watkins
claims that the Attlee Governments 'poured a very considerable capital sum into colonial
development',24 yet evidence shows that the Treasurey was reluctant to devote resources
to the colonies at the nation's expense and that the economic equation worked massively
to Britain's advantage. Between 1946 and 1951 the total Welfare and Development
budget amounted to approximately £40 million, whilst the colonies' loans to and
investments in Britain totalled £250 million in 1951 25 - in this manner colonial
'development' was used to finance Britain's post-war reconstruction.
19 Barclays Bank, for example, made advances for enterprises in South Africa and Rhodesia of over L70
million in 1947 and British banking and commercial interests were actively pursued by subsidiaries
throughout the East. H. Pollitt, Political Report, op.cit.
20	 .Minutes of an E.C. Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPGB (in volumes), May 13th., 1950,
(CPGBA).
21 Harry Pollitt, Political Report to the 20th. National Conference of the CPGB, op.cit., p.25.
22 R.P. Dutt, 1953, op.cit. Dutt had also published Britain's Crisis of Empire in 1949.
23 P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit., p.34, p.313.
24 E. Watkins, The Cautious Revolution, Secker and Warburg, London, 1951, p.182.
25 R. Overdale, 1984, op.cit., pp.95-8. Although there was little support for the CPGB's analysis at the
time, the Communist position is now widely recognised in academic studies to be a fact. See R. Hyam,
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There was some unease at the implications of the Government's colonial policy within
official circles. Attlee was warned by the Cabinet Secretary in January 1948, that the
decision to rapidly pursue the development of African resources in support of Britain's
economic and political position could leave the Government open to charges of
imperialism. 26 More significantly, Arthur Creech Jones voiced concern that the colonies'
essential import needs were still not being met nearly two years after the end of the war27
and questioned the practice of fixing the price of Government bulk purchases of colonial
exports, in some cases substantially below current market prices.28
But this opposition soon dissipated; colonial exploitation was justified by claims that both
economic recovery in Britain and 'development' in the colonies would progress through
mutual involvement in the European system of commodity production. 29 Labour's
colonial experts were of course heavily involved with the theory and policy of colonial
development, and therefore unlikely to provide any real opposition. Both Rita Hinden,3°
who served as secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau and, despite his reservations,
'Africa and the Labour Government 1945-51', inJoumal of Imperial and Commonwealth History No. 16,
1988; A.E. Hinds, op. cit.; J. Tomlinson, op.cit., R.F. Holland, 'The Imperial Factor in Imperialist Strategies
from Attlee to Macmillan', in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History No. 12, 1984, pp.165-86.
Robert Clough claims that, from 1948, 'the Empire was to be milked of all the dollars and superprofits it
could earn.' R. Clough, op.cit., p.78.
26 PREM 8 923, 14th. January 1948, (African economic policy): minute by Sir N. Brook (Cabinet
Secretary) to Mr. Attlee on possible criticism of the Government, in Hyam, op.cit., p.257. However, further
insight into the official attitude is furnished by the remark of one colonial official to Creech Jones following
a fact-finding tour of West Africa in 1948. The West African, he complained, 'looks on the Government as
a gigantic Father Christmas able to dip in his bag and pull out trains, schools, hospitals, roads, motor cars
and everything else.' CO 537 3561, no.1, 27th September 1948, 'West African tour - 1948': Mr. Rees-
Williams to Mr. Creech Jones, conclusions and recommendations, in Hyam, Part 2, op.cit., p.219.
27 Quoted in A.E. Hinds, op.cit., p.30.
28 CO 852 989 3, no. 17, March 1947, 'Prices of Colonial Export Products', draft Cabinet memorandum
by Mr. Creech Jones, in R. Hyam, op.cit., p.34.
29 John Strachey described the development of primary production in the colonies as 'a life and death
matter for the economy of this country',(Quoted in Rajani Palme Dutt, 1953, p.249) and sought to justify
the Government's actions by claiming that if Britain did not develop the colonies and dependent territories in
this way, others would. See Clough, op.cit., p.93.
30	 •Hinden claimed that many of the colonial peoples themselves supported the Labour Government's
alleged aim 'to help the colonial peoples towards decent conditions of political and economic life before
they can withdraw with a good conscience'. Rita Hinden, 'The Changing Face of Empire', inSocialisf
Commentary. Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1947, International Publishing Company, London, p.7, Economic and
Political Library, (LSE).
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Creech Jones, saw colonial 'development' as the way forward for Britain and the colonial
peoples; all but the most vociferous opponents of Empire within the Party accepted the
policy, ensuring that it found support in the pages of Tribune, as it did in Hinden's
Socialist Commentary and the publications of the Fabian Colonial Bureau.
To Hinden, who wrote of the 'imaginative boldness of the groundnuts scheme', 31 it was a
shock that the colonial peoples were unimpressed by Labour's 'benevolence'. She
complained of a 'repellent' tendency to give a 'sinister interpretation' to every Government
action regarding the colonies32 and expressed the priorities of many of her colleagues
when she stated that 'British socialists are not so concerned with ideals like independence
and self-government, but with the idea of social justice.'33 This was an allusion to the
frequently repeated claim in official and quasi-official circles after 1945, that economic
development had to precede political independence. It was an order of priorities which the
colonial peoples did not share and pressure for independence continued to grow, but as
the colonies moved inexorably towards independence British colonial policy shifted focus
in an effort to ensure that power was transferred to pro-British elements.
Constitutional Change
Increasingly, the emphasis was on keeping the colonies and dependent territories
'politically safe' for the West's economic and strategic interests. 34 Chastened by earlier
mistakes in India and Burma, the Colonial Office was particularly anxious to avoid
problems in Africa, where they believed that 'we may still have time to mould events:35
34 In the words of a Foreign Office memo., Britain 'must ensure that any major obligations it gives up are
taken over by its friends'. (Quoted in Curtis, op.cit., p.16) Hinden advocated a continuation of imperial
control in those territories where there was a possibility of elements which were not to Britain's liking
gaining power. Rita Hinden, 'Is Britain Still Imperialist?', in Socialist Commentary, Vol. 12, No. 7, April
1948, International Publishing Co., London, p.152, (LSE).
35 FO 371 91170, B81 44, pp.126,131-133 (Increasing Foreign Office interest in African policy): minutes
by R.H. Scott, J.N. Henderson, E.H. St. G Moss, E.J.W. Barnes and J.T. Tahourdin (FO), 9-12 July 1951, in
R. Hyam, Part!, op.cit., p.181.
31 R itaita 1-l inden, 'Is Britain Still Imperialist?, in Socialist Commentary, Vol. 12, No. 7, April 1948,
International Publishing Co., London, p.151, (LSE)
32 Ibid.
33 P.S. Gupta, 1975, op.cit., p.326.
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recognised in these colonies, there were, for example, only two registered African trade
unions in Kenya in 1947 despite the scale of local support for organised labour.42
It was during this year that the African Governor's Conference took place, involving the
first review of African policy under Creech Jones' guidance. This body agreed that the
first stage towards representative self-government - some responsibility in local affairs -
be introduced as soon as possible in all those African territories where this was not yet the
case, especially Nigeria - where the popularity of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was causing
concern43 - and the Gold Coast, where fears regarding the nationalist leader Kwame
N1crumah's alleged Communist sympathies persuaded the Labour Cabinet to introduce
enough constitutional progress to prevent 'the alienation of the moderates'.44
The CPGB dismissed the Labour Government's Constitutional concessions as an attempt
to 'fob off the demand for real self-government with phoney constitutions which give no
real power to the people 1 .45 Harry Pollitt offered some insight into the 'partnership' aspect
of the new African constitutions in his report to the 20th CPGB Congress in February
1947. Of the thirty-nine members of the new Kenya Legislative Council, only two
represented the African majority and these were nominated by the Government. In
Nigeria, an 'official' majority of twenty-one Africans were all nominated by the Governor;
only four African members were elected. The colour bar still operated in South and East
42 This was demonstrated, he believed by the spread of the dockworkers' strike in Mombasa port. Sam
Aaronovitch, 'Labour Conditions in East Africa', in World News and Views. Vol. 27, No. 4, 25-1-47, p.47.
43 it was believed that, if a policy of African local government was not initiated in Nigeria where Azikiwe
was regarded with 'Messianic fervour', Britain would find 'the masses apt to follow the leadership of
demagogues who want to turn us right out very quickly.' CO 847 35 6 (African administration policy):
minute by F.J. Pedler, commenting on Cohen's memorandum, 1st. November 1946, in R. Hyam, Part 1,
op.cit., p.118.
44 These fears surfaced during February 1948, when rioting broke out in the colony following an incident
when ex-servicemen demonstrating against the cost of living were fired upon, leaving two dead. Creech
Jones mistrusted Nkrumah and supported his more moderate rival, Joseph Danquah. (See Clough, op.cit.,
p.99) Although the Gold Coast Africans were considered to be the most advanced politically, it was thought
unlikely that internal self-government would be achieved in much less than a generation. CO 847 36 1, no.
9, 'Report of the (C.O. Agenda) Committee on the Conference of African Governors' (chairman: S. Caine),
22nd. May 1947, R. Hyam, Part 1, op.cit., pp.203-4.
45 This was the case in the Middle East, Communists argued, where reactionary 'puppet' administrations
were set up in order to maintain the hold of the monopolies over oil supplies and in Africa, where the Party
called for an end to 'British dictatorship'. Report of the 21st. National Congress of the CPGB, op.cit., p.44.
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Africa, where the institutions of hut tax, poll tax and pass laws forced the African to
work in the mines and on the plantations, and where trade union rights were suppressed
even under a Labour Government in London. British imperialism was modified, he
maintained, 'only to the extent that the exploited peoples compel the making of
concessions'46 It was the position which Emile Burns presented in a speech to the Annual
Conference of the WASU in Britain, when he stressed that self-government must mean
elected responsible government and that; 'every other form is deception and trickery.'47
The Government's 'partnership' strategy was successfully implemented in some instances,
notably by Sir John Macpherson's liberal regime in Nigeria, which approached the rise in
nationalism with the aim 'not to dam the flood but to divert it into useful channels.'48
When such tactics failed 49 however, the declaration of an 'emergency' in the territory
provided a breathing-space in which the colonial authorities could attempt to regain
control of the situation and restore the stability neccessary to safeguard Britain's
interests." The majority of such 'emergencies' did not go smoothly - events in Malaya,
Nyasaland and Kenya provide examples - and were accompanied by repressive measures
which gave ammunition to Britain's critics. In an attempt to counter such criticism, the
implementation of an 'emergency' was often justified by raising the tired spectre of
Communist activity in the colonial territories.
Communism in Africa
In fact, there was very little evidence of Communist activity in Africa at this time. During
the late 1940s, both Attlee and his Foreign Secretary voiced concern at the danger of
46 Harry Pollitt, Political Report to the 20th. National Congress of the CPGB, op.cit., p.29.
47 'African Students in Conference' in World News and Views, 7-8-48, p.330.
48 Quoted in Frank Furedi, op.cit, p.99
49 The Colonial Office attempted to take the initiative on the introduction of reforms in an effort to pre-
empt any Treasurey objections - it was considered imperative that the transition from British colony to
Commonwealth member and ally should not be disrupted by economic considerations.
50 In October 1948, the Secretary of State proposed the establishment of civil and military resources to
deal with any 'emergencies' which might occur in the colonies, also of a Central Intelligence Department to
evaluate the impact of external events on these territories.
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Communist infiltration in the African colonies, 51 doubtless fed by intelligence reports
such as those received during October 1948, which alleged that there had been 'increasing
evidence in recent weeks of a Soviet intention to foment disturbances in British Colonial
territories, especially Africa:' But these same reports could only find evidence of
Communist activity among the Indian population of Zanzibar, 53 the existence of two
unconnected Communist groups in Egypt and a Communist-inspired National Liberation
Front in Sudan. 54 Nevertheless, it was enough to reinforce a priori fears of Communist
expansion as evinced by Bevin's anxious note to Attlee in November 1948, stating that ' . .
. sooner or later the Russians will make a major drive against our position in Africa:55
Colonial Political Intelligence also reported on 'quasi-nationalist movements' in Kenya,56
where the situation was 'coloured by inter-racial and inter-sectional animosity'; and
Uganda, where 'the threat of violent agitation is never far from the surface'; 57 of a
'growing race consciouness' in Nigeria and an 'ominous. . .prevalence of anti-white
feeling' in the Gold Coast. 58 In the light of the Foreign Office's belief that the first step in
51 For Creech Jones however the possibility that incipient nationalist movements in areas such as Nigeria
and Kenya 'may well be a danger to the development of the territories concerned', was more a cause of
anxiety than Communist infiltration. (DO 35 2380, no. 3, 6th. January 1948, (Development of Africa):
memorandum by Mr. Creech Jones, commenting on Field Marshall Montgomery's memorandum, in R.
Hyam, op.cit., p. 201) Field Marshall Montgomery warned of the danger of Communist-led nationalist
movements in Africa in a 1948 memo.




5 Which, they believed, gave rise to the danger of 'a subversive influence upon sections of the whole
African population'. CO 537/2677, East African Intelligence Reports, July-September 1948, (PRO).
54 CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, prepared by the Colonial Office, the War Office and
the Commonwealth Relations Office, August 1950, p.3, (PRO). James Klugmann had developed contacts
with Hillel Schwartz - a leading member of the left-wing Egyptian group, Isla-a, and with Abdel Khaled
Majoub, leader of the Sudan CP. (Richard Kisch, op.cit., pp.42-3). There were reports of a volatile
situation developing in the West Indies with fears of growing communist support in Trinidad and suspicions
that the Jamaican nationalist movement had Communist leanings. (CO 537 2677, Colonial Political
Intelligence, pp.8-9.) The situation in Cyprus, where a strong Communist party (AKEL) was demanding
union with Greece through self- government, was also giving concern. CO 537 2677, Colonial Political
Intelligence: Summary No. 1, 1948, p 13, (PRO).
55 FO 800 435, ff. 118-120, 6-11-48, (Communism in British overseas territories): minute by Mr. Bevin to
Mr. Attlee, in R. Hyam, op.cit., pp.336-337.
56 CO 537 2677 Colonial Political Intelligence, op cit., pp.5-7.
57 CO 537 2677, East African Intell Reports, op.cit.
58 In British Guiana also, there was reported to be 'an increase ... in the strong racial feelings among the
educated sections of the Indian and African communities.' CO 537 2677, Colonial Political Intelligence,
op.cit., pp.5-7.
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the Communist's move to overthrow imperialism would be to 'support all nationalist and
racial discontent', 59 these developments gave cause for concern. British and US officials
identified potential Communist support among the various nationalist or national
liberation movements in different parts of the continent° and feared that this might foster
Communist influence in certain parts, notably South Africa - which was regarded as 'a
dangerous field for the spread of Communism' 61 - and West Africa'.62 The Foreign
Office, which claimed that activities in the colonies were normally directed by the CPs of
the colonial power concerned, identified individuals such as Nkrumah and Azikiwe who
were 'known to be in touch with the British CP1.63
In Nigeria, the CPGB's hopes lay with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
(NCNC),64 an organisation which supported the united anti-imperialist front and whose
General Secretary, Azikiwe, had shown himself willing to endorse Communist policies.
However, friction rapidly developed between the Council and sections of the Yoruba tribe
- whose leadership had traditionally dominated political activity in the colony -
represented by the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (E00). The CPGB consequently dismissed the
E00 and its supporters as allies of imperialism, but the continued turmoil of early
59 FO 371 80125, no. 1017, 1st. May 1950, 'Note on the aims, strategy and procedure of the Communists
in Africa': brief no.13 for the London Meeting of Foreign Ministers, in R. Hyam, op.cit., p.355-6.
60 Support which materialised, they maintained, because 'primitive peoples' follow leaders, presumably
like sheep. Although, the 'pull of parochial loyalties has so far proven stronger than the overall unity
preached' by the Communists. CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, op.cit., p.3, pp.4-5.
61	 Ibid.
62 Although in South Africa, where the CP was considered to have a considerable influence among 'the
native, Indian and coloured elements', (FO 371 80125, 'Notes on the aims, strategy and procedure of the
Communists in Africa, op.cit.) 'it could be assumed that recent developments had made the task of
Communists in the Union more difficult', (CO 537 5263, Communist Influence in the African Continent,
Summary of Discussions at the FO between officials of the US State Department and of the FO and other
Government Departments, 20-9-50, pp.1-2, (PRO) a reference to the apartheid system. Restrictive
legislation introduced by the Malan Government was presented as a move against Communism, but was in
fact directed against a far wider section of the South African population, as the terms Communist and
Communism were defined as being 'applicable to great number of shades of dogma or activity'. (Quoted in
'Solidarity with the Working People and Communist Party of South Africa', Statements of the E.C., 6-5-
1950, p.29, (CPGBA) The CPGB hinted at possible M.I.5 involvement in the drafting of the legislation,
after learning of a visit to South Africa by Sir Percy Sillitoe, head of that organisation.
63 FO 371 80125, 'Notes on the aims, strategy and procedure of the Communists in Africa' in R. Hyam,
op.cit., p.355.
64 The NCNC, which was formed in 1944, enjoyed great popularity in the colony. It waged a campaign
against British administration which included a national strike in 1945 and a deputation to the Colonial
Secretary in 1947.
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Nigerian politics made it vitually impossible for the Party to establish a sound base in the
colony.
Conditions in East and Central Africa were even less conducive to Communist advance
than those of West Africa. Here white settler power acted to stifle political development
and dissent, the African bourgeoisie was virtually non-existent and African unions were
still not recognised in all the territories. Despite the lack of political raw material, the
CPGB involved itself in issues which affected the area such as the plan for a Central
African Federation65 , which it opposed, and the Seretse Khama campaign, 66 in which the
CP took a leading role. The Party also managed to establish contact with S.G. Amin and
M.I. Fernandes of the East African Indian National Congress and by 1950 could claim
links with two prominent Kenyan leaders - Kenyatta and Peter Mbiu Koinange, a leading
figure in the Kenyan African Union. 67 Earlier attempts at Communist organisation in the
colony had been undertaken by Malchan Singh, a member of the CPI who formed the East
African Trade Union Congress in 1935. 68 Singh kept in contact with the CPGB during
the post-war years and received its support - when he was arrested for his political
activities for example, Dutt wrote with a promise to consult legal advisers on his behalf69
65 The plan, which triggered widespread opposition from the local African population, was condemned by
the Communists as a move to create 'a vast dominion under white rule from the southern frontier of Sudan to
the Limpopo'. ('British Imperialism and the Liberation Movement in Africa', Report of the International
Department, April 1953, CP CENT/PC 02 14, (CPGBA). The Labour Government had accepted the plan
by 1951, sparking a campaign which was waged through the pages ofWorld News and Views, the Daily 
Worker and African Newsletter and featured in a special supplement of the WFTU's journal. CPGB
speakers also addressed meetings organised by the labour movement on the subject.
66 Khama, a Bechuanaland chief, was ordered into exile by the Labour Government as a result of pressure
brought by South Africa in reaction to his marriage to a white woman. The affair obtained symbolic
significance for British anti-imperialists and the CPGB was dominant in the running of the Seretse Khama
Campaign Committee, of which Communist member Billy Strachen was secretary. S, Howe, op.cit.,
pp.196-7.
67 Koinange, who was in touch with CP member Sam Aaronovitch whilst studying in England during the
late 1940s, exercised 'considerable influence' within the Union, according to Colonial Office Intelligence,
(CO 537 2677, East African Intelligence Reports, op.cit; Colonial Political Intelligence, op.cit.) and was
believed to be 'establishing himself as the British CP's link with Kenya'. CO 537 5263, A Survey of
Communism in Africa, op.cit.
68 CO 537 2677, A Survey of Communism in Africa, op.cit. Singh had been active in Kenya since 1934.
69 C0/537 5306, Colonial Political Intelligence Summary, No.7, July 1950, (PRO).
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Elsewhere in East Africa, Communist progress was very slight. In Uganda, Semakula
Mulumba - who spent two years at the London School of Oriental and African Studies -
was believed by officials to be in contact both with the CPGB and the Soviet Embassy:70
I.K. Musazi, representative of the Uganda African Farmers' Union in London, was also
suspected of involvement with the CPGB and of disseminating Communist propaganda
in Uganda. In Southern Rhodesia, a small Communist cell led by the general secretary of
the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa, Charles Mzingeli,
reportedly received support from the CPGB, 71 whilst Communist publications from South
Africa such as Guardian and Inkululeka were said to be circulating inside Northern
Rhodesia.
In the West Indian colonies, Colonial Intelligence suspected The West Indian National
Party, the Workers' Freedom Movement 72 and the Caribbean Federation of Youth to be
channels of Communist doctrines. Jack Kelshall and John La Rose, both of whom held
positions of influence in these organisations, were 'well known for Communist
affiliation' 73 according to intelligence reports, which also claimed that La Rose operated a
communist cell in Port-of-Spain, where copies of the Cominform's publication For a
u
Lasting Peace, for a Peoples' Democracy were circ,lating. The British Guianese
progressive leader Dr Cheddi Jagan - who formed the Peoples Progressive Party in 1950 -
and his wife Janet Rosenberg were proclaimed to be 'avowed Communists. . . in
connection with the British CP',74 and Vincent Bowles was named as a Trinidadian
Communist who was attempting to set up cells throughout the colony.
713 CO 537 2677, East African Intelligence Reports, op.cit; CO 537 2677, Colonial Political Intelligence,
op.cit. The Bakata Party, which Mulumba represented while in London, was held to be a potential breeding
ground for Communists and the Makerere College was closely monitored for evidence of insipient
Communism.
71	 Ibid.
72 Whose stated aims included the setting up of a 'West Indian Socialist Republic'.
73 CO 537 5306, Colonial Political Intelligence Summary, op.cit.
74 CO 537 2677, East Africa Intelligence Reports, op.cit.; CO 537 2677, Colonial Political Intelligence,
op.cit.
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A survey of Communism in Africa conducted in 1950 was reassured that, whilst
nationalist leaders in Kenya, Nigeria and the Gold Coast had been in touch with the
British Commnist Party, 'there is so far no indication that their views are held by the bulk
of their followers'. 75 It was concluded that the national liberation movements in British,
Belgian or Portugese territories were not Communist-led 76 - neither were Communists
dominant in the national liberation movements of Nigeria and the Cameroons, East
Africa, Uganda, Kenya, the African Union, Sudan and Somaliland. However, 'the
democratic elements' - those with Communist sympathies - in these organisations had
established contacts with 'progressive centres' such as Communist Parties, the WFTU, the
IFDW, Partisans of Peace and others', 77 and this was seen as a cause for concern. Overall,
there was no evidence of any direct Soviet interference in the African colonies; unrest was
generally of an economic or nationalist character and any Communist sympathies tended
to spring from the experiences and aspirations of the African peoples themselves.
Communist Theory
The fear that Communist theories would appeal to colonial nationalists was real,
nonetheless; during the late 1940s, the Colonial Office was producing a fortnightly review
of Communism in the colonies, 78 on the basis that 'the battle against Communism is. . . a
battle against ideas: 79 During the inter-war years the subversive ideas in question took
75 CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, op.cit.
76 Ibid. Communism was, however, deemed to be more of a threat in French colonial territories. There
were established C.P.s in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, while in French West Africa the Rassemblement
Democratique Africain (RDA) - a powerful nationalist movement with branches in all French territories
except Mauritania - was considered to have been completely 'under the sway' of the French CP since 1946.
(Ibid.) The reasons for this success rested with the strength of the French Communist Party and the political
process of direct representation from the French colonies which brought figures like Lamine Senghore and
A. Cesaire to serve in the French Assembly.
77 FO 371 80125, 'Note on the aims, strategy and procedure of the Communists in Africa', op.cit., p.355.
78 These were the responsibility of Sir Marston Logan, a former Governor of the Seychelles, 1942-1947.
CO 537/2758, no. 4, 21st. October 1948, (Communist infiltration of the colonies): notes by I.H. Harris of a
CO internal discussion (18th October), in R. Hyam, Part 2, op.cit., pp.334-336.
79 The Colonial Office warned that Communism must not be al/owed to pose, as it had in the past, as 'the
champion of dependent peoples against their cynical and self-seeking oppressors'. CO 866/49, no.1, C
00C 1, 'Reflections on Colonial Office Organisation': note by H.T. Bourdillon for Colonial Office
Organisation Committee (Extract), 10th. May 1948, in R. Hyam, Partl, op.cit., p.323. There was seen to be
a need to divert the future rulers of Africa from 'pure politics' or the realm of theory, in which Communism
was proving to be attractive, to the 'solid discipline' of government administration, beginning with
experience in local government. R. Hyam, Partl, op.cit., Intro., p.xxx.
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the form of a blanket endorsement of colonial freedom, allowing Communists to pose as
the 'champions of the dependent peoples against their cynical and self-seeking
oppressors'. In the years following the second world war, however, the CPGB developed a
more thoughtful analysis which took into account the specific conditions present in each
individual territory.
In a speech to the Conference of Communist Parties of the British Empire, Dutt offered
some insight into developments in the Party's attitude towards the African colonies.
Whilst reiterating Communist support of the right of self-determination for all peoples, he
went on to differentiate between countries such as India, Palestine and Egypt - which had
reached a stage of 'national consciousness' - and countries which did not as yet possess a
'developed' nationalist movement which was both based upon and representative of the
people. The African colonies, with the exception of the South African Republic, were
placed in this latter category. In their case, the emphasis was placed on the fight for
democratic and civil rights, 'upon which a popular nationalist movement could build.' 8° 'I
would say that we would be guilty of the most empty phrases . . .' he declared, 'if we were
to be satisfied with an abstract political formula for the general right of self-
determination, and make no effort whatever to grapple with the actual problem of the
steps forward that require to be taken in each particular territory according to the
circumstances of that territory..81
Trade union organisation 82 was one aspect of the colonial peoples' democratic and civil
rights which Communists claimed was being undermined by the British Government's
policy of cracking down on labour militancy. Labour disputes in Nigeria in 1945, 1949
and 1950, South Africa in 1946, the Gold Coast in 1948 and Kenya in 1950 were quickly
R.P. Dutt, We Speak For Freedom, op.cit., p.48
8I	 Ibid., p.27.
82 The growth of secondary industry after the second world war had created a need for skilled African
labour and the working-class was expanding. Life in the rapidly-growing towns was often a desperate
struggle, fuelling the demands of the workers.
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suppressed by the authorities, who initiated and encouraged 'tame' trade unions in an
attempt to pre-empt future disturbances.
Radical efforts to counter what was regarded as interference by the metropolitan power
were mainly co-ordinated through the World Federation of Trade Unions. The WFTU,
which was comprised of trade unions from the Western powers (until a full-blown Cold
War developed after 1947), the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as labour
organisations from the far East and colonial countries such as Malaya, Jamaica and
Trinidad, 83 sustained a constant stream of protest against the violation of workers' rights
in the colonies. 84 The colonial peoples' case was put to the International Labour
Organisation (IL0),85 and to the United Nations Economic and Social Council by the
WFTU, and the Federation's journal, World Trade Union Movement, publicised the
impact of imperialism on the colonies.86
During the period of its membership of the WFTU, the British TUC was both anxious not
to facilitate Communist activity within the colonies and concerned not to support
measures which clashed with the interests of the Colonial Office." It consequently
vetoed a Soviet proposal in 1947 to provide funds to assist colonial unions and went
83 The WFTU claimed 56 affiliated national centres, representing a total of 70 million trade unionists.
84 A resolution adopted at the organisation's London and Paris Conferences in February and October
1945, committed the WFTU to 'undertake to raise, in the near future, the workers in colonial territories to
the same level as those of other countries'. WFTU, Pan-African Conference, Dakar, 10-13th. April, 1947,
(IISH).
85 The ILO, which was formed after the First World War, was comprised of national delegations which
included representatives of trade unions, employers and the state.
86 Jack Woddis, The Mask is Off, Thames Publications, June 1954, p.7.
87 During the late 1930s, the British TUC volunteered its services in sorting out 'those colonial trade
unions that were not in the 'right hands', as Walter Citrine put it, from those that could be trusted to follow
constitutional ways'. (See Peter Weiler, Brtish Labour and the Cold War, Stanford University Press, 1988,
p.39; D.1. Davies, 'The Politics of the TUC's Colonial Policy', in Political Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1,
January-March 1964, p.26). Trade unionist were subsequently appointed as Labour Advisers to the colonial
labour movement in an attempt to encourage non-political unions and defuse labour militancy. (Jack
Woddis, The Mask Is Off, Thames Publications, June 1954, p.10). This contrasted with the normally low
priority previously accorded to organised colonial labour by its metropolitan counterparts - for example,
there were no genuine representatives of colonial trade unions at International Labour Organisation
conferences until 1945. See Marjorie Nicholson, The TUC  Overseas, the roots of policy. Allen and Unwin,
London, 1986,p.168.
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against its own policy 88 by opposing calls in 1948 for colonial workers to be afforded the
same conditions as workers in the colonial power. 89 But, despite such efforts Communists
had gained a foothold in the trade union movements of Egypt, Nigeria, Northern
Rhodesia, and Kenya by 1950.90
Speaking at a WFTU Pan-African Conference, held in Dakar during April 1947, E.F.
Small, the Gambian trade union leader, explained that the press were excluded from the
proceedings 'so as to protect the delegates of the African trade unions from subsequent
reprisals, in the event of the Conference allowing itself to be led into making violent
attacks against the authorities in their country'. 91 Such militancy led right-wing trade
union leaders to eventually break with the organisation and set up the rival International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which established a permanent centre in
Accra in 1953 and launched a monthly journal, West African Worker.
Colonial Nationalists React
This support of colonial workers' rights, together with the Communists' post-1947 attacks
on colonial 'development' and Constitutional change - virtually the only considered left-
inspired criticism of the Government at this time - won them the gratitude of African
nationalists based in Britain. 92 Azikiwe93 - who subsequently became Prime Minister of
an independent Nigeria - and Nkrumah both wrote of their sense of betrayal at Labour's
failure to implement pledges made whilst in opposition. 'I regret that our hopes in the
Labour Party were completely dashed to pieces,' Nkrumah stated in his autobiography, 'in
fact we saw little difference between Labour colonial policy and that of the Tories.'"
88 The TUC's 1946 Congress had passed a resolution which made similar demands.
89 D.I. Davies, op.cit., p.30.
90 CP CENT/PC 02 14, International Department Report, April 1953, (CPGBA).
91 WFTU, Pan-African Conference, op.cit..
92 As early as April 1946, colonial activists had used a Fabian Colonial Bureau Conference as a platform
on which to express their disappointment with the Labour Government's colonial policies. D. Goldsworthy,
plonial Issues in British Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p.132.
'' Nnamdi Azikiwe, 'Nigerian Leader Thanks Communist M.P.s', in theDaily Worker, 9-10-49.
94 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.,
Edinburgh, 1957, p.58.
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I.T.A. Wallace Johnson, a close friend of Creech Jones with whom he had worked in the
IASB during the 1930s, produced a pamphlet in which he expressed his disappointment at
the record of the Secretary of State for the Colonies during his four years in office. He
had hoped, he wrote, that Creech Jones would 'transform ideas to ideals'; instead he had
'accepted uncompromisingly the creed of colonial officialdom'. 95 But perhaps the most
damning indictment came from Joe Appiah, the West African activist and president of the
WASU, who later remarked of Labour's colonial policy; 'I count this as one of the greatest
betrayals of friends by friends in all history.' 96 To these men, the stance taken by British
communists marked them out as potential allies.
Colonial Nationalists in Britain
Pan Africanism
By 1945, the growth and development of Pan-Africanist ideas presented British
Communists with a potentially formidable rival ideology with which to contend. The
moderate approach of earlier years had sharpened as new influences were brought to bear
and events such as the Abyssinian crisis shaped the consciousness of African political
activists. By the outbreak of the second world war, Pan-Africanism was already
developing in confidence and direction; the added effect of the conflict was to politicise
the movement and install a radical leadership.
The mid-1940s was a time of great activity by colonial nationalists in Britain - Makonnen
described the country as 'seething. .. like an African pot. 97 The Pan-African
Federation,98 which organised the fifth and most significant Pan-African Congress, had
95 I.T.A. Wallace Johnson, Exit Creech Jones, ACJ, Box 2, File 2, Item 5, Creech Jones Papers, Rhodes
House Library, Oxford.
96 J. Appiah, The Autobiography of an African Patriot Praegar, London, 1990, p.150.
97 R. Makonnen, 1973, op.cit., p.147.
98 The PAF subsequently developed links with the Parliamentary Labour Party, supplying Labour M.P.s
with information on African issues. The organisation also worked with the Reverend Michael Scott, who
had acted as a contact for the CPGB member and LA! courier, Michael Carritt, when he arrived in India in
1936. Scott, who was campaigning for the rights of black South Africans at this time, met with leading
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been formed in 1944 from a total of thirteen organisations with Dr. Peter Milliard 99 as its
president and Ras Makonnen as its general secretary.100 During the second world war,
these activists had established a base in Manchester, 10 1 where Makonnen set up the
African Co-operative Union and the Ethiopian Teashop 102 _ both of which operated as
social centres for Africans and West Indians in Britain - and a number of clubs, including
the Cosmopolitan, which Kenyatta ran for a period. However, the main impetus for
Makonnen's actvities was political, not social and he subsequently established the Pan-
African Publishing Company, which produced pamphlets by Kenyatta and Padmore in
addition to a monthly periodical, Pan-Africa.
Following a preparatory meeting in March 1945 103 to discuss the convening of a fifth Pan-
African Congress, the event was scheduled to begin on October 15th 1945, a week after
the Paris conference of the WFTU, IN with which it shared a number of delegates. Unlike
its four predecessors the Congress, which was attended by around 200 delegates, 105 was
more representative of colonial nationalists and radical thinkers and consequently adopted
a more militant stance. Delegates committed themselves to practical action rather than
rhetoric, agreeing to pursue a programme of action to secure the liberation of the African
black radicals when he stopped in Britain en route to plead his case at the United Nations in 1948. R.
Makonnen, op.cit., p.178.
" Milliard was a practicing M.D.
1 °° G. Padmore, 1956, op.cit., p.I49; Hakim Adi, 'The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress', inNorth 
West Labour History, No. 20, 1995-6, p.5.
101 Makonnen claimed that they felt at home in Manchester, where the people ' were human and warm and
you never were made to feel a stranger.' (R. Makonnen, 1973, op.cit., p.136.) He also identified with
Engels, who had lived in Manchester and supported Marx, 'I felt we were almost mimicking history', he
wrote. Ibid., p.164.
102 The profits from these enterprises were used to finance the Pan-African movement and to aid the black
community in Britain. Peter Fryer,Black People in th_e_British_Empire, Pluto Press, London, 1988, pp.338-
9.
103 Those involved included Makonnen, Milliard, Padmore, Ken Hill, Kentatta and Critchlow. (Ken Post,
op.cit., p.513.) The Congress organisers, their spirits lifted by the election of Attlee's Government in the
July, sent invitations to both the ILP and the Fabian Colonial Bureau.
104 Desmond Buckle, the CPGB's main South African contact in Britain, represented the Party at the
WFTU's Paris session held between 25th September and 8th October.
105 For details of the Congress see: Imanuel Geiss, op.cit.; P.O. Esedebe,Pan-Afticanism: the Idea and
Movement,  1776-1963, Washington, 1982; C. Legum, 1976, op.cit.; Adi, 1995, op.cit.
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colonies. Activists were urged to return to their own countries and fight for freedom,
instead of waging the campaign through sympathetic white opinion in Britain.106
Many of those attending the Manchester Congress subsequently served in the
governments of their respective countries following independence, thus instilling the
proceedings with special significance. Dr. Hastings Banda, who later became President of
Malawi was one example, as was Nkrumah, who claimed that the Congress 'provided the
outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political
consciousness: 107 Communists did participate in the Congress on an individual basis;
Desmond Buckle collaborated on the compilation of the draft manifesto for instance, and
Wallace Johnson was also involved in an organisational capacity. The delegate
representing South Africa, Marco Hlubi, had CPGB links I08 and a number of CPGB
members attended the Congress, including local CPGB members Len Johnson and Wilf
Charles. 109 However, British Government officials who scrutinised the event pronounced
themselves satisfied that the proceedings were not influenced by the poltical left.11(1
The West African National Secretariat
The influence of Communist ideas was more apparant within the West Africa National
Secretariat (WANS), which was founded in December 1945 charged with the task of
applying the Pan-African agenda to West Africa. The organisation's members included
Nkrumah, its secretary, and I.T.A. Wallace Johnson" who took the chair; Nigerian
student Bankole Akpata and Bankole Awoonor Renner - both of whom had Communist
connections - and Margot Parish, a leading CPGB member who served on the WANS
executive. I 12 With so many of its key workers sharing or sympathising with the
106 R. Makonnen, op.cit., p.168.
107 K. Nkrumah, Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumall Panaf Books Ltd., London, 1973, p.44.
108 Ras Makonnen, op.cit, p.159. Hlubi was a Zulu dancer with the Negro Theatre Company in London.
109 Michael Herbert, Never Counted Out, Dropped Aitches Press, Manchester, 1992.
110 H. Adi, 1995, op.cit., p.13, n.19.
I II Representing the Sierra Leone West African Youth League.
112 Kwame Nkrumah, 1957, op.cit., p.55; 1. Geiss, op.cit., pp.411-3; J.0. Langley,Pan-Africanism and
Nationalism in West Africa, Oxford, 1974, pp.356-365; Marika Sherwood, 'Kwame Nkrumah: the London
years 1945-47', in Immigrants and Minorities Vol. 12, Part 3, November 1993.
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Communist doctrine, it was unremarkable that the organisation adopted a left perspective,
claiming the support of the Communist movement for its aim of a united and independent
democratic federation of West Africa, a model described by Awoonor Renner as a 'West
African Soviet Union'. 113 The monthly journal published by the Secretariat, The New
African, which was edited by Nkrumah and Bankole Akpata, reflected this outlook by
taking a Marxist outlook.H4
The organisation's secretary, Kwame NIcrumah, who subsequently became leader of the
independent Ghana, was one of the most significant colonial nationalists operating in
Britain after the second world war. His arrival in Britain in May 1945 had been preceded
by a glowing testimonial from CLR James, H5 who arranged that he would be met upon
his arrival by Padmore and Joe Appiah 116 and taken to the WASU Hostel. During his
time in Britain, Nlcrumah immersed himself in Pan-African politics - in addition to his
secretaryship of the WANS, he became regional secretary of the Pan-African Federation
and served as vice-president of the WASU during late 1945-6." 7 But he also attended
CPGB meetings and was in contact with Party members - for example, while attending
the Manchester Pan-African Congress he stayed with Wilf Charles.n8
Nkrumah's Communist sympathies during this period are clear. His use of the dialectic in
contributions to WASU, in which he wrote of the 'cultural synthesis' which results from
113 World News and Views, 7-8-48, p.330; Communist Review, December 1948, pp.383-4.
114 K. Nkrumah, 1957, op.cit., p.56-7. A major initiative of the WANS was the formation of the Coloured
Workers Association of Britain, which catered for the needs of colonial workers in this country, especially
seamen. The Secretariat eventually concentrated its efforts on the organisation of these workers, leaving the
WASU to focus on colonial students. Ibid., pp.58-9.
115 James, who had become aquainted with Nkrumah while both were living in the US, recognised that he
was a radical, rather than a liberal. See R. Makonnen, 1973, op.cit., p.154.
H6 Appiah, who arrived in London in January 1944, had already met Nkrumah in the US. (See Joe
Appiah, 1990, op.cit., p.163.) Restrictive legislation introduced by the Malan Government was presented as
a move against Communism, but was in fact directed against a far wider section of the community, as the
terms Communist and Communism were defined as being 'applicable to a great number of shades of dogma
or activity'. (Quoted in 'Solidarity with the Working People and Communist Party of South Africa,
Statements of the Executive Committee, May 6th, 1950, p.29, (CPGBA). The CPGB hinted at possible
M.I.5. involvement with this legislation following a visit to South Africa by Sir Percy Sillitoe, head of that
organisation. Ibid.
117 Marika Sherwood, November 1993, op.cit.
118 Michael Herbert, op.cit.
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the meeting of two cultures; the 'struggle of opposites' which leads to the emergence of a
new culture, 119 reveal an interest in Marxist theory. While in Britain he formed 'The
Circle', a small, secret group of students pledged to the creation and maintenance of a
Union of African Socialist republics, 120 an organisation which Hakim Adi concludes,
'functioned as a vehicle for the transmission of the Marxism of the British Communist
Party.' 121 He also wrote admiringly in his Autobiography of leading British Communists
such as Emile Burns, Palme Dutt and Harry Pollitt, 122 carried a CPGB membership card -
although he denied ever joining the Party - and frequently used the term 'comrade' in
correspondence.
These Communist leanings 123 brought a rebuke from some of Nkrumah's fellow Pan-
African activists; he was accused of Machiavellism, and warned that his Communist
links could harm the Pan-African movement. 124 This latter concern was to some extent
justified - within twelve months of its inauguration, the WANS and Nkrumah were both
placed under observation by the Colonial Office, which produced a report detailing
Nkrumah's contacts with CPGB members William Rust, Michael Carritt and Maud
Rogerson.125
New International Society
Radical Pan-Africanists like Makonnen challenged Communist claims to represent the
interests and aspirations of the colonial peoples, accusing them instead of cynically using
the colonial issue in the furtherance of their own political ends. This hostility, which
119 Philip Garigue, January 1953,op.cit.
120 K. Nkrumah, 1957, op.cit., Appendix B, p.303.
121 H. Adi, 1994, Thesis, op.cit., p.182.
122 K. Nkrumah, 1957, op.cit., p.51.
123 Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast in November 1947 and was almost immediately appointed general
secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). Following a UGCC split in June 1949, he headed
the radical Convention Peoples' Party, which was elected to office in February 1951, while its leader was
serving a prison sentence. Padmore acted as advisor to the Nkrumah administration, which led its country to
independence in 1957, and CLR James visited regulary during the early years, but dissatisfaction grew as
Nrumah, who described himself as both a Christian and a Marxist Socialist, presided over a burgeoning
bureaucracy and a growing personality cult.
124 R. Makonnen, op.cit., pp.262-3.
125 M. Sherwood, November 1993, op.cit.
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sprang from a desire for racial self-sufficiency, extended on occasions to organisations
such as the Movement for Colonial Freedom and even the ILP was seen as a potential
threat to the PAF's independence. At one point, Makonnen, who accused Harry Pollitt of
planning to transform the British Empire into a Communist Empire, 126 reproved both
Padmore and Wallace Johnson for contributing to New Leader, although he admitted that
'there had always been groups in the white world which had been prepared even to risk
their own lives for this type of idealism'.127
Such attitudes did have a damaging effect on the CPGB's efforts to establish links with
colonial workers and activists in Britain during the post-war years. In 1946, three black
Communist members, Len Johnson, Wilf Charles and Syd Booth, established the New
International Society (NIS), in Moss Side, Manchester,u8 an initiative which led to the
establishment of the Cotton Club. The aim of the Club, of which Len Johnson was
secretary, I29 was to 'promote and encourage respect for Human Rights and for
Fundamental Freedoms for all without distinction as to Race, Sex, Language or Religion'
and to 'provide a centre for Cultural and Physical Recreation where people of all lands can
meet fraternally and in harmony:130
The NIS itself campaigned for the rights of coloured seamen in Britain and of black
people worldwide, holding regular meetings with guest speakers from the colonies and
former colonies as well as speakers from colonial organisations in Britain, such as the
India League. One campaign which was fought during 1947-8, focussed on the plight of
six young Afro-Americans sentenced to death after being convicted for allegedly
murdering a store keeper. This culminated in a rally organised jointly by the NIS,
126 R. Makonnen, op.cit., p.159.
127 R. Makonnen, 1973, op.cit., p.117.
128 By mid-1949, membership had risen to 250, with a further hundred belonging to a Liverpool branch.
(Michael Herbert, op.cit.; Daily Worker, 12-10-49.) Leading figures in the Liverpool NIS included Ludwig
Hesse, a Gold Coast seaman; Hugh Campbell from the West Indies and Olwyn White, who stood as a CPGB
candidate for the Abercrombie ward in Liverpool.
129 Other officers included Russel Talbot, president; S. Gandy, chair and N. Harding, treasurer.
130 Michael Herbert, op.cit.
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Lancashire and Cheshire Federation of Trades Councils and Reynolds News, which
attracted speakers like Paul Robeson and Horace Newbold, secretary of Manchester and
Salford Trades Counci1.131
There was considerable political opposition from the Pan-African Federation to the NIS,
which Makonnen condemned as 'Communist dominated'. In deference to such criticism,
the role of the British Communist Party in the NIS was not officially acknowledged,
although many CPGB officers and members were also members of the organisation and
the Party's International Department was in regular communication with Len Johnson.132
Elements of the Party leadership realised that greater efforts were needed in recruiting
from among the black and coloured population and to encourage them towards a more
independent role in respect of anti-colonialist and anti-racist campaigning. Maud
Rogerson of the CP's International Department, cautioned that 'the NIS is too closely
linked with the Party, and the club appears to have become a popular rendezvous for
white contacts patronised by a few coloured people.' 133 Such warnings were fruitless
however, the involvement of the CPGB proved a terminal encumbrance to the NIS and
the organisation folded in the early 1950s.
West Indians and the CPGB
The CPGB was able to exploit conflicts which arose between measures taken to alleviate
Britain's post-war labour shortage and the racialist attitudes which had been inculcated
throughout her imperialist past. In 1948, the S.S. Empire Windrush brought the first wave
of immigrant workers from the West Indies to Britain in response to a recruiting campaign
by British employers. The racism and discrimination which these workers and their
families subsequently encountered in the 'Mother' country, proved a shattering experience
for many. In the light of these experiences, the CPGB's uncompromising line on anti-
131 Ibid. The US Supreme Court quashed theverdicts in July 1949 and ordered a retrial.
132 M. Herbert, op.cit. Len Johnson and Wilf Charles corresponded with Wallace Johnson after he
returned to Sierra Leone.
133 Quoted in Ibid.
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colonialism and anti-racism - it was the only political party in Britain at this time to totally
oppose all forms of immigration controls and quotas on Commonwealth citizens 134 -
proved attractive to some of the more radical arrivals, who subsequently joined the
Party."5
A West Indian branch of the CPGB operated in London from the early 1950s to the
middle of the decade, reaching a membership of around fifty, most of whom were
students. I36 The Party also established a national West Indian Advisory Committee,
which was represented on the International Committee and on the EC, and organised
special meetings for West Indian members during the year, which were generally well
attended. I37 The majority of West Indian trade unionists in Britain were members of the
London branch of the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) 138 - established in 1945 to
campaign for a federation of free West Indian states - which was proscribed by the Labour
Party and the TUC as a Communist front organisation. 139 CPGB member Billy Strachen
served as branch secretary from 1947, working with members who subsequently rose to
prominance in their own countries, such as Forbes Burnham, later Prime Minister of
British Guiana and Michael Manley of Jamaica.140
One prominent Trinidadian activist who flirted with Communism in his early years at
Oxford was Eric Williams, 141 who founded Trinidad's Peoples' National Movement
(PNP) in January 1956 and dominated that country's politics for nearly three decades. His
134 The CPGB worked for the repeal of the Commonwealth Immigration Act and actively campaigned
against racism.
135 The issue was raised in the House of Commons by a Conservative M.P., who was concerned to read in
the Daily Worker that many of those arriving on the Empire Windrush were 'already happily placed in
Communist homes'. House of Commons Debates, Hansards, Vol. 453, Col. 614, 8-7-48.
136 The West Indian Students Union itself was an organisation which welcomed people from all political
persuasions.
137 Trevor Carter, shattering Illusions. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1986, p.56.
138 Richard Hart was secretary of the CLC from 1947.
139 Representatives from the London CLC attended the Communist-led World Youth Festivals - the first of
which took place in Yugoslavia in 1947.
140 S. Howe, op.cit., p.212. By 1950 the London CLC, hampered by its Communist connections and
receiving little practical support from the CPGB which had its own financial and manpower problems, was
largely defunct.
141 CLR James, Party Politics in the West Indies, Vedic Enterprises, Port of Spain, 1962, p.158.
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work - the most important of which, Capitalism and Slavery,) 42 presented a radical
interpretation of history based on an economic determinist argument - has been
interpreted by some analysts as a Marxist account of colonialism in the West Indies.143
However, although Williams developed close relations with activist such as Nehru,
Norman Manley, Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor and Aime Cesaire, he shunned the more
radical ideas of Padmore, James and others and always denied any Communist Party
connections.I44
African Students in Britain
During the post-war period, the CPGB intensified its activities among African students
studying in Britain. Denis Healey - then secretary of the Labour Party's International
Department - received a communication from the secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau,
Rita Hinden, in July 1948, in which she complained; 'There are now over 3,000 colonial
students in this country. . . While the Labour Party does nothing to meet and greet these
people, the Communist Party does everything. The Communists bring out a regular
African Newsheet . . . accompanied by a letter inviting visits to their Colonial Department
and expressing a readiness to take up any grievances or problems. I need hardly add that
these offers are often taken advantage of.'145
This view was supported in a letter to the Sunday Times, published in January 1951,
which claimed that Communists were 'only too eager to meet disgruntled overseas
students, undermine their loyalty and ensure their return home as trouble-makers.'146
142 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, Capricorn Books, New York, 1966.
143 Ken Boodhoo (ed.), Eric Williams - the man and the leader, University Press of America, London,
1986, p.52.
144 !bid, p.122; Selwyn R. Cudjoe, Eric Williams Speaks: essays on colonialism and independence
Calaloux Publications, Massachusetts, 1993, p.146. Williams moderated his stance once he became Prime
Minister of Trinidad and gradually moved closer to the US causing a rift with his erstwhile colleague and
supporter, C.L.R. James. See CLR James, The Future in the Present Allison and Busby, London, 1977,
Intro.
145 David Goldsworthy, op.cit., p.146.
146 Quoted in H. Adi, Thesis, 1994, op.cit, p.222.
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There was some justification for this concern, 147 Joe Appiah revealed that, on first
arriving in London, he was met on the platform by CPGB members offering
accomodation to 'colonial comrades' visiting Britain. Appiah had already organised to
stay at a WASU hostel, but the attraction of such an offer to a weary and often bewildered
traveller was obvious.148
The Colonial Office itself had been considering its reaction to the increasing numbers of
African students studying in Britain since the early 1920s,149 mindful of the fact that
most of these students would occupy important positions upon their return to Africa. The
need for co-operation with the emerging educated classes of Africa - the future ruling-
class - was fully appreciated by the British authorities. 150 The possibility that these
people would return home with a hostile view of Britain was seen by the Fabian Colonial
Bureau to be 'so important a matter, that even our major schemes for the development and
welfare of the colonies must be made secondary to the vital question of putting this
right'.151
Ultimate responsibility for supervising policy towards and activity in the colonial student
organisations lay with the Communist Party's International Department, 152 which was
147 A further source of concern was the International Union of Students (1US), which boasted a number of
affiliated colonial student bodies (CO 537 5306, Colonial Political Intelligence Summary, op.cit.) and
whose headquarters were in Prague - increasingly the base for Moscow's anti-colonial campaigning. The
announcement in November 1948 by the Central Union of Czecheslovak Students, the local member body
of the 1US, that twenty scholarships would be awarded annually to foreign and specifically colonial students,
intensified fears, (CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, op.cit.) and prompted West African
governments to co-operate in arrangements to endorse colonial students' passports for the U.K. only. CO
537 5263, Draft Summary of a Meeting in the Foreign Office, op.cit.
148 J. Appiah, op.cit., p.146. This view was borne out by the son of Archdeacon Banks - a student at
Edinburgh University - who suggested that the Communists' influence among colonial students reflected the
fact that they were prepared to take an interest in and champion the grievances of these students when other
organisations were not. CO 537 5306, 'Colonial Political Intelligence Summary, op.cit.
149 H. Adi, Thesis, 1994, op.cit., p.47; Sunday Times, Letter, 7-1-51.
ISO CO 537 2574 11020 30/2, 'Political Significance of African Students in Britain', memo. from Mr. Rees
Williams to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 16-2-48, (PRO).
151 CO 537 2574 11020 30 2, 'Notes on Conclusions to be Drawn from the Fabian Colonial Bureau
Conference at Pasture Wood', 17 18-1-48, (PRO).
152 Organisations in which they were interested included the Nigerian Union of Students, the National
Committee of Fedind, k London Committee of Indian Majlis, the WASU, the West Indian Students Union,
the South African Students Union, the Malayan Students Union, the Egyptian National Committee, the
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involved with various colonial student bodies, including the Co-ordinating Committee for
Colonial and Dominion Students, I53 with whom it collaborated in organising a Sheffield
Youth Peace Festival. 154 One significant factor which facilitated the Department's
recruitment of colonial students was the operation of the colour bar, an issue which also
concerned the Colonial Office. Officials were particularly worried about those colonial
students not studying under Government sponsored schemes who, it was believed, were
'more amenable to suggestions from members of the British Communist Party that they
were subject to racial discrimination'. 155 Such fears were heightened when CPGB
members Omoba Aderemi and Uche Omo - a leading WASU member - led students in a
strike over racialism and the shortage of accomodation in 1950.
West African Students' Union
The WASU's leadership continued to follow a moderate line in the post-war years -
Lapido Solanke maneouvred the organisation towards co-operation with the Labour Party
and many WASU members worked for the Party's 1945 election victory. The Union's
growing influence in official circles was manifest in the the formation of a West African
Parliamentary Committee, consisting mainly of Labour M.P.s and WASU members,
which served to keep Labour informed on West African opinion. I56 By the 1950s, the
Colonial Office was sufficiently reassured of the WASU's position to provide financial
support for its hostel provision, regarded as an acceptable alternative to the Communists'
embrace. 157
Sudanese Students Union and the Iraqi Students Association. Report of International Department to
Political Committee, CP CENT PC 02 15, (CPGBA).
153 This Committee was probably the same organisation as the Co-ordinating Council for Colonial Student
Affairs, formed by the NUS in 1948, which included East and West African Student Unions and a South
African students group.
154 The organisational work of the Festival, which was attended by over two hundred and fifty colonial
students, was repeated for the World Festival of Youth, held in Bucharest in August 1949.
155 CO 537 5263, Draft Summary of a Foreign Office Meeting, op.cit. At the end of 1949, 1,371 private
and 864 assisted African students were registered in the U.K. and Eire; of these, 40 were claimed by the
CPGB as members. See CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, op.cit.
156 The Committee met once a month to discuss colonial issues and was attended by such high profile
figures as Attlee, Bevan, Brockway, Reginald Sorenson, Lord Listowel, Richard Acland, Lord Stansgate,
Herbert Morrison and Leslie Hale. J. Appiah, op.cit.; Philip Garigue, January 1953, op.cit.
157 An earlier document had urged 'most strongly that a special allocation should be made from Colonial
Development and Welfare funds of a sum of £200,000 for the acquisition and equipment of student hostels
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During the late 1940s however, the organisations' radical wing - a younger element which
was more open to Communist ideas - began to take the initiative. This to some degree was
the result of a general disenchantment with the Labour government's colonial policies and
its lack of movement towards self-determination for Britain's African colonies, although
the British authorities considered that the trend was 'mainly due to the activities of the
CPGB'. I58 Whatever the source, it enabled the CPGB to develop close links with a
section of the WASU leadership. Ben Bradley, Reginald Bridgeman and Arnold Ward
were all invited to attend WASU meetings and Emile Burns, who ran classes on Marxism
for West Africans, I59 addressed WASU's annual Conference in July 1948. 160 More
significantly, Nigerian Communist Party members held official positions within the
WASU - Ade Thomas, the Union's national organiser and his fellow Communist Uche
Omo both attended the International Union of Students' Council meeting in Warsaw as
WASU observers.16I
In August 1950, the British authorities considered there to be 'a fairly strong minority of
Communist supporters in WASU', 162 just over a year later Solanke considered most of
the Union's E.C., including its president, Joe Appiah and secretary, Adenekan Ademola,
to be leading Communists. I63 However, there was little evidence of Communist ideas
being put into practice once the students returned to their own countries - for example, of
one hundred and sixty Sudanese students who returned home in the period 1946-8, none
and clubs' in an attempt to counter Communist influence. CO 537 2574 11020 30 2, 'Colonial Students in
the U.K. and Eire', n d, c.1948, (PRO).
158 Ibid., p.224.
159 Confidential Draft Discussion Document for the International Department, CP CENT/INT 24,
(CPGBA).
160 World News and Views, 7-8-48.
161 Draft Document, CP CENT INT 24, op.cit.
162 CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, p.8, op.cit. According to this same report, the
CPGB had forty members from among colonial students at this time.
163 His views were shared by Lord Milverton, who claimed that WASU was 'a Communist medium for the
contact of West Africans when they came to this country'. Quoted in H. Adi, Thesis, 1994, p.212.
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were reported to be engaged in Communist activities 164 despite CPGB claims to have
direct contact with the Sudanese National Liberation Front.165
Nigerian's in Britain
By the summer of 1949, the CPGB's Africa Committee had set up separate West and East
African Committees, charged with the task of distributing the journal African Newsletter
in East and West African territories. An East African Student's Union was formed and a
small number of East African students attended CPGB classes, although the Party
admitted in 1953 that it had been unable to recruit any Kenyan members in London.I66
By this time, the CPGB had established relations with several African groups operating in
Britain - the Nigerian Union; the Manchester-based Africa League; The Gambia League
and the Gold Coast Union, for example, I67 but was particularly successful in attracting
Nigerian members.I68
During the 1945 WFTU Congress, the Party secured a useful contact in T.A. Bankole,
President of the Nigerian TUC, who subsequently contributed an article on the Nigerian
labour movement to Inside The Empire. Further support came from H.O. Davies, founder
of the Nigerian youth movement, who approached the CPGB upon his arrival in Britain in
1947, explaining that he had been recruited to Marxism by a Party member who had been
stationed in Nigeria during the war. I69 By the end of the following year, a number of
students claiming to be members of a Nigerian-based Marxist group which published the
Nigerian Statesman, were working with the CPGB; these included Ade Ademola, Ayo
Ogunsheye and M.A. Aderemi. Later, as the Party developed its contacts with Nigerian
164 CO 537 5263, A Survey of Communism in Africa, op.cit.
165 Report of the International Department to the Political Committee, op.cit., CP CENT/PC 02 15,
(CPGBA).
166 'Marxist Groups in Nigeria', Draft Document for Commission, 4-8-53, International Department
Correspondence, Box 134A, (CPGBA).
167 Report of the International Department to the Political Committee, 25-6-53, Box 257A, (CPGBA).
168 Nigeria was Britain's largest African colony.
169 Draft Document, CP CENT INT/24, op.cit.
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labour organisations, the Labour Champion - Nigeria's first worker's paper170 _ sent Idise
Dafe to Britain join the Daily Worker and train as a Marxist journalist.171
But the Party's advancement in this area was accompanied by problems which triggered a
number of internal disagreements. The sudden influx of Nigerian members - around 150
were recruited following the 1950 election 172 - initially led to the establishment of
separate Nigerian branches, also known as 'Robeson Branches', in London. This
arrangement technically contravened the CPGB's Leninist rules and, following objections
from the London District Committee and the Central Organisation Department, these
organisations were dissolved. It was a decision which caused deep resentment among the
new recruits and was opposed by the International Department, which expressed alarm at
the possibility of alienating the newly-acquired Nigerian members. Palme Dutt, who had
favoured the idea of grouping the politically inexperienced Nigerians together in order to
protect them from political 'contamination', 173 was obliged to clarify Party policy on
recruitment and training of cadres in April 1951.174
The fact that Communist ideology did not separate the fight against racism from the
central struggle against class oppression often led to accusations that the Party was
neglecting the concerns of its African and West Indian members. One incident which
illustrates the Party's inattention to developments among black activists in Britain
occurred in 1951, when the Party's West African sub-committee 175 was unsuccessful in an
attempt to form a West African Youth and Student Organisation. The Party remained
170 The Labour Champion was established by the United Africa Company Workers' Union in 1950.
171 Draft Document, CP CENT INT 24, op.cit.
172 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.258.
173 Dutt feared that, without the protection of numbers, the Nigerians would be targeted by rival political
groups working as a front for the British authorities. See Ibid.
174 This stipulated that the formation of national branches within Britain was not normal Party organisation
and that colonial workers and students should be members of ordinary CP branches. All branches should
report to their District Committee unless a CP existed in the members' own country, in which case they
should report to the centre. Minutes of a Central Committee Meeting, report of NEC Meeting, 14th April,
1951, (CPGBA).
175 The sub-committee consisted of Ade Thomas, J. Vaughan, V. Ibeneme, I. Dafe, Jonathan Tetteh, Uche
Omo, A. Onibogi and Milton Brown.
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unaware of the fact that a similar organisation, the African Workers and Students
Association (AWSA), had been set up independently of the CP until early 1953, when the
International Department was informed of its existence by three CP members active
within AWSA. The value of this thriving group was immediately recognised by the Party
- the International Department reported that 'tender nursing' of AWSA could produce
some 'very fine working-class and student cadres'.176
The volatile nature of Nigerian politics was reflected in the loyalties of Nigerians based in
Britain - the establishment of an Action Group, a branch of the E00, in London during
1945 177 ensured that this was the case - causing tensions which occasionally tested the
unity of the CPGB itself. Following the emergence from the NCNC of the more left-wing
Zikhist movement in early 1949, the situation grew more complex. Sections of the CPGB
gave encouragement to Nduka Eze, a member of the NCNC leadership who helped
establish the Zikhist movement and later became its President. Eze was an active trade
unionist, being general secretary of the Nigerian National Federation of Labour, NFL, and
of the United Africa Company Workers Union, UACWU. 178 The CPGB, believing the
development of Marxism in Nigeria to be 'of the greatest urgency',179 in order for
Communists to be poised to take over the leadership of the national liberation movement,
praised Eze for constantly inspiring and educating 'the young men of this movement in the
spirit of Marxism'. i 80
Following the establishment of the Nigerian National Labour Congress (NLC) 181 in
February 1950 - the same month as the Zikhist movement was banned - and the Congress'
176 Report of a meeting between the International Department and Peter Brown, a Nigerian CP member,
and two other African comrades, one Nigerian, one Somali, 25-1-53, Box 134A, (CPGBA).
177 Emile Burns for example, took a more favourable view of the Egbe Omo Odudwa.
178 Marxist Groups in Nigeria, Box I34A, op.cit.
179 International Department Statement on Nigeria, Part 1, Economic Background, January 1953, Box
134A, (CPGBA).
180 Draft Discussion Document, CP CENT INT 24, op.cit.
181 The NLC was formed from an amalgam of the NCNC, the E00 and other groups as a response to
intensified repression in the colony, marked by the shooting by Nigerian authorities of striking miners at
Enugu. 'Nigeria's Bloody Friday', CP CENT INT 25 01, (CPGBA).
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affiliation to the WFTU, Eze, the organisation's general secretary, contacted Harry Pollitt
and was welcomed as a 'reliable Marxist'. However, support for Eze, whose opponents
included his erstwhile colleague Azikiwe, I82 was not unanimous within the CPGB.
Maud Rogerson, for example, did not hold him in high regard and there were fears that
the Party was 'backing the wrong horse'. 183 These concerns proved to be well founded;
Eze proved unable to sustain his political ascent, losing his positions both in the NLC and
UACWU as the Nigerian trade union movement split in 1951
During the early 1950s, several groups claiming to be the official Communist Party of
Nigeria were active in the colony. I85 A despairing Harry Pollitt had to stress in a letter to
Nigeria that no-one returning to that country from Britain had the authority to speak for
the CPGB, after several individuals implied CP recognition for their various
organisations. Dutt reinforced this message by stressing that recognition would be
conditional upon the group agreeing a 'correct' Marxist analysis in line with the main
aspects of the CPGB's policies and programme. I86 Underlying these numerous divisions
however, the main split remained that between the two tribal groupings, the Yoruba and
the Igbo, who were judged to be offering 'opposite answers to the question of the future of
the CP of Nigeria.'187
Despite the CPGI3's relative success in recruiting Nigerian activists , like the British
authorities it was aware that these recruits were not continuing their involvement with
Marxist politics upon their return home, a fact which was confirmed in a report prepared
by Dafe following a fact-finding visit to Nigeria in 1
182 Eze was alleged to have personally profited from a scheme which allocated scholarships to East
Germany. Although he was acquitted of any wrongdoing, the allegations damaged his standing with the
CPGB.
183 Draft Document, CP CENT INT 24, op.cit.
184 'The Dilemma of Imperialist Strategy in Nigeria', CP CENT INT 24, (CPGBA).
18 5 These included the Freedom Movement, which was set up in 1950; the League, established in February
1951; the United Working Peoples Party (UWPP), formed in July 1952 out of the Committee for Peoples'
Independence and the Convention Peoples Party.
186 'Marxist Groups in Nigeria, Box 134A, op.cit.
187 'The Weakness of the Trade Union Leadership', CP CENT/INT124, (CPGBA).
188 I. Dafe, Corrected Report on Visit to Nigeria, 27-5-53, Box 134A, (CPGBA).
.184
953 . 188 Furthermore, suspicions
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were raised within the Party with regard to the purity of the political ideas expressed by
some Nigerian members and the possibility that these views might be shared by long-
standing, trusted Party workers.I89
In a move to calm tensions, Barbara Ruhemann of the Africa Committee was appointed to
prepare a report on the political situation in Nigeria, but the report's conclusions 190 -
which dismissed the Action Group as an imperialist-backed organisation and condemned
Yoruba chiefs as a semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois compradore group - only inflamed
supporters of the E00. Grievances and rivalries continued to simmer throughout the
early 1950s and Desmond Buckle and Peter Blackman were among those who complained
to Party leaders over their cavalier treatment of Nigerian members. 191 Deteriorating
relations prompted the Party to reinstate the Nigerian branches and to establish a Nigerian
Commission in May 1953, in an effort to salvage the situation.192
Although the Commission's report i93 discounted some of the more serious accusations
levelled at the CPGB leadership, it ordered a revision of the Political Committee's
analysis of the Action Group and rebuked Dutt and Burns for their failure to resolve the
situation earlier. However, these conciliatory moves were not sufficient to heal the Party's
troubled relationship with its Nigerian members, the underlying cause of which lay with
the immature nature of Nigerian domestic politics. By 1956, the Party could still see no
189 It was alleged that two members of the Kensington branch, O.A. Bameshe - a founder member and one-
time secretary of the London branch of the Action Group - and his colleague, Emanual, had both expressed
'deviant' views and had claimed that Desmond Buckle shared these views. (Letter, unsigned to Rajani Palme
Dutt, 1-4-53, Box 134A, (CPGBA). Margo Parish warned that E.E. Obahiagbon, a self-declared Titoist,
was involved in organising fortnightly meetings on Marxism, which were attended by between thirty and
fourty people and chaired by Ade Thomas, a hitherto trusted Party worker. (Letter, Margo Parish to Palme
Dutt, n/d, Box 134A, (CPGBA). Members were also concerned that the WASU journal, WASU - a
publication with a widespread readership - was carrying the same line on Nigeria.
19 The report was presented to the International Department and the Political Committee in June 1952,
191 Both I. Dodiye and Bameshe resigned amid accusations that the CPGB leadership exhibited a
chauvinistic and autocratic attitude towards the Party's African members. Dutt was attacked for his
continued support of the NCNC. Rajani Palme Dutt, 'People of Nigeria Rise in Struggle for Freedom', from
For a Lasting Peace. For a People' Democracy, 9-1-53, Box 134A, (CPGBA).
192 This body, which consisted of Palme Dutt, Idris Cox, Barbara Ruhemann, Emile Burns and J.R.
Campbell, did not contain any Nigerian members, their role being limited to a consultative one. Nigerian
Commission, 3-6-53, Box 134A, (GPGBA).
193 The body presented its report in 1954.
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sign that Marxist elements in the colony had 'reached a clear political outlook and
programme which can form the basis for an organised CP.' 194 Uniting the various
factions behind such a programme remained the responsibility of the CPGB, however, and
in March of that year, Dutt pleaded in vain to the CPSU for help in solving the matter.195
Conclusion
After 1947, Britain's economic position deteriorated further as her dollar debt grew,
triggering an intensification of exploitation in her colonies, especially the African
territories, where 'development' was the euphemism employed to justify the process. At
the same time, constitutional reforms were being used as a device to quieten demands for
freedom and to promote elements friendly to British interests. During these years, the
only significant section of the British left to critically assess and monitor these
developments was the CPGB. Clearly, Cold War perceptions of sub-Saharan Africa as a
bolster for British and US economic and strategic goals, together with evidence of the
evolving consciousness of the African peoples, encouraged Communists to take a greater
interest in developments on that continent. Thus, whereas the Party had said little to
suggest that it had major misgivings about Labour's African policies before Cold War
attitudes hardened in the summer of 1947, it fell in line with Soviet policy and resumed
sustained attacks upon the colonial policies of the British Labour Government after the
Cominform was set up in October of that year.
Many on the left of the labour movement accepted Labour claims that its colonial
programme would bring progress to the colonial peoples - Arthur Creech Jones, for
example, perceived it to be an enlightened course - others were prepared to support the
policy for the benefits it brought to the domestic economy. This enabled Communists to
gain a measure of credit with those colonial nationalists who had invested great hopes in a
194 Nigerian Report, January 1956, CP CENT INT 24, (CPGBA). Despite a claim by the Party in July
1954 that conditions in Nigeria were conducive to the development of a cohesive Marxist party able to lead
a united anti-imperialist front. World News and Views, July 1954, nos.32 3, pp.630-633, pp.649-652.
195 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.259.
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Labour Government only to feel betrayed when their expectations were not met. British
Communists attempted to build on this confidence in their efforts to win support amongst
African and West Indian political activists in Britain and the colonies.
The CPGB's work in establishing links with radicals in the African and West Indian
colonies was impeded by the rise of anti-Communist paranoia, which regarded all
liberation movements in the colonies as part of a Communist conspiracy. This greatly
added to the general repressive atmosphere in which they were forced to operate and led
to tighter restrictions on the publication and distribution of Communist literature in the
colonies, which obstructed the dissemination of communist ideas. However, the main
problem in establishing the Party in Africa, where the time for organisation was believed
to be 'over-ripe', I96 remained the low level of modem class development. Nationalist
movements were developing rapidly throughout the region, but lacked a central guiding
force - this was particularly seen to be the case in Kenya, the Gold Coast and Nigeria.
Simultaneously, British communists were having to compete with a more radical form of
Pan-Africanism which dismissed the 'narrow confines of class' 197 intrinsic to communist
doctrine and regarded conventional white-dominated politics with suspicion. One
implication for the CPGB of this growing self-confidence was increasing criticism that
the Party was not fully addressing the interests and concerns of its African and West
Indian members. In fact, the Party's analysis gave key importance to the recruitment and
political education of Africans in Britain -just as Indian groups in Britain had been of
great significance during the 1920s and 1930s, the same was true of Africans in the 1950s.
But, given the greenness of the political movement in Africa, this was not an easy task. In
the case of Nigerian politics for example, the British Party was faced with a number of
embryonic political movements claiming Communist authenticity but unable to surmount
entrenched tribal divisions. Despite the Party's failures however, many appreciated its
fundamental anti-imperialist and anti-racist credentials. As one colonial member
196 James Klugmann, Minutes of a Political Committee Meeting, 7-5-53, CP CENT/PC 02/15, (CPGBA).
197 G. Padmore, op,cit., p.379.
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explained to Trevor Carter; 'I stayed in the CP because I disagreed with those who
claimed that the racism of the left was an inherent feature of their attitudes.'198
198 Trevor Carter, op.cit., p.62.
264
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of early British Socialists tended
to base their objections to Empire on the Radical approach to imperialism; essentially a
mix of humanitarian concern for the exploited peoples and a consideration of British
interests. The absence of a theoretical spine in the debate surrounding the colonial
Empire allowed for the expression of views which were all too prevalent in a nation
accustomed to ruling over two thirds of the earth. When commenting upon colonial
issues, even some leading figures on the left exhibited attitudes which were paternalistic,
chauvinistic and at times, racist.
Following the formation of the CPGB in 1920/21 however, an alternative anti-imperialist
discourse was introduced on the British political left. The new Party received instruction
on Lenin's dynamic analysis which, in identifying the time as ripe for revolutionary
socialism, positioned anti-imperialism at the centre of Communist doctrine and stationed
the colonial liberation struggle in the front line of the war against international capitalism.
It was the clear and uncompromising nature of Lenin's theory of imperialism which, when
contrasted with the position adopted by the Labour leadership whilst in office, enabled
Communist ideas to gain ascendency on the left in Britain, most notably within the ILP.
This same analysis included a practical strategy of action through which to implement the
theory - including temporary tactical alliances with the colonial national bourgeoisie and
the non-Communist left and the utilisation of struggles for colonial independence in the
advance towards international Socialism. It was in the conversion of theory into practice
that complications arose, however. The Comintern itself was divided on the issue of
collaboration with the national bourgeoisie for example, while the essential expediency of
a policy which pursued alliances with nationalist leaders in order eventually to overthrow
them and supported nationalist causes as a means of ultimately rendering nations obselete,
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was almost certain to engender mutual distrust and suspicion. These problems were
compounded by an increasing tendency within the Communist movement to regard the
advancement of the international revolution as an extension of Soviet interests.
When the CPGB, a minor player on the domestic political stage, was assigned the core
task of nurturing colonial liberation movements within the British Empire, it was able to
call on the knowledge and commitment of a small group of members with a special
interest in colonial issues. These activists were instrumental in the establishment and
operation of various anti-colonial initiatives within Britain, they ensured that the Party
kept up a steady stream of criticism of successive British governments' colonial policies
and worked to spread Communist ideas among Indian and African students studying at
British universities, many of whom went on to occupy leading positions in post-
independent India.
British Communists played a significant role in conceiving and convening the Brussels
Congress - a highly successful initiative which provided an important point of contact
between colonial nationalists and sympathetic Western opinion, exposing each to the
ideas and aspirations of one another and establishing the basis for future co-operation.
Together with Reginald Bridgeman - who, whilst not a CPGB member, was a loyal
'fellow traveller' - the Communists formed the bedrock of the British LAI. This
organisation was the most effective of the national sections, despite its repudiation by the
leadership of the labour movement for its Communist connections. The League
campaigned for Indian independence and the recognition of China's nationalist
government, it championed the democratic rights and civil liberties of all colonial peoples
and worked to expose racism in Britain and elsewhere. As the organisation which arose
from the Brussels Congress, it was able to utilise the connections made there and
provided a useful contact point and support for African and Asian nationalists in Britain.
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Despite early hopes that the League would develop into a mass anti-imperialist
movement, the organisation rapidly fell victim to a number of problems, the most
damaging of which were the unrelenting hostility of the leadership of the LSI and the
change in Comintern policy from 1928-1934, though it has to be added that interest in
colonial issues within European labour movements was minimal. As with earlier British
initiatives, these factors, together with the Party's small and over-worked membership, set
severe limitis on what could be achieved. The League, a child of the united front period,
failed to realise the potential it had promised immediately after the Brussels Congress; the
trust and goodwill it had built up destroyed by sectarianism.
From the mid-1920s, the CPGB provided emissaries to assist in the formation of Workers'
and Peasants' Parties and in the organisation of Indian labour. This was done so ably that
the Indian authorities, fearful of an alliance between Communists and radical nationalists,
constructed the Meerut trial in an effort to halt their progress within the labour movement
and sour their relationship with the nationalist left. Although the arrest and subsequent
trial of the leading activists constituted a setback to the Indian revolutionary movement,
the overall effect was not as the authorities anticipated. Much sympathy was generated
for the defendents in India, where Nehru championed their cause and in Britain, where the
campaign for their defence and later release included many non-Communists. In a final
irony, the trial proceedings provided valuable publicity for the activists and their ideas.
Greater damage was effected by the Comintern's sectarian line which dissolved the WPPs,
split the Indian trade union movement and the Meerut campaign and excluded Indian
communists from the INC's great civil disobedience movement.
The adoption of the ultra-left line also threatened the CPGB's relationship with Indian
nationalists - the Party pursued a consistent policy of co-operation with bourgeois
nationalists based on their own analysis of the Indian situation until 1928, when the
colonial bourgeoisie were denounced by the Comintern and the CPGB's analysis was
condemned. It appears that the Party reacted by restricting its public comment on Indian
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affairs during the class-against-class period in an attempt to softened the impact of
Communist attacks upon Nehru and the Congress left, who were still regarded by Dutt as
potential allies. From the mid-1930s, the popular front eased the ban on cooperation with
the bourgeois nationalists allowing Dutt and others in the British Party the opportunity to
repair relations at a time when Nehru was warming to Communist ideas. It was a task
made all the more difficult by the reluctance of the CPI to abandon sectarian views but, as
Moscow became increasingly absorbed by the political situation in Europe, the British
Party was given greater freedom to guide the CPI towards a more concilitatory attitude to
the nationalists. It was the prioritising of the fight against fascism which caused support
of colonial liberation struggles to be held in abeyance however, and cost the Communist
movement the support of some of its leading black activists.
The Comintern had begun to target black activists from the late 1920s, in the belief that
the economic depression would have a politicising effect upon the peoples of Africa and
the West Indies. But if India represented an example of a mature nationalist rebellion
within the British Empire, the opposite extreme in terms of political maturity was the case
in Africa. Although there was Communist activity in north and, especially, in South
Africa - the CPGB had established links with groups in both areas - Communists had little
practical involvement with sub-Saharan Africa during the inter-war years, confining
themselves mainly to propaganda and agitation in Britain, because a base for action in any
of the African colonies simply did not exist at that time. By the mid-1930s, a small
educated class had emerged in the urban centres and the first stirrings of labour unrest was
evident, but even at this stage, the discontent did not assume a political character.
The LAI played an important part in reaching out to the international black community,
acting as a contact point for African and West Indian nationalists in Britain, offering
practical help and campaigning on land rights in Africa and workers and civil rights in the
colonies and among the black diaspora. Once again the Communist movement's change
of emphasis from international revolution to popular front against fascism affected the
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presentation and content of this work. The sacrifice of initiatives such as the ITUCNW,
together with the repercussions of the Abyssinian invasion, caused some leading black
activists to break with the Communists and turn instead to Pan-Africanism, although this
did not signify a rejection of Marxist ideas in the case of the most famous of them -
George Padmore. It was a situation which caused problems for the CPGB, already
constrained in its efforts to recruit African and West Indian members by the relatively
small pool of black political activists in Britain, but the Party continued to pursue its work
in this area and was perhaps more effective in doing so, once the sectarianism of the Third
Period was abandoned. During the 1930s, the Communist-controlled NWA obtained a
degree of co-operation with other black organisations in Britain, such as the WASU, the
IASB and even the moderate LCP. Communists worked through the SMM, the Colonial
Seamen's Union and the CDA in Britain's ports to represent the rights of those colonial
seamen who had settled in Britain and their families. The Party had supporters among the
West African student leadership of WASU and, although limited by a lack of established
contacts in the African colonies, developed contact with activists in Trinidad and Jamaica,
working within the CWIA in Britain on behalf of the West Indian people.
During the inter-war years, the CPGB was the Comintern's main link with the British
colonies and semi-colonies. It campaigned and agitated for colonial causes, disseminated
anti-colonial propaganda, formed and worked with existing pressure groups and worked
to establish a mass movement against imperialism. It provided theoretical guidance and,
in the case of India in particular, practical help in organising colonial workers. Following
the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on the Allied side in 1941, however, the
encouragement of colonial revolution was no longer compatible with Soviet foreign
policy aims. Increasingly, though imperceptibly at first, the emphasis was on national
Communism, and the dissolution of the Comintern itself, in 1943, soon came to be seen
as a step in that direction. Colonial self-determination was presented in terms of a spur to
enjoin the fight against fascism, though not, it was stressed, as a condition for the colonial
peoples participation in the anti-fascist front.
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The war inevitably made contact with activists in the British colonies more difficult for
the CPGB, though informal contact was maintained through individual members serving
with the British armed forces abroad. The distribution of literature to the colonies was
also disrupted, although after June 1941, there was less coverage of colonial issues in the
Communist press and that which was printed was less provocative. For example, in
January 1942, Desmond Buckle welcomed as 'imaginative' a Government report on
labour conditions in West Africa by Major Orde Brown.' Later that year he wrote that
'The peoples of Africa, and the West Indies, of Ceylon and other colonies are our allies
both in destroying fascism and in building a world free from war.' 2 This contrasted with
Michael Carritt's December 1940 dismissal of a Ministry of Information poster describing
the peoples of the Empire as Britain's proud allies as, jingo trash'. 3 There is evidence
however that the CP were aware of the inadequacy of the British Government's reponse to
economic problems in the colonies at this time - when reviewing a report on Welfare and
Development by Sir Frank Stockdale4 Buckle claimed the scheme had only 'nibbled at the
periphery' of the task.5
In contrast, Dutt used Labour Monthly to put forward a generally sympathetic line
towards the aims of Congress, a policy which helped to ameliorate the effect of the CPI's
overzealous prosecution of pro-war directives in the face of Congress' intensification of
the independence campaign. Whilst the CPGB managed to retain its own theory and
policy on the Indian bourgeoisie up to and after Indian independence despite pressure
from Moscow, at the same time the Party's attempts to court the Congress left were
repeatedly frustrated by elements of the CPI who insisted on following a separate path
despite pleas from Dutt; at first adhering strictly to Comintern dictates, and later
1 Desmond Buckle, 'West African Worker', in World News and Views, Vol. 22, No. 3, 17-1-42, p.46.
2 Desmond Buckle, 'Colonial Policy', in World News and Views, Vol. 22, No. 50, 12-12-42, p.477.
3 M ichael  Carritt, 'Allies - and Proud of it', in World News and Views, Vol. 20, No. 50, 14-12-40, p.718.
4 Stockdale was Comptroller for Welfare and Development in the West Indies.
5 Desmond Buckle, Welfare and Development in the West Indies', in World News and Views, Vol. 23,
No. 17, 24-4-43, p.132.
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following a Maoist line. The evidence would suggest that, in this instance at least, both
the national and the colonial parties enjoyed a degree of autonomy in their relationship
with the centre.
The election of a Labour Government in 1945 prompted the CPGB to restrict its criticism
of foreign and colonial policy until 1947, by which time Cold War developments had
ended any illusions of a continuing post-war alliance between the Soviet Union and the
Western Allies. Although Communists grew increasingly concerned at the Attlee
Government's eagerness to maintain Britain's world role and the nature of Britain's
relationship with the US, the CPGB's criticism of colonial policy was particularly muted
during this period. It is unlikely that this quiescence occurred through ignorance of the
effects of British policies on the colonies6 rather that the Party chose not to refer to these
through a desire to give the benefit of all doubt to the British Labour Government and in
the belief that the spirit of co-operation between the leading powers which was projected
at the end of the war would continue. In this sense, the CPGB's policies both pre- and
post-1947 were ultimately determined by Soviet foreign policy.
After 1947 the CPGB operated in an oppositional role to the Labour Government on
colonial issues, scrutinising colonial policy and publicising what they claimed to be the
introduction of bogus constitutions as a means of perpetuating British control and the use
of 'colonial emergencies' to counter 'undesirable' nationalist forces - many of which, as in
the case of Malaya, were Communist-led. The Party was the only significant organised
political grouping in Britain to expose, albeit belatedly, the exploitation inherent in
Labour's Welfare and Development policy for Africa, a programme which was welcomed
as the African peoples' path to progress by significant sections of the left.
6 The E.C.'s Colonial Resolution of December 1946 accused the Labour Government of seeking 'new
forms and relationships adaptable to new situations, but retaining the old essence of exploitation'. See 'The
Colonial Resolution', in World News and Views, Vol.26, No. 49, 7-12-46.
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The Communists' role in highlighting the manipulative nature of Labour's colonial
policies enhanced their standing among colonial nationalists, many of whom, encouraged
in their struggles by evidence from the Second World War that the imperialist powers
were not invincible, were looking with interest to Soviet methods of modernisation
through state control. Despite this goodwill, the Party's post-war efforts to recruit
Africans and West Indians studying and working in Britain were hampered both by the
Cold War ideology, which had an impact on all sections of society and the rise of a more
militant form of Pan-Africanism, especially visible from the 1945 Pan-African
Conference, whose adherents tended to dismiss Communism as operating on a par with
other white imperialisms.
Nevertheless, the Party intensified its colonial work at this point - this was especially true
in regard to Britain's African territories which, it claimed, had acquired the status of the
'new Eldorado' 7 for Western capitalism. Two Conferences of the Colonial Parties of the
British Empire were held in 1947 (We Speak For Freedom) and 1954 (Allies For
Freedom) - which, in line with the Cold War preoccupations of the Soviet Union,
emphasised the importance of peaces for the advancement of colonial liberation
movements9 - and an International Affairs Committee was set up by the International
Department to address matters of policy.') CPGB members strove to build the Party
among black communities in Britain and received some support, boosted to a degree by
7 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit, p.237.
8 Specifically, Britain's withdrawal from NATO and support of nuclear disarmament.
9 CP CENT PC 02121, Proposals to the Political Committee on the Conference of Empire Parties, 16-11-
52, (CPGBA).
W This Committee consisted of nine sub-committees covering: the West Indies, India, Africa, the Far
East, the Middle East, Malaya, South Africa, the Irish Committee and the Jewish Committee. A number of
these were involved in wider forms of organisation - the Caribbean Labour Congress, which produced
Caribbean News; the Lee Tian Tai Committee, whose journal was the Malayan Monitor; a number of
Middle Eastern student organisations, who co-operated in compiling Middle East Today; the Connolly
Association, which published the Irish Democrat and the Africa Committee, which published the African 
Digest and the African Newsletter from 1947-54. (CP CENT PC 02 15, International Department Report to
Political Committee, op.cit.; See also H. Adi, 'West Africans and the Communist Party in the 1950s', in N.
Fishman (ed.), Opening The Books, 1994,) The International Department was directly responsible for
contacts with Egyptians, Iraqis and Sudanese and in addition shared joint responsibility for the organisation
and education of groups of colonials from Ceylon, India, the West Indies and Nigeria with the London
Colonial Advisory Committee. CP CENT PC 02 15, International Department Report to Political
Committee, op.cit.
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their record on opposing racism in Britain. But while the Party's greatest success was in
its work with West African students and Nigerians in particular, the low level of political
and social development in the region made substantial progress in these colonies
extremely difficult.
The CPGB's post-war analysis of the colonial question was set out in its 1951 manifesto,
The British Road to Socialism, a title which reflected the fact that the Communist
movement now believed that there were various roads to Socialism based on different
national conditions, including the Parliamentary road. The document's call for a 'close
fraternal association' based on equality and mutual interest, between a Socialist Britain
free from US control and her former colonies (which were also expected to be under
Socialist rule)," upset some colonial members who regarded it as too close to the
Socialist Commonwealth idea, 'upon which the Party had previously heaped sconi1.12
This was indicative of the problems which the Party faced in shaping a new strategy to
meet the changing world conditions in the absence of any guidance from the centre.13
During the inter-war years, Communist propaganda had demanded the complete and
unconditional independence of all colonial territories and Communist parties concentrated
on the tactics of how that independence could be achieved, with little consideration of
how the colonies would survive as independent states." Padmore said of the CPGB in
the early 1950s that they were still 'spouting the old party clap-trap of the inter-war years,
that only "the proletarian vanguard can liberate Africa." 15 But it was during this decade
11 CP CENT 1NT/24, Document, n d, n t, (CPGBA).
12 Trevor Carter, op.cit., p.60. Dull had warned in 1948 against adopting a perspective which promoted
the idea of 'a specific future economic-political grouping' which would replace the existing Empire, on the
grounds that it could cause colonial nationalists to question the CPGB's commitment to a programme of full
liberation. (Rajani Palme Dull, Notes for 'The Crisis of the British Empire' article, subsequently published
in World News and Views, 6-11-48, International Department Files, Box 2, (CPGBA). In the event, Dull
suppressed his doubts and supported the manifesto, at least until after the death of Stalin - the document's
schematist. See John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.241.
13 John Callaghan, 1993, op.cit., p.256.
14 There were exceptions of course, see Hugo Rathbone, 'The Problem of African Independence', in
Labour Monthly, Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1936, pp.161-172 and No.4, April 1936, pp.237-269.
15 G. Padmore, op.cit., p.340.
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that Communists began to address the specific problems of each territory. The Soviet
Government moved to improve its contacts with African nationalist leaders through
international events arranged by sympathetic organisations - the rehabilitation of the idea
of the national bourgeoisie's progressive role was significant here - and gained some
insight into the faults in their analyses through these contacts.16
The CPGB itself was examining problems caused by the imposition of artificial
boundaries, of nationality and nations, as well as the question of what constitutes a nation
and the issue of African consciousness. But, while accepting that there were differences
between specific colonies, Communists continued to argue that it was always the ruling-
class of the colonial power which derived economic or strategic advantage - despite the
uneven development of the liberation movements and the varied character of the demands
being made, 'all of them enter into the general stream of the fight against imperialism:17
The numerically tiny CPGB, operating for the most part in an unsympathetic domestic
climate, faced insurmountable problems in its attempts to carry out the mammoth task of
leading the fight against imperialism in the British Empire. The endeavour was burdened
from the outset by Lenin's harnessing of two fundamentally antithetical creeds -
nationalism and internationalism - in the anti-imperialist struggle and the ever closer
identification of the Communist movement with the Soviet state. But despite such shaky
foundations, the Party's record on anti-colonialism was one which compared favourably
with all other political parties on the left in Britain.
The Party press constantly carried reports on conditions in the Empire-Commonwealth
and articles on colonial issues by its own experts, it provided practical help to colonial
nationalists, organised public meetings, raised funds to help colonial causes, instituted
and participated in numerous demonstrations, vigils and deputations. It supplied books
16 The Third World increasingly held the best hope for communist advance as, following the debunking
of the Stalin myth in February 1956, European communism came under increasing strain.
17 CP CENT PC 02 14, International Department Report, April 1953, (CPGBA).
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and pamphlets to colonial trade union and nationalist organisations, launched campaigns
for public action, championed the rights and civil liberties of colonial peoples and
provided legal services to trade unionists and nationalist leaders under arrest in Africa,
Asia and the Middle East. Party activities spanned Africa, the Middle East, the Far East,
and the West Indies.
The CPGB has been accused of a lack of enthusiasm for its anti-imperialist role and of
chauvinist tendencies in its treatment of its colonial allies and it is doubtless true that, as
in any organisation, evidence - anecdotal or otherwise - exists to support these claims.
But it is also the case that the Party initiated frequent discussions on the colonial question,
often indulging in sharp self-criticism and making genuine efforts to improve its
members' performance in this area. Key individuals devoted the better part of their lives
to this work, often at personal risk. The frequency with which colonial issues came before
the Central Committee also testifies to the seriousness with which this work was
conducted. In addition, the Party campaigned against racial discrimination in Britain and
fought for the rights of black workers and their families based in this country; it
persistently pricked the conscience of the non-Communist left and helped to raise the
awareness of the labour movement on a range of colonial issues. It was a record
recognised by national leaders in many countries in Africa, Asia and the West Indies,
who, while they did not embrace Communism, acknowledged the part which the CP had
played in their political development.
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APPENDIX I
The LAI and the Social Democrats
That ILP members maintained their collaboration with the League despite an escalating
campaign of vilification during the ultra-left period, is a testiment to the importance these
individuals attached to colonial nationalist support of the organisation. From the
inaugural meeting of the British section, Brockway made a number of representations on
behalf of the League to the Socialist International. In a letter to the LSI secretary,
Friedrich Adler, in April 1927, he explained the reasons for ILP representation at the
Brussels Congress and asked if the Party would be in breach of the LSI's constitution if it
affiliated with the League Against Imperialism. The communication made light of the
Communists' role in the Congress, stressing the involvement of the colonial nationalist
parties.'
Adler replied that the matter would be referred to the Executive Committee of the LSI for
a ruling, but if it was decided that the Second International should collaborate, 'we must in
my view make conditions which would give us influence in such a League corresponding
to the importance of our International, which, with its seven million members, would be
by far the strongest organisation to come into consideration at all'. 2 It was an answer
guaranteed to intensify Communist distrust of the Social Democrats' motives.
Brockway continued to defend the League against allegations of Communist
manipulation throughout the summer of 1927. During a meeting convened on 21st July to
consider the formation of an Advisory Committee, he reported that the Provisional
Committee had investigated these allegations and found them to be baseless. He pointed
out that of the LAI's nine-member E.C., only two were CP members and further claimed
i	 ID CI 36/5iv, Letter, Fenner Brockway to Friedrich Adler, 8-4-27, (LPA).
2 ID CI 36/51v, Letter, Friedrich Adler to Fenner Brockway, 13-4-27, (LPA).
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that only £30 out of a total of £1,780 contributed to the Brussels Congress had emanated
from an organisation with Communist associations, namely the W.I.R.3
Following the International League's E.C. meeting in Cologne during August 1927, at
which Brockway replaced Lansbury as International chair, he again wrote to Adler,
enclosing a letter from Gibarti declaring that the LAI was 'absolutely independent,
financially and morally, from any party or government'. 4 When the issue was finally
debated by the LSI the following month, Brockway attended to plead the case for
affiliation. He was pitted against William Gillies, secretary of the British arm of the LSI,
who complained that whilst the British Labour Party and TUC had received an invitation
to the Brussels Congress, the Second International and International Federation of Trade
Unions had not. This had fuelled suspicions that Congress organisers were attempting to
split the international socialist movement. Moreover, as the Congress had no basis of
representation, the Labour Party's representative would carry no more authority than any
individual invited by the organisation to participate.
The LSI's subsequent rejection of the League had an immediate effect upon the British
Section. Brockway, forced to choose between his position on the LSI's Executive and his
chairmanship of the National and International L.A.!., relinquished the latter posts. There
was some compensation in the decision of James Maxton to assume the vacated posts and
of Ellen Wilkinson and Father Conrad Noel to join the League's EC, but by the end of
1927, Colonel Malone and Ernest Thurtle had both resigned their membership as it
became increasingly difficult for socialists to participate in both organisations
simultaneously.
3 According to Haikel, Munzenberg asked the Comintern to contribute at least a third of the estimated
15,000 dollars cost of the Congress, agreeing that the WIR should provide the rest from its own resources,
Despite Comintern agreement, the money had still not been transferred three days before the Congress
opened. M. Haikel, op.cit., p.26.
4 ID Cl 36 5vi, Letter, Louis Gibarti to Fenner Brockway, 21-8-27, (LPA).
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The end of any significant Social Democratic involvement in the League was signalled at
the Frankfurt Congress, where the most vitriolic offensive was directed at James Maxton,
the only remaining leading British socialist to occupy a post on the International LAI's
ruling body. 5 At the close of that Congress, Maxton was pressured into replying to the
attacks by distancing himself from what he agreed was the imperialist policy of the
Labour Government and the reformist tendency within the ILP. But this did not satisfy
his critics within the League, who urged him to utilize the pages of New Leader to
promote their views.
On September 3rd., 1929, the League's London District Committee passed a resolution
demanding that 'Comrade Maxton should make his position clear'. 6 This was followed by
a telegram agreed at the E.C. meeting of the British Section held on 10th. September,
1929 - which Maxton did not attend - asking him to publish his Congress speech in New
Leader immediately. The beleaguered Maxton replied with the single word, 'Nor and
subsequently asserted that he had no intention of being 'bullied, harassed and pestered as
to his times and methods, by which he should express himself,7.
At the ensuing E.C. meeting - which Maxton refused to attend - the following resolution
was passed : 'In view of his refusal to carry out the League's work according to the
decisions of the E.C. of the British Section, James Maxton should be expelled from
membership of the League Against Imperialism'. 8 Maxton, who was on holiday with his
family in Largs when he received the news, 9 retaliated by printing a report in the
September 27th. edition of New Leader, which described the expulsion as 'final proof of
the impossibility of working with Communists, while they remain in their present state of
mind, except upon terms of absolute subservience to their narrow and stupid ukasses'.1°
5	 B. Gross, op.cit., p.195.
6 ID CI 36 33, Report of the Annual Conference of the League Against Imperialism, British Section,
February 1931, p.9, (LPA).
7	 Ibid.
8	 Ibid.
9	 J. McNair, op.cit., p.184.
10 International Information, Vol.VI, No.5, 9-10-29, p.23, ID/CI 36/28iii, (LPA).
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The expulsion, and the campaign against social democrats which accompanied it, tended
only to lend credence to an earlier warning by the LSI that the communists would use
individual socialists and 'after they had done what was required of them, they could go,
and take with them as thanks a flood of insults'."
" international Information, Vol.VI, No.28, 20-7-29, p.301, ID Cl/36/18, (LPA).
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APPENDIX II
THE OFFICIAL LIST OF OFFICERS ELECTED AND DELEGATES IN
ATTENDANCE AT THE BRUSSELS CONGRESS
The General Council - Professor Albert Einstein, Germany; Henri Barbusse, France;
Mme. Sun Yat Sen, China; General Lu Dshung Lin, China.
The Executive Committee - George Lansbury M.P.., (president); Edo Fimmen, General
Secretary of the International Transport Workers' Union, (vice-president); Mohamed
Hatta, President of the National Party of Indonesia; Liau Hansin, KMT, Central Executive
Committee of China; Dr. Marteaux, member of the Belgian Chamber; Willi Munzenberg,
Member of the German Reichstag; Jawaharlal Nehru, Executive member of the INC;
Lamine Senghor, president of the Committee for the Defence of the Negro Race; Manuel
Ugarte, National Party of Porto Rico.
Ordinary Members - Chen Kuen, Central Council of All-China Unions; Professor
Kyomeng You, National University of Peking; Sen Katajama, Japan; F. Martinez, Union
cartel Tampico; Julio A. Mella, Peasants' Association of Mexico; Jose Vasconcellor,
National Party of Porto Rico; A. Alminiana, Society for the Independence of the
Phillipines; Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey, chair of the Egyptian National Party; Messali
I Iadj, North African Star; Daniel Colraine, South African T.U.C.; A. Semaon, Indonesia;
Kin Fan Ling, Korea; Roger Baldwin, Civil Liberties Union, New York; Manuel Gomez,
secretary of the Anti-Imperialist League, Chicago; Fenner Brockway, secretary of the
Independent Labour Party; S.O. Davies, Miners Federation of Great Britain; Harry Pollitt,
English National Minority Movement; Reginald Bridgeman, secretary of the British
League Against Colonial Oppression; S. Saklatvala M.P., Great Britain; Henriette
Roland-Holst, writer, Holland; Georges Gerard, secretary of the League Against Colonial
Oppression, Brussels; Paul Henri Spaak, editor; Charles Plisnier, Belgium; Victorio Verri,
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journalist; Giudo Miglioloi M.P., Italy; I Ienri Barbusse, writer; Madame Duchesne, vice-
president of the International Womens' League for Peace and Freedom; Albert Fournier,
member of the Chamber; Leon Vernochet, International Association of Education
Workers, France; Professor Theodor Lessing, Professor Alfons Goldschmidt; Georg
Ledebour, chair of the Socialist Federation; Frau Dr. Helen Stoecker, German Peace
Congress; Professor Nejedly, Czecheslovakia; L. Gibarti, general secretary, LACO.
Delegates to Congress
China:
General Lu Dschung Lin, Canton army; Chen Kuen, Central Executive of Chinese
Unions; Liau Hansin, KMT Executive Committee; Professor Kyomeng You, National
University of Peking; Hsuiung Kwang Suen, KMT Government; Henri Tchai, Chamber of
Trade, Canton; General Schao Li Tse, Revolutionary Army; Chao Ting Chi, Sun Yat Sen,
Union of America; Siao Tchen Hoin, Chinese Workers' Association, France; Han Tianso
Kie, Li Sun Ching, KMT, Holland; Tsan Wei Ming, KMT Billencourt; Vu Pas Y,
Chinese Students' Union, Charleroi; Li Kone Tsai, Machine Workers Union, Canton and
Canton Union Cartel; Koe Yang Tong, Principal Association of Chinese Students,
Germany; Li Ping Hen, Paris; Tang King Pei, KMT, England; Y.S. Hsieh, KMT,
Germany; Sia Ting, KMT, Central Europe; Wang Chou, KMT, Central Europe; Li Wen
Pey, Defence Committee for the Rights of the Chinese Race; Fan Koen Yuen, Office for
the Campaign against Unequal Contracts, Belgium; Wang Kie Kiang, Principal
Association of Chinese Students; Van Kien Tchevu, KMT; Koe, KMT, Belgium.
India:
J. Nehru, INC; Professor M. Barakatulla, Indian Freedom Party of America; V.
Chattopadhyaya, Association of Indian Journalists; J. Naidu, Association of Indians in
Central Europe; Bakar Ali Mirza, Indian Oxford Union; Tarini Sinha, Indian Office of the
ILP, London; A.C.N. Nambiar, Association of Indian Journalists.
America:
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Roger Baldwin, League for Human Rights and the Urban league; Manuel Gomez, Anti-
Imperialist League; Richard Moore, America Negro Workers' Congress and the Union for
the Advancement of the Negro; Martins, Patriotic League, Haiti; Angel Sotomayor,
Workers' Union of Cuba; M. Morales, Columbia; E. Rabines, Argentina; Victorio
Codevilla, Argentina; Charles Quijano, Venezuela; Haya de la Toree, Panama and Peru;
F. Martinez, Mexico; Jose Vasconcellos, Porto Pico; A. Alminiana, League for the
Independence of the Phillipines.
South and North Africa:
Messali Hadj, North African Star; Chadly Ben Mustapha, Tunis; I.A. La guma, Trade
Union Federation, South Africa; J.T. Gumede, South African National Congress; Daniel
Colraine, South Africa T.U.C.; Lamine Senghor, president of the Committee for the
Defence of the Negro Race.
Egypt:
Mohamed Ali Hafiz Ramadan Bey, president of the National Party of Egypt; Youssef,
National Radical Party.
French Antilles:
Danae Narcisse, Defence Committee of the Negro, (representing French Equatorial
Africa); Elie Bloncourt and Max Bloncourt and St. Jacques Camille, Inter-Colonial
Union.
Indochina:
Tramanchi, Indochina Union; Hoang Van Giu, Annamite Party for Independence; Van
Luc and Duong Van Giao, Constitutional Party and Dui Cong Trung, Young Annamite
Party.
Syria:
Mazhar Bakri and Haidar Mardam Bey, Syria-Palestinian Committee.
Palestine:
I. Itzchaki, Workers' Party of Palestine, (Poale Zion).
Persia:
Mortesa and Alavi, Achmed Assadoff, Republican-Revolutionary Party.
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Korea:Yiking Li, Korean Students' Union; Whang Wooli, Union of Writers and
Journalists of Korea;
Kolu Li, Kin Fa Ling.
Indonesia:
Semaon and Abdul Manaf, Indonesian Freedom Party; Nazir Pamontziak, Gatot and
Achmed Subardja, Indonesian Freedom Party; P. Bergsma and Mohammed Hatta, Union
of Indonesian National Parties.
France:
Henri Barbusse; Mme, Duchesne; Albert Fournier M.P.; A. Herclet, CGTU; Deloyer,
Vernochet and Kyriako, International of Education Workers; Ventadour, secretary of
LACO; Dutilleul, Levassort, C. Drevet, "Womens' Voice"; Semard.
Belgium:
Dr. Marteaux M.P.; Georges Gerard, secretary of LACO; Charles Plisnier; Paul-Henri
Spaak; Lejour Independent Union of Socialist Students; Liebaers and A. Geerts, Clothing
Workers' Union; Gouin Victor; Verspleht, Collot and Jolser, Socialist Union of Former
War-Participants; A. De Bevere. International of Conscientions Objectors; Frau Marceline
Hecquet, International for Cooperation; Pasted; Mackeuse; Van Overstraeten;
Driessehaert.
Germany:
Professor Alfons Goldschmidt; Professor Theodor Lessing, Dr. Fritz Sternberg; L.
Gibarti; With Munzenberg; Frau Dr. Goldschmidt; Frau Helene Stocker, George
Ledebour; Dr. Kurt Kersten; Gerhart Pohl; Paul Scholze; Lehmann-Lukas; Hans Jager;
Otto Lehmann - Russbuldt; Johann Resch, LACO; Dr. Meyer, Socialist Students
Federation; Erich Schirner, Union of Bank Employees; Georg Stolt, Imperial Union of
German Public Servants; Walter Stocker, Member of the Reichstag; Armin T. Wegener,
Conscientious Objectors; Otto Bachmann; Georg Duninghaus; Lucy Peters, LACO;
Magda Hoppstock-Huth, International Womens' League for Peace and Freedom; Arthur
Holitscher; Fritz Bach; Ernst Toller; Alfons Paquet. Karl August Wittfogel; Fritz Heckert,
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Member of The Reichstag; Fritz Schonherr; Putz, Member of the Reichstag; Koenen,
Member of the Reichstag; Rev. Fritze, Union of Religious Socialists.
Holland:
Edo Fimmen; Henriette Roland-Hoist; I. W. Kruyt; S. J. Rutgers; Han Van Walree;
Albert de Joug, Anti-Military Bureau; Muller Lehning; Wijnkoop; Schermerharn; Struyk;
Koch, Lackerfeld.
Italy:
Guido Miglioli, Member of the Chamber; Victorio Verri, Dr. D. Martini.
Switzerland:
Dr. Tobler; Willi Trostel.
Czecheslovakia:
Professor Nejedly; Lad. Beran.
Austria:
Dr. Leopold Katz; Frau Dr. Raissa Adler.
England:
The official list of British delegates were:
George Lansbury M.P.; Fenner Brockway; Renginald Bridgeman; Harry Pollitt; S. 0.
Davies; John Beckett M.P.; Mrs Beckett, Shapurji Saklatvala M.P.; Herbert W. Jones,
Society of Friends; Ellen Wilkinson M.P.; Helen Crawfurd, secretary of the British WIR;
Arthur MacManus, Chair of CPGB; Raymond W. Postgate, Plebs League and
International War Registers Union; Stokes, All-London Trades Council; James Crossley;
William Rust; M. Brown, Secretary of the Amsterdam T.U. International.
(see Rolf Italiaander, Schwarze Haut im Roten Griff, Dusseldorf, 1962, pp.27-31).
In addition to these, representatives from various colonial organisations in Britain were
also present, for example, the London Majlis, the Edinburgh Indian Students' Union and
Dr. K. S. Bhat of the Workers' Welfare League of India.
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